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Abstract: . 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse policy effects on the financial sector in India 
by modelling a flow of funds for four sectors with six financial instruments for the 
period of 1951-1993 with associated simulation techniques. In the general equilibrium 
model, the whole financial sector is endogenised by means of demand functions for 
asset choice in the four sectors and each financial market is solved by the market 
clearing conditions. 
An important innovation is that the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) is utilised 
for a system of demand function, and cointegration techniques are adapted into the 
econometric methodology. The policy simulation experiments are conducted with a 
view to analysing the delivery of loanable funds to sectors which are the most in need 
of poverty-reducing economic growth, at the same time, they are largely in line with 
the financial refonns that started in the early 1990s in India. The system-wide 
simulation designed in this thesis will pennit us to analyse a wide spectrum of policy 
effects on such issues as the determinant of interest rates, financing capital 
fonnulation, the role of financial institutions, government debt and allocation of credit, 
as a result of interactions in the disaggregated economic sectors. 
The key finding is the significant role of interest rates in portfolio selection and 
thereby on the flow of funds for India. The policy simulations, however, reveal that 
the liberalisation of interest rates may be no better than the administered rates in 
ensuring loans to private sectors. Possible perverse outcomes from the liberalised 
interest rate regime are also highlighted in the stochastic simulations, as policies 
become sensitive or fragile in the face of uncertainty in the economy. These 
demonstrate the importance of a gradual de-regulation in the financial sector, rather 
than an indiscriminate attempt at financial decontrol. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
A flow of funds in the financial sector arises from financial transactions among economic 
agents. These financial activities of an economy are then registered in a flow of funds 
account, which shows the flows of borrowing (i.e. sources) and lending (i.e. uses) of 
funds among disaggregated sectors for a certain financial instrument. There are two 
important aspects in a flow of funds study. One is that the non-financial activities that 
generate income and production are linked through each sector's net worth in the account, 
i.e. Net Acquisition of Financial Assets (NAF A) is equal to its excess of saving over 
consumption and capital expenditure. This interrelationship between financial and non-
financial conditions in the economy provides greater insight to identify the influences of 
financial market activities on the real economy or vice versa. The other aspect is 
disaggregation. Disaggregation is essential in empirical work, since the balance sheet and 
flow of funds data of different sectors clearly show marked differences with respect to 
their net wealth positions and the pattern of assets and liabilities. In the disaggregated 
financial markets across sectors, interest rates and financial stock and flows for the 
spectrum of assets emerge as a result of interactions between disaggregated sectors. This 
distinguishes a flow of funds analysis from the traditional macroeconomic models such as 
the textbook type of ISILM model, in which typically only money and one homogenous 
non-money asset are considered in an aggregated economy. It also departs from a simple 
term structure equation in determining interest rates. In this respect, the flow of funds 
accounts offer an excellent opportunity for the empirical study of financial sector 
development and thereby resource mobilisation (Green and Murinde, 1999 and Green, 
Murinde and Moore, 2002). 
The flow of funds model is potentially a fruitful approach for analysing developing 
economies, because their financial systems tend to be characterised by a range of 
restrictions such as administered interest rates, credit control and reserve requirements 
(Fry, 1995). The flow of funds framework is able to incorporate these developing 
country-specific features and contributes to identifying effective policies for encouraging 
poverty-reducing economic growth. Further, there is the favourable aspect of a flow of 
funds analysis for developing economies. In industrial economies, interest rates and 
prices play a major role for an efficient resource allocation providing much of the 
fundamental and timely information on the economy, to which the policy is directed. On 
the other hand, in developing economies where the markets are fragmented and strictly 
governed, in which interest rates and prices tend to be administered, interest rates do not 
particularly function as an equilibrium mechanism. In this case, the quantities in a flow 
of funds analysis would provide us with a more useful insight into the formation of 
economic policy (Green et al. 2002). 
However relatively few flow of funds studies have been done for developing countries. 
Modelling a flow of funds requires relatively detailed data. Therefore, the apparent 
impediment in developing countries is the limited or non-existent availability of data, 
particularly in the case of low-income developing countries. However, there does exist a 
comprehensive detailed presentation of flow data for India: The Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI) publishes from time to time the flow accounts in the Reserve Bank of India 
Bulletin. 
In this thesis, using the published flow accounts a flow of funds is constructed and used to 
conduct policy simulation experiments, in order to address the impact of government 
policy changes and financial reforms on the financial sector, and to investigate the 
appropriate policy instruments for financial development in India. The main intellectual 
foundation for this project was provided by Brainard and Tobin (1968): in the general 
equilibrium model, the whole financial sector is endogenised by means of demand 
functions for asset choice in the disaggregated sectors, and each financial market is solved 
by the market clearing condition. This is a complete flow of funds model in a consistent 
manner. 
In the thesis, the real sector is assumed to be exogenous and so the emphasis is on the 
development of the financial sector. Financial development is a necessary condition for 
the promotion of economic growth, (though it is not a sufficient condition), because as 
Copeland (1949) argues that financial sources are the cause of expenditures: it is the 
changes in credit flows, which alter total spending on goods and services, since without 
credit, aggregate expenditure is severely constrained. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) 
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are also great sympathizers with 'the role of financial deepening as a means of 
accelerating economic growth of developing countries' 1 • 
The methodology taken in our study has a number of following contributions. 
i) By treating the asset demand system as analogous to the consumer demand 
system, innovatively, the linear approximation of the Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS) of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) is utilised for a system of demand functions. 
Given that only annual data are available for India, our estimated model is a long-run 
equilibrium model, to which the AIDS provides data-coherent theoretical properties, 
satisfying axioms of rational choice. The AIDS is flexible in allowing us to include 
policy variables presenting subsistence level portfolios. The AIDS approach is a 
relatively new development in the field of flow of funds models. Therefore its application 
to a developing country, which has rarely been attempted, is a further contribution to the 
existing literature. 
ii) The application of the AIDS model is greatly motivated by the empirical work of 
BaIT and Cuthbertson (1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1992a, 1992b and 1994) for the portfolio 
behaviour for the UK, obtaining statistically and theoretically sensible results. This study 
however goes beyond the study of BaIT and Cuthbertson, because all the AIDS model for 
a single sector is consolidated to embody the whole financial sector for the simulation 
policy experiments. The empirical performance of such a complete flow of funds model 
is rare even for industrial economies; in many cases the study tends to stop at individual 
sectors. Covering a wide range of assets and considerable sectoral disaggration, such an 
undertaking is huge and therefore tends to discourage researchers (Green, 1982). 
iii) Our policy simulation experiments are expansionary in terms of delivering 
loanable funds to private sectors for economic activities. At the same time, this is largely 
in line with the de-regulation and liberalisation of the financial reforms that started in the 
early 1990s in India, such as removing the ceiling for interest rates, lowering reserve 
requirements and the disciplinary stance of fiscal deficit. Simulation quantifies the 
potency of policy instruments on the flows, hence it can give a clear picture of the 
channels through which policies may affect different sectors of the economy (Green et al. 
2002). Clear understanding of the outcomes of policy instruments is necessary for the re-
design of the financial reforms. The system-wide model designed in this thesis will 
I There has been, however, increasing dispute over the causation as to whether finance causes growth or 
vice versa (see for example, Sen, 2000). Yet, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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permit us to analyse the considerable spectrum of policy effects on such issues as the 
determinant of interest rates, financing capital formulation by firms, the role of financial 
institutions, government debt and the allocation of credit. 
iv) A flow of funds in India was modelled and simulated by Sen, Roy, Krishran and 
Mundlay (1996) using the published flow accounts for the period from 1970-71 to 1989-
90. The study was conducted in line with the stabilisation macroeconomic policy 
undertaken in the early 1990s in a simple general equilibrium framework. However, there 
are a number of limitations with their study. First, the sector study is confined in a 
specific manner; there are only two sectors of banking and household sectors with four 
financial assets, assuming financial flows in other sectors to be policy-determined. 
Second, the data is drawn from the flow accounts in an ad-hoc manner, largely neglecting 
the elements which can be determined by the behavioural equations. Third, the financial 
sector is not properly specified in the general equilibrium system, therefore market 
clearing identities are fragmented. Here, the approach is more extensive and consistent in 
scope. There are four sectors of banking, other financial institutions (OFIs), private 
corporate business (PCB) and household sectors with six financial assets, that are 
modelled for the period of 1951-52 to 1993-94. The data employed are the complete net 
transactions of uses and sources of funds, satisfying the market clearing conditions in a 
consistent manner. 
The thesis is organised in the following manner. 
In Chapter 2, the empirical literature on the demand functions for a flow of funds model is 
reviewed. This survey is aimed at addressing the main features of the different types of 
demand functions from both theoretical and empirical aspects, so that it will contribute to 
the building of a flow of funds model for developing economies. The survey 
demonstrates the difficulty in obtaining plausible estimates of interest rates on a priori 
grounds. The main cause is the heavy parameterisation giving rise to multicollinearity. 
The attraction of the AIDS in consumer demand theory is highlighted. 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the financial system and the compilation of the flow of funds 
matrix for India. After independence, financial markets had been functioning in a heavily 
regulated framework in India. In particular, regulations imposed on the banking sector 
such as administered interest rates and mandatory high reserve requirements are closely 
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associated with fiscal devices, and they have repressed financial development. Financial 
liberalisation started in the early 1990s, aimed at the de-regulation ofthe financial system. 
In section 3.1, the course of reforms and their effects on the financial markets are 
examined, versus their condition in the pre-reform period. This section has direct 
relevance to our interpretation of empirical results. In section 3.2, the India-specific 
property of the financial intermediaries is spelled out. In this section, a flow of funds 
matrix, which forms a foundation for econometric estimation, is compiled using the 
published flow data. The matrix gives important insights into how India's financial 
system functions. 
In Chapter 4, the data set, the AIDS model specification and econometric methodologies 
employed in the empirical analysis are described and justified. In section 4.1, a 
theoretical flow of funds model in a general equilibrium framework for India is presented, 
in which a number of behavioural equations and market clearing identities are identified. 
This is followed by the derivation of stock data for econometric estimation. In section 
4.2, the theoretical model, AIDS, is thoroughly examined. Since the data are potentially 
non-stationary, section 4.3 discusses cointegration techniques and emphasizes the role of 
cointegration identifying long-run, equilibrium relationships. 
The building blocks of a single sector study for a system-wide flow of funds are set up in 
Chapters 5 to 8, in which econometric estimation and results are presented for the four 
sectors. Asset shares are the dependent variables in the model with interest rates (or 
AIDS prices) as the principle explanatory variables, the system of estimations is estimated 
using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression technique. General to specific methodology, 
by enforcing theoretical restrictions, is employed for the long-run model in order to obtain 
economically plausible results with a view to attaining sensible simulation solutions in the 
subsequent chapters. In Chapter 5 the banking sector is modelled. The number of 
regulations imposed on this sector is an obstacle to modelling a portfolio behaviour for 
this sector. Despite this, the estimated model provided an intuitively plausible result. 
Modelling the PCB sector in Chapter 6 is equivalent to modelling the determinants of 
capital structure, since this sector is a deficit sector. The flow of funds approach to 
capital structure is distinguished from other empirical analyses of corporate finance, in 
that the capital structure is viewed as a macroeconomic rather than microeconomic 
problem. The OFIs sector consists of term lending institutions and investment institutions 
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and is modelled in Chapter 7. With substantial intra-transactions in this sector, in which 
many assets and liabilities cancel out, the sector is modelled in two ways: one is by using 
the data of net transactions (as with other sectors) and the other is by using the data of 
uses only (i.e. assets only). The result in the former is complemented by that of the latter. 
The novelty of the household sector study in Chapter 8 is that the demand for money is 
examined as an integral part of the portfolio behaviour in a system of equations rather 
than in an aggregate single equation framework. This allows us to examine the asset 
motive in the demand for money in a richer fashion, since the opportunity cost includes 
all the interest rates that are relevant to a flow of funds in the household sector. Overall, 
this single sector study highlights interest rates as being the principle determinant in asset 
choice, brings out a modest contribution to our understanding of the portfolio behaviour. 
In Chapter 9, 10 and 11, we implement policy simulation experiments by integrating the 
separate sectoral models (derived in the previous four chapters) and market clearing 
conditions. In Chapter 9, the financial constraints are relaxed in turn, to examine the 
channel in which a higher proportion of loanable funds is transferred to the non-financial 
private sectors. Evidence reveals that lowering the cash reserve ratio and removing the 
ceiling of deposit rates are the most preferable policies. The simulation experiments are 
extended in Chapter 10 by de-regulating the administered deposit rate. This is a further 
step toward a complete liberalisation of interest rates in India. It is however revealed that 
the de-regulated deposit rate is no better than the administered rates in terms of assuring 
the funds reaching the private sector. Stochastic simulation is conducted in Chapter 11, in 
which the sensitivity of policies is analysed in order to assess how robust policies are, in 
the face of uncertainty in the economy. In order to qualify the uncertainty, the results in 
this chapter are compared with those in Chapter 9 (that is, deterministic simulation). It 
turns out that the more interest rates are liberated, the more sensitive or fragile policies 
become. The financial system's fragility is related to particular forms of government 
interference in the financial sector, but these simulation experiments highlight the 
importance of a gradual transition to de-regulated interest rates, rather than an 
indiscriminate attempt at financial decontrol for India. 
The summary and the key policy implications drawn from the empirical analysis are found 
in Chapter 12, together with limitations and the area of promising research ideas. 
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Finally, the thesis may bear the following two prospects. First, although, it may be 
difficult to generalize results from one particular country, India's monetary controls and 
their effects share some common features with those of other developing countries. Thus, 
it is hoped that conclusions based on detailed flow of funds analysis ofIndia-specific data 
will be applicable (or at least will give guidance) to the formulation of macroeconomic 
and financial policies aimed at growth stimulation and poverty reduction in other 
developing economies, where data is too sparse for detailed and conclusive study. 
Second, given the difficulty of conducting a complete flow of funds analysis and the 
scarcity of empirical literature available, it is hoped that the thesis will be a potential 
foundation or catalyst for further flow of funds research. 
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Chapter 2 Survey of Asset Demand Functions for Modelling 
a Flow of Funds 
2.1 Introduction 
A flow of funds account takes the fonn of a matrix: each column indicates disaggregated 
sectors and each row implies financial instruments. Entries in each cell indicate purchases 
or sales of assets during a discrete period of time. They can be positive, negative or zero 
depending on the position of a sector; for example, if the sector accumulates obligations in 
the asset in question, then it is a negative entry. The flow of funds matrix contains the 
interlocking nature of the accounting system as a whole (Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 1975). In its columns, though each sector is free to choose the 
composition of assets, total net acquisitions of financial assets (NAP A) in any time period 
are constrained by the sector's overall surplus or deficit on income and capital accounts. 
When stock data, rather than flow data, enter in the matrix, each column implies a given 
sector's balance sheet, since this is the presentation of assets and liabilities of the sector in 
question, at a point time. Since purchases of an asset by one sector are to be accomplished 
by sales of the asset by another sector, each row sums zero. Each entry in the matrix is 
detennined either exogenously or endogenously. The latter accounts for portfolio choices 
of the disaggregated sectors, usually based on portfolio demand functions relating 
financial assets to interest rates. The market clearing conditions are nonnally met by 
equating the asset demand and supply, and each market is solved for either the asset yield 
(or the asset price) or the total supply. This constitutes a system-wide flow of funds 
model. 
This survey has concentrated on demand functions for a single-sector study, because 
sector studies are the essential building blocks of a flow of funds model (Green and 
Murinde 1999), and also the empirical work of a complete flow of funds model is rare, 
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exceptions are those of such as Green (1984) for the UK, Hendershott (1977) for the US 1• 
To qualify in a system-wide model, we consider the following properties of a system of 
demand functions. First, the theoretical foundation is some form of utility-maximising 
behaviour by agents: it implies restrictions on the coefficients, then given potentially 
highly collinear explanatory variables, the estimation of asset demands is much facilitated 
by such restrictions (Perraudin, 1987, p.741). Second, there is the need to incorporate the 
adding-up restrictions implied by the accounting framework of the balance sheet, thereby 
it maintains the internal consistency of any solution: in each sector a change in one of the 
interest rates with its wealth fixed can change the distribution of asset holdings, but not the 
total, thus the interest rate coefficients must sum to zero across equations. Third, the 
demand and supply equations are properly specified, such that a market clearing condition 
determines the yields or quantities within the system, and the total impact of policy 
changes on the financial sector can be analysed (e.g. the impact of an increase in deposit 
rates on the increases in total deposits and the consequent portfolio switches). 
In this survey, the aim is to address the main features of the various asset demand 
functions from both theoretical and empirical aspects, so that it will contribute to the 
construction of a flow of funds model for developing economies. This is a selective 
survey; demand functions are chosen, which are theoretically designed or empirically 
applied to financial asset choice with a view to modelling a flow of funds. The asset 
demand model is then largely classified into three types; the pitfalls model approach, the 
mean-variance approach and the consumer demand theory approach. All three approaches 
hold the common assumption of separability: the portfolio balance decision is separated 
from the consumption-saving decision (Tobin, 1969, Buckle and Thompson, 1992), 
though we will investigate some attempts at integrating both decisions in due course. 
For many years portfolio modelling generated disappointing empirical results: it is said 
that modelling a portfolio behaviour is the 'graveyard of applied economics' (Buckle and 
1 Yet, each study faces some limitations. In the case of Green (1984), the household and corporate sectors 
are consolidated into a non-bank private sector. Further he claims the difficulty in simulating his model. 
Hendershott's model contains significant complexity in disaggregating financial assets, while explaining 
only three market-clearing interest rates for the developed economy (Green, 1993). 
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Thompson, 1992). The main problem lies in the heavily parameterised specification 
leading to statistical inefficiency. The particular attention is therefore placed on recent 
developments in portfolio modelling, which pave the way to mitigating the problem. 
The outline of each section is as follows: 
In Section 2.2, discussion centres around the pitfalls model. The basic accounting 
framework for portfolio modelling of n assets is set out in a simple stylised model as a 
system of linear equations. One of the model's main features is that it advocates the 
'general disequilibrium' framework for the dynamics of stock adjustment to a 'general 
equilibrium'. The dynamics of cross-adjustment are incorporated in that the adjustment of 
anyone asset holding depends not only on its own deviation of the previous actual level 
from desired level of asset holdings, but also on the deviations from equilibrium of other 
assets2• 
The pitfalls model is probably the most influential statement of wealth allocation from the 
viewpoint of empirical implementation for a flow of funds. At the same time it is known 
to have several limitations. First, there is no theoretical foundation in the pitfalls model: 
the explanatory variables are chosen in an ad hoc manner, not explicitly derived from the 
utility maximising behaviour (Buckle and Thompson, 1992). Second, the cross-
adjustment mechanism makes the size of a flow of funds model very large, hence the 
model suffers from heavy parameterisation leading to anomalies in parameter. In order to 
mitigate this problem, the followers of the pitfalls model applied Theil's 'mixed 
estimation' procedure consisting of sample and prior information. Third, it is argued that 
the pitfalls dynamic model is a stock adjustment model and hence fails to distinguish 
between new cash flows and previously held wealth. Friedman (1977) referred to the 
'optimal marginal adjustment model' to take into account the flow of asset demands and 
their role in the determination of the market rate of return. 
Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958) laid the foundation of portfolio selection theory based 
2 The term 'Pitfall' originates from this point 
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on the mean-variance (M-V) hypothesis. M-V is an attractive way to bring a theoretical 
structure to asset-demand functions. In discrete time, it forms the asset demands of an 
investor who maximises a function of the mean-variance of his end-of-period real wealth. 
The early stage of the work is limited to the explanation of the quantities of the various 
assets that are specified as functions of the expected returns and the expected risks, 
treating the structure of interest rates as exogenous. The model specification is therefore 
similar to the pitfalls model (e.g. Parkin, Gray and Barrett 1970, White 1975, Bewley 
1981 and Spencer 1984). Consequently, in general these studies tend to share the same 
problem of multicollinearity as experienced in the pitfalls model. On these grounds, these 
models are consolidated in the pitfalls type model in their discussion. 
Frankel and Dickens (1983), Frankel and Engel (1984) and Frankel (1985) have brought 
the theory of mean-variance optimization to the asset demand functions by inverting the 
model: the properly specified interest rate equations based on the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) of M-V are linked with the portfolio demand functions and the estimation 
is to regress interest rates on asset shares. A similar approach was taken by Green 
(1990a). The CAPM itself is, however, subject to some methodological criticisms. Roll 
(1977) argued that the results were sensitive to a failure to include all relevant assets in the 
portfolio. The CAPM also requires stringent assumptions that expected returns and the 
"betas" (the covariance with the market return) are constant over time, but this is 
inconsistent with the changes in asset supplies and the consequent changes in expected 
returns. Besides, many empirical studies are embarrassed by the presence of statistically 
insignificant and wrongly-signed coefficients. In Section 2.3, discussion is focused on the 
CAPM-based inverted (demand) model, titled the M-V approach. This is a direct study of 
a determinant of interest rates using a flow of funds, and also a way of mitigating the 
theoretical problems of CAPM. The M-V hypothesis is tested by explicitly allowing 
expected returns to vary freely, and by imposing the constraint that the coefficient matrix 
is proportional to the variance-covariance matrix of the error term. In these tests portfolio 
shares do make a significant contribution to explaining asset returns, however its main 
theoretical restrictions are in general rejected, since the constraint of mean-variance 
optimization is rejected. 
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Barr and Cuthbertson (1989) advocated the demand for assets in the context of 
neoclassical demand theory. In demand theory the utility functional forms implicitly 
impose theoretical constraints of the basic axioms of rational choice, hence it does not 
need to assume homogeneity or symmetry, yet it is possible to test these properties. This 
is contrasted with the pitfalls model, which satisfies the minimum requirement of adding-
up but is not consistent with the theoretical constraints of homogeneity and symmetry. 
In consumer theory there is, however, no fixed functional form of utility function. A 
specific functional form is applied such as in the linear expenditure system (LES) and the 
Rotterdam model. These are the most popular demand models, however, the underlying 
specified utility function is an additive one, so that the system suffers from the limitations 
of additive systems (Thomas, 1985). There is therefore a trade-off between flexibility and 
the degree of freedom (Theil, 1980 and Prasad, 2000). A flexible functional form 
circumvents this problem without the cost of a reduced efficiency of estimates, including 
the Cobb-Douglas, the constant elasticity of substitution (CES), Translog (Transcendent 
Logarithm) and AIDS functions. In Section 2.4, the focus is on the particular flexible 
functional forms of Translog and AIDS models. The Translog model developed by 
Christens en, Jorgenson and Lau (1973) approximates the direct (indirect) utility function 
by functions that are quadratic in the logarithms of the quantities consumed (the ratios of 
prices to the value of total expenditure). The 'translog indirect utility function' has 
frequently been used in assessing the substitutability between financial assets with some 
fruitful results. The AIDS model, put forward by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a), 
approximates the cost function by functions that are quadratic in the logarithms of prices. 
The AIDS model has a number of attractions in terms of empirical application as 
compared with other demand system, and is empirically well supported. 
In Section 2.5, some empirical evidence and limitations on a flow of funds model for 
developing economies are reviewed, although there are limited sources of information. 
The concluding remarks are found in Section 2.6. 
12 
2.2 Pitfalls Model Approach 
2.2.1 The Pitfalls Model 
The pitfalls model, which provides a suitable accounting framework, explicitly 
incorporating balance-sheets constraints, is illustrated following Smith (1975). The 
desired allocation of n financial asset shares depends linearly upon their own and other 
rates of return and other explanatory variables, such that 
i = 1,2, ...... n (2.1) 
where ai * is the desired holdings of i th asset and w is the stock of wealth, rj is the asset 
j th interest rate and Xj is the j th explanatory variable3• (Asset stocks and wealth are 
measured on an end-of-period basis, though time subscripts are omitted.) Since the 
budget constraint implies that I a i ' = w, the consistency condition (or adding-up 
constraints) requires 
IPiO =1, Ipij =0 (j=1,2, ..... n),and IOij =0 (j=1,2, ..... q). 
i i i 
Since the dependent variable represents portfolio shares, the sum of the constant must 
equal one, and the change in any r or X can not alter the size of a portfolio, then the sum 
of the columns equals zero. Equation (2.1) also captures the wealth homogeneity 
constraint, which implies that any shift in an asset's share in the desired equilibrium is due 
to movements either of yields or of other explanatory variables, not due to the change of 
the total portfolio (Friedman, 1977).4 The assumption of gross substitutes implies that the 
partial derivative of an asset share is positive with respect to its own return but non-
positive with respect to other returns, i.e. Pij > 0, i = j and Pij ~ 0, i"* j, i.e. all 
financial assets are substitutes. But this is not a requirement of utility maximisation and it 
3 Brainard and Tobin (1968) include new saving and capital gain as other explanatory variables. 
4 However, an increase in total wealth will very often be accompanied by an upward revision of the 
expectation of yield and this will, for example, decrease the demand for money. 
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is empirically rarely supported5• 
The dynamic model takes a form of cross-partial adjustment. This is based on the 
optimization of quadratic cost functions where there are adjustment costs arising from the 
distance between the desired and the actual level of an asset holding6• Brainard and Tobin 
(1968) advocated that each asset adjustment depends upon a complete description of the 
disequilibria in the portfolio, referred as 'general disequilibrium'. This is given by 
n 
l1a j = z/Jij(a/ -aj(_I») i = 1, 2, .... n (2.2) 
j=1 
The equation (2.2) implies that it depends not only on its 'own' asset discrepancy but also 
on the 'cross' discrepancy. This is consistent with the balance sheet constraint: if there is 
an adjustment for an asset, there must be some offsetting adjustment in other assets in 
order to maintain the wealth constrain{ 
The adding-up restriction can be derived from (Smith, 1975, p.512): 
I1w= Ll1aj = LLBij(a/ -aj(_I»)' This equation can hold if and only if LBij = 1 (j 
j j 
= 1, 2, ... n). A coefficient Bij is interpreted as the partial effect on holdings of the i th 
asset of a unit increase in desired holdings of the j th asset accompanied by an equal 
increase in I1w. Alternatively, it is the speed of adjustment toward the long run 
equilibrium level. By substituting equation (2.1) into (2.2), the reduced model for 
estimation is derived as given by, 
n n n 
l1a j = (LBijPjo)w+[L(LBijpjh)rh]w+[L(LBij£>jh)Xh]W- LBijaj(_I) (2.3) 
j=1 h j=1 h j=1 j 
5 Assets with high negative covariance of returns could be complements, because hedging activities involve 
purchases of these assets and also if there are strong wealth or income effects resulting from an increase in 
the expected yield, the gross substitutes assumption will fail (Tobin, 1982). 
6 Christofides (1976) justifies the cross adjustment mechanism using a quadratic cost function. 
7 If l1a j = Gj(a; -aj(_I») is adopted for all n assets, inconsistency arises. Since Aw= Lj(a; -aj(_I»)' 
and I1w = L da j = L Gj (a; - aj(_I»)' it must be Gj = 1, i.e. consistency in a pure linear own-
j j 
adjustment model requires that actual holdings adjust fully (Smith, 1975, p.51O). 
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The pitfalls model itself is developed for a flow of funds model, and this type of model is 
widely used for a flow of funds empirical study among researchers. However the 
equilibrium relationship of the long-run model loosely implies the utility-maximisation 
theory (Owen 1986). Buckle and Thompson (1992) have formerly shown that the pitfalls 
model cannot be derived from utility maximising behaviour in comparison with LES, 
indicating that consistent preferences are not implied in the model. 
2.2.2 Empirical Results, the Bayesian Approach and Imposition of Symmetry and 
Homogeneity 
In the pitfalls model, each demand equation includes the yields on all competing assets. 
With a plausible degree of disaggregation of financial markets, empirically the model, 
especially the cross adjustment dynamic model becomes heavily parameterised. 
Multicollinearity is inevitable if assets are close substitutes, as their interest rates will tend 
to move closely together (Green and Murinde, 1999). Consequently, the estimated 
coefficients are likely to be incorrectly signed or statistically insignificant,8 and the 
estimation results may not meet a priori economic intuition. Further, this fails to provide a 
plausible basis for simulation9, (e.g. see Brainard and Smith 1976, Backus and Purvis 
1980 and Backus, Brainard, Smith and Tobin 1980). The potential solution is considered 
by approaching estimation with priors, so that the underlying pattern of behaviour avoids 
being scrambled. 
One way is to utilise a mixed estimation procedure: Theil-Goldberger mixed estimation or 
Bayesian approach is often employed by researchers. The technique involves combining a 
prior information (i.e. plausible values in coefficients) with the data. The mixed 
estimation procedure requires prior judgements of all moments of the first and the second 
8 Green and Kiernan (1989) attribute these results to the interaction between multicollinearity and 
measurement errors on the expectation of interest rates among the interest rates in the asset demand 
functions. 
9 Green (1993) points out that the coefficient anomalies generate excessive volatility in interest rates when 
the model is solved and simulated 
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order of the various parameters. The difficulty is, in particular, the construction of the 
second-order cross-moments (the prior covariance). This is a formidable task, especially 
when there are a large number of parameters to be estimated. The process can be 
simplified however by assuming that the variance and covariance among the errors in the 
priori-specified parameters are the same in estimating a system of demand equations. IO 
With this simplified version, the mixed estimation technique demonstrates that explicit 
incorporation of a priori information is a way of dealing with the problems of a heavily 
parameterised model; some test results indicate that the mixed estimates are more 
plausible than the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates, and in terms of forecast and 
simulation they also perform relatively well. 
Table 2.1 shows selective empirical studies of the pitfalls type model, in which the 
proportion of the correctly-signed own-interest rate coefficients (on a priori ground) by 
OLS and the mixed estimations is presented. OLS is accompanied by the proportion of 
the statistically significant own-interest rate coefficients. The results testify the difficulty 
of obtaining statistically significant and plausible own-interest rate effects by unrestricted 
OLS; in many cases, the coefficients are insignificant at a 5% level. In the work of Smith 
and Brainard, the mixed estimates improve the OLS results. Keamey and MacDonald 
(1986) also claim that the mixed estimates are more consistent than those of OLS, and 
many of the peCUliarities in their OLS estimates are moderated. However, a number of 
peCUliarities still remain in the estimated coefficients in the work of Backus et al. (1980) 
without qualitative improvement. This led them to utilise only a prior information. 
The other method to cope with the problem of multicollinearity on the estimated 
coefficients is to impose the a priori constraints of adding-up, homogeneity and symmetry 
in estimation. It is shown that the balance sheet property of the data ensures that the 
adding-up constraints hold automatically, whereas homogeneity and symmetry need to be 
enforced during estimation. Building the linear restrictions into the coefficients has 
10 Yet, Smith (1981) argues that the true covariance matrices for priors do differ across equations; the 
variances vary positively with the size of the coefficients and tend to be smaller for own than for cross 
effect. 
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advantages in empirical applications by reducing the number of independent interest rate 
coefficients, thereby decreasing the anomaly in the estimated coefficients in the face of the 
multicollinearity (Hendershott, 1977 and Taylor and Clements, 1983). 
Homogeneity implies that an equal change in each return will not alter the composition of 
the portfolio, and it is relative rather than absolute interest rates, which affect the level of 
asset shares, hence L flij = 0 for all i (j '* 0). The condition of symmetry requires 
j 
fl ij = fl ji (j '* 0), i.e. the effect of a change in the return of j th asset on the holding of i th 
asset share equals that of i th asset on the holding ofj th asset share11 • 
The symmetry and homogeneity conditions are often maintained in empirical portfolio 
studies, though they are frequently rejected by the statistical tests. It is argued that the 
failure of the data to support homogeneity and symmetry is a consequence of the improper 
treatment of dynamics (Anderson and Blundell, 1982). This is however not necessarily the 
case. Roley (1983) has shown that the necessary and sufficient condition for symmetry is to 
exclude wealth effects on asset share, i.e. if symmetry holds, this implies that investors' 
utility functions exhibit constant absolute mean-variance risk aversion. Therefore, he argues 
that symmetry is not a general implication of utility maximisation, but depends on the 
individual utility function. There is some empirical evidence in which the symmetry 
constraint is met, however not satisfactorily. In the study of Parkin, Gray and Barrett (1970) 
on the portfolio choice for Discount Houses in the UK, symmetry constraints are generally 
supported in the long-run asset demand. However, it is pointed out that there appears to be 
no rigorous test of the constraints employed in estimation in Parkin et al.'s paper (Courakis, 
1975). Hood (1987) estimated the dynamic adjustment portfolio model for the UK's 
personal sector and found that the estimated coefficients accepted the symmetry property in 
the short run. Yet, Hood's research is limited to a similar type of capital-certain 
11 Adding-up plus symmetry constraints automatically constitute homogeneity, but adding-up plus 
homogeneity do not generate symmetry. 
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Table 2.1 Selective empirical studies of portfolio behaviour with the pitfalls type model: OLS vs Mixed 
Study Sector Period Asset categories" Proportion of OLS Mixed 
the significant Correct sign * Correct sign * 
own interest (LR) (LR) 
rates by OLS (SR) (SR) 
at 5% level. 
Brainard and Savings and Loan 1952-69 Short-term marketable assets, Long-term NA 113 3/3 
Smith (1976) associations Quarterly marketable assets, Mortgages 113 2/3 
" Mutual savings 1966-72 Above plus Time deposits, Other loans NA 4/5 5/5 
banks Quarterly 4/5 5/5 
Backusand Household 1954-75 Broad money, Bonds, Corporate Equities, 2/5 (SR) 3/5 2/5 
Purvis (1980) Quarterly Mortgage loans, consumer loans 2/5 4/5 
Backus, Brainard, Households 1954-73 Time deposit at commercial banks, Time 2/7 (SR) 5/7 NA 
Smith and Tobin Quarterly deposits at savings institutions, Shorts, 6/7 5/7 
(1980) Longs, Equity, Mortgages, Loans 
" Savings Institutions 1954-78 Shorts, Longs, Mortgages, Loans 0/4 (SR) 3/4 NA 
excluding 3/4 3/4 
1966 (1) 
Quarterly 
" Insurance and 1954-78 Shorts, Longs, Equity, Mortgages 0/4 (SR) 4/4 NA 
pension funds Quarterly 3/4 2/4 
" Commercial banks 1968-78 Excess reserves, Borrowed reserves, A 2/6 (SR) 3/6 NA 
Quarterly short, L short, Longs, Mortgages 3/6 NA 
Keameyand Private sector 1973-82 Broad money, Bank loans, domestic bonds, 114 (SR) 3/4 3/4 
MacDonald Monthly Foreign assets dominated in foreign 114 3/4 
(1986) currency 
- NA= Not avallable, LR=long run model, SR=short run model, A, L = Unknown 
- " Currency and Demand deposits are excluded since their nominal interest rates are zero. 
- * Proportion of the correct sign (on a priori ground) on the own interest rates. LR in the upper and SR in the lower. 
- Country covered is US, except the work of Kearney and MacDonald for the UK. 
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assets. In the empirical work of Taylor and Clements (1983) for Australia, both symmetry 
and homogeneity are rejected for the capital-certain assets in the long-run. Roley (1983) 
tested the symmetry restriction using the 'optimal marginal adjustment model' (discussed 
in the next section); the demands for two different maturity classes of Treasury securities 
are estimated for six categories of US institutional investors. The symmetry restriction is 
rejected in five out of six cases at low significance levels. 
The gam m the empirical results by imposing symmetry and homogeneity are not 
necessarily promising. Owen (1986) tabulates the empirical studies, which were 
conducted in the 1970s or the 1980s and are viewed as the applications of the pitfalls type 
in five out of seven studies which are imposed of the restrictions; the proportion of the 
statistically significant coefficients among explanatory variables at a 5% level is less than 
half. Further, in the studies of Courakis (1975) and White (1975) for the portfolio 
behaviour in the banking sector with the imposition of symmetry and homogeneity, the 
presence of anomalies in the estimated coefficients is persistent, and in the latter case, the 
imposition of symmetry led to inferior results than would otherwise be expected 12. 
2.2.3 Optimal Marginal Adjustment Model 
Modigliani (1972) argues that the adjustment lag anses from the cost of shifting 
previously held assets, rather than from the allocation of newly accumulated wealth in the 
asset market. Because transactions costs in allocating new cash is less than those in 
reallocating existing portfolio holdings. It is then plausible to postulate that financial flow 
variables are potential determinants of investors' short-run asset demands due to the 
differentials in the transactions costs (Friedman, 1977). The pitfalls model fails to capture 
• 
this point. It is clear when the model (2.2) is rewritten by letting !!.i.- = a·;, then 
w 
n n 
I!:.a; = Lrija~l!:.w + Lrij(aj ·W(_I) -aj(_I» where I!:.W+W(_I) =w. It implies an equal 
j=1 j=1 
12 This is also the case in our current study for the corporate sector in Chapter 6; it turns out that the 
imposition of both restrictions led to an inferior result. 
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adjustment speed in the initially held assets and the new flows. In order to specify 
explicitly flow effects on a portfolio, the adjustment model needs to be modified by 
separating the existing holdings from the new cash flows. Such that a model referred to as 
the 'optimal marginal adjustment' by Friedman is specified as 
(2.4) 
The constraint on the coefficients () if is L () ij = e (for all j ) which is not required to be 
unity. The modified model captures the effect of differential transaction costs by 
rendering the allocation of the new cash flows more sensitive to the yields than the 
reallocation of the existing asset holdings since there is no longer adjustment term as an 
element ofthe coefficient for ~w. 
There are, however, some difficulties in the econometric estimation of equation (2.4). 
First, the equation (2.4) is over-described since W(_I) = La j(_I) for allj. The procedure, 
j 
thus, requires some experiments to reach satisfying goodness of fit and statistical 
properties13. The other drawback is that there are too many explanatory variables to 
permit efficient estimation. Therefore in multi-equation models it may be impossible to 
apply two-stage least squares, and instead the instrumental variables technique of Brundy 
and Jorgenson (1971)14 is utilised. 
The empirical test of the optimal marginal adjustment model by Friedman for six major 
categories of corporate bond investors in the US using seven financial instruments 
supports the hypothesis embodied in this model; cash flow variables are a significant 
determinant of investors' short-run asset demands in the presence of transactions costs. 
The full-model dynamic simulation results are also supportive ofthis structural model. 
\3 See p.678 in Friedman (1977). 
14 This derives consistent estimators by using as instrument variables not only the leading principal 
components of the full-system set of exogenous variables, but also on an equation-by equation basis, the 
single-equation sets of exogenous variables themselves. 
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The effects of new investable funds on the asset demands may be decomposed as Role 
(1980) argues; i), flows affect the reallocation of assets already in the portfolio, ii) positive 
and negative new flows have asymmetric effects and iii) different sources of flows are 
allocated differently. Although these assumptions sound reasonable, Role's specified 
model seems intractable with so many parameters, and that it is difficult to interpret the 
estimated results. 
2.2.4 Integrated Models 
In the original pitfalls model Brainard and Tobin linked the real sector to the financial 
sector by incorporating Tobin's Q, through which financial events affect the real economy 
or vice versa. According to Tobin's Q theory, investment is stimulated when capital is 
valued more highly than replacement cost and discouraged when its valuation is less than 
its replacement cost. They envisage that the total change in wealth is treated as exogenous 
to the financial sector, i.e. the NAF A is given exogenously, hence the portfolio balance 
decision is separated from the consumption-saving decision (Tobin, 1969). However, for 
a rational household, appropriate levels of consumption may be primarily a portfolio 
matter or available financial resources determine the purchase of a commodity (Matthews 
and Thompson, 1986). The pitfalls model can be extended to form an integrated model; in 
the integrated flow of funds models, the sectoral NAF As emerge endogenously. 
Purvis (1978) specified saving and portfolio decisions in an integral fashion; both saving 
and asset flow demands depend on current and the desired level of holdings of individual 
assets, such that the saving function is given by 
n 
S = 2: qj (a/ -aj(_I») (2.5) 
j=1 
A change in wealth is now endogenous, and that savmg and asset holdings are 
simultaneously determined. In the empirical work of the US household sector by Backus 
and Purvis (1980), the consumption equation can be derived from the budget constraint, 
and is given by C = Y - 2: da j , where Y is income. The components of wealth enter 
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into the consumption equation individually. Their study reveals that the lagged asset 
stocks influence consumption positively and that the composition of wealth is potentially 
an important determinant of expenditure in the short run. Buckle (1991) also estimated a 
model similar to the pitfalls model with the vector of dependent variables consisting of 
consumption, two real assets, five financial assets and two liabilities using co-integrating 
techniques and found a wider range of disaggregated wealth effects on consumption. The 
study of investment decisions and portfolio decisions for the UK private sector by 
Matthews and Thompson also support the integrated model. Integrating expenditure with 
the full range of asset demand decisions allows examination of some aspects of the 
interrelationships between financial and real assets. 
2.3 Mean-Variance Approach 
2.3.1 Inverted Model in a One-Period Utility Maximization Problem 
One of the major problems in the M-V model is the assumption of the constant expected 
returns perceived by investors. Frankel and Engel (1984), Frankel and Dickens (1983) 
and Frankel (1985) developed an inverted version of the pitfalls model, in which expected 
rates of return are allowed to vary freely, and the M-V constraints are placed on the 
parameters, so that the hypothesis of M-V optimization behaviour is tested. Unlike the 
pitfalls model, adjustment lags are ruled out, as it is assumed that the financial markets are 
always in equilibrium. 
More specifically, the process explores the relation between portfolio theory and CAPM 
by linking the inverted portfolio demand functions of the pitfalls type model and the 
interest rate equations that are specified based on M -V optimization. This brings more 
structure to an ad-hoc type of asset-demand functions. The logical explanation of this 
approach is given by Green (1990a, 1993). In a general equilibrium model, solving an 
interest rate in the market clearing condition is carried out by setting estimated asset 
demands equal to supplies, then it implies that the estimation of asset demands by the 
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regression of an asset quantity on interest rates is equivalent to regressing an exogenous 
variable on endogenous variables. Then the appropriate way of modelling interest rates is 
to regress an interest rate on asset supplies rather than the other way roundl5. 
Following the study of Frankel and Engel, the demand functions 
at = r + P(Etrl+l - iEtrt:l ) are inverted utilizing rational expectations as given by, 
where 
a : a column vector of n-1 asset shares 
r : a vector of intercepts 
f3 : a matrix of coefficients 
Etrl+l : a column vector ofthe n-1 expected real returns 
Etrt: 1 : the expected real return on the n'th asset 
i : a column vector ones, length of n-1 
&t+l: a prediction error that is orthogonal to all information at time t. 
(2.6) 
The expected excess returns are now viewed as depending on asset supplies and are 
therefore free to vary accordingly. 
The constraints on the parameters by the M-V hypothesis will be derived by assuming that 
investors maxmize a function of the expected value and variance of the end-of-period 
wealth (Frankel and Engel, 1984, p.315): 
(2.7) 
By differentiating F [.] with respect to the choice variable a, we can solve for the 
expected relative returns as produced by,16 
IS The possible simultaneity between holdings of fmancial assets and the asset yields is also recognised by 
Weale (1986); he argue that the use of 3SLS with the lagged interest rates as instrument variables copes with 
this problem (p.145). 
16 See p.135 in Frankel and Engel (1984) for the detailed derivation. 
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(2.8) 
where 
p= -W,2F;/ F;.: the coefficient of relative risk-aversion which IS assumed to be 
constant17 
From equations (2.6) and (2.8), it is clear that p-1 = pO. and n is the vanance-
covariance matrix of the error term, i.e. n = Et (c1+1 C'1+1 ). This implies that the 
coefficient matrix p-1 should be proportional to the variance of the forecast error if M-V 
hypothesis is to hold18• 
Empirical Results 
The estimation results applying the inverted model may be arguably superior to the 
previous studies of the M-V optimal portfolio to the extent that they use data on asset 
supplies allowing expected returns to vary over time and that the parameters are not 
determined as arbitrary. However, the overall test results did not please the advocators. 
Frankel and Engel (1984) estimated real rates of return on five national currencies relative 
to that of the US dollar and found only one or two coefficient estimates in each equation 
are significantly different from zero. Frankel and Dickens (1983) also report that only a 
few of the coefficients appear significantly different from zero in the estimation of the 
relative returns of five assets. The work by Frankel (1985) shows a surprisingly small 
magnitude of bond supply effects on expected relative rates of return, which leads him to 
conclude that the effects of asset supplies on expected relative returns are economically 
17 A constant relative risk aversion implies that demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in 
expected returns, hence asset demands can be written as functions of the differentials between any n-l 
expected returns and the remaining n'th return (Green 1991). 
18 The imposition of a constraint between the coefficient matrix and the error matrix requires non-linear 
maximum likelihood estimation. 
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insignificant (though statistically significant). In tenns of the M-V hypothesis, the 
likelihood ratio test rejects the constraints on /3-1 in all three cases, suggesting that 
investors fail to optimize with respect to the mean and variance of their real wealth. 
Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988) extended the inverted model by allowing the 
second moments ofthe returns to vary over time19, applying the autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) technique on the covariance matrix of a set of asset returns20• 
The ARCH approach turns out to be fruitful in that the expected relative returns are 
significantly influenced by the conditional second moments of the returns. Engel, Frankel, 
Froot and Rodrigues (1990) also found that the incorporation of the changing conditional 
variances improves the model statistically in their study of the V.S. stock market, though 
the M-V hypothesis is again rejected. 
Green (1990a) and Green, Na and Maggioni (1995) considered market imperfection as one 
of the possible sources of the model's failure, hence they incorporated several different 
specifications of transaction costs. Yet, the test results using the UK asset market monthly 
data by Green (1990) bear some inconsistent aspects of our understanding of portfolio 
behaviour. Adjustment costs turn out to be insignificant, and the hypothesis of zero risk 
premium is rejected, i.e. r£2 "* o. This implies that portfolio shares do contribute to 
explaining asset returns and that portfolio diversifications are significant factors III 
explaining asset returns. A SUbjective covariance matrix of relative returns are symmetric 
and positive semi-definite, implying that M-V optimization is accepted, however, the 
estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion is large in magnitude and perversely signed 
(i.e. negative). The latter suggests that investors are risk seekers and that they will choose 
a non-diversified portfolio. In the study ofNa, Green and Maggioni (1995), a negative 
relative risk aversion is also observed. 
These empirical results lead the authors to reject the M-V approach (or CAPM) to the 
19 Because it is more likely that time-varying expected excess yields build around a time-varying covariance 
matrix. 
20 n in equation (2.7) is now a time-varying conditional covariance matrix. 
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portfolio theory, suggesting that investors' portfolio shares may be linearly related to 
expected returns, hence the more general portfolio balance approach (such as the pitfalls 
model) may be appropriate to explain investors' behaviour. The rejection of the M-V 
approach may be explained in that the theory requires indeed too many assumptions21 and 
that the violation of any single assumption may be possible in contributing to the rejection 
of the theory. Among others, Fama (1970) points out that the assumption of portfolio 
choice in a one-period context does not take account of uncertainty or the state of the 
world: consumption and investment opportunities available in the future can be state 
dependent. Friend and Blume (1975) also comment that the model, in contrast to a multi-
period model, fails to capture the possibilities of hedging against future changes in the 
investment opportunity set. In order to examine the uncertainty and future aspects in the 
portfolio choice the continuous time model or intertemporal capital asset pricing model is 
briefly considered. 
2.3.2 Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (lCAPM) 
The specification of the one-period maximization problem imposes the separation of 
portfolio selection and saving decisions, assuming that either investors have quadratic 
utility functions in portfolio returns or asset returns are normally distributed. In the case 
of ICAPM, in which the investor's lifetime utility maximization problem of consumption 
is solved, portfolio selection can be analyzed in either a separated or integrated manner, 
depending on different assumptions. 
The problem of choosing optimal portfolio selection and consumption rules under 
uncertainty is typically formulated by 
(2.9) 
subject to wealth accumulation, where C = a real consumption. E = expectation 
21 Frankel and Dickens (1983) and Franke1 and Engel (1984) list the required assumptions, such as a perfect 
capital market, optimisation of end-of-period expected utility, a normal distribution for underlying returns 
(or a quadratic utility function such as a negative exponential), a constant variance-covariance matrix of the 
returns over time, homogenous investors, rational expectations. 
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conditional on current wealth and B[W(T),T] = a bequest function. By restating equation 
(2.9) in a stochastic dynamic programming form, first order conditions are obtained. The 
explicit demand functions for assets are then derived. Given continuous perfect market 
conditions, the equilibrium-expected excess asset returns are determined in the form of the 
inverted demand functions (Solnik, 1974). 
The central feature of ICAPM is that asset prices are assumed to follow a 'Geometric 
Brownian hypothesis' or Ito's process, that is 
dP 
-= Jrdt+ariz p (2.10) 
This states that over a short time interval, the proportionate change in the price level is 
explained by mean 1ldt and variance 0'2 dz , where dz is a stochastic part. The assumption 
of constant investment opportunity set, that is, 7t and cr are constant, implying P(t) is 
stationary and log-normally distributed, combined with the constant relative risk aversion, 
lead to separability (Branson and Henderson, 1985). Merton (1969 and 1971) shows that 
the optimal portfolio allocation decision is independent of the saving decision in a 
continuous time modef2. 
However, it is argued that a stationary Brownian motion for asset prices is not consistent 
with the dynamic of asset prices, because this implies that the prices of assets relative to 
each other would have the same random factor and so would all be perfectly correlated 
(Adler and Dumas, 1983). Merton (1973), Breeden (1979) and Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 
(1984) introduced non-stationary Ito's process where the parameters of 7t and cr in 
equation (2.9) would be functions of a vector of state variables such as shocks from 
government or weathe?3. Consumption and asset demands are then simultaneously 
determined as functions of state variables. In Merton's model, the expected excess returns 
on any assets are given by a 'multi-beta' version of the CAPM, whereas Breeden (1979) 
uses a single beta, 'consumption beta', i.e. the instantaneous expected excess return is 
proportional to its beta (or covariance) with respect to aggregate consumption. The latter 
22 Samuelson (1969) derived the model in a discrete version. 
23 Kouri (1974) and Hodrick (1981) also specified a similar integrated model. 
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makes the empirical test eaSIer to the extent that the identification of aggregate 
consumption is less difficult than that of the market portfolio. 
The integrated version may be more accurate to capture the dynamic movement of asset 
prices, hence the dynamic portfolio behaviour of investors under uncertainty than the 
separated version. There is however the difficulty of identifying the state variables for 
empirical application24 and estimating the functional link between the parameters to the 
process and the state variables (Adler and Dumas, 1983). Although the theoretical model 
is attractive, these complexities may have discouraged researchers from conducting the 
empirical test. Unfortunately, there seems to be hardly any empirical evidence on asset 
demands using the ICAPM (even in the case of separated modeli5. Furthermore, Green 
and Murinde (1999) point out that ICAPM diverges from the flow of funds, as its 
emphasis is on the regression relationships between asset returns and the aggregate 
consumption, rather than asset demand. 
2.4 Consumer Demand Theory Approach 
The final approach to portfolio modelling is based on neo-classical demand theory, in 
which the demand of a utility-maximising consumer depends on prices and total 
expenditure (Thomas, 1985). This approach reverts to Friedman's (1956) statement: the 
demand for money should be modelled in the same way as the demand for any goods. 
One of the properties of the neoclassical demand approach is that it allows for testing of 
the basic axioms of utility maximisation behaviour. Whether the system of demand 
functions can be generated by utility maximization subject to a budget constraint depends 
on integrability, that is, the system of demand functions could be integrated to recover the 
underlying utility function (Ewis and Fisher, 1984). Testing integrability involves such 
theoretical restrictions as Slutsky symmetry, homogeneity, negativity (own-price effects 
24 Hodrick (1981) points out that at the aggregate level, the number of state variables is quite large. 
2S Fisher (1975) presents a theoretical prediction that the demand for each asset is positively related to its 
own expected nominal rate of return in the framework of a continuous time model, but this is not empirically 
demonstrated. Merton (1973) and Breeden (1979) illustrate how testable specifications can be generated 
from the model for empirical testing, though actual test is not conducted. 
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should be non-positive) and summability. The satisfaction of such conditions is essential 
for approximating the behaviour of aggregate data by demand theory. This implies that 
these restrictions are embedded within a maintained hypothesis, hence, unlike in the case 
of the pitfalls model, there is no need to assume, although it neatly allows, the testing of 
these restrictions (Anderson and Blundell, 1983a). 
Of the greatest interest in demand functions is a flexible functional form. The survey 
focuses, in particular, on the Indirect Translog and the Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS) models, and as an extension we briefly look at semi-nonparametric flexible 
functional forms. These flexible functional forms permit inference of consumer 
preferences without prior constraints about elasticities (Barnett and Lee, 1985), and 
distinguish themselves from other functions by allowing a greater variety of substitution 
patterns among financial assets26• 
2.4.1 Translog 
Translog proposed originally by Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1973) is to approximate 
the indirect utility function by functions that are quadratic in the logarithms of the ratio of 
prices to the value of total expenditure. The resulting utility functions have enough 
parameters to provide a good local second-order approximation to any utility function. 
This is a rigorous approach to analyse data since the translog specification is able to 
capture the interactive relationships between independent parameters (Evans, Green and 
Murinde, 2000). 
Following Drake (1991), the indirect utility function Vas a function of income normalised 
prices can be represented as in the equation (2.11), 
(2.11) 
The indirect translog utility function derived as a second-order Taylor-series expansion is 
26 The unitary elasticity of substitution of Cobb Douglas function and CES, both imply strict limitations on 
the behaviour of the consumer. 
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expressed as given bl7 
Using Roy's Identity, budget share equations are generated as follows 
aj + LPij In V; 
s. = i ] aM + LPiM In V; 
j j 
(2.12) 
(2.13) 
The equation (2.12) illustrates the expenditure share equations corresponding to the m 
asset demand equations. Since the equations for the budget shares are homogeneous of 
degree zero in the parameters, a normalization of a M = -1 is chosen. The homogeneity 
implies LiPij = O. Symmetry of the Slutsky matrix is given by Pij = Pji. 
Empirical Studies 
The indirect translog function has frequently been used in the study of financial asset 
substitutability in recent years. Empirical works are usually conducted utilizing the Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method with the assumption of a first-order 
autoregressive process. See Conrad (1980), Serletis and Robb (1986), Serletis (1991)28 
and Drake (1991). Overall empirical results are quite good. For example, Drake (1991) 
reports in the study on the UK data; i) the estimated equations are generally of a good fit, 
ii) the estimated elasticities of prices are generally highly significant and consistent with 
demand theory, in particular, the symmetry condition is accepted which is a rare 
occurrence. 
The translog form appears to provide a data coherent specification, however, in the work 
of Ewis and Fisher (1984) it fails to satisfy the functional form restrictions. Ewis and 
Fisher tested the validity of the translog functional form by setting two restrictions of 
27 This is a homothetic version (i.e. unitary expenditure elasticity) oftranslog function (Serletis, 1991). 
28 SerIetis demonstrates that the error correction model types perform better than the autoregressive or partial 
adjustment dynamic model. 
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linear homogeneity and neutrality on the US data29, and found that they are rejected. The 
rejection of the functional form may be attributed to the hypothesis of homotheticity 
implied in the model. The insight is provided by the study of Serletis and Robb (1986): 
Their demand system for estimation is a quasi-homothetic version of the translog, 
incorporating 'subsistence level of expenditure in the model structure, thereby it allows 
for more complicated interdependencies among monetary assets. The integrability turns 
out to be more satisfactory than that of the homothetic version. 
2.4.2 Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) developed a more simplified flexible functional form, 
AIDS. AIDS is derived from duality, in which agents choose quantities so as to minimise 
the total cost to achieve a given level of utility, and this is equivalent to maximising 
utility, since the budget constraints equal the total cost (the detail is left until Chapter 4). 
The AIDS model approximates the cost function by functions that are quadratic in the 
logarithms of prices and the resulting cost function is concave, homogeneous of degree 
one in prices30 and is increasing in utility, hence it is consistent with the axioms of rational 
choice. The cost function provides a local first-order approximation to any true demand 
system whether derived from the utility maximisation or not. Deaton and Muellbauer 
demonstrate that the AIDS has a number of advantages over Translog (and also over 
pitfalls models and the M-V approach for some advantages). 
i) It is possible that the AIDS share equations can be modelled as linear in the 
parameters. Therefore, the AIDS model is far more tractable than the non-linear translog 
model, especially in the process of dynamic adjustment. 
ii) It provides an efficient framework for imposing and directly testing restrictions in 
the parameters that are associated with the axioms of rational choice, while in the case of 
29 Linear homogeneity implies L/lij = LiPij = 0 and given aM = -1, it also implies Pij = Pji' 
They included a monetary technological change as an explanatory variable and if neutrality holds, the effect 
on asset shares should be zero. 
30 Concave in prices means that as prices rise, cost rises no more than linearly, and homogenous of degree 
one in prices means that if prices double, outlay also doubles to stay on the same indifference curve. 
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Translog, homogeneity and symmetry conditions are independent of linear restrictions on 
estimated parameters and are therefore difficult to test on the Translog. 
iii) AIDS is a member of the Price Independent Generalised Logarithms (PIGLOG) 
class of functional forms, which has a desirable aggregation property: it permits exact 
aggregation over consumers, and that it allows that presentation of market demands as if 
they were the outcome of decisions by a rational representative consumer. Besides, the 
PIGLOG yields long-run equilibrium in the levels ofthe variables. (This is relevant to the 
current study as a static model is considered.) 
iv) It is flexible in that it allows other 'non-price sensitive' explanatory variables31 
without violating the theoretical property, for example real variables or policy variables 
are represented in the parameters of the cost function. 
v) In order to mitigate multicollinearity, Deaton and Muellbauer suggest imposing 
appropriate restrictions, on a priori grounds, on parameters; these are empirically and 
theoretically permissible without adverse consequences for the properties of the AIDS 
model. 
In contrast to the M-V approach in which expected utility is derived from terminal wealth, 
in the AIDS model, utility is assumed to depend on the expected one-period-ahead real 
value of all assets held, such that 
( TT T ) U = U a 11+1' a2t+1' •••••••••• anI+1 (2.14) 
Following Weale (1986), Barr and Cuthbertson (1991a) and Adam (1999), the AIDS cost 
function is given by 
(2.15a) 
and the budget constraint is 
(2.15b) 
where 
ai~+l = a il+1 / ZI+I = real asset holdings of the ith asset at the end of period t+ 1 
31 By 'non-price sensitive', it means that the explanatory variables are independent to AIDS prices. 
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Z = aggregate price level for goods 
~T = ~ / Z/ = real wealth at end of period t 
'i = expected nominal return on asset i , between t and t+ 1 
g = expected proportionate rate of goods price inflation, between t and t+ 1 
n - rPI "P2 "P3 "P. 
- PI P2 P3 · .. ···Pn 
The i'th asset share equation is solved using Shepherds's Lemma, such that 
Si = ai + Irij lnp;/ + Pi In(W T / pO,,) (2.16) 
j 
where Si = ail / ~ and r ij = (r; + r;J / 2 
In pO" may be interpreted as a composite real interest rate and defined by 
n 
lnpo" = ao + Ia i lnp; + I Ir; lnp; lnp;. But if lnp; are reasonably collinear, 
I j 
Deaton and Muellbauer suggested a Stone index of the form lnpo" = ISi lnp~. The 
model then becomes linear in the parameters. 
The system implicitly imposes data admissibility; i) the adding up constraints imply 
and I r ij = I Pi = 0, ii) homogeneity and symmetry require I r ij = 0 and 
i i j 
respectively and iii) negativity implies that the matrix of coefficients 
0ij = 0 if i '* j) is negative semi-definite. 
The dynamic model follows the two-step cointegration approach of Engle and Granger 
(1987)32. Long-run asset demand equations (2.16) are estimated by OLS. Assuming that 
all variables are integrated of order one and are cointegrated, OLS yields consistent 
32 The empirical work by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) on the static model (2.15) for non-durable 
consumer expenditure showed rejection of homogeneity and symmetry, although the AIDS is capable of 
explainning the commodity budget shares. They note that serial correlation in the residuals is induced when 
homogeneity restrictions are imposed. This suggested the need for the dynamic specification. 
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estimates for 1(1) explanatory variables. The residuals from (n-l) share equations are then 
substituted in the error correction model; Barr and Cuthbertson refer this as error feedback 
equations (EFEi3. If we let the long-run AIDS model (2.16) be in vector notation 
S; = IIXt , then the EFE is given by, 
where X t =q x I vector of independent variables 
IT = n x q matrix of parameters 
(2.17) 
(S - S·)t_1 = et-I: disequilibrium in the level of X in the previous period 
L = n x (n-I) matrix ofparameters34 
Equation (2.17) states that disequilibria in (n-l) asset shares at time /-1 influence the 
current period adjustment of asset shares. The 'general to specific' methodology is 
applied to obtain parsimonious dynamic equations while maintaining the estimates of the 
long-run parameters. 
The advantageous feature of estimating (2.17) by the cointegration techniques may be 
revealed by comparing it with the unrestricted short-run model of the Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ADL)35 type given by Weale (1986), 
St =flnpt +VSt_1 +UXt 
From this, the long-run model is derived as 
St = (1-Vr1flnpt +(1-VrIUXt 
(2.18) 
(2.19) 
As it is clear from (2.18), the direct parameterisation of the long-run model is impossible; 
one cannot easily test and impose long-run restrictions of symmetry and homogeneity as 
these depend on the non-linear functions. Furthermore, testing down to a parsimonious 
dynamic representation may implicitly alter the long-run solution and the final equation 
may be inappropriate on a priori grounds (Barr and Cuthbertson, 1991a). With the EFE of 
33 Barr and Cuthbertson generalise the quadratic cost of the adjustment function ofChristofides (1976) for 
the dynamic adjustment and obtain generalized interdependent error feedback equations (EFE). 
n 
34 Since L (SI - S;)t_1 = 0, only the (n-l) independent disequilibrium shares are required (Anderson and 
I 
Blundell, 1983a). 
3S An error-correction model is a linear transformation of an ADL model (Pradhan and Subrarnanian, 1999). 
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a two-step co integration process, one can directly estimate and impose restrictions on the 
long-run parameters and the long-run estimates are fixed in the specific adjustment model. 
Empirical Studies 
Several empirical works of the AIDS model for financial assets are shown in Table 2.2. 
The main works are those of Barr and Cuthbertson (B & C). As shown in the table the 
symmetry and homogeneity in the static model are not rejected in the study of B&C 
(1991a), (1991c) and (1994), while these restrictions are rejected in that of Weale. The 
work of B&C (1991b) links the long-run hedging demand and the short-run speculative 
activity for capital uncertain assets by an interdependent EFE; although it is disappointing 
that short-run homogeneity and symmetry are rejected, they have obtained intuitively 
acceptable parameter estimates and parameter stability. Other than that, in general, the 
AIDS dynamic model satisfies the conditions of symmetry and homogeneity. In terms of 
the own-price coefficients, except in the short-run study ofB&C (1991c) and (1992b) and 
the work of Perraudin (1987), the proportion of the significant own-price coefficients is 
more than 50%. It seems that prices are well-determined as evidenced by almost all 
negative own price effects in both long- and short-run. All these empirical results support 
the use of the AIDS, especially with the two-step cointegration process 36. 
36 The dynamic AIDS specification by Ray (1984) captures the effects of, not only, lagged purchases of the 
individual items, but also the past consumption of all the items via the lagged aggregate expenditure with an 
assumption of serial correlation of the errors (p.236, p.237). However, in the empirical work the tests for 
homogeneity and symmetry restrictions were rejected in both static and dynamic AIDS contexts. 
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Table 2.2 The study of financial assets using the AIDS model 
Study Sector Period 
Weale 1986 Personal sector 1967:2-1981:3 (UK) 
Non-bank 
Perraudin 1987 private sector 1976:2-1985:4 
(UK) 
B&C 1991a Personal sector 1977-1986 (UK) 
B&C 1991b Personal sector 1977-1986 (UK) 
B&C 1991c Company 1977-1986 
sector(UK) 
B&C 1992b OFIs (UK) 1977 :4-1986:4 
B&C 1994 Overseas 1978-1986 
sector * (UK) 
Adam 1999 Private sector 1973-1990 (Kenya) 
Collins and Household 1984:1-1993:7 Anderson 1998 
sector (US) (Monthly) (Non-linear) 
Data: quarterly except Collins and Anderson 
B&C=Barr and Cuthbertson 
Assets 
NC,SD,BS, 
LAT 
NC+SD, TD, 
NS,GS, 
OS+NFCD, 
TB 
NC, TD,SD, 
BS,NS 
UT, CS,PSL, 
OS 
Ml, TD,PSL, 
FCD 
LQ,PSL, CS, 
FC,LN 
NSD, CS, 
PSL,NFCD 
NC, TD+SD, 
GS, TK,NTK 
NC, UT, TB, 
SB 
Dynamic Dynamic S&H 
model Static S & H 
ADL Rejected Accepted 
-- Not imposed --
EFE Accepted Accepted 
EFE Not imposed Rejected 
EFE Accepted Accepted 
EFE 
-- Accepted 
EFE Accepted Accepted 
EFE Not imposed Not imposed 
EFE -- Accepted 
-- : Not available, EFE=error feedback equations (Cointegration technique is employed), ADL= autoregressive distributed lag 
S=Symmetry, H=Homogeneity, LR=long run, SR=short run 
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Proportion of Proportion of 
the significant the negative 
own price coef. sign on the own 
at a 5% level price coef. 
** 
3/3 (SR) All negative 
2/5 (LR) (NS, 4/6 (LR) 
t-ratio not 
available) 
5/5 (LR) All negative 2/4(SR) 
4/4 (LR) All negative 
112 (SR) (but one 
negative 
imposed in SR) 
3/4 (LR) All negative 113 (SR) 
3/5 (LR) All negative 115 (SR) 
2/3 (LR) All negative 
-- (SR) 
4/5 (LR) 4/5 (LR) 
4/5 (SR) 4/5 (SR) 
4/4 (SR) All negative 
* Two-stage budgeting process is taken: the 'upper-level' decision constitutes holdings of net foreign currency deposit and the set of three 
sterling assets ofNSD, CS and PSL, and the 'lower-level' decision, between NSD, CS and PSL. The test results are based on the lower level estimation 
** When the number of price coefficients is less than the number of assets, it implies the coefficients being imposed of restrictions. In the case of We ale and 
Perraudin, there is no own interest rate for NC. 
BS=Building society deposits 
CS=Company Securities 
FC=FCD and OS 
FCD=Foreign Currency Deposits, 
GS=Government securities 
LAT=Local Authority Temporary Deposits 
LN=Lending 
LQ=SD, TD, BS and local authority temporary debt 
NC=Notes and Coin 
NFCD= Net foreign currency deposit = FCD less foreign currency loans 
NS=National savings investment account 
NSD= Net sterling deposits = SD + TD less Sterling loans 
NTK=Non-traded capital 
OS=Overseas Securities 
PSL=Public sector long-term debt 
SB=Saving bonds 
SD=Sight deposits 
TB=Treasury bills 
TD=Tirne deposits 
TK =Traded capital 
UT=Unit Trust 
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2.4.3 Fourier and Asymptotically Ideal Models (AIM) 
Drake, Fleissig and Mullineux (1997) have pointed out that the Translog and AIDS 
models are restrictive in that they can only approximate the data at a single point and may 
fail to converge to the true utility function. Whereas such flexible functional forms as the 
Fourier or the AIM possess global properties at the limit, implying an approximation at all 
points. The Fourier or AIM specification is an example of a semi-nonparametric function, 
that is, parametric enough to retain direct contact with economic theory but nonparametric 
enough to have desirable asymptotic properties: The Fourier or the AIM flexible form can 
be treated as the true cost function or indirect utility function in the analysis (i.e. direct 
contact with theory) and the number of parameters can increase with sample size (i.e. 
nonparametric statistical properties). In estimation, the order of the series expansion is 
increased until the function converges asymptotically to the true utility function. In 
addition, unlike ordinary flexible forms, it can be used to estimate an elasticity without a 
priori knowledge of functional form. The economic content of the parameter estimates is 
evaluated via elasticities, hence credibility of estimates depends to a considerable extent 
on whether or not estimated elasticity of substitution matrices are negative semi-definite. 
(Elbadawi, Gallant and Souza , 1983, Bamett, Fisher and Serletis, 1992 and Fleissig and 
Swofford, 1996) 
Semi-nonparametric functions are frequently used in money or asset demand studies. For 
example, Fisher and Fleissig (1997) examined the liquid assets of the US monthly data 
utilizing the dynamic Fourier flexible form. Fleissig and Swofford (1996) find that a 
static AIM(2) (a second-order series expansion) with an AR(I) correction best fits the data 
of the US monetary assets. Drake, Fleissig and Mullineux (1997) also find that the AIM 
(2) with an AR(I) is the most appropriate specification for the UK financial asset data. 
The semi-nonparametric function approach can provide an arbitrarily accurate asymptotic 
approximation of the levels and derivatives of any continuous function. Since the 
elasticities are functions of the derivatives, this approach provides precise estimates of the 
elasticities of substitution at each data point. However, in pursuit of the accuracy in 
estimation, the more flexible models have more parameters to be estimated, implying the 
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need for large sample size and the functions become highly non-linear; thus there is a 
trade-off between size and tractability. 
2.5 A Flow of Funds Model for Developing Countries 
Relatively few flow of funds studies have been done for developing countries, despite the 
fact that it possesses a potential importance in identifying effective financial reforms and 
government policies for promoting economic growth. Because of its nature, the 
application of flow of funds models requires relatively detailed flow of funds data. 
Therefore, the obvious hindrance in modelling a flow of funds in developing countries is 
the limited or non-existent availability of data, particularly in the case of low-income 
developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia. In many cases, there is neither 
the institutional framework nor the resources to compile systematic statistics in 
developing countries. For example, Honohan and Atiyas (1993) report that few of the 
individual country time series are long enough to carry out much worthwhile statistical 
analysis in the study of intersectoral financial flows in developing countries37• Bahra, 
Green and Murinde (1999) are also embarrassed by the paucity of data in studying 
transitional economies in Eastern Europe; in many cases, the longest available series is 
only the six years of 1991-1996, and the majority of this is annual. (See also Green, 
Murinde, Suppakitjarak and Moore (2000) in more detail, where the data problem is well , ,,' 
documented in relation to a flow of funds model.) 
Green et al. (2000) point out that one way to alleviate this problem is to explore the 
standard official sources, rather than resorting to country sources; there are the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) Yearbook, the Government Finance Statistics 
(GFS) Yearbook, in addition, the United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA) 
which presents a statistical framework for flow of funds accounts. However, it also seems 
difficult to rely on these official sources. For such low-income developing countries, the " 
37 Honohan and Atiyas (1993) quote that' .... this data set spans 17 years (1970-86) for 17 countries, but of a 
potential total of289 observations for that number of years and countries we have only 118 observations, 
though a sample of seventeen developing countries are regarded as having the best data availability! '(p.667). 
40 
. .' 
...... 
statistics of IFS and GFS are disturbed with a considerable amount of missing data, or a 
lack of detailed data leading to large discrepancies between the current account and total 
financial transactions. As to the SNA, it is also unthinkable without statistical 
discrepancies for developing countries (Nakamura, 1998). 
Alternatively Green and Murinde (1999) suggest that given a poor data set, simulation 
techniques without estimation may be a potential way forward. This is advocated by 
Brainard and Tobin (1968); a flow of funds model is specified and calibrated with 
guesstimated parameter values, then the simulation is exercised for policy experiments 
with the least data set. 
There are so far two flow of funds studies conducted for developing countries using 
demand functions for asset choice; one for India and the other for Kenya38• 
The study for India by Sen, Roy, Krishnan and Mundlay (1996) is a rare complete flow of 
funds model (though it is a simple version) utilising the pitfalls model with the annual 
flow data published by the RBI. The portfolio choice behaviour of household and 
commercial banks are integrated with the real sectors of the Indian economy. The strictly 
controlled financial sector in India is elaborately built into the model framework. They 
find a weak impact of interest rates (though statistically significant) on the asset shares. 
38 There are some flow of funds models, which are specified in the context of a macroeconomic model for 
developing countries. Odedokun (1987) formulated a flow of funds model in order to evaluate the 
behaviour of a fiscal sector (treasury) and monetary sector (Central Bank) using Nigerian annual figures 
from 1968 to 1982. The reaction functions of public authorities are estimated to see whether the effect on 
target variables (prices, employment, GDP and external reserves) promotes expansionary or contractionary 
policies. Odedokun (1990) further studied a cross-sectional flow-of-funds model as a tool for analysing the 
determinants of the budgetary behaviour of Nigerian State Governments for each of the four years of the 
country's civilian regime, 1980-83. Green and Murinde (1998b) specified a macroeconomics model, that is 
explicit about the flow of funds among the various sectors of representative transition economies and 
suitable for policy analysis during the financial restructuring. It captures particular features in the transition 
economies by allowing for the co-existence of official and informal ( or curb) fmancial markets of loans, 
foreign currency and goods. The model is applied by Bahra et al. (1999) to simulation experiments for the 
analysis of fmancial policies for Estonia and Poland. In their work, the parameters are not derived from 
estimation, instead the limited available time series are used to calculate e1asticities for the model 
parameters. 
41 
As it is listed in Table 2.2, a sector study for Kenya is conducted by Adam (1999). The 
AIDS model is applied to a private sector, in which the asset portfolio consists of both 
financial and real assets. The empirical results are quite satisfactory, in particular the 
interest rates (or the AIDS prices) are well-determined. However, there are two 
shortcomings in terms of data. First, because of data limitations, the model is estimated 
using data for the consolidated private sector of households and enterprises. Second, data 
sources are inconsistent: while the data for financial assets are specifically those of private 
sector, the data for real assets are aggregated data. 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, a selective survey of a system of demand functions for a flow of funds 
analysis has been conducted by classifying the models into three types; the pitfalls model, 
the M -V approach and the consumer demand theory approach. 
Common to all three approaches is that each emphasises the importance of interest rates in 
the portfolio decision-making process. On the other hand, this is the reason why this kind 
of study is so difficult. In particular in the pitfalls approach, an array of collinear interest 
rates creates the problem of multicollinearity. Several attempts to mitigate the problem 
by incorporating prior information have not been fully successful. The optimal marginal 
adjustment model, which incorporates a flow variables in asset demand, is theoretically 
more plausible than the pitfalls adjustment model, yet at the expense of restricting the 
degrees of freedom. 
The inverted model based on the M-V theory has shown the relationship between the asset 
shares and asset returns, but with little contribution to explaining portfolio allocation 
based on M-V optimization. The following limitations raise the question of the 
applicability of the M-V approach to a flow of funds model. First, in modelling capital-
uncertain assets, in general the M-V theory (in a one-period model) is restrictive, in that 
portfolio choice is determined by one period ahead of expected returns, a risk aversion 
coefficient and the variance-covariance matrix of returns. Second, the model measures the 
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excess returns, hence it does not provide any specific role for money in determining the 
interest rate structure; this role is taken over by capital-certain assets, while the capital-
certain assets are viewed as being homogeneous. Although this contributes to a reduction 
in the number of estimated coefficients (as compared with the pitfalls model), the benefit 
is at the expense of severe restriction of possible substitution effects among a range of 
risk-free financial assets, which are the major element of a flow of funds (Barr and 
Cuthbertson, 1989). Third, a capital market is assumed to be always in equilibrium. 
Hence, a well-developed capital market is required in modelling a system of demand 
functions. This is far-fetched in a developing economy. Fourth, although the inverted 
model is a coherent approach by linking the demand function and the CAPM, albeit with 
the excess return being on the dependent variable and the quantity of assets being 
exogenous, it is probably not compatible with the financial system in developing 
economies, where interest rates tend to be regulated, thereby asset quantities are more 
likely to be determined in the market. Moreover, the inverted model is confined to a 
specified sector study, since the excess return is determined in the single sector, in other 
words, the market clearing endogenous variable is determined in a single sector without 
incurring a market clearing condition in a general equilibrium model. As it is reconciled, 
this is a divergence from flow of funds models towards more direct modelling of asset 
prices and returns (Green, 1993). 
It seems that the demand for assets is best viewed as part of neoclassical consumer 
demand theory. Derivation of a demand system from consumer demand theory is likely to 
be more satisfactory than the heuristic approach adopted in the pitfalls model (Weale, 
1986). One can define the portfolio allocation problem in terms of utility maximization 
subject to a budget constraint as similar to that of mean-variance analysis, however it 
departs from the M-V approach in that the consumer demand theory approach allows an 
analysis of holdings of not only capital-uncertain but also of capital-certain assets. 
Particularly, the AIDS model with a cointegration technique sheds light on asset choice. 
In applied economics, it provides a number of advantages over other types of demand 
function. Empirical works are theoretically and economically quite satisfactory, as 
evidenced in Table 2.2, which is contrasted with that of the pitfalls model and the inverted 
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M-V model. It is, however, argued that the neoclassical model neglects uncertainty or risk 
variables. Against this, BaIT and Cuthbertson argue that these 'omitted risk variables' are 
in principle subsumed in the parameters of the cost function, hence, should any of the 
latter change, then this will be picked up empirically, either by a failure of homogeneity or 
symmetry or by parameter instability (see also PeITaudin, 1987, p.755). 
Developing countries tend to face the problem of obtaining adequate data for modelling a 
flow of funds. Although we found a complete set of flow accounts for India, it is limited 
to low frequency annual data, and that we model a flow of funds in a static model, which 
is the one in which stocks are stationary from period to period (Cohen, 1987i9• The 
AIDS model was developed for the static long-run model by Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980a) who also empirically demonstrated that the static AIDS model explains the 
commodity budget shares. Subsequently, BaIT and Cuthbertson have empirically shown 
that the AIDS is capable of explaining the financial asset shares satisfying homogeneity 
and symmetry in the long-run. It remains to be seen how robust the AIDS will be for a 
flow of funds in India. 
39 We should mention that we attempted a dynamic of error correction model. However, given a small 
sample size of 43 the multivariate dynamic model is overparametrised. Taylor and elements (1983) face a 
similar problem. 
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Chapter 3 
India l 
Financial System and Flow of Funds Matrix in 
3.1 Development of the Financial Markets and its Monetary Policy Implications 
3.1.1 Introduction 
During the post-independence period until the early 1990s, the financial system in India 
was characterised by a heavily regulated framework such as interest rate controls, a 
directed credit programme and strict entry rules to the financial markets. In addition, 
money and capital markets were underdeveloped, and the budget deficit of the central 
government was automatically monetised by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Against 
this background, a macroeconomic crisis arose in the early 1990s. Due to a deficiency in 
the tax system and a significant proportion of unplanned expenditure in the fiscal sector, 
the budget deficit became persistent. Furthermore, India had to rely on foreign debt in 
order to fill the saving-investment gap in tpe face of a declining trend of external 
assistance flows in the 'seventies. The accelerating fiscal deficits led to a higher rate of 
inflation and a balance of payments crisis occurred in 1991. Since then, the government 
has launched a gradual financial reform programme as an integral part of its stabilization 
policies. 
This section starts with a brief overview of the current main regulations imposed on 
commercial banks. Then the development of the financial markets in the pre- and post-
financial reform periods will be discussed, including the government securities market, the 
credit market, the money market, the stock market and the foreign exchange market. The 
size of the transaction costs in the Indian financial sector is also briefly examined. The 
impact of the liberalisation in the financial sector on the conduct and effectiveness of 
monetary policy will then be examined. Concluding remarks summarise the major effects 
I Notations are found in the last page of this chapter. 
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ofthe financial refonns on the real and financial sectors. 
The main contribution of liberalisation and deregulation of the financial sector on a flow 
of funds is the increased financial intennediation and substitutability of corporate finance. 
3.1.2 Main Regulations in the Banking Sector 2 
Table 3.1 presents the main regulations currently (in 2000/01) imposed on the commercial 
banks. 
Table 3.1 Main Regulations in the Banking Sector 
Regulations 
CRR (cash reserve - Under the Reserve Bank oflndia Act 1934, every commercial bank has to keep 
ratio) certain proportion of the aggregate deposit liabilities as cash reserves with the 
RBI. 
- The ratio ranged from 3% to 15% over the period 1951-1994. Currently, it is 
8.5% (RBI, 2000b). 
SLR (statutory - Banks are required to invest a certain proportion of their aggregate deposit 
liquidity ratio) liabilities in government securities or government approved securities (issued by 
public sector fmancial institutions) by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. 
- The ratio was set at 20% until 1963. It reached its highest level of38% in 1988 
and is currently at 25 % (RBI, 2000b). 
Priority Sector - When the major commercial banks were nationalised in 1969, the government 
Lending stipulated bank lending to the priority sectors of agriculture, small industry and 
Requirements business and small transport operations. 
- Unlike CRR and SLR, there is no fixed proportion of their liabilities set up. 
However, about 40% of their resources after the reduction ofCRR and SLR is 
forwarded to these sectors. 
CRAR (capital to risk- - Capital adequacy norms were fixed at 8% by RBI in 1992. 
weight assets ratio) 
2 The banking sector in general indicates here the commercial banks unless otherwise stated. 
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3.1.3 Government Securities Market 
There has been a structural weakness in central government finance, in that revenue 
generation has been lower than expenditure required. This led to a significant volume of 
government debt during the 1980s. The RBI automatically monetised the component of 
the deficit which was financed by the ad-hoc issue of91-day Treasury Bills, increasing the 
amount of reserve money. In order partially to neutralize the effect of deficit financing on 
the level of the money supply, CRR was frequently raised (it gradually reached 11 % in 
1988 from 6% in 1979), and also to facilitate the expanding government debt, an 
involuntary credit ratio by commercial banks under the provision of SLR was increased. 
Further, in order to keep the cost of borrowing from the market low, interest rates on 
government securities were suppressed: the Indian government manipulated government 
securities yields down by quoting the security prices below face value, besides captive 
market in credit allocation and the tax concession on the return of government securities 
supported the low level of the yields. 
Fiscal reforms have taken place following the recommendation of the Chakravarty 
Committee 1985: the government was to finance its deficit directly from the market at 
market-related rates rather than through automatic monetisation by the RBI. See Table 
3.2. 
Although the reform started with the objectives of activating an internal debt management 
policy and for more effective monetary policy, it brought unintended results. The market-
determined interest rates have led to an increase in interest payments, adding to the debt 
accumulation process during the last decade3. Furthermore, the market-related interest 
rates of the risk-free government securities attracted banks to invest in them, reducing 
other financial investments. It appears that the unbalanced budget position in the Central 
government and the corresponding policies forms vicious cycle and has adversely affected 
3 When government securities' yields were market-determined, this raised the nominal yields from around 
7% or 8% in the 1980's to around 13% in the early 1990's. 
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the credit market in India. 
Table 3.2 The Main Reforms in the Government Securities Market 
1991 - The maximum coupon rate on central government securities was raised to near-market 
rates. 
1992 - 93 - The system of selling 91-days Treasury Bills through weekly auctions was introduced. 
- The new instruments of 364-day Treasury Bills and Dated government securities4 
emerged at market-detennined rates on an auction basis. 
1994 - The automatic monetisation of the Central government budget deficit through ad hoc 
Treasury Bills came to an end. In 1997, the government's temporary shorfalls in 
fmance were replaced by Way and Means Advances (WMA). 5 
3.1.4 Credit Market and Banking Sector 
Credit in the banking sector was characterised as being a captive market in the sense that 
banks were forced to provide credits to the government sector or the government-owned 
financial institutions under SLR and the priority sector lending requirements. Combined 
with a high ratio of CRR, the usage of bank deposit resources at their own discretion was 
extremely restricted. For example, during the fiscal crisis in early 1990's with CRR and 
SLR being raised to the statutory maximum of 15% and 38.5% respectively, they had only 
about 45% of the resources and even out of this, 40% was allocated as loans to the priority 
sectors. Only the residual was allocated to the industrial sectors, despite the fact that bank 
financing was a prime external source of funds for the commercial sector due to a less-
developed capital market. 
Another disturbing feature was the structure of interest rates, which was complicated with 
about 50 lending categories and a large number of stipulated interest rates depending on 
4 This is to convert maturity Treasury Bills to dated government securities when they become due, in order to 
fund maturing Treasury Bills. 
5 Section 17(5) of the RBI Act, 1934 provides that RBI should make advances to the state or central 
government repayable not later than three months from the data of advance. 'Ways and means' advances are 
granted at 1 % below the Bank rate. 
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the loan size, usage and types of borrowers. There was, therefore, a significant cross-
subsidy between sectors: pre-emption6 of resources was at concessional rates of interest, 
on the other hand much higher lending rates were imposed on medium and large 
industries. In general, there were ceilings on bank lending rates and credit flows were 
quantitatively restricted. Because of the ceiling rate system, the cost of funds (i.e. deposit 
rate) was repressed. 
The nature of pre-emption coupled with administered interest rates, represented financial 
repression in the credit market and prevented sound banking practice; i) banks were unable 
to satisfy the credit requirements of the productive economic sectors, ii) the restrictions on 
banks' use of funds affected their profitability, iii) the reduced role of the interest rate as 
an equilibrium mechanism led to inefficient allocation of credit. In addition, restrictions 
on entry norms and the dominance of PSBs (public sector banksf constrained market 
forces in the banking sector. 
The major financial sector reforms were undertaken with a VIew to encouragmg 
competitive efficiency in the banking sector following the recommendation of the 
Narasimham Committee 1991. The major reforms involved i) the reduction of statutory 
pre-emption levels, ii) dismantling the complex administered interest rate structure, iii) 
laying down of capital adequacy requirements and iv) liberalisation of entry norms for 
domestic and foreign banks. See Table 3.3. 
The financial sector reforms have had a significant impact on the banking sector. A 
general scaling down of pre-emption by lowering the level of CRR and SLR has 
encouraged banks to manage their asset portfolio in a more market-oriented fashion. The 
deregulation of lending rates contributed to the banks' profitability and so deposit rates 
were raised to attract investors. This also initiated interest rates as an equilibrium 
6 Pre-emption refers to policy-determined prior claims by SLR and Priority Sector Lending Requirements. 
7 The 20 nationalised commercial banks (14 in 1969 and 6 in 1980) and 8 state banks are collectively 
referred to as PSBs, which held 92 % oftotal deposits in the banking sector in the 1980's. 
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mechanism allocating resources in a more efficient manner in the credit market. 
Along with the liberalisation, there was a movement towards a regulatory mechanism that 
would ensure the safety and solvency of the banking sector. In the last decade, an 
increased perception of risk was prevalent in the banking sector, especially after the 
South-East Asian and the Barings Bank crises. This was reflected in a shift of funds in 
favour of zero-risk investments; investments in government securities voluntarily 
exceeded the SLR during the 1990' s, whereas the share of loans and advances in total 
assets showed a consistent decline over the same period. The banks' behaviour is 
consistent with prudent measures. By the end of March 1996, all public sector banks 
attained CRAR of 8 %. 
Table 3.3 The Salient Reforms in the Credit Market and Banking Sector 
1992 - CRAR (capital to risk-weighted assets ratio) was fixed at 8% complying with 
international standards8• 
1992-93 - The structure of lending rates for the commercial banks was simplified; the six 
categories of interest rates were reduced to four in 1992 and to three in 1993. 
1994 - Banks were allowed total freedom to set their own lending rates on bank advance over 
Rs.2lakhs in 1994 (1Iakh=100,000). 
- The interest rates on loans up to Rs.2 lakh were deregulated later in 1998 subject to 
small-scale borrowers being charged at not exceeding prime lending rate (PLR). 
1997 - The SLR gradually decreased to 25% from its peak of38.5% of Net Demand and 
Time Liabilities in 1990-92 and concessional rates were replaced by market-related rates. 
1999 - The CRR gradually falls to 9.0 % from a peak of 15% in 1989-93. 
1999-2000 - The Bank rate was lowered to 8.0% gradually from 12.0% in 1997 leading PLR to fall. 
Other - The interest rates on deposit and on advances of all co-operative banks9 have been 
Reforms deregulated subject to a minimum lending rate of 13%. 
since 1991 
- Lending rates of OFIs (other financial institutions) were freed subject to a minimum rate 
ofI5%. 
- OFIs were to comply with the CRAR; 4% in 1993 and 8% in 1996. 
8 Under the Basel Agreement, the capital adequacy is 8% of the risk-weighted assets. 
9 We will briefly discuss about co-operative banks in the next section. 
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3.1.5 Other Financial Markets 
The main refonns in other financial markets are found in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 The Main Reforms in Other Financial Markets 
May 1989 - Call money rates were effectively freed from the regulated rate and the grant of entry 
was given to all participants in the bills rediscounting market as lenders, also in 1993, the 
OFIs are permitted to join in the call market as borrowers. 
June 1989 - Certificate of Deposits (CDs) was introduced and it became a market-determined 
instrument in October 1993. 
Jan. 1990 - Commercial Paper (CP) was introduced at freely determined discount to face value. 
1992 - Beginning of relaxation of foreign exchange controls. 
1992 - The CCI (controller of capital issues) which had regulatory control over all capital 
issues was abolished. 
- SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board ofIndia) was given statutory powers for 
regulating the security markets. 
- Issuers of securities were allowed to raise capital from the market without any consent 
from any authority either for floating the issue or for pricing it. 
Sept. 1992 - Foreign institutional investors (FIls) were allowed unrestricted entry in terms of volumes 
of investment in the security market. 
Dec. 1992 - Reserve Bank's Repurchase Agreements (Repos) was introduced. 
March 1993 - Exchange rate transitioned from a basket-linked managed float to market based system 
via a transitional phase of dual exchange rate regimelO• 
Money Market 
Untill the late 1980's, the Indian money market was characterised by a limited number of 
participants, regulation of entry, limited availability of instruments and tightly regulated 
interest rates. The refonn involved a phased decontrol and development of money 
10 During 1992-1993, the government introduced a dual exchange rate system with the official rate of 
exchange and the market rate of exchange. 
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markets with a view to the gradual integration among these markets. 
The inter-bank call money market, which was the core of the money market till the late 
1980s in India, was very active due to the high cash reserve requirement in India. After 
reforms, with the widening of the market through the participation of non-banking 
financial sectors and the introduction of CDs (Certificate of Deposits), scope for short-
term funds in the banking sector has expanded. This was reflected in the declining trend 
of the commercial banks to hold excess reserves. However, the deregulation of the 
interest rate led the call money rate to vary in a highly volatile manner; during the South-
East Asian crisis when the Reserve Bank undertook a series of tight monetary policy 
measures to control liquidity conditions, the average call rates reached the high level of 50 
% in January 1998. The Repos were introduced so as to stabilise money market rates by 
influencing short-term liquidity. The Reserve Bank switched over from auction-based 
repos to daily fixed-rate repos in November 1997 to provide signals to money market rates 
and to set a floor to call rates to impart stability to short-term interest rates. 
The introduction of Commercial Paper has widened the availability of short-term finance 
in the corporate sector, which can obtain funds at a lower cost than the cost of borrowing 
from banks. 
Stock Market 
During the pre-reform period, the stock market continued to suffer from senous 
deficiencies; i) the prevalence of many unhealthy practices, ii) the regulation of pricing 
and the high cost of issuing new shares, iii) eligibility of interest payment of debt as an 
item of expenses vis-a-vis dividend payment. These factors discouraged corporations 
from raising funds by issuing new shares and this ensured that a relatively high debt-equity 
ratio for Indian companies was the consequence. 
In the post-reform period, issuers of securities have been allowed to raise capital from the 
market without any consent from any authority either for floating the issue or for pricing it. 
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Deregulation of the primary issues market led to a substantial decrease in the cost of 
raising funds in the capital market, and resulted in a significant shift in capital structure for 
the corporate sector; in 1992-93 the equity share constituted over 20 % ofthe total sources 
of funds from 7.8% in 1991-92 and during this time an unprecedented upsurge of activity 
was experienced in the stock market; the BSE (Bombay Stock Exchange) Sensex 
increased by 266.9%. A further step was taken to strengthen the entry norms and 
disclosure standards to ensure the quality of the issues in the rapidly growing market, for 
which SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India) guidelines were set up. 
International Finance and Foreign Exchange Market 
The experience of the external payments difficulties of the early 1990s highlighted the 
weakness of the debt-dominated capital account financing in India. This has brought out a 
policy of fully fledged liberalisation of the foreign investment regime since 1991. In 
particular, foreign direct investment flows have been encouraged with full repatriation 
benefits to foreign investors. Portfolio Investment in listed companies can be made by 
foreign institutional investors (FITs) without any lock-in period for the remittance of the 
funds. 
At the same time, a market-determined exchange rate and a relaxation of exchange 
controls were pursued in the post-reform period, aimed at the integration of domestic 
foreign exchange markets with foreign markets and more operational freedom for dealing 
banks. Also, significant measures have been taken in the direction of removing 
restrictions on imports and exports. 
The evolution of the liberalisation in the foreign sector led to a considerable growth in the 
current and capital account transactions and has contributed to the overall balance of 
payments surplus since 1993-94. However, these external reforms were at the expense of 
a increase in domestic money supply. As is often the case in emerging markets, after the 
liberalisation there was a massive inflow of foreign funds into India generating excess 
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liquidity. Against this, the RBI had to purchase foreign currency for domestic currency in 
order to avoid an appreciation of the exchange rate. This led to sharp increases in narrow 
money, consequently leading to a higher rate of inflation in the post-reform from 6 % in 
1989 to 14 % in 1991 (CPl). 
3.1.6 Transaction Costs 
In general, in developing economies, transaction costs in the financial sector tend to be 
high. This is due to the under-developed financial intermediation and a relatively high risk 
involved in credit. Interest rate differentials between assets and deposit liabilities in the 
banking sector (though in an ad-hoc manner) may give an insight into the scale of these 
transaction costs. The mean annual interest rate differential between the government 
securities yields and deposit rates over the period 1951 to 1993 is 0.45%, whereas that 
between lending rates and deposit rates over the same period is 4.31 % (the 4.31 % amounts 
to about a third of the mean lending rates). There is a relatively large spread in the case of 
lending rates in comparison with the case of government securities yields. This implies 
that higher transaction costs are imposed on borrowers in India as compared with the case 
of borrowing by the government. 
As to the Indian stock market, high transaction costs are imposed on issuers, but this is 
also the case for investors, making the net returns low even in the-post reform period. For 
example, against an investment ofUS$100,000, the Indian non-institutional investor faces 
charges about 66 times higher than investors in the USA (1998/99). 
The factors, which contribute to high transactions costs for both issuers and investors, are 
considered to be: 
i) The operation of an open outcry trading system on the floor of the stock 
exchange!!: this tended to cause the intermittent trading of a relatively small number of 
stocks, and the market for most stocks is illiquid. 
11 The open-outcry was transfonned into electronic trading in a 'big bang' in 1995 in India. 
54 
ii) The inefficiency in the process: the clearing system was fragile, and the settlement 
procedure was slow and unreliable as it was based on physical security certificates. 
iii) Barriers to entry inhibiting competition, especially in the brokerage industry. 
In the case of mutual funds that are popular investments for the household sector, the 
following specific factors contribute to the high costs. 
i) In order to manage other people's funds a license (for which a fee is involved) is 
required from the regulatory body, SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India). 
ii) There are a limited number of SEBI licensed portfolio managers (for example, 21 
portfolio managers in 1998/99) in India, so that mutual funds face very little competition. 
iii) The portfolio managers charge fees irrespective of the performance, i.e. the fees are 
not on a return-sharing basis. 
The impact of transaction costs on heterogenous investors can be conjectured by the 
taxation system. In India, there is an increasing trend of indirect taxes as compared with 
direct taxes: the total indirect taxes as a percentage ofGDP is around 7% in 1960-61, 10% 
in 1970-71 and 14% in 1980-81, whereas the total direct taxes as percentage of GDP is 
maintained at around 3% over the period (Report on Currency and Finance, 1998-99). 
This implies that the Indian tax system is regressive, and the tax imposed on the income 
derived from financial savings tends to be more in favour ofthe rich rather than the poor. 
3.1.7 Monetary Policy in India 
The RBI pursues its monetary policy using the instruments of the Bank rate, OMOs (open 
market operations), CRR, SLR and Selective and Direct credit control. Before the 
financial liberalisation, open market operations as a method of monetary control were a 
useless weapon, plagued by the underdeveloped securities' and money markets and 
administered interest rates. The effect of the Bank rate on other interest rates was also 
limited by regulated interest rates. Yet, the Bank rate may have influenced the level of 
money supply in a manner peculiar to developing economies. Due to the lack of 
substitutes for the short-term liquidity in the banking sector (for which re-discounting bills 
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of exchange was a main source of short-term funds), the impact of the change in the Bank 
rate on the amount of credit might not have been trivial. The CRR, SLR and a selective 
direct control on credit were probably the main effective policy instruments. Since 1973, 
the RBI raised or reduced the CRR a number of times to influence the volume of cash 
within the commercial banking system and thus influence their volume of credit. Higher 
liquidity ratio, SLR, for the part of government securities12, is to reduce banks' ability to 
grant loans and advances to business and industry, hence anti-inflationary. To the extent 
that there were few substitutes of credit, direct credit control also performed effectively 
during the pre-reform period. These features are probably common in other developing 
economies. 
As a corollary to the financial reforms, the impact of the policy instruments on the 
financial markets has altered significantly. The liberalisation has initiated the transition 
from a direct monetary policy (i.e. CRR, SLR and credit control) to the use of indirect 
instruments (i.e. OMOs and the Bank rate) as the dominant tool of monetary policy. First, 
as other financial institutions and financial innovations develop, the CRR is seen as a tax 
on the banking system and its effectiveness is eroded as there is a loophole to avoid the 
CRR (Sellon and Weiner, 1997); e.g. an increase in the CRR leads banks to bid for more 
wholesale deposits. There is also pressure on RBI to reduce CRR to international levels 
and not to use it as an instrument of credit control (Datt and Sundharam, 2000). Second, 
the initiators of the financial reform envisaged that open market operations were to be the 
principal instrument of liquidity management in India. OMOs are attractive among others 
in that the base money is adjusted within short periods of time without incurring confusion 
in the financial markets and administrative problems in banks (Cargill, 1979). The 
evolution of the auction system of government securities at market-related interest rates is 
an important step. Third, the liberalisation of the administered interest rates will vitalise 
the role of the Bank rate. Interest rates have been emerging as instruments of resource 
allocation and there would potentially be an interest rate channel of monetary 
12 Remember that there are two tiers in SLR; government securities and government-approved (company) 
securities. 
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transmission. Then, it is possible that the Bank rate works as a signalling instrument of 
monetary policy by indicating the interest rate stance to all economic agents, as is the case 
in developed economies. For example, when India found itself in a severe liquidity 
position, the RBI reduced the Bank rate in 1999 and this prompted the banks to reduce the 
Prime Lending Rate. 
There are however some fundamental weaknesses remammg m the effectiveness of 
monetary policies. First, the Indian financial market is disturbed by the existence of two 
markets, one organised and the other unorganised 13 with the divergence in the structure of 
interest rates. There are borrowers who are entirely dependent on the unorganised market, 
especially in rural areas of India. A uniform implementation of monetary policy is 
difficult in the segmented financial market (Agrawal, 1978). Second, it is a cause of 
inflationary pressure. To the extent that the pressure is the result of the growth in bank 
financing, the RBI's general controls will have a positive effect, however, if it comes from 
the government's deficit financing (or the shortage of goods due to supply shocks), the 
RBI's control has little effect. It seems that the latter has been the case in India (Datt and 
Sundharam, 2000). Third, the overall effect of monetary policy via credit may be weak in 
India due to the relatively high currency-deposit ratio: the credit creating capacity is 
limited. Fourth, India was often confronted with a dilemma of conflicting objectives; the 
need to restrict money supply, but at the same time the need to provide funds to certain 
sectors for the economic growth of the country. Accordingly, the conflicting policy 
measures of direct credit control (contractionary policy) and the reduction of lending rates 
(expansionary policy) were often implemented. 
3.1.8 Concluding Remarks 
Some noticeable impacts of financial liberalisation are summarised as follows. On the 
negative side financial liberalisation is exacerbating the fiscal deficit due to increased 
\3 The PSBs and the Indian joint stock banks, etc. referred to as organised, have reasonable uniformity in 
respect of their practice, whereas indigenous banks and money lenders referred to as unorganised, practice 
banking business or only money lending with no uniformity. 
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interest rate payments as government securities' yields rise as they became market-related. 
This is also causing the banking sector's holdings of government debt to rise. Thus a 
tighter monetary policy means more holdings of government debt in relation to other 
assets in the banking sector. Eventually large interest rate payments and additional debt 
holding must be met by issues of high powered money, leading to higher inflation rates 
than otherwise (Sargent and Wallace, 1993). Besides, an unanticipated surge in capital 
inflows in the post-reform period contributed to a higher rate of inflation. From this point 
of view, the financial liberalisation has worsened the macroeconomic situation. In the 
wake of the occurrence of the large fiscal deficits in 1993-94, a recourse to money-
financing of the deficit was called for (Sen and Vaidya, 1997). The positive side is 
observed in the financial sector: First, financial savings in the household sector have been 
encouraged, recording an impressive growth from 6.9% of GDP in 1988-89 to 11.1 % in 
1994-95 (National Account Statistics; Central Statistics Organisation). This can be 
attributed to the improved interest rate structure (a positive real rate of return), increased 
financial intermediation and development of the financial system. Second, financial 
liberalisation creates an environment in which sectors are able to switch from one source 
of funds to another relatively easily, reflecting an emergence of competitiveness in 
financial markets. This, coupled with the increase in the saving in the household sector, 
widened the investment opportunities in the industrial sector. Finally, the reforms have 
not encompassed a reduction in the priority sector lending requirements, hence a large 
contraction of credit to the vulnerable sectors has been avoided. 
3.2 Flow of Funds Matrix in India 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The RBI has published articles covering the flows of funds since 1967 in the Reserve 
Bank of India Bulletin as cited by Green, Murinde, Suppakitjarak and Moore (2000). So 
far, there are 10 such articles covering detailed flow data sector-wise and instrument-wise 
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from 1951-52 to 1993-94 with the financial year starting 1st April and ending 31st March. 
It is surprising to find that there is a comprehensive detailed presentation of flow data 
available in India, since such data are believed to exist only in statistically advanced 
countries (Ruggles, 1987). 
This section investigates the published flow data, and based on the data a flow of funds 
matrix is constructed. This section is divided into three points. First, informal sector that 
is relevant to the household sector and the India-specific property of the financial 
intermediaries are analysed following the brief accounts of the published flow data. 
Second, the quality and limitation of the published data are examined. Third, a flow of 
funds matrix is compiled and the three representative matrices are presented with the 
comments. 
3.2.2 Flow of Funds Accounts in India 
In the original accounts of a flow of funds, the Indian economy is largely divided into six 
broad sectors of 1) banking, 2) other financial institutions (OFls), 3) private corporate 
business (PCB), 4) government, 5) Households and 6) rest of the world (ROW). The first 
four sectors are further divided into sub-sectors. Throughout the period of 1951-52 and 
1993-94, the government and PCB sectors were deficit sectors, whereas the household and 
the ROW were surplus sectors. Table 3.5 shows the sub-sectors and the composition 
where appropriate. 
The major instruments through which financial flows have taken place in India are: 
Currency, Deposits, Government securities, Company securities, Loans and Advances, 
Insurance and Provident funds and Foreign assets. 
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Table 3.5 Six disaggregated economic sectors in the published flow account in India 
Sectors Sub-sectors Composition 
Banking -RBI 
-Commercial banks 
-Co-operative banks and credit societies 
OFIs -Financial corporations and companies -Term lending institutions (e.g. IDBI 
-Insurance sector and ICICI) 
-Non-government provident funds -Investment institutions (e.g. mutual 
funds, provident funds) 
PCB -Private non-fmancial companies -All non-government public and 
-Co-operative non-credit societies 14 private limited companies 
-Branches of foreign companies 
Government -Central government 
-State government 
-Local authorities 
-Government non-departmental commercial 
undertakings 15 
Household No sub-sectors -All individuals 
-Non-government, non-corporate 
enterprises of farm and non-farm 
business 
-Non-profit institutions 
ROW No sub-sectors -Residents outside India 
-Governments of foreign countries 
-International organisations (e.g. IMF) 
IDBI=Indusmal Development Bank ofIndta, ICICI=Indusmal Credit and Investment CorporatIOn ofIndta 
3.2.3 Informal sector 
India is said to be a dualistic economy with a fonnal, modem sector existing side by side 
with a lower productivity infonnal sector (Datt and Sundharam 2000). There is 
tremendous heterogeneity in what falls in this infonnal sector. It is argued that the 
infonnal sector can embrace a whole range of economic activities that lack legal status; 
14 Co-operative non-credit societies have been developed as an integral part of a co-operative movement. 
The main purpose is to promote returns to the producers and raise their economic conditions. Most of the 
societies function at national, state, central and primary levels. The first three societies (apex societies) have 
fmancial transactions to a large extent among themselves, hence the magnitude ofa flow of funds of this sub-
sector against other sectors is small. In general, the operations of co-operative non-credit societies are 
similar to those of non-fm an cia I companies, so that they are categorised in the PCB sector. 
15 Non-departmental commercial undertakings consist oflimited companies in which the government's share 
participation is 51 % or more (RBI, 1967). 
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some of these activities may be unorganised and irregular, some survivalist, and some 
even criminal (Dasgupta 2003, p52). In the current study, the infonnal sector may be 
linked with the priority sectors in the household sector, as these sectors embrace fanners, 
the self-employed and small businesses, which feature in the infonnal sector 16. 
The share of the fonnal and infonnal sectors in total employment have remained constant 
at 10% and 90% respectively. For example, in 1995, the fonnal sector accounts for only 
27.53million workers, whereas the rest of the 312 million workers are engaged in 
agriculture as wage labourers, or self-employed in the infonnal sector (Datt and 
Sundharam, 2000). The majority is in agriculture; for example, about 82% of the 
workforce was engaged in agriculture in 1972-73, and its share has come down to about 
74% in 1987-88. 
The available data by the Central Statistical Organisation reveal the share of the 
agricultural sector in total GDP in 1950-51 at 55.4%, in 1970-71, 44.5% and 1990-91, 
30.9%. Although, there is a tendency to fall over the period, agriculture contributes a 
major share of the national income of India. 
Other than agriculture, the informal sector compnses mainly self-employed in 
manufacturing, construction, small transport and services, in which, due to the lack of 
capital, skill and technology, most of the employment continues to be low level. Dasgupta 
(2003) argues that in India, urban informal employment as a proportion of total 
employment is estimated to be 44.2 per sent. In particular, the infonnal services, such as 
the petty traders, street vendors, barbers are said to be the biggest employment generator in 
the urban India (Dasgupta, 2003 and Todaro, 1997). 
While the informal sector exerts a significant impact in tenns of employment and GDP, it 
has a disadvantage in terms of obtaining loans. The organised credit institutions were 
16 The discussion concentrating on the urban informal sector comprising a large number of small-scale 
production and service activities is beyond scope of this thesis. 
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extremely rigid in their requirement for security and margins were too high for the 
majority of small borrowers. The indigenous banks (including moneylenders), which are 
organised in the form of family or individual businesses, therefore play a dominant role in 
providing loans to the informal sector. Recently (exact date not known), they were 
estimated to meet at least 90% of the financial requirements of the informal sector, though 
the rates of interest charged by the indigenous bankers were very high. 
There is a need to strengthen the availability of resource in this sector in order to improve 
the formation of capital, technology and skill, so that productive employment yields a 
higher level of income. It also has an important implication in mitigating the problems of 
poverty in India. 
3.2.4 Financial Institutions in India 
The major commercial banks were nationalised in 1969. This was to promote the banking 
facilities available in remote areas and provide credit under the provision of 'priority 
sector lending requirements' as discussed in Section 3.1. This led to quite appreciable 
progress not only in the expansion of rural branches, but also in diverting an increasing 
share of bank funds to such sectors as agriculture and small scale industries (Agrawal, 
1978 and Sen, Roy, Krishnan and Mundlay, 1996). However, despite these developments, 
regional imbalances have been large and persistent as the bank service has tended to 
concentrate on prosperous regions. The inadequacy of the banking facilities in the 
backward areas makes the role of co-operative banks and credit societies distinct from that 
of commercial banks. 
Co-operative banks and credit Societies were set up by the co-operative movement of 
India with the objective of promoting thrift and saving by farmers and offering credit to 
them at low rates of interest. In India, the agricultural sector, though accounting for a 
significant proportion of the national product, has had difficulty in obtaining adequate 
support from institutional finance. Traditionally, the bulk of their credit needs have been 
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met by money lenders, who it is often argued, can exploit their monopoly position as the 
provider of credit. Co-operative banks and credit societies are, therefore, of special 
relevance to India as financial institutions for economic development of the disadvantaged 
(Datt and Sundharam, 2000) with implications for taking over the activities hitherto 
carried out by money lenders. 
OFIs cover all non-banking financial institutions. Peculiar to India is that the majority of 
the institutions are government-owned. They are functionally divided into two types; term 
lending institutions and investment institutions. The former have some resemblance in 
their functions to commercial banks. 
Among the term lending institutions, the largest in size and influence are IDBI (Industrial 
Development Bank of India) and ICICI (Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of 
India) 17. They not only subscribe to the equity of firms, but also supply direct term-loans 
to firms in the same way as commercial banks. The main financial sources of the term 
lending institutions have been obtained by issuing government-approved securities (i.e. 
bonds, shares and debentures), against which commercial banks involuntarily provide 
funds under the provision of SLR. These funds are then directed mainly toward the PCB 
sector. In a deregulated financial environment, these subsidised and captive sources have 
contracted and the government's support has declined, implying that they have to raise 
resources directly from the market. This suggests that the distinction between commercial 
banks and term lending institutions is further blurred in that they have to compete with 
each other to obtain funds, whereby sharing the role of interest rate determination and 
regulatory requirements (Sen and Vaidya, 1997). 
The investment institutions, which include Mutual funds, Unit Trust of India (UTI), life 
insurance companies (LIC) and non-government provident funds, obtain funds in the main 
from the household sector. After the deregulation of the capital market, the growth of 
mutual funds and UTI were prominent. LIC and non-government provident funds hold a 
17 ICIC is privately owned. 
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significant share in the total source of funds in the OFI sector. In India, there are 
substantial compulsory insurance schemes, under which the insurance and provident funds 
are used as a captive market for the government as such; i) the main uses of LIe's 
investable resources are government securities and loans and advances (each 
approximately sharing the total flows), ii) the contributions of the provident funds are 
invested predominantly in the form of government securities (around 80% of the total 
funds as per the government's guidelines), small savingsl8 and bank deposits (RBI, 1967, 
p.268). 
3.2.5 Qualification and Limitation of the Published Flow Data 
An example of the published flow accounts in India is shown in Appendicies 3.1 and 3.2; 
those of commercial banks as a sub-sector of the banking sector, in which sources 
(Appendix 3.1) and uses (Appendix 3.2) are recorded for the period between 1990-91 and 
1993-94. 
In general, the data sources for government, banking and OFIs sectors are based on the 
balance sheets of their own accounts, though the sectoral break-down of the flow data is 
not necessarily obtained from their own accounts. The break-down for a financial 
instrument is usually obtained through ownership surveys, but in the absence of such 
surveys, it is estimated based on the accounts of the investing sectors or the borrowing 
sectors (RBI, 1988). Sometimes, flow data themselves are derived from adding the 
sectoral break-down data, as is the case for bonds in the government non-departmental 
companies, which are not shown in their consolidated balance sheet, so the amount of 
borrowing through bonds has to be collected from the accounts of other sectors. In the 
earlier years, due to the data deficiency in many respects, crude assumptions were taken 
such as, 'paid-up capital' in commercial banks which were assumed to be held only by the 
household sector (RBI, 1967). 
18 Small savings comprise mainly post office saving deposits and national saving certificates. 
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The construction of the PCB sector requires much collaboration in its compilation. First, 
the assembly of basic financial data for PCB does not exist, therefore, the flow-of-funds 
accounts ofPCB are based oh the blown-up data of the sample companies, in other words, 
the data that are collected from the sample companies are adjusted for populations of the 
companies using the total paid-Up capital of these companies (RBI, 1988). Second, 
sectoral break-down of any items like 'paid-up capital' and 'debentures' are not available, 
and so they are derived by using the information reported by the asset holding sectors. 
Third, the accounting year is not uniform for all the companies; studies cover all 
companies, which close their accounts on any date during the period from 1st April to 31st 
March. 
The accounts for the household sector are derived from other sectors either as residual by 
netting the accounts of other sectors, or by using the benchmark ratios of the various 
surveys of financial instruments (RBI, 1988). The accounts of ROW are based on the 
balance of payments, published by the RBI in the form of credits or debits, that are 
constructed from the stand-point of India, hence for a flow of funds account, they are 
converted into the ROW. 
Over the period, SInce the first publication of the flow data, the methodology has 
undergone several revisions as the financial system develops and the availability of data 
improves. All the same, the flow of funds accounts in India are subject to a number of 
limitations as the construction requires diversified sources of data that accounting 
identities would not normally hold. The main drawbacks in the flow data in India are as 
follows. 
i) Non-reporting and under-coverage: some entries reported as sources are not 
reported as the uses or vice versa. For example, the survey on local authorities was 
discontinued after 1968-69, so it is in the flow accounts as well, but other sectors may 
report their transactions with local authorities, a discrepancy would then arise for the 
instrument in question, leading to statistical discrepancies (RBI, 1980). Another example 
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is in the PCB sector that in the earlier period between 1951-52 and 1954-55, the available 
data is only that of public limited companies, hence the data for private limited companies 
and foreign companies are assumed to be zero. Dawson asserts that this is the main reason 
for inconsistency (Dawson 1991a). 
ii) Lack of proper identification in linking the sectors issuing claims with the sectors 
holding these claims (RBI, 1980): hence the origin/destination of sectors involved in a 
given transaction cannot necessarily match. 
iii) Lack of uniform classification of various instruments by the issuing sectors and the 
holding sectors: for example, in India IMF loans to government are seen as loans in the 
ROW accounts, however, as deposits in RBI accounts. 
iv) Differences in timing of recording the entries: accounting periods of all sectors do 
not correspond over the same period. The financial year for RBI, commercial banks, 
Government and ROW runs from April to March and in respect of co-operative banks and 
credit societies and UTI, from July to June. In the case of the insurance sector, a calendar 
year (end of December) is used (RBI, 1967). In particular, the balance sheets of different 
PCBs are drawn at different points of time, so that when all the balance sheet data are 
pooled together for compilation, the matching of the total sources and uses in instruments 
is impossible (RBI, 1988). 
v) Valuation differences: in principle, revaluations are not considered as transactions 
in the flow of funds accounts, nonetheless, discrepancies in the valuation of financial 
assets arise between sectors. In the case of 'paid-up capital' in the PCB sector, the issuer 
of the claim records it at face value, meanwhile, the holder of the claim records it at the 
cost of acquisition (market value) (RBI, 1980). In estimating the holdings of government 
securities, the surveys of ownership of government debt show the face-value, whereas the 
holding sector's accounts pertain to book values. 
vi) The information sources change over time. 
Consequently, the consolidated form, which is derived from putting together all the 
individual sector accounts is plagued with large statistical discrepancies. See the example 
of the financial year 1993-94 in Appendix 3.3, which records a discrepancy of Rupees 
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(Rs.) -28,504 crore in total; 1 crore = 100 lakh = 10,000,000. 
3.2.6 Construction of a Flow of Funds Matrix 
In the wake of such large inconsistencies and discrepancies in the flow accounts, a 
relatively aggregated approach (i.e. by the sector), rather than a specific manner (i.e. not by 
the sub-sector) is taken place in constructing a flow of funds matrix, except for the 
banking sector. The banking sector is decomposed by sub-sector: RBI, commercial banks 
and the cooperative banks and credit societies. It is obvious that RBI is functionally 
different from commercial banks. The commercial banks also distinguish themselves 
from the cooperative banks and credit societies due to a large difference in financial 
regulatory framework; besides, it would be particularly valuable to be able to trace how 
funds are provided in rural or agricultural sectors through these institutions (Green et a!., 
2000). Sectors are then disaggregated into eight of 1) government, 2) RBI, 3) 
commercial banks, 4) co-operative banks and credit societies, 5) OFIs, 6) PCB, 7) 
household and 8) ROW. 
The main financial instruments are disaggregated into nine. See Table 3.6. High-powered 
money is disaggregated into 'currency' and 'bank reserves', since each has different 
sensitivity from policy instruments, e.g. the Bank rate as a tool of monetary policy is likely 
to exert more impact on bank reserves affecting credit flows in India. The government 
issues securities, small savings and deposits in order to finance the deficit and they are all 
classified as 'long-term government debt'. In the case of PCB, not only equities and 
debentures, but also fixed deposits are classified into 'company securities' as they are 
capital market instruments (RBI, 1991). Sector-oriented instruments such as provident, 
life and pension funds, are separately classified as 'provident funds' (Dawson, 1991 b). 
Next, the method of entering the data in the matrix is explained. In order to show the 
inter-sectoral relationship in a flow of funds system, flows originating in one sector must 
be consistent with flows recorded in the counter-sector (International Monetary Fund 
Institute, 1981). This is consistent with the specific instruments of 'bank reserves', 
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'Treasury Bills' and 'provident funds', but other broadly classified instruments need 
careful attention. In the case of 'currency' and 'deposits' all flow data and the sectoral 
break-downs are collected from the issuing sectors, and, in the case of 'loans and 
advances', from lending sectors. These data are entered in the flow of funds matrix. With 
respect to 'government debt' and 'company securities', the government deficit financing in 
the government sector and the capital financing in each sector as sources of funds are 
considered as data sources, since an investment category as uses of funds does not tell us 
the type of investment: whether 'paid-up capital', 'bonds' or 'debentures'. 
Table 3.6 Financial Instruments for a Flow of Funds Matrix 
Instruments Composition 
Currency Notes issued by RBI, Coins and one rupee notes issued by government 
Deposits Deposits (demand and time) ofRBI, commercial banks, 
co-operative banks and credit societies and OFIs 19 
Bank reserves Balance with the RBI in commercial banks 
Long-term government debt Government securities, Government deposits, Small savings 
Short-term government debt Treasury bills 
Company securities Paid-up capital, Bonds and debentures, Unit Trust capital, 
Fixed deposits ofPCB 
Loans and advances All sectors' loans and advances 
Provident funds Non-government provident, life and pension funds, 
Government provident funds 
Foreign assets Securities of foreign countries, Cash balances and fixed deposit 
with foreign banking sector, etc 
With this methodology, for example, in the case of commercial banks, the total flow and 
break-down data of 'Paid-up capital' (as company securities) and 'Deposits' (as bank 
deposit) in sources in Appendix 3.1 and 'Balance with RBI' (as bank reserves) and 'Bank 
credit' (as loans) in uses in Appendix 3.2 enter in the compiled matrix. 
19 The deposits with the OFIs are those received under the Companies deposit scheme, 1976 ofIDBI. 
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The advantages of our methodology are that first, statistical discrepancy is avoided 
(though the problem of unidentified sectors remains), and second, the financial flow data 
are mainly picked up from the statements of government, banking and OFIs sectors, 
whereas data collection from peB, household and ROW sectors is minimized or avoided. 
This is consistent with the assertion that the domestic and international reporting 
requirements on government and banking sectors generate better quality of data than other 
sectors (Green et al. 2000). 
3.2.7 Comments on the Flow of Funds Matrix 
Table 3.7a is the matrix of 1967-68 (1967 hereafter): this is before the nationalisation in 
the commercial banks in 1969. Table 3.7b is for 1989-90 (1989 hereafter) depicting the 
pre-financial liberalisation, and Table 3.7c is for 1993-94 (1993 hereafter) the post 
financial-liberalisation. These tables show the sources and uses for each sector for a 
financial instrument. The high-lighted cells indicated the origin of the data base2o• Tables 
3.8a, 3.8b and 3.8c show the net transactions respectively. 
By comparing 1967 with 1989 and 1993, the effect of the nationalisation of the 
commercial banks and the credit rationing can be examined, while with 1967 and 1989 
versus 1993, the effect of the financial reforms. However, it needs to be noted that the 
numerical magnitude of 1967 is so different from 1989 and 1993. Also since we only 
picked up a representative year from the different regimes, this may involve some bias. 
This caveat needs to be borne in mind. 
We start with the salient features drawn from the net transactions flow of funds matrix. 
See Tables 3.8a, 3.8b and 3.8c. 
20 For example, the currency data of 13903 (line 2 ofRBI) in Table 3.7c and the sectoral break-down are 
collected from the RBI statement, such that the data of uses in counter-sectors are ignored. 
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a) In general, it is particularly disconcerting that unidentified accounts in loans and 
advances are so large; they are attributed to the unidentified sector in the loans from 
the government and PCB sectors, due to a lack of break-down data (this is shown in 
sources and uses matrix in line 15 and 20 in Tables 3.7a, 3.7b and 3.7c). 
b) Sector surplus/deficit in the last line ofthe table indicates that for all three time periods 
the government and PCB sectors are deficit sectors with a negative sign, whereas the 
household and ROW sectors are surplus sectors with a positive sign. 1989 and 1993 
reveal the substantial increase in the flow of funds over the four years in the PCB and 
household sectors. The effect of the financial liberalisation seems to be apparent. 
c) The sector surplus/deficit line also reveals that in 1989 and 1993, the household sector 
plays a major role in financing the government and PCB sectors, whereas in 1967 the 
role is shared with the ROW sector. It illustrates the dependence on the foreign sector 
for funds in the earlier years in India. 
d) In the line of Foreign Assets, there is little outflow in 1967 and 1989, though in 1993 
there is some (Rs. 8,358 crore) from the RBI. It can be said that strict exchange 
controls restricted the holding of foreign assets in the pre-reform period. 
e) The comparison of 1989 and 1993 reveals that the dependence of the government on 
the RBI for funds was drastically curtailed in the post-reform period. The total of 
long- and short-term government debt falls from Rs. 14,122 crore in 1989 to Rs. 1,712 
crore in 1993. 
The sources and uses flow of funds matrix permits us to analyse the movement of funds 
in more specific manner than that in the net transactions flow of funds matrix. See Tables 
3.7a, 3.7b and 3.7c. 
a) The effect of the Priority Sector Lending Requirements stipulated in 1969 is featured 
in the bank credit to the household sector (line 17). In 1967, in the main the bank 
credit (Rs. 338.2 crore) is forwarded to the PCB sector (Rs. 238.8 crore) and rarely to 
the household sector (Rs. 15.3 crore). This situation reverses in 1989 and 1993, in 
which approximately 46-47 % of bank credit flows to the household sector. This 
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reflects the increased credit toward the priority sectors from 1969 onwards. At the 
same time, a similar pattern in the pre-reform (1989) and post-reform (1993) indicates 
that the deregulation programme in the post-reform period did not affect the bank 
credit towards the vulnerable sectors. 
b) In comparing 1989 and 1993, there is a remarkable increase in the volume of deposits 
in commercial banks and OFIs from the household sector, from Rs. 16,347 crore in 
commercial banks and Rs. 1,537 crore in OFIs in 1989, to Rs. 30,712 crore and Rs. 
9,276 crore respectively in 1993 (line 4 and 6). This is perhaps due to the 
improvement in the real interest rate or the financial intermediation after liberalisation. 
c) However, the substantial proportion of the increase in deposits in commercial banks is 
absorbed by long- and short-term government debt, reaching Rs. 29,551 crore in 1993 
from Rs. 6,143 crore in 1989 (total figures in line 8 and 9). It seems that the market-
related government securities' yields and the prudential measures of the post-
liberalisation period have contributed to this (RBI, 1995). 
d) While government debt soars in uses of the commercial banks in the post-reform, it 
emerges that the proportion of loans and advances in the total uses falls from 50.5 per 
cent in 1989 to 27.3 per cent in 1993 (line 17). 
e) The sources and uses flow of funds matrix provide insight into competitiveness 
amongst financial institutions. The ratio of bank credit to OFIs' credit towards the 
PCB sector has been drastically reduced: 4.21 in 1967, 1.14 in 1989 and 0.37 in 1993 
(calculated based on figures in line 17 and 19). The ratio of bank deposits to OFIs' 
deposits as sources has also declined: 11.96 in 1989 and 4.02 in 199321 (based on 
figures in line 4 and 6). The ratio of banks' obtaining funds through the capital market 
to that ofOFI's has increased in the post-reform period: 0.03 in 1967,0.04 in 1989 and 
0.54 in 1993 (based on figures in line 11 and 13). It is interesting to discover that the 
distinction between banks and OFIs is blurred, in particular the role of banks as major 
lending institutions to the PCB sector may be losing their prime position to the OFIs. 
£) Loans and advances have remained the main sources for filling the resource gap in the 
21 The OFl's deposit as sources in 1967 is zero; in the earlier period there are little deposit liabilities in this 
sector. 
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PCB sector, yet the proportion of company securities in sources (line 14) to the 
sector's total sources has been rising: 17.29 % in 1967,33.68 % in 1989 and 35.48 % 
in 1993. In particular, in comparing 1989 and 1993 the PCB witnesses more than a 
three-fold increase in company securities as a source of funds. The increased issue of 
new shares in this sector reflects the effect of loosening the tight controls in the stock 
market. 
g) The sharp increase in the total financial inflows from abroad from Rs. 1,515 crore in 
1989 to Rs. 14,248 crore in 1993 (line 21), probably owing to the liberalisation in the 
foreign sector, helped to finance the deficit sectors, in particular, the government 
sector. 
3.2.8 Conclusion 
The broad pattern of the compiled flow of funds appears to reflect the financial system in 
India described in Section 3.1. In particular, the compiled flow of funds seems to reflect 
the regulated financial sector in 1967 and 1989 and the de-regulated financial sector in 
1993. This study proves that a detailed presentation of a flow of funds is able to provide 
quantitatively a greater insight into how the nation's financial sector functions across 
sectors over the period in question. 
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Table 3.7a Flow of Funds Matrix 1967 (1967-1968) 
Government RBI 
S U S U 
I Currency 5S 
2 9.6 ;!ibb179i3. 
3 Deposits -10.9 'll , ,~ %67:8 
4 31.6 
5 
6 
7 Reserves 3.7 
8 LT Gov't Debt ~ 9 ST GOy't Debt 10 Comp. Sec. 
11 
12 31.4 
13 1.4 
14 7.7 
15 Loans & Adv. 245;3 
16 39 
17 88.2 
18 
19 38.8 
20 
21 c0f:¥618~8 1.,····:l1'TO· 
22 Proy. Funds ,\\ciLl16.7 
23 4.6 
24 Foreil(ll Assets \10; 
Total 1427 320.7 250.8 
Sector 
SurpluclDeficit -1106.3 
LT=long tenn, ST= short tenns 
High-lighted cell: Origin of flow data and break-up 
Sources: Flow data in the RBI Bulletin 
0.9 
66.1 
85.1 
4.6 
30.2 
0;8 
187.7 
-63.\ 
Commbercial 
Bank 
S U 
-0.1 
2 
430.1 
3.7 
69.6 
25.\ 
!' ···£O.sl 
20.6 
2.3 
3.3 
-38.9 
I;;·",' 338.2.; 
-4.4 
0 
Y"Y;:/\' ,·"0 
387.3 464.7 
77.4 
(Rs. crore=lO million rupees) 
Cooperative banks Unident 
& Credit Societies OFIs PCB Household ROW -itied Total 
S U S U S U S U S U 
0.\ 0.1 0.3 4.2 0.0 0 
2.5 1.2 5.1 158.9 0.0 0 
0.8 1.1 58.4 18.4 0 
-4.9 55.7 5.5 336.4 5.8 0.0 0 
68.2 5.7 62.5 0.0 0 
),;(),. 0.0 0 
0.0 0 
8.9 149.7 -0.4 101.8 6.3 0.0 0 
-5.7 16.1 -2.6 0 
0.0 0 
0.5 0.0 0 
lOt1 14.1 0.5 29.9 0.0 0 
0.5 19.4 0.1 15.1 0.0 0 
5.4 35 ~78.9 . 11.9 15.6 0.0 0 
34 20.2 85.2 20.3 -77.2 0 
26.1 4 0.0 0 
-6.6 2.5 238.8 15.3 0.0 0 
'%!\i195.2' 41.4 153.8 0.0 0 
4}27:6 67.4 27.8 -2 0.0 0 
. ~ ', .. 9.2 9.2 0.0 0 
() ;';'5:4" 9.6 633.8 0.0 0 
116.7 0.0 0 
305;5; 8 295.2 -2.3 0.0 0 
"{JiO ,Tt\, .1.4 ho.' Nil::O' rJ: ';·12:'''', . -0.6 0.0 0 
197.2 208.5 370.8 377.9 456.3 34 291.3 1132.6 17.7 733.7 -61.4 0 
0 
11.3 7.1 -422.3 841.3 716 -61.4 
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Table 3.7b Flow of Funds Matrix 1989 (1989-1990) 
Government RBI 
S U S U 
1 Currency I~'\"¥ .56, 
2 -77 \ ~ , , '806211 
3 Deposits -459 I; ;ilii)-49l?, 
4 3582 
5 121 
6 12 
7 Reserves 6541 
8 LT Gov't Debt :~i ,26 518. 3000 
9 ST Gov't Debt ;. "11136 11122 
10 Camp. Sec. ",,;:;' 3514; 
11 96 
12 44 
13 562 -19 
14 236 
15 Loans & Adv. ';;6006 
16 341 T. 1494i 
17 3456 
18 
19 2148 
20 
21 '7':' -99' 1'0;: !,o;:'i, 
22 Prov. Funds ::j.:, i 4157N 
23 34 
24 Foreign Assets o >:%'>,,0111 i'si -217 
Total 51227 10157 14112 
Sector 
Surp1ucIDeficit -41070 
LT=long term, ST= short terms 
High-lighted cell: Origin of flow data and break-up 
Sources: Flow data in the RBI Bulletin 
15380 
1268 
Commbercial 
Bank 
S U 
-29 
147 
0 
26820' 
357 
i!!'i'<6541 
6006 
137 
626 
\\,°#"'356 
28 
2211 
312 
0 
-112 
;16739 
2322 
,;";);:,59 
13; 
29445 33088 
3643 
(Rs. crore=10 million rupees) 
Cooperative banks Unident 
& Credit Societies OFls PCB Household ROW -ified Total 
S U S U S U S U S U 
5 2 78 0 0 
62 182 171 7577 0 0 
18 -88 79 -41 0 
548 710 1975 16347 3658 0 0 
.;,?1466 137 1208 0 0 
.. 
""2242 298 1537 38 0 
0 0 
470 10817 7263 -1038 0 
-123 0 0 
368 339 -29 2210 0 
260 0 
457 316 20 49 0 0 
165 'c" 9296 2769 3184 602 -178 0 
3383 2178 63 0 0 
57 503 740 732 635 -3339 0 
11 1244 4 5 -1 0 
8 25 5362 7888 0 0 
2426 499 1927 0 0 
539 10990' 4707 1029 162 -83 0 
.:i4019, 302 -3717 0 
"i~tiiO ,\2" , 711: 844 . "iF:' -,' " 1515 0 0 
4157 0 0 
67 9763 25 0 0 ~ I::' !~i!*l :, :,:Z::-7i "i, .'.<:: -212 0 0 2538 3689 23910 18328 9451 11883 53680 585 5790 -5889 0 
0 
1151 2772 -8877 41797 5205 -5889 
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Table 3.7c Flow of Funds Matrix 1993 (1993-1994) 
Government RBI 
S U S U 
I Currency f '1i0'll'r. 89 
'; f231 1 2 
297 
3 Deposits -378 
4 8772 
5 191 
6 
7 Reserves 16116 
8 LT Gov't Debt 
'*'1it -5332 9 ST Gov't Debt 1;':~~4739 7044 10 Comp. Sec. 
11 6454 707 
12 726 
13 547 80 
14 373 
15 Loans & Adv. 1584' 
16 -22 I£i, it::4825il 
17 3450 
18 
19 1827 
20 
21 .. \. 8417\ /618 
22 Prov. Funds 1:"°8305' 
23 56 
24 Foreign Assets -230. 8358 
Total 84572 18392 32956 6032 
Sector 
SUIllluclDeficit -66180 -26924 
LT=long tenD, ST= short tenns 
High-lighted cell: Origin of flow data and break-up 
Sources: Flow data in the RBI Bulletin 
Commbercial Cooperative banks 
Bank & Credit Societies 
S U S U 
-35 
-453 626 
541 
.,45780 -1260 
.. " 5963 
420 
':1:'16116' 
28558 420 
993 
1387 
.' 8131 
87 "·\'2363" 
1074 197 
1602 
0 -40 
-4259 -125 
'''18715 6 
:+12798 
199 -52 
"iF -2431 .. ";t:iY· ;1': 
.i.< :{~6 . F \~n'j':;, 
49608 68458 8115 13322 
18850 5207 
(Rs. crore= 1 0 million rupees) 
Unident 
OFIs PCB Household ROW -itied Total 
S U S U S U S U 
-3 -16 143 0 0 
-59 267 13225 0 0 
101 1682 373 0 
304 4123 30712 3129 0 0 
98 5674 0 0 
.11380 1723 9276 -39 0 
0 0 
14898 6626 4195 0 
150 215 0 0 
318 672 8 2354 0 
820 150 0 
1398 69 28 55 0 
0~~15145 3603 9056 319 269 0 
8893 !i:181541. 6037 1249 0 0 
1371 1096 710 -216 1337 0 
-432 2 11 0 0 
28 6468 8763 0 0 
3883 3198 -5717 0 
:22638. 17243 1630 183 -1608 0 
10938' -8 -10946 0 
;:.;, 1132.1 1.'::.·'4324 .~;'.{.'.0:'" 14248 0 0 
8305 0 0 
19692 111 19491 34 0 0 ~203 .-:; • 53; • lit: •. ~',L 7972 0 0 
48316 48435 51170 20969 14304 110065 7939 20884 -9577 0 
0 
119 -30201 95761 12945 -9577 
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Table 3.8 Flow of Funds Matrix in net transactions (Rs. crore=10 million rupees) 
a) 1967 (1967-1968) 
Gov't RBI Corn. Coop. OFIs PCB House 
Bk Bk 
Currency 4.1 -178.4 1.9 2.6 1.3 5.4 163.1 
Deposit 20.7 -67.8 -430.1 -72.3 56.8 11.2 398.9 
Reserves -3.7 3.7 
LT Gov'tDt -402 66.1 69.6 8.9 149.7 -0.4 101.8 
ST Gov't Dt -118 85.1 25.1 0 -5.7 0 0 
Comp.Sec. 40.5 4.6 25.7 -95.2 30.2 -78.3 56.9 
Loans & Adv. -539.5 30.2 381.5 167.3 81.7 -368.2 -291.3 
Prov. Funds -112.1 -305.5 8 411.9 
Foreign Asset 0 0.8 0 0 -1.4 0 0 
Sector 
surplus/deficit 
-1106.3 -63.1 77.4 11.3 7.1 -422.3 841.3 
b) 1989 (1989-1990) 
Gov't RBI Corn. Coop. OFIs PCB House 
Bk Bk 
Currency -133 -8062 118 62 187 173 7655 
Deposit 3256 491 -26463 -900 -1620 2410 19092 
Reserves -6541 6541 
LT Gov'tDt -26518 3000 6006 470 10817 0 7263 
ST Gov'tDt -11136 11122 137 0 0 0 0 
Comp.Sec. -2576 -19 2821 -292 -5229 -3383 5750 
Loans & Adv. 160 1494 14470 1811 8507 -8137 -11883 
Prov. Funds -4123 -9889 67 13920 
Foreign Asset 0 -217 13 0 -1 -7 0 
Sector 
surplus/deficit -41070 1268 3643 1151 2772 -8877 41797 
c) 1993 (1993-1994) 
Gov't RBI Corn. Coop. OFIs PCB House 
Bk Bk 
Currency 208 -13903 -488 626 -62 251 13368 
Deposit 8585 -2319 -45360 -6682 -10975 5944 45662 
Reserves -16116 16116 
LT Gov'tDt -49365 -5332 28558 420 14898 0 6626 
ST Gov't Dt -8402 7044 993 0 150 0 0 
Cornp.Sec. 3361 787 -3981 -2166 -4536 -14482 16613 
Loans & Adv. -12088 -5443 23018 13009 20539 -22078 -14304 
Prov. Funds -8249 -19692 111 27796 
Foreign Asset 
-230 8358 -6 0 -203 53 0 
Sector 
surplus/deficit -66180 -26924 18850 5207 119 -30201 95761 
LT=long term, ST=short term, Coop Bk=Co-operative banks and credit societies 
Sources: Flow data in the RBI Bulletin 
ROW Unidenti 
-fied 
0 0.0 
64.2 18.4 
0.0 
6.3 0.0 
16.1 -2.6 
15.6 0.0 
615.5 -77.2 
-2.3 0.0 
0.6 0.0 
716 -61.4 
ROW Unidenti 
-fied 
0 0 
3737 3 
0 
0 -1038 
-123 0 
636 2292 
718 -7140 
25 0 
212 0 
5205 -5889 
ROW Unidenti 
-fied 
0 0 
4811 334 
0 
0 4195 
215 0 
1576 2828 
14281 -16934 
34 0 
-7972 0 
12945 -9577 
Total 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Total 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Total 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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Appendix 3.1 
STATEMENT 1.2: COMMERCIAL BANKS (reproduced) (Rs. Crore) 
Reserve Bank of India Bulletin January 1998 
Sources 1990·91 1991·92 1992·93~ 1993.94@ 
1. Paid·Up Capital 1,229 912 680 8,131 
a) Banking 128 0 0 707 
i) Reserve Bank of India 128 0 0 707 
b) Other Financial Institutions 0 0 0 0 
i) Insurance 0 0 0 0 
c) Government 1,371 846 628 6,454 
i) Central Government 1,369 846 625 6,452 
ii) State Governments 2 0 3 2 
d) Households 0 0 0 820 
e) Others -270 66 52 150 
2. Deposits 30,523 38,227 37,825 45,780 
a) Banking 518 -1087 1,254 -1,260 
i) Co-operatives 518 -1087 1,294 -1,260 
b) Other Financial Institutions 1,544 789 3,964 304 
i) Financial Corporations 1,359 780 3,861 -235 
ii) Insurance 296 82 93 251 
iii) Provident Fund -111 -73 10 288 
c) Private Corporate Business -502 8,438 -3,753 4,123 
i) Companies -524 8,599 -4,786 3,830 
ii) Non-Credit Societies 22 -161 1,033 293 
d) Government 2,649 -1,267 583 8,772 
i) Central & State Governments 845 109 -247 1,902 
ii) Local Authorities 636 -62 114 3,385 
iii) Commercial Undertakings 1,168 -1,314 716 3,485 
e) Rest Of the World 10,295 16,863 8,766 3,129 
n Households 16,019 14,491 27,011 30,712 
3. Borrowings 5,998 ·5,421 5,050 ·6,753 
a) Banking 4,018 -5,635 2,326 -3,917 
i) Reserve Bank of India 3,993 -5,521 2,263 -3,844 
ii) Co-operatives 25 -114 63 -73 
b) Other Financial Institutions 1,676 56 744 -2,593 
i) Financial Corporations 1,676 56 744 -2,593 
c) Rest Of the World 304 158 1,980 -243 
4. Bills Payable ·82 2,929 ·272 3,566 
a) In India -85 2,929 -272 3,525 
b) Outside India 3 0 0 41 
5. Other Liabilities 4,807 0 0 0 
6. Branch adjustment with offices outside India ·78 0 122 271 
7. Due to Branches/Parent Offices Abroad ·9,823 ·6,686 -4,330 4,588 
TOTAL 32,574 29,961 39,075 55,583 
@ Provisional Estimates 
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Appendix 3.2 
STATEMENT 1.2: COMMERCIAL BANKS (reproduced) (Rs. Crare) 
Reserve Bank of India Bulletin January 1998 
Uses 1990·91 1991·92 1992·93@ 1993·94@ 
1. Cash In Hand 417 563 345 ·888 
a) RBI Notes 410 558 340 -864 
b) One Rupee Notes and Coins 7 5 5 -24 
2. Balances with RBI 3,109 5,865 ·5782 16,116 
3. Investments 10,932 16,315 15,757 24,196 
a) Banking 16 -1 23 -67 
i) Co-operatives 16 -1 23 -67 
b) Other Financial Institutions 1,398 715 -1,097 41 
i) Financial Corporations 1,398 715 -1,097 41 
c) Private Corporate Business -32 745 289 1,601 
i) Companies -32 745 289 1,601 
d) Government 9,554 14,837 16,546 22,627 
i) Central Government 5,935 10,132 11,445 22,453 
ii) State Governments 2,009 2,731 1,974 1,281 
iii) Commercial Undertakings 1,105 780 2,440 711 
iv) Local Authorities 630 -74 51 -580 
v) Other Government Securities -125 1,268 636 -1,238 
e) Rest of the World -4 19 -4 -6 
4. Bank Credit 14,856 9,300 25,772 18,715 
a) Banking 2 17 10 6 
i) Co-operatives 14 17 10 6 
b) Other Financial Institutions 4,222 17 30 28 
c) Private Corporate Business 57 4,659 8,190 6,468 
i) Non-Credit Societies 4,165 456 145 463 
ii) Companies 3,836 4,203 8,045 6,005 
d) Government 151 1,446 7,472 3,450 
i) State Governments 3,480 -319 555 420 
ii) Commercial Undertakings 205 1,930 6,335 3,396 
iii) Quasi-Government Bodies 6,782 -165 582 -366 
e) Households 1,610 3,161 10,070 8,763 
5. Branch Adjustment 1,610 2,389 ·623 4,093 
a) With Offices outside India 0 2,389 -623 4,093 
6. Other Assets 
° 
-351 ·22 375 
TOTAL 30,924 34,081 35,447 62,607 
.. @ ProvISional Estimates 
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Appendix 3.3 
STATEMENT 8: FINANCIAL FLOWS - INSTRUMENT WISE (1993-94) (reproduced) (Rs. Crore) 
Reserve Bank of India Bulletin January 1998 
Instrument/Sector Other Private Rest Discre-
Banking Financial Corporate Govemment' OfThe Households pancy 
Total 
Institutions Business World 
Sources Uses Sources Uses Sources Uses Sources Uses Sources Uses Sources Uses Sources Uses (Sources 
-Uses) 
1993-94@ 
1. Currency and Deposits 68.512 100 11.380 20.874 2,050 7,555 9,724 1,193 316 2,546 0 61,400 91,982 93,668 -1,686 
2. Investments 9,700 35,042 15,312 19,128 16,104 6,539 45,714 7,897 27,520 13,522 0 15,115 114,350 97,243 17,107 
a. Central & State Govemments' Securities 0 25,402 0 7,141 0 1,200 40,976 0 0 239 0 175 40,976 34,157 6,819 
b. Other Govemment Securities 0 -988 0 5,313 0 0 4,738 0 0 0 0 672 4,738 4,997 -259 
c. Corporate Securities 0 1,643 0 8,516 16,104 0 0 373 0 13,283 0 4,364 16,104 28,179 -12,075 
d. Bank Securities 9,700 0 0 580 0 36 0 6,981 0 0 0 848 9,700 8,445 1,255 
e. Other Financial Institutions' Securities 0 166 15,312 0 0 5,082 0 1,100 0 0 0 9,056 15,312 15,404 -92 
of which 
i) Mutual Funds (including units of UTI) 0 0 10,595 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,272 10,595 1,272 9,323 
f. Foreign Securities 0 8,352 0 -73 0 53 0 0 27,520 0 0 0 27,520 8,332 1,91,988 
g. Others 0 467 0 -2,349 0 168 0 -557 0 0 0 0 0 -2,271 2,271 
3. Loans and Advances -2,682 30,867 8,085 22,875 23,317 10,938 8,115 1,584 -164 5,071 14,541 0 51,212 71,335 -20,123 
4. Small Savings 0 0 0 706 0 0 7,157 0 0 0 0 6,541 7,157 7,157 0 
5. Life Fund 0 0 8,643 0 0 0 939 0 0 34 0 9,548 9,582 9,582 0 
6. Provident Fund 0 0 10,882 0 0 0 7,366 0 0 0 0 18,248 18,248 18,248 0 
7. Compulsory Deposits -8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -8 -8 -8 0 
8. Trade Debt or Credit 0 0 492 0 -1,682 0 687 2,922 0 0 0 -1,190 -503 1,732 -2,235 
9. Foreign claims not elsewhere classified 0 20,204 15 0 0 0 0 54 -8,551 -926 0 0 -8,536 19,332 -27,868 
10. Other Items not elsewhere classified 6,587 7,704 5,979 3,953 4,378 -842 1,669 1,497 0 0 0 0 18,613 12,312 6,301 
TOTAL 82,109 93,917 60,788 67,536 44,167 24,190 81,371 15,147 19,121 20,247 14,541 1,09,54 3,02,097 3,30,601 -28,504 
.. 
• Excludes Local AuthOrities except Port Trusts 
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Notation 
BSE (Bombay of Stock Exchange) 
CDs (Certificate of Deposits) 
CRAR (Capital to Risk-weight Assets Ratio) 
CRR (Cash Reserve Ratio) 
CS (Company Securities) 
ER (Excess Reserves) 
FITs (Foreign Institutional Investors) 
GD (Government Debt) 
LA (Loans & Advances) 
LIC (Life Insurance Companies) 
OFIs (Other Financial Institutions) 
OMOs (Open Market Operations) 
PCB (Private Corporate Business) 
PLR (Prime Lending Rate) 
PSBs (Public Sector Banks) 
RBI (Reserve Bank of India) 
ROW (Rest of the World). 
SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India) 
SLR (Statutory Liquidity Ratio) 
UTI (Unit Trust of India) 
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Chapter 4 Data, Model Specification and Econometric 
Methodology 
4.1 Data 
A theoretical flow of funds model is presented in a general equilibrium framework for 
India, in which behavioural equations and market clearing endogenous variables are 
detennined for empirical application. Then, based on the compiled flow of funds 
matrix in the previous chapter, we deploy the derivation of the stock data for the 
sample period from 1951-52 to 1993-94. This is followed by the presentation of the 
whole list of variables used for estimation. 
4.1.1 Theoretical Flow of Funds Model 
A theoretical flow of funds model in a general equilibrium framework is presented in 
Table 4.1 in which each column represents disaggregated sectors and each row 
represents different categories of assets and liabilities. The table presents 7 sectors and 
8 financial assets that cover the period from 1951-53 to 1993-94. There are two 
points, which are different in its construction from a flow of funds matrix in the 
previous chapter. First, in the theoretical model, the RBI is consolidated in the 
government sector: in general, the RBI is seen as an agent of the government in India 
(e.g. the government issues securities to the RBI for monetization), so that it is treated 
as part of the government sector in the model. Second, Government debt implies only 
long-term. Treasury Bills (or short-term government debt) are not considered in the 
theoretical flow of funds model on the grounds that Treasury Bills in the RBI will be 
reflected in the quantity of currency, and also Treasury Bills in uses in other sectors are 
negligible. Thus there is no market for short-term liquid assets in the model. In 
developed economies, the immediate impact of any monetary policy changes is felt in 
the money market and normally transmitted to the other related markets. Yet, in the 
underdeveloped money markets in developing economies, similar effects are weak. 
From this aspect, the omission of the Treasury Bills market will not distort the broad 
picture of the financial system in India. 
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Table 4.1 Theoretical flow offunds in Financial and Real Sectors in India 
Gov't Banks Coop OFls PCB Household ROW 
(G) (B) (CO) (OFI) (PCB) (H) (ROW) 
Financial Sector: surplus (+), deficit (-) 
Currency 
-tl.GCUR +tl.HCURO 
(CUR) 
Bank Reserves 
-tl.GR +tl.BR (.) 
(R) 
Deposit -tl.BDEP -tl.CODEP + tl. PCBDEP (.) +tl.HDEP(.) 
(DEP) 
Gov't Debt -tl.GGD +tl.BGD(.) +tl.COGD +tl.OFIGD(.) +tl.HGD (.) 
(GD) 
Company Sec. +tl.Bcs(.) -tl.COcs -tl.OFIcs(.) -tl.PCBcs(.) +tl.Hcs (.) 
(CS) 
Loans & +tl.BLA(.) +tl.COLA +tl.OFILA(.) -tl.PCBLA(.) -tl.HLA (.) 
Advances 
(LA) 
Provident funds -tl.OFlpF +tl.HPF (.) 
(PF) 
Foreign Reserves -tl.GFR +tl.ROWFR 
JFR) 
(1) Net worth (-) 0 0 0 (-) (+) (+) 
Real Sector: inflow (+), outflow -) 
Tax (T) +G(T) -H(T) 
Wage (W) - PCB(W) +H(W) 
Goods -GE + PCB(Y) -H(C) 
- PCB(I) 
(2) Net position (-) 0 0 0 (-) (+) 
(1) - (2) = 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bank Reserves=Total Reserves, Gov't=Govemment + RBI, Banks=Commerclal banks, Coop-Cooperative banks and credIt socIeties 
GSY=Govemment securities yields, RS=Retum on shares, LR=Lending rate 
GE=Govemment Expenditure, Y=Gross National Product, I=Investment, C=Consumption 
Within-period 
Endog. variables 
=0 
=0 ~ GR 
=0 tl. DEP 
=0 tl.GGD or 
GSY 
=0 RS 
=0 LR 
=0 tl.PF 
=0 
=0 
=0 
=0 
=0 
=0 
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In any cell in the financial sector, (±)AI; refers to the J'th sector's net purchases (+) or 
net sales (-) of the i'th asset during the unit time period of one year. The endogenous 
variables in the cells which are assumed to be explained by an asset demand and/or 
supply function is denoted by O. This implies that the (±) AI; (.) represents the desired 
net acquisition of ;'th assets or liabilities by sector J. 
We have selected financial assets (i.e. (±) AI;) that comprise the major elements in 
each sector's portfolio and also with a view to studying the effect on the financial 
flows in changes in policy variables. A flow of funds in the cooperative banks and 
credit societies and the ROW sectors are considered as an exogenous variable, since it 
is relatively too small to be explained by the demand functions. The empty cells imply 
either the transaction is none or the transaction is small enough to be ignored, so that 
they are also treated as being exogenous. 
In the columns, the net worth in the financial sector is the NAF A (net acquisition of 
financial asset) which is to equal the net position of the real sector, hence (1) - (2) = O. 
In the rows, the row-sum zero presents the market clearing conditions. With an 
assumption of the exogenous sectoral NAF As, an N-market flow of funds matrix 
determines N-l endogenous variables (Backus et al. 1980 and Green 1984). 
Currency (CUR) has its nominal yield fixed at zero and that currency is typically 
thought of the Nth or the residual market. 
Each financial market is cleared as follows: 
i) The bank rate and deposit rates are set by the authorities and financial 
institutions, hence bank reserves (~GR ) and deposits (~DEP) are demand-
determined I. We also assume that provident funds (~PF) are demand-determined. 
Therefore in the bank reserves, deposits and provident funds markets, quantities rather 
than the interest rates make the within-period adjustment. 
ii) With respect to government debt (GD), before the financial liberalisation 
government securities yields were manipulated by the authorities, the flow of 
government debts are therefore determined by the asset-choice of investors, that is, 
I The central bank accepts all reserves, and banks accept all deposits placed with them at the current rate 
of interest, which they change from time to time. 
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government debts are infinitely supply elastic (Green, 1982). After the financial 
reforms in the early 1990s, government securities yields have been set at market-
related rates, thus it may now be more reasonable to solve the model for the level of 
interest rates. Hence we consider both (in simulation): one is to endogenise 
government debt (~GGD), and the other is to endogenise government securities' yields 
(GSyl 
iii) In the Company Securities and Loans and Advances markets, the interaction of 
the sectoral asset demand and supply will determine the equilibrium values of the 
return on shares (RS) and the lending rate (LR). In respect to the latter, although 
lending rates are regulated to some degree, against the subsidised rates to particular 
sectors, there are compensating lending rates toward corporate sector that are assumed 
to be determined by the market. 
The table provides insight into the mechanism linking the financial sector to the real 
sectors. The sector surplus/deficit is linked to the real sector in a simple chain-like 
path. PCB sector is assumed to produce the entire income (y), carries out investment 
(I) for replacement and net investment, and sells consumption (C) and government 
expenditure (GE) to household and government sectors respectively. The PCB 
sector's deficit, that is the excess of investment over saving, is financed through 
issuing company securities, borrowing or withdrawing internal funds. Wages (W) are 
paid to households for labour from PCB. The household sector's surplus is their 
savings from their wages after tax (T) and consumption (C), and this is distributed in 
the financial sector. The government collects tax (T) and purchases goods (GE). The 
budget deficit is financed either by issuing securities, printing high-powered money or 
borrowing from ROW (Backus, Brainard, Smith and Tobin, 1980). The real sector 
variables are assumed to be exogenous in this model. 
Balance Sheet Identity 
The balance sheet account for each sector is outlined in the following contexts and the 
detailed discussion of balance sheet identities for banks, OFIs, PCB and household 
2 However, for econometric estimation, the government securities' yields are treated as exogenous, since 
a large part of the sample period belongs to the period, in which the government controlled the level of 
the yields. 
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sectors are left in the subsequent sector-study chapter. 
The government's budget constraint is defined as GE - G(T)= ~GCUR + ~GR + ~GGD + 
~GFR3. It is assumed that the government does not attempt to influence the supply of 
currency but issues legal tender to meet the requirements of firms and individuals (Datt 
& Sundaharam, 2000). Hence, narrow money is determined by demand functions 
here. There are however two conflicting views on the determination of money stock. 
One is a standard approach that the money supply is an exogenous policy instrument. 
This is based on the assumption of a definite mUltiple relationship between the stock of 
money and the liabilities of the central bank4. The other view is that the quantity of 
money is endogenous reflecting the economic behaviour of banks and other private 
economic units and also the growth of nominal income (Hester and Tobin 1967, Mayes 
and Savage 1983 and Owen 1986). Sen and Vaidya (1997) comment that in a 
repressed financial system, one should not expect great variation or instability in the 
money multiplier, supporting the view that the money supply is exogenous. 
Notwithstanding this, if the reserve ratio is mandatory, the bank would hold fluctuating 
amounts of excess reserves for precautionary reasons and the multiplier would not be 
stable (Cobham, 1991). Moreover, in the period of fixed exchange rates, it is more 
plausible that the money stock is treated as demand determined (Mayes and Savage, 
1983). On these grounds, our approach, that money is demand-determined may be 
appropriate. Similarly, government securities are determined by investors' asset 
choice in the pre-reform period. The implication is that no allowance was made for the 
authorities' debt management operations, or in other words, the government's 
obligations were not used as an independent shift-variable in the model structure. In 
India, in order to accommodate the changes in the government deficit, the SLR was 
used as a policy instrument, by which a certain proportion of government securities 
were obtained as pre-emption. It can be seen from the level of SLR; it reached its 
highest level of 38 % in 1988 when government was experiencing a substantial budget 
deficit (Chapter 3). In the post-reform period, as the government securities' yields 
became market-related, there has been more scope in ~GGD. not entirely depending on 
SLR, in debt management. 
3 Interest payments on government debt are subsumed in government expenditure. 
4 It is argued that so long as the central bank can change the level of a penal rate on their loans to banks, 
it can control its own liabilities, hence the stock of money can be controIled. 
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The banks balance sheet identity is Deposits = Bank Reserves + Government Debt + 
Company Securities + Loans and Advances. Other sources of bank funds are assumed 
to be exogenously given. The OFIs balance sheet identity is Company Securities + 
Provident Funds = Government debt + Loans and Advances. PCB as a deficit sector 
holds liabilities in the form of company securities and loans and advances. The PCB' s 
holdings of deposits may be seen as internal funds. The Household sector holds five 
financial assets of currency, government debt, company securities, provident funds and 
bank deposits and one liability ofloans and advances. Following the view of Dawson 
(1991a), it is postulated that the wealthy population sector has a large financial surplus 
which is placed into various financial assets responding to interest rate levels and 
differentials, whereas the large poorer group, farmers and small business owners, 
account for the bulk of borrowing from banks for farming or business. 
4.1.2 Flow and Stock data for Econometric Estimation 
The estimation sample period consists of 43 annual observations for the period 1951-
52 to 1993-94. The financial year begins on 1 st April and ends on 31 st March. The 
financial stock data for the whole time series are not available. Therefore, based on 
the compiled flow of funds matrix in Chapter 3, we have derived the stock data for 
behavioural equations. Using the end-of-year stock data 31st March 1951 as a 
benchmark position, the subsequent stock data are constructed by incrementing the 
flow data collected from the net transactions flow of funds matrix such as in Table 
3.8a, 3.8b and 3.8c in Chapter 3. 
Table 4.2a shows the stock data on the 31 st March 1951. The stock data of 
government, banking, OFIs and PCB sectors are collected from various official 
publications. For the household sector, such publications are not available, therefore 
the benchmark stocks are broadly approximated in such a way that elements in the 
matrix satisfy market clearing conditions. Table 4.2b presents the flow data for the 
period 1 st April 1951 to 31 st March 1952. By adding both figures in Table 4.2a and 
4.2b, the stock data on 31 st March 1952 are obtained and they are presented in Table 
4.2c. Repeating this process up to March 1994 generates series of end-of-year stocks 
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Table 4.2 Flow/Stock data for behavioural equations 
a. Stock data on 31st March 1951 Rs. crore 
Gov't Banks OFIs PCB Household Exogenous Total 
CUR (-1439.0) 1439.0 0.0 0.0 
R (-67.2) 67.2 0.0 0.0 
DEP (-819.0) 59.5 696.2 63.4 0.0 
GD (-732.6) 263.1 292.3 175.4 1.8 0.0 
CS 35.0 -40.0 -265.4 283.5 -13.1 0.0 
LA 488.8 299.8 -54.0 -840.1 105.5 0.0 
PF (-508.5) 563.7 -55.2 0.0 
Net Worth -2238.8 35.0 43.6 -259.8 2317.6 102.4 0.0 
b. Flow data during 1st April 1951 to 31st March 1952 Rs.crore 
Gov't Banks OFIs PCB Household Exogenous Total 
CUR (117.4) -116.7 -0.7 0.0 
R (13.5) -13.5 0.0 0.0 
DEP (33.0) -1.7 -28.2 -3.1 0.0 
GD (-49.0) -60.6 32.7 -4.8 81.7 0.0 
CS -1.0 2.2 -56.3 7.0 48.1 0.0 
LA -22.0 16.1 -34.3 40.2 0.0 
PF (-39.6) 43.9 -4.3 0.0 
Net Worth 81.9 -64.1 11.4 -92.3 -98.8 161.9 0.0 
c. Stock data on 31st March 1952 Rs. crore 
Gov't Banks OFIs PCB Household Exogenous Total 
CUR (-1321.6) 1322.3 -0.7 0.0 
R (-53.7) 53.7 0.0 0.0 
DEP (-786.0) 57.8 668.0 60.3 0.0 
GD (-781.6) 202.5 325.0 170.6 83.5 0.0 
CS 34.0 -37.8 -321.7 290.5 35.0 0.0 
LA 466.8 315.9 -88.3 -840.1 145.7 0.0 
PF (-548.1) 607.6 -59.5 0.0 
Net Worth -2156.9 -29.1 55.0 -352.1 2218.8 264.3 0.0 
- Rs. crores = 10 million rupees 
- The figures in Table 4.2 b come from the net transactions flow of funds matrix such as table 3.8a-c in 
Chapter 3. 
- CUR=Currency, R=Bank reserves, DEP=Deposit, GD=Govemment debt, CS=Company securities 
LA=Loans and advances, PF=Provident funds. 
- 'Exogenous' includes quantities that are treated as being exogenous, negligible and unidentified. 
- ( )= Demand determined 
- Stock data sources 
Government: RB! Bulletin various issues 
Banks: Balance sheets of the aggregated commercial banks 
OFIs: RB! Bulletin various issues 
PCB: Combined balance sheets of selected medium and large public limited companies 
Household: The stock data are approximated given market clearing conditions. 
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without any gaps, with the data in Table 4.2c being the first observation of the sample 
periods. The total wealth (or net worth) for each sector is constructed by adding such 
stock data. By treating the data for the cooperative banks and credit societies and 
ROW, and also the data for the negligible and the unidentified as being exogenous the 
zero-row sum is accomplished and a complete and consistent flow of funds data-base 
is generated for econometric estimation and subsequent simulation. 
The following points should be noted: First, debentures, bonds and fixed deposits (in 
PCB sector) are classified in Company Securities (CS) in the compiled flow of funds 
matrix of Chapter 3, however they are consolidated in Loans and Advances (LA) for 
the empirical studl. The main reason for this is that debentures, bonds and fixed 
deposits are less risky assets as compared with shares, therefore it can be argued that 
the lending rate is more appropriate as their own interest rate, rather than is the return 
on shares. Further, evidence is proved by preliminary estimations in that the lending 
rate explained these assets more appropriately than did the return on shares. Second, 
the revaluation for CS is not specified. It is important to distinguish transactions from 
changes as a consequence of revaluation because it is transactions, which reflect the 
portfolio decisions of economic agents, not revaluations (Bain, 1973). The original 
flow accounts in the Reserve Bank of India Bulletin themselves are, however, 
ambiguous about revaluation. As noted in the previous chapter, there are discrepancies 
in the valuations of financial assets among sectors. In addition, incorporating 
revaluations in estimating a long-run model leads to totally unacceptable results in the 
Company Securities equation7• Therefore it is assumed that revaluations are already 
incorporated in the published flow data, i.e. the figures in Table 4.2b incorporate the 
flow of assets and the capital gains/losses in CS. 
We also present the stock data on 31st March 1994 (the last observation) in Appendix 
4.1. The stock data of currency, deposits, bank reserves and government debts are also 
S Friedman (1977) constructed the series of stock data by decrementing the flow data from the stock data 
of the last observation. 
6 Hence in Table 4.2, LA incorporates loans and advances, debentures, bonds and fixed deposits, 
whereas CS consists of paid-up capital and unit trust. 
7 The formula used for revaluation in the test run is: AI = P, / P'-l (AI_1 + F, /2) + F, /2, where 
AI = the market value of the asset at the end of time period t, F, = the normal flow into the asset 
during period t, P, = the market price of the asset at time t. 
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available in IFS, hence they can be compared to each other (though for other financial 
assets, there is no such comparative data available). Table 4.3 shows both stock data 
ofthese financial instruments: one from Appendix 4.1 and the other from the IFS. 
It is evident that the two sets of figures are remarkably close to each other. In this 
respect, there are good grounds to be confident about the methodology taken for the 
compilation of the flow of funds matrix in Chapter 3 and the subsequent derivation of 
the stock data The stock data presented in this section may be regarded as being 
unbiased as a data set for the empirical study. 
Table 4.3 Comparison of the Stock data Rs. crore 
Financial assets Data based on the compiled Financial assets IFS (1993 from the year 
flow of funds matrix book) 
(Appendix 4.1: 31't March 
1994) 
Currency 83,554 Currency 78,330 
(line 14a) 
Deposits 318,157 Time and demand 313,210 
Deposit 
(line 24+25) 
Bank Reserves 47,758 Reserves 48,390 
(line 20) 
Gov'tDebt 398,812 * Gov'tDebt 406.070 
(line 88a) 
.. 
- Rs. crores = 10 millIon rupees 
- * Gov't Debt includes, not only debt (273,900), but also loans (75,183) and provident funds (49,729), 
though loans and provident funds in the government sector are consolidated as exogenous in Appendix 
4.1. 
4.1.3 Behavioural Equations, Interest Rates and Other Data 
Table 4.4a lists the behavioural equations (denoted by (.) in Table 4.1) together with 
the corresponding interest rates and other relevant explanatory variables used for 
estimation. The detailed discussion of the explanatory variables are left to each sector 
study. These variables are categorised either as exogenous or endogenous in Table 
4.4b. Table 4.5 lists the data source of the interest rates and other explanatory 
variables. Table 4.6a and 4.6b present the mean, variance and correlation of the 
nominal interest rates. 
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Table 4.4a The behavioural equations, interest rates and other explanatory variables 
Sector Behavioural equations Own interest rates Other explanatory 
(-) deficit variables common to each 
(+) surplus behavioural equation in a 
sector 
Banks (+) Excess Reserves * Bank rate Y,CRR, SLR, 
(+) Government debt Government Securities Yields Dummy 90, Sector wealth 
(+) Company Securities Return on Shares 
(+) Loans & Advances Lending rate 
OFIs (+) Government debt Government Securities Yields Y, Dummy 69 and 90, 
(-) Company Securities Return on Shares Sector wealth 
(+) Loans & Advances Lending rate 
PCB (-) Company Securities Return on Shares Y, SLR, Dummy 69 and 90, 
(-) Loans & Advances Lending rate Sector wealth 
(+) Deposit Deposit rate 
Household (+) Currency Inflation rate (negative sense) Aggregate Expenditure, 
(+) Deposit Deposit rate Real Exchange rate, 
(+) Government debt + Government Securities Yields Dummy 69 and 90, 
Provident Fund ** Sector wealth 
(+)Company Securities Return on Shares 
(-) Loans & Advances Lending rate 
* Excess reserves, rather than total bank reserves are estImated. 
** The provident funds share equation wiII be consolidated with the government debt share equation; 
the detail will be found in the household sector in Chapter 8. Y=aggregate income 
Dummy 69 = 0: 1951-68 and 1: 1969-93; Nationalisation of major commercial banks in 1969. 
Dummy 90 = 0: 1951- 89 and 1: 1990-93; Financial liberalisation in 1990. 
Table 4.4b Exogenous and Endogenous Variables 
Variables 
Exogenous variables CRR, SLR, Bank rate, Government securities' yields, 
Deposits rates, Aggregate income (Y), 
Aggregate expenditure, Exchange rate, 
Dummy 69, Dummy 90 and Sector wealth (i.e. NAFA) 
Endogenous variables 15 shares of holding financial instruments, Return on shares 
and Lending rate 
In deriving the return on shares, the rate of growth in share prices is used (see Table 
4.5); dividend yields are not available for part of the data period. In India, the total 
return is dominated by the capital appreciation component over the period of 1980-97; 
the components of capital appreciation account for three-fourths or more of the total 
returns (Gupta and Chowdhury, 2000). Garg, Verma and Gulati (1996) also argue 
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that, in general, dividends on shares tend to be low in a developing economy. Hence, 
the assumption that the decision of the portfolio in favour of equity depends mainly on 
the rate of growth in share prices may be perhaps plausible in India. The return on 
shares however exhibits extremely high variance of 374.22 in Table 4.6a, indicating 
the volatile movement of the share prices in India. The lending rate is somewhat 
volatile, whereas the deposit rate is the least volatile among other interest rates. With 
respect to correlation in Table 4.6b, except the return on shares, the other four interest 
rates tend to show high a correlation to each other, indicating the high likelihood of 
multicollinearity in a system of equations. 
Table 4.5 Data sources of the variables 
Variables (1951-93) Source Note 
Bank rate IFS 
Government securities IFS for 1951-85 
yields Report on currency and finance for 
1986-93 
Return on shares IFS (share prices) The rate of growth in share prices 
Lending rates Statistical Abstract of the India SBI's (State Bank of India) 
Union for 1951-71 discount rate for 3 month 
Handbook of Statistics on Indian commercial bills for the period 
Economy for 1971-1993 1951-52 and 1956-57 and SBI's 
advance rate for the rest of the 
sample period 
Deposit rate Statistical Abstract of the India Bank deposit rate for 1 to 3 years 
Union for 1951-71 
Handbook of Statistics on Indian 
Economy for 1971-1993 
Inflation rate IFS (CPI) The rate of change in CPI 
Aggregate income (Y) IFS (GDP at factor cost) 
CRR Handbook of Statistics on Indian This is proportionally calculated 
Economy for the financial year based on the 
effective date. 
SLR Handbook of Statistics on Indian This is proportionally calculated 
Economy for the financial year based on the 
effective date. 
Real exchange rate IFS (e, p* andp) Real exchange rates are expressed 
as ep*lp, where e = the number of 
national units of currency per US 
dollar, p* = US CPI, and p= 
India CPI. 
Aggregate IFS (constant price consumer 
Expenditure spending) 
91 
Table 4.6a Mean and variance of the nominal interest rates 
(%) 
Mean for the sample 
period Variance 
Bank rate 
7.06 8.05 
Lending rate 
10.49 29.20 
Deposit rate 
6.18 7.21 
GOy't Sec. 
Yields 6.63 8.77 
Return on shares 
8.74 374.22 
Table 4.6b Correlation of the nominal interest rates 
GOY't Sec. Return on 
Bank rate Lending rate Deposit rate yields shares 
Bank rate 
1 
Lending rate 
0.9873 1 
Deposit rate 
0.9604 0.9507 1 
GOy't Sec. 
Yields 0.8886 0.8673 0.9175 1 
Return on 
shares 0.4125 0.4116 0.4485 0.5030 1 
4.1.4 Structural break 
The inclusion of dummy 69 and 90 in Table 4.4a as explanatory variables may be 
explained as follows. 
It is argued that parameter instability is a common phenomenon when time-series data 
span a long time horizon, as it is more likely for the underlying data-generating 
mechanism to be disturbed by various factors (Bai, 1996). This may be the case for 
the sample period for estimation. The Indian financial sector has experienced two 
major shifts in the post-independence period; one is the nationalisation of the 
commercial banks in 1969, and the other, the financial reforms in 1990 (Chapter 3). 
The failure to take into account these shifts, given their presence, may lead to incorrect 
policy implications. In order to examine these shifts, a breakpoint test (though in an 
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ad-hoc manner) is conducted. Given the sample period from 1951 to 1993 (43 
observations), four potential break points are chosen for the test; 1960, 1969, 1980 and 
19908• The test is conducted by including all the regressors listed in Table 4.4a (based 
on the AIDS model specification explained in the next Section 4.2). Bai (1996) argues 
that the maximum point is where the statistic test is rejected in the highest significance 
among other potential breakpoints. Table 4.7 presents the test results. The balance of 
results indicates that at 1969 and 1990 there appears to be the evidence of structural 
breaks, hence the inclusion of dummy 69 and 90 in the model specification may be 
appropriate. These dummies are however again subject to t-statistics hypothesis test in 
a system of equations in a single sector study. However in general, the point at 1980 
tends to indicate a significant break point, and for the OFIs sector the share equations 
tend to be significant at all breakpoints. Yet without a suitable economic theory, and 
also in order to maintain the degree of freedom, the dummy is not applied for 1980 
(and also for 1960 in the case of the OFIs sector). 
In the current study, the dummy is limited to be the intercept, as the observation of the 
estimated slope coefficients does not in particular exhibit a large difference over these 
breakpoints, in comparison with the intercept coefficients. 
8 With Chow's breakpoint test, each subsample requires at least as many observations as the number of 
estimated parameters. In the current study the test at the point 1990 is unobtainable, therefore Chow's 
forecast test is utilised. The whole sample period (T observations) is split into two at each point, then 
the first 1i. observations are used for estimation and T2 = T - T, observations are used for testing and 
evaluation. It estimates the model for the first T, observations. This estimated model is then used to 
predict the values of the dependent variables in the remaining T2 = T - 1i. observations. 
The Chow's forecast F-statistic is computed as 
(RSSr -RSSr,)JT2 F= I 
RSS1j J(T, -k) 
where RSSr is the residual sum of squares when the equation is fitted to the whole sample period, 
RSSr.. is the residual sum of squares for the ~ observations and k is the number of estimated 
coefficients. The statistic follows F-distribution. If the null is rejected, then there is a structural break at 
the chosen point. 
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Table 4.7 Breakpoint tests 
Behavioural 1960 1969 1980 1990 
Equations F-stat. [Prob.] F-stat. [Prob.] F-stat. [Prob.] F-stat. [Prob.] 
Banks 
Excess Reserves 10.33 [0.09] 27.90 [0.00] 5.54 [0.00] 12.42 [0.00] 
Gov't Debt 7.39 [0.13] 0.73 [0.74] 1.67 [0.14] 4.52 [0.00] 
Cornp. Securities 8.31 [0.11] 8.45 [0.00] 1.75 [0.12] 2.55 [0.05] 
Loans and Adv. 3.22l0.26] 0.56 [0.87] 0.53 [0.881 0.65 [0.62] 
OFls 
Gov't Debt 131.64 [0.00] 9.91 [0.00] 3.26 [0.01] 0.43 [0.78] 
Cornp. Securities 55.30 [0.00] 56.84 [0.00] 31.00 [0.00] 3.20 [0.02] 
Loans and Adv. 187.62 [0.00] 43.23l0.00] 8.31 [0.001 1.33 [0.27] 
peB 
Cornp, Securities 3.87 [0.10] 1.14 [0.42] 2.55 [0.03] 6.32 [0.00] 
Loans and Adv. 5.15 [0.06] 1.34 [0.31] 2.67 [0.02J 4.99 [O.OOJ 
Deposit 2.05 [0.26J 2.76 [0.04] 1.71 [0.121 5.05 [O.OOJ 
Household 
Curency 5.24 [0.33] 6.08 [O.OOJ 4.15 [0.00] 0.34 [0.84] 
Deposit 97.27 [0.08J 18.51 [O.OOJ 5.76 [O.OOJ 8.54 [O.OOJ 
Gov'tDebt 4.13 [0.37J 3.78 [0.02J 1.38 [0.24J 0.24 [0.91J 
Cornp. Securities 245.67 [0.05] 2.81l0.04] 5.70 [0.001 2.52 [0.06J 
Loans and Adv. 6.96 [0.171 10.66 [0.00] 3.59 [0.01] 11.88[0.001 
- The sample penod: 1951 to 1993. 
Critical value at 5% (d£) 1960 1969 1980 1990 
Banks 19.5 (33, 2) 2.90 (25,9) 2.20 (14,20) 2.69 (4, 30) 
OFIs 5.75 (33,4) 2.51 (25,12) 2.13 (14, 23) 2.69 (4, 33) 
PCB 8.62 (33, 3) 2.61 (25, 11) 2.15 (14, 22) 2.69 (4, 32) 
Household 250 (33,1) 2.90 (25, 9) 2.20 (14, 20) 2.69 (4, 30) 
4.1.5 Summary 
A regulated financial sector in India is specified in a theoretical flow of funds model, 
being consistently linked with the real sector, in which behavioural equations and 
market clearing endogenous variables are determined. 
In sum, there are 15 behavioural equations and 5 market clearing identities, which 
determine 20 endogenous variables. We have arrived at the manageable size of a 
system-wide flow of funds model largely avoiding becoming too large and 
cumbersome, to which flow of funds models are prone. 
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4.2 AIDS Model Specification 
With respect to our conclusion in the survey of the demand function in Chapter 2, in 
modelling a system of equations for each sector we utilise the AIDS model. The 
derivation and application of the AIDS share equation are spelled out in this sectorl. 
Further Seemingly Unrelated Regression techniques and likelihood ratio tests that are 
used for estimation and hypothesis test respectively are also made clear. 
4.2.1 Derivation of the AIDS 
The AIDS model is derived using duality (Gravell and Rees, 1992). The primal 
problem for a consumer is that of maximising utility subject to budget constraints: 
Max u = u (ql' ..... .qJ (4.1a) 
n 
subject to LPiqi = W (4.1b) 
i:\ 
This yields a Marshallian demand system. The dual problem is that of minimising cost 
function to attain a specific utility level at given prices: 
Min C(p, u) 
subject to u = u 
where 
u = utility 
qi= quantity of good i 
Pi = price of good i 
W = budget or wealth 
C = total nominal expenditure 
This generates a set of Hicksian demand functions. 
(4.2a) 
(4.2b) 
In this study, the AIDS share equations are derived via the dual problem. That is, 
given a 'well-behaved' cost function, which is concave and homogenous of degree one 
in prices hence satisfying the axioms of rational choice (i.e. the existence of consistent 
I Since the AIDS model is introduced in the survey in Chapter 2, there is inevitably a repetitive 
discussion involved in this section. 
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preferences), an indirect utility function can be derived. The problem is then stated 
without any particular information about the original utility function. The AIDS 
model is a particular parameterisation of the cost function. 
The AIDS model belongs to the PIGLOG class preference, which is represented via 
the cost function as given by (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a): 
InC(u,p) = (l-u)ln{a(p)} + u In{b(p)} (4.3) 
where u lies between 0 (= subsistence) and 1(= bliss). 
The AIDS cost function is an example of a flexible functional form, hence it possesses 
enough parameters; at any single point its derivatives can be equal to those of an 
arbitrary cost function. It can be written: 
lna(p ) = a o + Lai In PiT +! L LYO ij lnp; lnp; 
i 2 i j 
(4.4a) 
lnb(p) = lna(p) + PoTIpf; (4.4b) 
where 
a and y = parameters 
Following Weale (1986), BaIT and Cuthbertson (1991a), Adam (1999) and Prasad 
(2000), we implement the augmented AIDS model by including conditional variables. 
The equation (4.4a) can be re-written: 
lna(p) =ao + Lai lnp; +! L Lyoij InpiTlnp; + (Loikzk)lnpi 
i 2 i j k 
(4.5) 
where 0= parameters, Z k = k'th other determinant 
A number of other determinants, z, which influences the demand for a particular 
financial instrument, are included as part of the baseline holdings. They are 
conditional variables in a sense that if they were not included, then the model could 
suffer from omitted-variables bias. In our current study, this allows us to include 
policy variables, real variables and also dummies which can be postulated as the 
conditional variables. 
Substituting (4.4b) and (4.5) into (4.3), the AIDS cost function can be written 
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C(u, p, z) is linearly homogenous in price provided that2 
L;a; =1, LjY; = L;Y; = LjPj = Lk 8;k =0 
(4.6a) 
(4.6b) 
The demand function can be derived by Shephards's Lemma (Le. by differentiating the 
cost function with respect to p;) 
BC(u,p,z) 
B 
=q; 
p; 
(4.7) 
In order to derive shares, we multiply both sides by p; / C(u,p,z) , then we find, 
BlnC(u,p,z) = p;q; = S. 
Blnp; C(u,p,z) I 
(4.8) 
S; (= the budget share of good i) is then defined as 
S; =a; + LYif lnpj +uPoTIpf; + L8;k Z k (4.9a) 
j k 
(4.9b) 
For a utility maximizing consumer, the total wealth, Win (4.1b) is equal to C(u, p, z) 
and this equality can be inverted to give utility as a function of p, z and W, i.e. the 
indirect utility function, such that (4.6a) can be: 
1 
InW = a o + La; lnp; +-L LY*if lnp; lnpj +uPoTIpf; + (L8;k zk)lnp; (4.10) ; 2; j k 
We define 
(4.11) 
then, 
In W -In P = uPoTIpf; (4.12) 
Substituting (4.12) into (4.9a), we have the budget shares as a functionp, z and W: 
2 It implies that if prices double then the cost of obtaining a given utility level must also double. 
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S; = a; + Ir if In P j + f3; In(W / P) + I O;k Zk (4.13) 
j k 
This contains sufficient parameters to be regarded as a first-order approximation to any 
demand system. LnP may be interpreted as a composite price. If InP are reasonably 
collinear within a group, Deaton and Muellbauer suggested a Stone index of the form: 
(4.14) 
Given highly collinear interest rates, this is perhaps a plausible approach in our study. 
With this substitution, the model becomes linear in the parameters, and Z k is now 
outside financial instruments' prices, i.e. non-price sensitive variables. 
The restrictions of (4.6b) and (4.9b) imply restrictions on the AIDS parameters for n 
financial assets (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a): 
n n n n 
Ia; =1, Irif =0, Ip; =0 and IO;k =0 (4.15a) 
;=\ ;=\ ;=\ ;=\ 
(4.15b) 
(4.15c) 
Equation (4.15a) implies the adding-up restrictions, i.e. IS; = 1. The restriction of 
(4.15b) indicates homogeneity that the shares are homogeneous of degree zero in 
prices, and (4.15c) satisfies Slutsky symmetry. 
Negativity of the Hicksian demand function arises from the concavity of the cost 
function and can be checked by calculating the eigenvalues of the Slutsky matrix. 
Deaton and Muellbauer, however, suggest using the eigenvalues of kif which has the 
same signs as those of the Slutsky matrix: 
(4.16) 
where 0if is the kronecker delta. In order to satisfy negativity, the matrix should be 
negative semi-definite, i.e. all the diagonal elements are non-positive. 
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4.2.2 Application of the AIDS in a Flow of Funds Model 
The AIDS share equation was originally applied in the context of consumer demand 
theory. The following explains the application to demand for assets. 
Suppose that there exists a utility function, which depends on the expected (one period 
ahead) real value of all financial assets held: 
( " , ) u = u a11+1' a21+1 , ••••••••• • ant+! (4.17) 
This depicts that agents are concerned with the asset consumption at the beginning of 
t + 1. The relationship between real assets in adjacent periods is 
The budget constraint here is that real assets sum to real wealth: 
Lai: =W/ = (W/Z)t 
Such that the budget constraint becomes, 
where a;;+1 = real asset holdings of the ith asset at the end of period t+ 1 
W;'= real wealth at the end of period t (= W, / Zt) 3 
Zt = good price index 
Pi' = [(1 + lj )(1- g) r 
1i = expected nominal return on asset i , between t and t+ 1 
(4.18) 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
g = expected proportionate rate of goods price inflation, between t and t+ 1 
The i'th asset share equation (4.13) can be re-formulated in real terms: 
Si =ai + LYij lnp5t + LOikZkt + Pi In(Wr / por)t (4.21) 
j k 
where Si = ait / W, 
The equation (4.21) is applied in modelling the flow of funds for each sector. 
3 The current wealth (W; ) is the sum of end-of-last-period wealth, current saving and capital gains or 
losses. 
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Expected rates of return 
For 1j of Pt = [(1 + 'i )(1- g) r, nominal interest rates presented in Table 4.4 are used. 
In the model specification, asset demands are functions of expected rates of return. We 
employ a perfect-foresight assumption by proxying the expected returns (except the 
return on shares) at the beginning of period t by the actual returns realized over the 
period. 
With respect to the expected return on shares, 'naIve expectation', a special case of 
autoregressive expectations, is utilised: Following Friedman and Roley (1979, p1477), 
the return on shares at time t is given by, 
r, = d, + g'+1 
where 
d = the dividend yields (which is known at time t) 
g = the capital gain or loss component of the yield defined as 
g = PI+I - P, 1+1 
P, 
where P = the share prices 
gl+l is not known at time t, such that 
where the e superscript indicates an expectation as of time t. 
(4.22) 
(4.23) 
(4.24) 
Note that the equation (4.24) implies that there is an inverse relationship between the 
expected return on shares and the expected share prices. The investors' expectations 
of the one-period capital gain (or loss) is formed from its previous period, such that 
(4.25) 
The expected return on shares are given by substituting (4.25) into (4.24) and with the 
assumption of no dividend yields, it takes the form of, 
(4.26) 
The equation (4.26) is applied to the return on shares. (The same naive expectation is 
applied to the expected rate of inflation.) 
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It seems to be reasonable that for the administrative interest rates, the perfect foresight 
expectation is adapted, whereas for the volatile return on shares, an autoregressive type 
of expectation is used. 
4.2.3 Elasticities 
In the AIDS model, the effects of explanatory variables on the dependent variable are 
measured as elasticities. The elasticities show the responsiveness of the movement of 
various interest rates on the share of holdings of asset i (i.e. Sj = ait / w,) in a precise 
manner, since elasticities vary at each observation. 
The Slutsky equation decomposes the price effect into substitution effect (due to a 
change in relative price with real wealth held constant) and income effect (due to a 
change in wealth or cost with relative price constant). The full effect of the price 
change, or compensated elasticities is specified as given by (BaIT and Cuthbertson, 
1989 and CoIlins and Anderson, 1998): 
(4.27) 
In the thesis, the interest rate elasticities are presented by changing the sign on the 
price elasticities4, such that 
(4.28) 
Eij (R) measures the proportionate change in the demand of a particular asset to 
changes in both its own and the cross interest rates5• In order to satisfy negativity, the 
own interest rate elasticity is expected to be positive. With respect to the cross-
interest rate elasticities, positive cross-interest rate elasticity indicates complements, 
and negative cross-interest rate elasticity indicates substitutes for the assets i andj. 
Wealth elasticities are specified: 
Ew = Pi/Si +1 
4 This is because that the AIDS prices are the inverse of the real interest rates. Since 
In pr = In [(1 + ri )(1- g)]-t ,and In pr = -In[(1 + ri )(1- g)], then 
In pr = -In(1 + Ri) = -Ri' where R =real interest rates. 
S It is defined as; Eij (R) = 1: unitary elasticity, 0 < E ij (R) < 1: inelastic, 1 < E ij (R) : elastic. 
(4.29) 
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Ew is defined as the proportionate change in the quantity of particular asset from a 
proportionate change in W. In each sector study, the aggregated income or expenditure 
is incorporated as one of non-price sensitive explanatory variables, and the elasticity is 
specified as: 
Ey = t5jy / Sj (4.30) 
All elasticities presented in the thesis are based on the mean portfolio shares6• 
For other variables such as eRR, SLR and dummies, although the estimated 
parameters of the AIDS model do not have such a direct economic interpretation, we 
can still draw inferences from the parameters in respect of their signs and statistical 
significance. 
4.2.4 The General to Specific Model 
When the share equation (4.21) is applied in a system of equations, there is likely to be 
a large number of parameters, and it may be difficult to obtain well-determined 
parameters. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a, p.315) suggest placing whatever 
restrictions on r ij parameters, on a priori grounds, arguing that it is empirically or 
theoretically plausible without adverse consequences for the properties of the AIDS 
model. The sign on r ij has approximately the same sign as that on the compensated 
price elasticity, and therefore this is useful in providing insight in prior restrictions7. 
This recommendation is taken into account in proceeding from the general to specific 
model8• Likewise, with respect to non-price sensitive explanatory variables, it is not 
necessarily the case that freely-detennined coefficients lead to the economically 
sensible results. Therefore restrictions on the coefficients (i.e. zero imposition) are 
imposed where appropriate. 
6 Ew and Ey are defined as follows: Ew' Ey > 1: luxury, Ew' Ey < 1: necessity Ew, Ey < 0: 
inferior. 
7 Note that if the coefficient is numerically very small, the sign between the coefficient and price 
elasticity (and also the eigenvalue of kin (4.16)) may not be the same. 
S BaIT and Cuthbertson frequently imposed restrictions of negativity and zeros on price parameters, 
other than those of homogeneity and symmetry in their AIDS model specification. 
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The calibration with the data by imposing restrictions is a necessary procedure, not 
only because of the difficulty of obtaining plausible estimates in asset demand 
functions, but also because the data themselves are not of good-quality as described in 
the previous chapter. The restrictions implemented in this thesis are nevertheless far 
less dramatic than those of other flow of funds researchers; recall that Brainard and 
Tobin (1968) used 'guesstimated' estimates; the followers of the pitfalls model 
employed mixed estimates; Bhara, Green and Murinde (1999) calculated the 
parameters. 
The selection of the preferred specific model is reconciled with maintaining the 
economic sense in estimates, while obtaining plausible simulation results. 
4.2.5 Weak Separability 
In many empirical demand analyses, the assumption of separability between a 
consumption decision and the allocation of portfolio decisions is treated as a 
maintained hypothesis: a consumption decision being taken first followed by a 
portfolio decision. Such a separability is at the heart of neoclassical demand systems, 
and it is applied to the AIDS share equation. Specifically, the application of weak 
separability allows the demand functions within each group to depend only on the 
prices in the same group. This narrows the focus, and contributes to reducing the data 
requirements and preserves statistical degrees of freedom in empirical work (Swofford 
and Whitney, 1987). 
Despite this advantage, it is well known that the conditions to satisfy weak separability 
are quite severe. First, whole groups are either complements or substitutes for each 
other. Second, it requires a set of consistent group price indices and this kind of price 
aggregation is possible, if and only if, the utility function is structured either as 
homothetically separable or as strongly separable. The former implies that doubling 
the quantity of each good is matched by an equal increase in utility. It imposes unitary 
expenditure elasticities, that is, budget shares within each group are independent of 
total group expenditures. However, this contradicts the general tenor of budget studies 
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a). The latter is more restrictive in that it requires 
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'additivity' between groups: U = ua (qJ + Ub(qb) + .... This means that all other prices 
outside the group in question are required, since the group price indices, say ~ , are 
given by Pa = Pa(ua,pa) , and are dependent on ua' which in turn depends on all other 
prices outside the group. If preferences are neither homothetic nor strongly separable, 
one possibility is to assume that the group price indices ~ do not vary much with the 
group utility ua' hence most of the explanation of ~ is the sub-set of prices, pa 
(Deaton and Muellbaur, 1980b and Barr and Cuthbertson, 1989). Taking this 
suggestion, weak separability is assumed in the portfolio demand functions. 
In this study, the weak separability tests are conducted in an ad-hoc manner by using 
the available other interest rates outside the group: if the extraneous interest rates are 
statistically insignificant, weak separability is supported in this respect. We also 
conduct the homotheticity tests, as these are associated with weak separability. If there 
are no wealth effects on the holding of assets (i.e. the unitary wealth elasticity), then 
the utility function is homothetic and weak separability is supported in this respect. 
But if we find a wealth effect, the share of the financial assets will depend indirectly 
on the excluded interest rates in a system of equations, since the excluded rates will 
influence the allocation oftotal wealth between the sub-groups. 
4.2.6 Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Estimates 
For the system of AIDS share equations with the imposition of cross equation 
constraints on the parameters, Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) developed by 
Zellner (1962) is employed for the estimation. In SUR, a GLS method is applied to 
exploit the correlation in the errors across equations, in which the errors are assumed 
to be independent over time but correlated across equations. This methodology 
requires a diagonal variance-covariance matrix of the disturbances obtained from 
running OLS on each equation separately, which is used as a weighting matrix when 
the model is re-estimated. See Appendix 4.2 for the SUR specification. 
It is known that the GLS estimator reduces to OLS, that is, there is no efficiency gain, 
when i) the contemporaneous error terms are not correlated across equations, and ii) all 
equations contain the same variables across equations. With respect to the former, it is 
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clear that the disturbances are correlated; with the total shares summing to one and that 
the error terms sum to zero across equations. For the latter qualification, as we 
proceed from general to specific model, it is not always the case that each equation 
contains the same explanatory variables. 
Binkley (1982) investigated the efficiency of SUR relative to OLS, and found that 
there is a gain using SUR when multicollinearity problems are encountered for the 
following reasons. By accounting for cross-equation error correlation, SUR decreases 
the variance of the error term (this increases the precision of estimates, mitigating the 
multicollinearity problem), while increases the predictability of the error terms. The 
latter is like additional variables to an equation. The additional variables, even if they 
are highly correlated with those already in the equation, are unlikely to markedly 
increase the overall multicollinearity if it is already quite high among the original 
variables. Hence, the more likely is SUR to lead to significant efficiency gain, the 
greater the multicollinearity within an equation. It was therefore more tempting to 
employ the SUR technique, as our model tends to suffer from multicollinearity given a 
set of interest rates as principle regressors in the AIDS framework. We employ the 
iterated SUR technique9• 
4.2.7 Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Hypothesis testing of linear constraints on the parameters of the AIDS model (such as 
homogeneity, symmetry, weak separability and homotheticity) can be performed using 
the likelihood ratio (LR) testlO• The LR test compares the maximized values of the log 
likelihood functions between constrained and unconstrained models based on the 
statistic as given by: 
(4.31) 
9 With several test runs, the iterated SUR technique, which iterates until linear models converge (TSP, 
1999), proved to be statistically superior to the conventional SUR and also to 3SLS. With respect to the 
3SLS, the lagged prices were used as instrument variables. However, there is some difficulty posed in 
this: Endogeneity is mainly in the prices (i.e. interest rates), but these were varied administratively for 
much of the estimation period. Treating them predetermined may therefore not be reasonable. 
10 Wald test is also conducted, though the test results are not presented here on the following reasons. It 
is argued that in a heavily parameterised system the Wald test is more likely to 'over-reject' the null 
than is the likelihood ratio test. This problem becomes more severe as the number of equations in the 
system increases or the sample size becomes smaller. See Evans and Savin (1982). 
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where lu (lr) is the log likelihood of the unrestricted (restricted) equation and J is the 
number of restrictions. L has an approximate X 2 (J) distribution. 
The LR test however is known to be too large in small samples, hence the small 
sample-adjusted LR test is also carried out. This is given by the product ofLR statistic 
and (T-K)/T, where T = No. of observations and K = No. of exogenous variables in 
each equation, excluding the imposed zero restrictions. The small sample-adjusted LR 
test is also distributed as X2 (J) (Bohm, Rieder and Tintner, 1980). 
4.3 Cointegration 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Any time series data are generated by a stochastic process. The stochastic process is 
stationary if the mean and variance are constant, and covariance does not depend on 
time but on the time lag between two observations. The stochastic process is non-
stationary if mean andlor variance are not constant, i.e. it exhibits the time-changing 
mean andlor variance. 
The non-stationary data can be largely classified into two types of data-generating 
process. One is a linear trend that yields the trend-stationary processes. The other is a 
random walk, that yields the difference-stationary processes (Mills, 1990). They are 
also referred as a detenninistic trend and a stochastic trend respectively. The major 
difference between them is that, given any shock, the impact is temporary in the 
former case, whereas it is persistent in the latter case by definition 1 I. A process with a 
stochastic trend is known as an integrated process, and this is the one associated with 
the cointegration argument. 
11 Both trend-stationary and difference-stationary processes exhibit a time-varying mean, however, the 
latter is also characterised by a variance that is an increasing function of time (Mills 1990). 
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Explicitly, suppose that a variable Y t is generated by the following process: 
Yt = PYt-l +Ut Ut ~ !ID(O, 0-2 ) (4.32) 
where, Ut is independent identically distributed Gaussian error tenns. 
The variable Y t is stationary if Ipl < 1, and non-stationary if p = 11. 
If Y is the latter case, it has a stationary representation after differencing once, and it 
is said to be integrated of order 1, (l(I)). If, in general, Y has a stationary 
representation after differencing d times, it is said to be integrated of order d, (l(d)) 
(Dol ado, Gonzalo and Mannol, 2001). 
In the collaborative work by Granger and Newbold (1974), it was reported that two 
independent integrated time series tended to exhibit apparent relationships in 
regression: any tendency for both time series to grow leads to correlation reflecting the 
'common trends' that are shared between the non-stationary variables, even though 
each is growing for very different reasons (Harris, 1995)2. Such a regression is tenned 
a spurious regression. However, for two or more non-stationary processes there may 
exist linear combinations, which are stationary. In this instance, the results are not 
spurious, and the two variables are said to be cointegrated. 
Engle and Granger (1987) explicitly define cointegration: if the residuals obtained 
from regressing Yt ~ I( d) on xt ~ I( d) are of a lower order of integration, I( d-b), where 
b > 0, then the two (or more) series are cointegrated and fonn an equilibrium 
relationship. Cointegration mimics the exist~nce of a long-run equilibrium, in which 
economic forces are in balance, and the economic system moves towards equilibrium 
defined by a meaningful long-run relationship. (Dolado, Gonzalo and Mannol, 2001, 
p.637 and Harris, 1995, p.22) 
1 Iflpl> 1, the process is explosive. 
2 This phenomenon tends to be accompanied by high R-squared and highly autocorrelated residuals as is 
indicated by very low DW (close to zero) (Granger and Newbold 1974). Moreover, the distributions of 
the I-statistics diverge as I becomes larger, so there are no asymptotically correct critical values for the 
test (Granger, 2001). 
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Given the finding of spurious regression and cointegration with respect to the non-
stationary nature of time series, it seems to be almost mandatory to conduct some form 
of cointegration analysis. In this section, we examine first of all a unit root test, which 
determines whether a variable is generated by an integrated process or not. Then, the 
two most commonly used cointegration tests are discussed: one is the single-equation 
framework of the Engle-Granger (EG) approach and the other one is the system-based 
10hansen approach. 
4.3.2 Unit Root Test 
We conduct the popular Dickey-Fuller (DF) test for a unit rooe. The DF test amounts 
to estimating the above equation (4.32), but by reformulating the model as given in a 
general form with an intercept (11) and a deterministic trend (t): 
~Yt = 11 + r t + (p -1)Yt_1 + Ut (4.33) 
and Ho :(p -1)=0, HI :(p -1)<0 
When the null is not rejected, the variable is said to contain a unit root (or an integrated 
process). The DF test presents a first-order autoregressive process of the series Y t • 
This can be augmented by allowing a pth order autoregressive process in Y t to take 
account of serial correlation in the error terms referred to as the augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test: 
p-I 
~Yt = 11 + r t + (p -1)Yt_1 + LIf/;· ~Yt-; +Ut (4.34) 
;=1 
If (p -1) = 0 against alternative (p -1) < 0, then Y t contains a unit root. Given the 
small sample size of 43 and also the use of annual data, we arbitrary set the lag length 
of 2 for ADF and present the results together with those of the DF test. With ADF(2), 
3 There are other unit root tests. Among others, the Phillips Perrons (PP) test of Phillips (1987) is 
relatively popular. The PP test is a variant ofDFIADF based on the Z-test. While the Dickey-Fuller 
procedure retains the validity of tests based on white-noise errors in the regression model, the PP test 
involves a non-parametric correction to the test statistic to account for the serial correlation in residuals, 
and produces statistics that are robust to heteroskedasticity (Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith and Hendry 
1993). It has been however known that although it generally has higher power, the PP test has more 
severe poor-size properties. Hence, we do not pursue this alternative test. 
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white noise error is almost ensured4• 
In DF and ADF tests, it is important to note whether the data generating process for the 
variables contains detenninistic variables of intercept and trend or not. Without a 
constant, it implies that the overall mean of the series is zero, and this is unlikely, 
hence the constant is adhered to in the unit root test. In respect of a detenninistic 
trend, this is closely related with the drawback of a unit root test. It is argued that the 
unit root test often suffers from poor sample size and power properties (BIough, 1992). 
Any unit root process (but close to stationary around a detenninistic trend) can be 
approximated by a trend-stationary process, especially when the sample size is small, 
hence there is a tendency to over-reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. On the other 
hand, in finite samples any trend-stationary process (but close to having a unit root) 
can be approximated by a unit root process, therefore there is a tendency to under-
reject the null5• Therefore, in part to alleviate this limitation (in particular the under-
rejection of the null), we arbitrarily include a trend in the DF and ADF regressions. If 
it is not significant, we conduct the unit root test without a time trend, and if 
significant, with a time trend. 
In the DF and ADF tests, a t-test of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is not based 
on the standard t-distribution, but on the non-standard Dicky-Fuller distribution. 
Further depending on the detenninistic variables, the critical values differ. In testing 
unit root, we use the Davidson and MacKinnon's asymptotic critical values. This has 
some advantages over the Dicky-Fuller critical values; i) they can be read off for any 
sample size, and ii) they do not require either normality or homoskedasticity in error 
terms, whereas the finite-sample critical values depend upon the assumption of white 
noise error tenns (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993, p.708). 
In conducting a unit root test, there are two points to be noted. First, there is a 
4 In 17 out of 63 cases (total number of the unit root and cointegration tests presented in the thesis) in 
the DF test, residuals exhibit serial correlation at the 5 % significance level by the LM test, and it will be 
reduced to 9 cases at the 1% level. In the case of ADF(2), 10 out of 63 cases indicate the serial 
correlation at the 5% level, and only 2 cases at the 1 % level. 
5 This follows from the closeness of the finite sample distribution of any statistics under a trend-
tationary process and under a difference-stationary process (Harris, 1995, p.39). 
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theoretical problem in that asset shares are bounded, and that they cannot be a random 
walk, since such a series is unbounded6• However, none of the share series in our 
current study approaches the bound, neither the upper nor the lower, i.e. none of them 
are 1(0), hence we carry out cointegration analysis. Second, it is associated with the 
breakpoint in the time series. Perron (1989) argued that standard tests of the unit root 
hypothesis are not consistent against 'trend stationary' alternatives where the trend 
function contains a shift in the level or the slope. He advocated the unit root test, 
referred to as Perron's model, by allowing both the null and alternative hypothesis for 
the presence of a one-time change in the level or in the slope of the trend function. 
This may be relevant to the current study, since there are possible structural changes in 
1969 and 1990 in the Indian financial system (see Chapter 3). Hence the Perron's unit 
test is conducted by incorporating the trend, post-break constant dummy and the post-
break slope dummy. Refer to Appendix 4.3 for the detailed model specification. 
There are however some limitations in applying Perron's unit root test. The fact that 
the structural change is exogenous implies that the results are conditional. That is, 
conditional upon the presence of a change in the trend function, the fluctuations are 
transitory. Next, it contains only one break in Perron's model, though there are two 
possible structural breaks of 1969 and 1990 over the sample period of 1951-93. But 
this can be mitigated by concentrating on the structural break at 1969, since, when the 
break point is close to the beginning or the end of the sample period, the results are 
similar to those of the Dickey-Fuller test. Finally, Perron's model focuses on 
determining the existence of a unit root, rather than determining the order of 
integration of the variables, and the latter is the most interesting in the current study. 
Perron (1989) reconciles that a rejection of the null hypothesis does not imply 
acceptance of a particular alternative hypothesis. For these reasons, though Perron's 
unit root test is relevant to the shift in the Indian financial sector, the test results are 
presented in an appendix in each single sector study. (As a whole, the results turn out 
to be broadly consistent with those of the Dickey-Fuller test, while some variables 
exhibiting statistically significant post-break dummies.) 
6 See Barr and Cuthbertson (l991a, p.868 in footnote) and Adam (1999, p.106). 
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4.3.3 EG Co integration Test (Single-Equation Approach) 
The EG test is a single equation approach for the cointegration test. In the context of 
our study, the long run parameters of the AIDS model are used to construct the 
residuals which are then subject to the DF and ADF tests for stationarity. Explicity, 
the residuals are 
e=S-ITx (4.35) 
where S = the share of holding financial assets, fI = long run parameters estimates and 
X = the matrix of variables. 
However, the calculated e is based on the estimated cointegrating parameters, the 
variance of the residuals is therefore minimized, and this prejudices the testing 
procedure toward finding stationarity (Dolado, Gonzalo and Marmol, 2001). Hence, 
larger (in absolute value) critical levels than the standard critical values for unit root 
are needed. Further, the distribution of the test statistic under the null is affected by 
the number of endogenous regressors (n) included in the AIDS model: as n increases, 
the critical value increases. 
The rejection of the null hypothesis means that the residuals are stationary, and that 
cointegration exists in the regression. Then a long-run stationary relationship is 
established between the integrated dependent variable and the regressors. Moreover 
once cointegration is established, the estimates are said to be 'super-consistent'? 
4.3.4 Johansen Cointegration Test ( System-Based Approach) 
In the current study, the potential 1(1) endogenous variables (n) in each equation are 
the share of holding financial assets, lending rates, returns on shares and the AIDS 
wealth (WT / pOT) 8 (see Section 4.1). This implies that each long-run model would 
consist of up to n = 4. 
7 The estimators with non-stationary variables converge to its true values at a much faster rate than do 
the usual estimators with stationary variables (Stock, 1987). 
P OT 8 Although the sector wealth is exogenous, the AIDS wealth is endogenous since varies with the 
lending rate and return on shares. 
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So far, we have confined the analysis to the case where there is, at most, a single 
cointegrating vector in a single equation framework. This is quite restrictive when we 
are analyzing the cointegrating properties of a n >2 dimensional vector of 1(1) 
variables, in which up to n-I linearly independent cointegration vectors are possible9• 
Besides, in the EG approach the cointegration regression may suffer from small-
sample bias (BaneIjee, Dolado, Galbraith and Hendry, 1993). All these suggest that 
EG test is not sufficient, and there is a need of supplementary tests. Hence we conduct 
the 10hansen cointegration test. 
The Johansen approach involves a maximum likelihood estimation procedure based on 
the so-called reduced rank regression method, which is compatible for the case n >2. 
The Johansen approach can be explained by modelling a vector ZI as an unrestricted 
vector autoregression (V AR) with k-lags, 
U 1 - iid(O,"£) (4.36) 
where 
ZI : (n x I) endogenous 1(1) variables 
A;: (n x n) matrix of parameters 
"£ : symmetric positive-definite matrix 
Johansen and luselius (1990) explain that this can be reformulated into a vector error-
correction: 
U 1 -iid(O,"£) (4.37) 
where 
1; =-(1-A)- .... -A;) (i= 1, ... ,k-I) 
IT = -(1- A) - ...... - Ak ) 
This contains information on both the short- and long-run adjustments to changes in 
the variables in the model via the estimates of t; and fr respectively. 
9 Dickey, Jansen and Thornton (1994) comment that it is better to have many cointegrating vectors. 
Cointegration vectors may represent constraints on the movement of the variables in the system in the 
long-run. Consequently, the more cointegrating vectors there are, the more stable the system is, and it is 
desirable to be stationary in as many directions as possible. 
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Since all llZt-i are 1(0), for Ut ~ 1(0), ITZt_ k must be stationarylO. ITZt _ k ~ 1(0) occurs 
when there exists up to n-1 cointegration relationships (r). Then, it can be specified as 
IT = apt , where a represents the speed of adjustment to equilibrium, while p is a 
matrix of long-run coefficients. The long-run relationships of p can be decomposed 
into stationary and non-stationary: r columns of p form r linearly independent 
combinations of the variables in Zt' each of which is stationary, while the remaining 
(n - r) columns of p form unit root combinations termed 'common trends' and are 
non-stationary vectors. Only the co integration vectors in p enter (4.37), which 
implies that the last (n - r) columns of a are effectively zero. Testing for 
cointegration amounts to finding the number of r linearly independent columns (or 
rank) in IT. 
Partial Version o/the VECM 
A single equation in our system of AIDS share equations would potentially consist of 
not only 1(1) but also 1(0) variables, further 1(1) is divided into exogenous and 
endogenous variables. Hence, a partial version ofVECM, which takes into account of 
heterogeneous variables, is applied. This is given by: 
Ut ~ iid(O, 'i) (4.38) 
where 
Y = vector of endogenous l( 1) variables 
X= vector of weakly exogenous 1(1) variables 
Z=Y, X 
D = vector of exogenous 1(0) variables (e.g. dummy) 
The weakly exogenous variables remain in the long-run model. This implies that Y is 
conditional on X Conditioning on these variables will usually ensure that the system 
determining ~y, has better stochastic properties in terms of the residuals 11. As 
equation (4.38) implies, the short-run behaviour of the weakly exogenous variables is 
not modelled. This is due to the fact that since the exogenous variable equation 
10 The sum of an 1(1) process and an 1(0) process is always 1(1) (Dolado et al. 2001). 
11 The distribution of the test statistic will not be invariant to X (Dickey et al. 1994, p.20). 
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............. --------------------------
contains no infonnation about the long-run fJ, there is no loss of infonnation from not 
modelling these variables (Harris, 1995). 
Given that there is no cointegration vector and that a = zero in the exogenous variable 
equation, the weakly exogenous variables are defined as given by: 
(4.39) 
Notice that (4.39) allows for feedback from 8Y to M, but does not allow for level 
feedback (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997). In the current study, it is assumed that the 
administered interest rates, policy variables and the real variables belong to the weakly 
exogenous variables. This is perhaps economically plausible. 
Tests, Lag-length and Deterministic Components 
A 
Reduced rank regression provides n eigenvalues of A; (i= I, ... , n). The magnitude of 
A 
A; is a measure of how strongly the cointegration relationships are correlated with the 
A 
stationary part of the model. Eigenvalues of A; =0 for i = rt I, .. . n, are associated with 
the non-stationary part of the model. Thus to test the null hypothesis that there are at 
most r cointegration vectors and (n-r) unit root amounts to: 
i=rtl, .... n 
where only the first r eigenvalues are non-zero. 
The test can be conducted using either of the following two test statistics. 
Trace statistic: Atrace = - 210g(Q) = -Tt log{l- i; ) 
;~r+1 
where Q = restricted maximised likelihood +unrestricted maximised likelihood 
Ho :r=q, HI :r~q+1 
where q =0, 1, 2, ... . n-I 
A 
Maximum eigenvalue statistic: Amax = - T log{l- Ar+!) 
Ho :r=q, HI :r=q+1 
where q =0, I, 2, .... n-1 
(4.40) 
(4.41) 
Note that if i l sand il+l are close to zero, the statistics will be small, as In(l) = o. 
114 
It is argued that the power of the trace test is lower than the maximum eigenvalue test 
(Johansen and Juselius, 1990), besides if there are deterministic variables in the model, 
critical values of the trace test are only indicative. However, it has an advantage over 
the maximum eigenvalue test, in that the trace test is more robust in terms of skewness 
and excess kurtosis in the residuals. Both, however, have the problem of a small 
sample size. Hence we conduct both to support the choice of r. 
The Johansen approach requires the residuals to be 'white noise'. This involves setting 
the appropriate lag-Iength. In our study, this is determined in the following process: 
Given an arbitrarily chosen maximum value of lag=4, the V AR is modelled then the 
appropriate order of augmentation is selected by Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) 
and Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC), while checking that the residuals satisfy 
white noise. If conflicting results emerge between them, choose the lower lag in order 
·d . . 12 to aVOl over-parametensatIon . 
The test of whether there are deterministic components in VECM or not, is undertaken 
simultaneously with the test for the reduced rank. There are five cases ranging from 
the most restricted model to the least restricted model. See Table 4.8. 
In the current study of the AIDS model, wealth and some real variables exhibited a 
deterministic trend in the levels of the data, while other underlying variables were non-
trended. We therefore present the results of Model 3 for all sectors. In choosing the 
model, Johansen (1992) suggests a so-called 'Pantula principle', that is to test from the 
most to the least restrictive model, and stop the first time the null hypothesis is not 
rejected in the trace or maximum eigenvalue test. The 'Pantula principle' approach is 
also supportive for Model 313. 
12 It turns out that the order ofVAR=lis found for 20/25 cases, VAR=2 for 4/25 cases and VAR=3 for 
1125 cases in the lohansen tests presented in this thesis. 
13 Out oftotal 25 lohansen test results presented in the sector study, the Pantula principle (excluding 
Model 1 in Table 4.7) chooses Model 2 for 13 cases, Model 3 for 10 cases and Model 4 for 2 cases. 
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Table 4.8 Johansen tests 
Models Notes 
Model 1: This is unrealistic as the intercept needs to 
without trend, nor intercept in the short-run and in account for the units of measurement of the 
the long-run variables in 1';. 
Model 2: Ifthere are no linear trends in the levels of the 
without trend but with restricted intercept data (long-run), then the first-differenced series 
(short-run) has a zero-mean. Hence, the intercept 
is restricted to the cointegration space or long-run. 
Model 3: If there are linear trends in the levels of the data, 
without trend but with unrestricted intercept then the model can be specified with an intercept. 
Model 4: If there is some long-run linear growth, which the 
with restricted trends and with unrestricted model can not account for, then a linear trend 
intercept should be in the cointegration vectors. 
ModelS: This allows for linear trend in the short-run and 
with both unrestricted trends and intercept thus quadratic trends in the cointegration vectors. 
Sources: Hams (1995) 
4.3.5 Concluding Remarks 
Given a relatively small sample size against not a small number of explanatory 
variables, and the system of the share equations being imposed of restrictions, the 
application of unit root and cointegration tests to our study will be conducted in the 
somewhat restricted manner. There are other points to be noted in applying 
cointegration techniques to the AIDS model. 
As discussed in the partial version of VECM, cointegration is present when there is a 
mix of different order series ofI(O) and 1(1) in the model14• 1(0) variables might play 
a key role in establishing a long-run relationship between 1(1) variables, in particular, 
if theory a priori indicates that such 1(0) variables should be included (Harris, 1995, 
14 It is also possible that two 1(2) variables cointegrate, and this will form another cointegration with 1(1) 
variable, referred to as multicointegration (Dolado et a/. 2001). 
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p.80). In the Johansen approach, however, the inclusion of 1(0) variables increases the 
number of cointegration vectors, r. Since each 1(0) variable is stationary by itself, it 
forms a linearly independent column in IT. This is borne in mind when we draw 
inference from the Johansen cointegration test. 
In a multivariate model, the EG test is applicable when there is a single cointegration 
vector, and when all the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous with respect to 
the dependent variable. Otherwise, a potential inefficiency problem arises, because 
information is lost unless each endogenous variable appears on the left hand side of the 
estimated equations (Harris, 1995). In this respect, Johansen seems to be superior to 
EG. However, Gonzalo and Lee (1998) show that in some situations mis-specification 
of deterministic components and an inclusion of a 'near' 1(1) variable15 as an 1(1) 
process in the cointegration test, can hurt the Johansen test more than EG. In this 
setting, Johansen's likelihood ratio tests tend to find spurious cointegration16• This is 
due to the fact that they have different loss functions: EG looks for the linear 
combination of integrated variables with minimum variance, whereas Johansen looks 
for the linear combination of integrated variables with maximum correlation. The 
latter is more affected by these situations. 
As a robustness check, we apply both cointegration tests. The analysis of portfolio 
behaviour, however, has to resort to the cointegration vector based on the Engle-
Granger approach, rather than that based on the Johansen approach on the following 
ground: The AIDS system of equations are estimated by SUR technique with each 
equation subject to cross-equation restrictions. It is possible to conduct the EG 
cointegration test directly on the single equation without breaking the restrictions. In 
the case of Johansen, each equation in the system is subject to a system of equations, 
and the restrictions imposed on each equation become meaningless17• Further, in the 
VAR model to produce Johansen test, the short-run adjustments are implicit, though 
the data are not reliable enough to analyse the dynamic model. 
15 This is a stochastic unit root variable, that is not constant but stochastic and varying around unity. 
16 This is different from spurious regression, in that spurious cointegration is not detected by the 
cointegration test. 
17 The J ohansen test has not been developed for a set of equations subject to cross-equation restrictions 
(BaIT and Cuthbertson, 1992a) 
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Banerjee et al. (1993, p.285), however, report that when there is one cointegrating 
vector and a common factor error representation is valid, then the Engle-Granger two-
step method is asymptotically equivalent to the Johansen method. Further in the 
empirical study of Dickey et al. (1994) the cointegration vectors derived from the EG 
approach are found to be numerically very close to those derived from the Johansen 
approach18• These suggest that irrespective of the component of the dynamic model in 
the VAR model, the long-run model of the EG and that of the Johansen approach may 
share some common features. The Johansen test can be used to identify the number of 
cointegration vectors and to supplement the results ofthe EG test19• 
18 The empirical comparative study on the cointegrating vector between the Johansen and the EG 
approach was conducted using three 1(1) variables by Dickey et al. (1994, p.34). They found that the 
estimated cointegrating vectors obtained from the Johansen and Engle-Granger are almost identical 
when both indicate cointegration, though this is not formally proved. 
19 Hence, we do not deal with the cointegration vector found in the Johansen approach. We are, 
however, aware that where coefficients have counter-intuitive signs we could check the other 
cointegrating vectors to see if the signs are better, but this does not help estimation under restriction. 
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Appendix 4.1 
Stock data for behavioural equations on 31st March 1994 
Rs crore 
Gov't Banks OFIs PCB Household Exogenous Total 
(G) (B) (OF!) (PCB) (H) 
CUR (-83554.0) 77581.1 5972.9 0.0 
R (-47758.3) 47758.3 0.0 0.0 
DEP (-318157.7) 19788.1 253054.8 45314.9 0.0 
GD (-273900.5) 96476.9 102463.5 61602.5 13357.6 0.0 
CS 25909.0 -23295.6 -28493.2 83767.7 -57887.9 0.0 
LA 156252.7 99543.8 -151361.1 -130237.7 25802.3 0.0 
PF (-124074.4) 172388.7 -48314.3 0.0 
Net Worth -405212.8 8239.1 54637.3 -160066.1 518157.0 -15754.5 0.0 
- CUR=Currency, R=Bank reserves, DEP=Deposit, GD=Govemment debt, CS=Company securities 
LA=Loans and advances, PF=Provident funds. 
- 'Exogenous' includes data for the cooperative banks and credit societies, ROW, negligible and 
unidentified. 
- ( )= Demand determined 
Appendix 4.2 
SUR specification 
A system ofN equations with T observations can be specified as given (Fiebig, 2001), 
i= I, ..... N (A4.1) 
where r; and U; are of dimension (T xl), X; is (T X K; ) and /3; is ( K; xl). 
Note that each equation does not have to have the same number of explanatory 
variables (K). Stacking all N equations yields, 
1'; XI 0 0 /31 UI 
Y2 0 X2 0 /32 U2 
+ (A4.2) 
YN 0 0 X N /3N UN 
This can be alternatively written as 
Y = X/3+u (A4.3) 
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The dimensions of Y, X, P and U are, respectively, (NT xl), (NT x K), (K x 1) and 
N 
(NT x 1), with K = LK;. 
;;1 
For the NT x 1 vector of stacked disturbances, it is assumed that E(u) = 0 and the NT x 
NT covariance matrix consists of N 2 blocks of E(u;u j ') = (j;/T where IT isa TxT 
identity matrix. The covariance matrix for the complete error vector can be given by 
Q = L ® IT where L is the N x N contemporaneous covariance matrix and ® denotes 
the kronecker products: 
(jl1 I T (j12 I T (jINIT 
L®IT = 
(j2lT (j22 I T (j2N I T (A4.4) 
(jNlT (j N2 I t (j NNIT 
The elements of Q is obtained from the residuals by running OLS on each equation 
separately. 
The implication is that the T disturbances in each of the N equations have zero mean, 
equal variance and are uncorrelated, but covariances between contemporaneous 
disturbances for a pair of equations are nonzero. 
The GLS applies to the stacked model, and since Q-I = L-1 ® IT the GLS estimator is 
defined as (Greene, 2000): 
jJ = [X'Q-1X]x'Q-Iy 
(A4.5) 
The covariance matrix is given by, 
(A4,6) 
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Appendix 4.3 
Perron's Unit Root test 
Given a series {y,}~ that is a realisation from a process characterised by the presence 
of a unit root and possibly a non-zero drift, the approach allows a one-time change in 
the structure occurring at a time TB (1 < TB < T) . Three different models are 
considered under the null hypothesis. One that permits an exogenous change in the 
level of the series, one that permits an exogenous change in the rate of growth, and 
one that allows both changes. The hypothesis can be parameterised as follows: 
Null hypothesis: 
Model (A) 
Model (B) 
Model (C) 
DTBt =1 
DU, =1 
Yt = P + dDTBt + Yt-I + et 
Y, = PI + Y,-I + (P2 - PI )DU, + e, 
Yt = PI + Yt-I + dDTBt + (P2 - PI )DUt + et 
if t = TB + 1 , 0 otherwise; 
o otherwise; 
(A4.7) 
(A4.8) 
(A4.9) 
and where e, is taken to be of the ARMA (p, q) type. TB refers to the time of break, 
i.e. the period at which the change in the parameters of the trend function occurs. 
Perron considers the following alternative hypothesis: 
Alternative hypothesis: 
Model (A) 
Model (B) 
Model (C) 
Y, = PI + pt + (112 -111 )DU, + e, 
Y, = P + PIt + (P2 - PI)Dr,· + e, 
Yt =PI +Plt +(P2 -111)DUt +(P2 -PI)DY,* +et 
where Dr,· = t - TB if t > TB and 0 otherwise. 
(A4.10) 
(A4.11) 
(A4.12) 
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Model (A) describes the 'crash' model. The null hypothesis of a unit root is 
characterised by a dummy variable which takes the value one at the time of break. 
Under the alternative of a trend stationary system, Model (A) allows for a one-time 
change in the intercept of the trend function, the magnitude of this change being 
Model (B), the 'changing growth' model, specifies under the null that the drift 
parameter change from fll to fl2 at time TB' which under the alternative, a change in 
the slope of the trend function of magnitude P2 - PI' without any sudden change in 
the level, is allowed. 
Model (C) allows both effects to take place simultaneously, i.e. a sudden change in the 
level followed by a different growth path. 
In the current study, (since it is not known whether the effect of the institutional shift 
or the financial reforms cause a shift in the level or the slope of the trend function of 
the variables,) the cautious approach, that is, Model (C) is chosen. 
Perron (1989) generalises the models by assuming that y, responds to a shock in the 
trend function in the same way as it reacts to any other shock, i.e. the inclusion of a kth 
autoregressive process iny, (we arbitrary test both k =0, without augmented 
autoregressive process, and k = 2 to be consistent with ADF test). 
The critical values are larger (in absolute value) than their Dickey-Fuller counterparts, 
which depend not on T, but on the time of the break relative to the sample size, i.e. on 
the ratio A. = TB / T with the largest value occurring when the break is in mid-sample. 
The critical values of the statistics are smallest when A. is close to ° or 1; the critical 
values are identical to those of Dickey-Fuller when A. =0, 1. 
The procedure is to estimate the regression: 
2 
y, = fI + eDU, + pt + yDT,· + c;DTB, + ~'_I + L 8i~Yt-i + e, (A4.13) 
i=1 
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and rewrite as 
2 
~Yt = Jl + BDUt + pt + yDT,* + c;DTBt + PYt-\ + I8/1Yt-; + et (A4.14) 
;=\ 
where p = rjJ-I. 
Under the null hypothesis of a unit root, p = 0 (or rjJ =1) and B = P = r = 0 , whereas 
under the alternative hypothesis of a trend stationary process, p <0 (or rjJ <1) and B, 
p, r"* O. These parameters imply the coefficients for the constant (it ), the post-
break constant dummy (B), the trend (/J), and the post-break slope dummy er) and 
the break dummy ( ; ). 
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Chapter 5 A Flow of Funds Model for the Banking Sector! 
5.1 Introduction 
Regulations imposed on the banking sector, such as administered interest rates, mandatory 
high reserve requirements (both for cash and liquid assets) and a directed credit 
programme are closely associated with fiscal devices, and they have repressed the banking 
sector in India with respect to its efficiency and profitability. The banking sector is 
however believed to be the principal institution for providing loanable funds to non-
financial private sectors, and bank financing is a prime external source of funds for them, 
due to the under-developed securities market and the costliness of moneylenders in India. 
Therefore the study of the asset choice (or a flow of funds) in commercial banks will bring 
out crucial policy implications for economic activities. In this chapter, a flow of funds 
model for the banking sector is estimated for the long-run static model. By modelling the 
flow of funds, the sensitivity to interest rates and policy variables in the portfolio 
behaviour in the banking sector is revealed, and thereby investigate the policy 
implications. 
The model proposed and implemented in this chapter departs from the seminal flow of 
funds study on India presented by Sen, Roy, Krishnan and Mundlay (1996). Sen et al. 
utilised a 'general disequilibrium' framework of the Brainard-Tobin (1968) type. Their 
study for the banking sector, however, has the following limitations in scope. First, the 
sample period is only 20 years, from 1970-71 to 1989-90. Second, the estimated financial 
assets are only those of excess reserves and loans. Third, there is a narrow scope in data 
used for estimation; the data used for loans in commercial banks are only those for the 
private corporate sector, assuming that those for other sectors are all policy-determined. 
Moreover, banks hold government debt and other financial institutions' (OFls') securities 
subj ect only to the liquidity ratio. The model presented here is more consistent and 
I This chapter is a revised version of the paper by Moore et al. (2001), which was presented at the Finance 
and Development conference, Nairobi, Kenya, 10-11 July, 2001. 
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extensive in scope. First the sample period consists of 43 observations from 1951-52 to 
1993-94. Second a broader array of financial assets is considered, namely, excess 
reserves, government debt, company securities and loans. Third, the data used for 
estimation is based on net transactions of all uses and sources of the flow data. 
There are some specific implications in applying the AIDS model to the banking sector 
(and also to the OFIs sector). If shares are thought to be increasing in own returns and 
decreasing in cross returns, one is left with the property that, for example, a rise in the rate 
of return on government securities yields will yield an increase in their portfolio share 
(Weale, 1986). This may be particularly asserted to the case in the financial institutions in 
pursuit of profitability, especially, in the banking sector the funds at their own discretion 
are reduced by the regulatory framework. However, there are no theoretical grounds for 
believing that this is the case in the pitfalls type model. Developments made in the 
analysis of the allocation of wealth have led to allocation procedures of a more 
sophisticated manner, founded on utility maximization. The mean-variance model 
introduced the theory in the portfolio balance model, yet, this approach fails to explain the 
capital-certain assets (Chapter 2). The financial institutions hold capital-certain assets, or 
risk-free assets, because of a number of regulations being imposed on them, such as CRR, 
SLR and CRAR (capital to risk weight asset ratio). Hence this approach is also not 
applicable to financial institutions. The consumer theory approach allows an analysis of 
holdings of not only capital uncertain assets, but also capital-certain assets. In particular in 
the AIDS model, it is possible to include a number of policy variables as conditioning 
variables, or as part of subsistence level, into the system of demand equations, which will 
capture the influence of other attributes besides price in determining portfolio behaviour. 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 deals with a balance sheet constraint 
clarifying the financial assets for estimation. The other explanatory variables are 
specified in Section 5.3. Estimation procedures and the results are presented in Section 
5.4. Section 5.5 draws inference from the results. The conclusions are found in Section 
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5.6. 
5.2 Balance Sheet and Financial Assets 
Uses and sources for the commercial banks can be expressed as given: 
ATotal Reserves + A Government Debt + A Company Securities + A Loans & Advances = ADeposits + A 
Share capital (5.1) 
The left hand side (LHS) indicates assets, while the right hand side (RHS), liabilities. 
This can be re-adjusted by separating the total reserves into excess reserves and required 
reserves, and also by consolidating share capital into company securities, such that: 
/).Excess Reserves + /). Government Debt + /). Company Securities( -/). Share capital) + /). 
Loans & Advances = M)eposits - /). Required Reserves (5.2) 
The financial instruments on LHS are to be determined in the banking sector, whereas the 
instruments on RHS are assumed to be determined outside the banking sector, since 
deposits are postulated to be demand-determined and required reserves are policy-
determined. 
The financial instruments to be modelled are then the following four assets in Table 5.la. 
The mean shares for the stock of asset categories over the sample period are also presented 
in the table. The interest rates (r;, i = 1,2,3,4) used for the AIDS prices (lnp;, i = 1,2, 
3, 4) are in Table 5.1 b. 
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Table S.la Financial instruments for the banking sector 
Financial instruments with notations Mean shares 
ER Excess Reserves 3.1 % 
GD Government debt 25.8 % 
_(government securities, government deposit, small savingst 
CS Company Securities 7.0% 
_(company securities deducted of share capital)_ 
LA Loans and advances 64.0% 
_(loans and advances, bonds and debentures) 
The mean shares are derived by, e.g. ERIW for excess reserves, where W=ER+GD+CS+LA. 
Table S.lb The interest rates used for the AIDS prices 
AIDS prices with notations Interest rates 
1n pr = PER (Price of ER) Bank Rate 
1n p~ = PGD (Price of GD) Government securities yields 
1n pr = PCS (Price of CS) Return on shares 
1n p~ = PLA (Price of LA) Lending rate 
In the model, Bank rate is used as being equivalent to the return on the excess reserves for 
the following reason: The bank rate is the central bank's rediscount rate, or in other 
words, the borrowing rate for banks at RBI (Reserve Bank of India). The rate can be, 
therefore, seen as a penal rate, i.e. banks are penalised equivalent to the bank rate, if they 
do not hold enough excess reserves faced with the need of short-term funds due to such as 
an increase in eRR. This will probably hit hard in the operation of the banking practice in 
India, since the money markets are underdeveloped and that the substitutes for the short-
term liquidity is limited. Hence, it is hypothesized that banks are more willing to hold 
excess reserves as the bank rate rises. 
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5.3 Non-Price Sensitive Explanatory Variables 
In the share equations, other than the AIDS prices (lnp;) and the AIDS real wealth 
(In(W T / pOT)), non-price sensitive determinants can be added to the model as part of 
baseline holdings, namely, aggregate income (In(Y /W) = Log of GDP at factor cost 
deflated by W 2), CRR, SLR and Dummy 90. 
The influence of the aggregate income on asset choices is a causal link from the real sector 
to the financial sector. CRR is primarily to capture the policy effect on the holding of the 
excess reserve. Dummy 90 is added so as to take account of the effects of financial 
liberalisation: dummy 1 for 1990-1993 (post-financial liberalisation) and dummy 0 
otherwise. 
The property of SLR is to force commercial banks to invest in government securities 
(issued by the government) and/or government approved securities (issued by other 
financial institutions). Sen et al. argues that approximately 70% ofSLR of bank deposits 
was invested in the government sector while the rest, about 30% of SLR, in other financial 
institutions (OFIs) during their sample period 1970-89. They then postulate that the banks 
hold government debt and OFIs' securities subject only to the SLR. 
However, the proportions 70% and 30% and the effect of SLR are not so clear as they 
claimed. Table 5.2 presents the proportion of government debt and company securities in 
OFI (both invested by the banking sector) in the total SLR of bank deposits, constructed 
using the flow data for the same period 1970-71 and 1988-89. From the table, it can be 
argued that, first, 70 % of SLR to the government and 30% of SLR to the OFIs does not 
seem to be supported, as the proportion significantly varies year by year, and, second, if 
the banking sector invests in the government sector and OFIs sector subject only to the 
SLR, then the total proportion should be close to 100%, but this is not the case. The total 
2 This is to avoid multicollinearity between In(W T / pOT) and In Y. 
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varies from 50.9% to 127.9%, implying that banks may be investing voluntarity to these 
two sectors in the case where the figure is above 100%, and SLR may not be fulfilled in 
the case where the figure is below 100%. 
It proves that quantifying the policy detennined flow of funds is very difficult. Therefore, 
in this study, prior claim by SLR is not excluded from the data source for estimation. It is 
assumed that the SLR variable captures the policy-detennined level of the government 
securities and government-approved securities in the holding of assets for the banking 
sector. 
Table 5.2 The Proportion of the SLR of Bank Deposits Allocated to Government and OFIs Sectors 
Between 1970-71 and 1988-89 
Year Government OFIs 
1970-71 64.0% 7.4% 
1971-72 90.0% 10.0% 
1972-73 113.4% 14.5% 
1973-74 41.2% 9.7% 
1974-75 73.9% 12.7% 
1975-76 54.7% 15.9% 
1976-77 62.6% 19.9% 
1977-78 70.0% 23.0% 
1978-79 66.6% 22.7% 
1979-80 76.5% 24.8% 
1980-81 65.6% 32.8% 
1981-82 59.0% 33.8% 
1982-83 45.4% 24.7% 
1983-84 60.8% 23.9% 
1984-85 60.8% 23.9% 
1985-86 87.3% 31.6% 
1986-87 90.7% 20.7% 
1987-88 90.8% 29.2% 
1988-89 72.3% 24.9% 
The proportions are constructed as given by 
Government = government debt +(SLR x bank deposits) 
OFIs = company securities in OFIs + (SLR x bank deposits) 
Data Source: RBI Bulletin various issues 
Total 
71.4% 
100.0% 
127.9% 
50.9% 
86.6% 
70.6% 
82.5% 
93.0% 
89.3% 
101.3% 
98.4% 
92.8% 
70.1% 
84.7% 
84.7% 
118.9% 
111.4% 
120% 
97.2% 
The priority sector lending requirement regulates banks to provide loans to the priority 
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sectors (mainly the household sector which include such as agriculture and small industry) 
to approximately 40 % of their resources after the reduction of eRR and SLR. Sen et al. 
assumed that all bank loans to the household sector are exogenously given under this 
stipulation. We considered using dummy 69 to capture the credit controls (this regulation 
was established since the major commercial banks were nationalised in 1969); dummy 0 
for 1951-1968 and dummy 1 for 1969-1993, however the estimates of the dummies in the 
share equations were all statistically insignificant at the lower level, hence the dummy is 
excluded from the model. This is probably due to the fact that the total loans to other 
sectors may remain the same over the sample period, and it is the distribution of the loans 
to sectors that has changed since 1969. 
5.4 Estimation and Result of the Long-Run Model 
5.4.1 Estimation Procedures 
Estimation is conducted from general to parsimonious specific model. In the process, 
statistically and/or economically insignificant variables are deleted, if the deletions 
improve the overall result. The priority is however placed on economic significance: this 
means that even though some variables are statistically significant, if it does not make any 
economic sense or intuitively implausible, on a priori grounds, the variables may be 
deleted. (This principle applies to all other sectors.) This is perhaps justified on the 
following grounds: In the general model, where there is a high likelihood of 
multicollinearity among the AIDS prices, and all the non-price sensitive explanatory 
variables automatically enter in each equation, some explanatory variables may spuriously 
pick up the relationship with the dependent variables without any economic sense. Further 
in later chapters when we simulate the policy variables, intuitively implausible coefficients 
are likely to lead to volatility in the simulated solutions. 
Prior to estimation unit root tests for dependent and independent variables are conducted. 
Then for the system of AIDS share equations, SUR is utilised for the long-run model. The 
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overvIew from a general to preferred long-run specific model is depicted. We then 
conduct the tests of cointegration, stability and axioms of rational choice for the specific 
model. 
5.4.2 Unit Root Tests 
The results of the unit root tests for variables are shown in Table 5.3. The vector of prices 
seems to be rather stationary than non-stationary in the DF test in levels. However the 
ADF test statistics are below the critical value at a 5% significance level for PGD, PCS 
and PLA, and at a 1 % level for PER. We take the ADF result as an indication of a unit 
root for the prices3. For other variables, a unit root is found in levels in both DF and ADF 
tests at a 5% level. In the DF tests for the differenced series all the variables reject the null 
of a unit root at 5% significance level. It may therefore be reasonable to assert that all the 
variables are integrated of order one4• The Perron's unit root test is found in Appendix 
5.1. With respect to the estimated coefficient p , the results almost replicate those ofDF 
and ADF tests. 
Following the unit root test, the dependent and independent variables are categorised in 
the following manner. 
1(1) endogenous variables: ER, GD, CS, LA, PCS, PLA, In(WT / pOT) 
1(1) exogenous variables: PER, PGD, eRR, SLR, In(Y/w) 
1(0) variable: dummy 90 
In determining endogenous or exogenous in variables, let us recall the following: PCS (or 
3 The LM autocorrelation test for residuals supports the ADF test results: in the DF tests for PER, paD and 
PLA, the residuals suffer from serial correlation at the 5% or 10% significance level, while in the ADF tests, 
the residuals are whitened. 
4 Note that a deterministic trend is found to be significant at a 5% level for 1n(WT / pOT) and eRR in levels 
as indicated by (t), therefore for both variables the test results are based on the specification with the trend. 
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return on shares) and PLA (or lending rate) are assumed to be determined in the market 
clearing conditions in the company securities and loans markets respectively, such that 
they are endogenous variables. This implies that In(WT / pOT) should be endogenous. 
PGD (or government securities' yields) is determined by the authorities in India. PER (or 
bank rate), eRR and SLR are the policy variables. A real variable ofln(Y/w) is assumed 
to be determined outside the financial sector, hence it is exogenous. 
Table 5.3 Order of Integration of the variables 
Level DifTerenced 
DF ADF DF ADF 
S\ (ER) -2.45 -1.71 -6.97 * -2.91 * 
S2 (GD) -1.09 -0.65 -4.88 * -4.57 * 
S3 (CS) -1.76 -1.90 -3.31 * -1.95 
S4 (LA) - 0.08 -0.25 -5.43 * -3.43 * 
lnp: (PER) -3.71 * -2.99 * -6.06 * -4.09 * 
lnp; (PGD) -3.84 * -2.84 -5.77 * -3.79 * 
lnp; (PCS) -3.41 * -2.40 -5.49 * -4.39 * 
lnp; (PLA) -3.43 * -2.30 -5.71 * -3.80 * 
In(WT / pOT) -2.67 (t) -1.90 (t) -6.49 * -4.00 * 
In(Y/w) -1.43 -1.74 -4.93 * -3.05 * 
CRR -1.67 (t) -1.18 (t) -6.51 * -4.10 * 
SLR -0.80 -1.20 -3.91 * -2.60 
-* Significant at the 5% level 
2 
- ADF is modelled as Mit = a + P X H + L biMt-i + et . (t): a detenninistic trend is specified 
i:\ 
in DF and ADF tests as the trend is statistically significant at a 5% level. 
- Critical value 're (constant, no trend): -3.43 (1%), -2.86 (5%), -2.57 (10%) 
Critical value 'ret(constant, trend): -3.96 (1%), -3.41 (5%), -3.13 (10%) 
by Davidson and MacKinnon, p708, 1993 
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5.4.3 Overview of the General to Specific Model 
Figure 5.1 presents the overview of the unrestricted general to specific model. The figure 
presents the log likelihood of each model accompanied with the likelihood ratio (LR) test 
and small sample-adjusted LR (SSLR) test. The unrestricted model is estimated without 
homogeneity and symmetry, but maintaining adding-up constraint so that the estimated 
coefficients satisfy the balance sheet condition. Estimates of the general unrestricted 
model and residual diagnostics are given in Table 5.4. The 'fit' of the model given by the 
R-squared is reasonably high. LM residual tests are relatively satisfactory, though there is 
some evidence ofheteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (order=2) in GD share equation at 
a 1 % significance level. The relatively collinear data set seems to suffer from 
multicollinearity leading to wrongly signed estimates in own prices: the own-price 
coefficients of ER and LA are statistically insignificant with a wrong positive sign. 
Overall, the price coefficients as the major determinants of asset choice are poorly-
determined. This is contrasted with other explanatory variables that are statistically highly 
significant. 
The constraints of homogeneity and symmetry on the price coefficients are imposed across 
equations. Figure 5.1 indicates that in SSLR the joint test of 'Symmetry and 
Homogeneity' is rejected, but the 'Symmetry given Homogeneity' is not rejected at a 5% 
significance level. We maintain the restrictions since they improve the price coefficients. 
Then the coefficients which are statistically or economically insignificant on intuitive 
grounds are deleted from each equation, namely CRR in GD and CS share equations, SLR 
in ER share equation and a dummy variable in CS share equation. The zero impositions 
on these variables are jointly rejected (see Model 1 in figure 5.1), mainly due to the 
deletion of CRR in CS equation, in which CRR has a relatively high t-statistic of 4.43 in 
the general model. However, it rarely makes economic sense that a rise in CRR (i.e. an 
indication of a tight monetary policy) increases CS, the most risky asset among others. 
The deletion ofCRR in GD statistically improves the coefficient ofPGD and SLR in GD. 
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Arguing that PGD and SLR should have more relevance to the GD share equation than 
does CRR, it may justify this deletion. These zero restrictions are also associated with the 
fact that CRR and SLR are relatively highly correlated (the coefficient correlation is 0.8) 
potentially leading to multicollinearity; the deletion of CRR in GD and CS share equations 
renders SLR more sensitive to these share equations that are directly related to this policy 
variables. Model 1 is the long-run model being imposed by these restrictions and is an 
improvement on the general model. 
Figure 5.1 Overview of the general to specific model 
LR=36.684(6) * 
SSLR=30.447(6) * 
Symmetry and Homogeneity 
(LL=387.203) 
LR=28.256(3) * 
SSLR=23.452(3) * 
LR=8.428(3)* 
SSLR=6.995 (3) 
Symmetry given 
Homogeneity 
(LL=387.203) 
~ ~R=25.194(4)* 
r--__ -=--------, SSLR=21.663( 4) * 
Model 1 
- * Significant at the 5% level. 
Zero restrictions on 
non-price explanatory 
variables 
(LL=374.606) 
Model 2 
-0.38 restriction on 
PER in ER 
(LL=373.721) 
LR=1.77 (1) 
SSLR=1.522(1) 
- LL= Log likelihood, LR=Likelihood Ratio test, ()= the number of restrictions. 
- SSLR=Srnall sample-adjusted LR 
- Critical values: d.f. 1=3.84 (5%), 6.64 (1 %), d.f. 3 = 7.82 (5%), 11.34 (1 %), 
d.f. 4 = 9.49 (5%),13.28(1%), d.f. 6 = 12.59(5%),16.81 (1%). 
5 Recall that the SLR is associated with government securities (i.e. OD) and government approved company 
securities (i.e. CS). 
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Table 5.4 Unrestricted (General) Model 
lnpt' Inp; In p; lnp; Constant 
(PER) (PGD) (peS) (PLA) 
1. ER 0.4335 -0.0424 -0.0039 -0.5134 0.6731 
(0.87) (0.14) (0.29) 0.59) (2.80) 
2.GD -0.1077 -0.9835 0.0122 0.7620 2.0698 
(0.12)_ (1.81) (0.51 ) (1.33) (4.82) 
3. CS 0.2346 0.0324 -0.0188 -0.3279 0.2912 
(0.99) (0.23) (2.96) (2.16) (2.57) 
4. LA -0.5604 0.9934 0.0105 0.0793 -2.0340 
(0.59) (1.72) (0.41) _(0.13) (4.48) 
CRR SLR Dummy R-squared SSR 
90 
1. ER 0.0081 0.0008 -0.0471 84.49 % 0.0053 
(4.62) (0.57) (3.62) 
2.GD 0.0070 -0.0004 0.0739 75.13 % 0.0171 
(2.24) (0.16) (3.18) 
3. CS 0.0036 0.0039 -0.0042 97.27% 0.0012 
(4.43) (6.09) (0.68) 
4. LA -0.0187 -0.0042 -0.0227 86.88 % 0.0190 
(5.67) (1.66) (0.92) 
.. 
- t-ratio IS m parentheSIS. 
- No. of observation: 43 (1951-52 to 1993-94), Log Likelihood: 405.545 
-Columns may fail to sum to zero due to rounding. 
-SSR: sum of squared residuals 
Residual diagnostics (chi-square values) 
1. ER 
2.GD 
3.CS 
4. LA 
LM Heteroskedasticity 
0.048 [0.827] 
8.502 [0.004] 
2.566 [0.109] 
0.019 [0.889] 
[ ] is P-value. One tail tests 
LM Serial Correlation 
(Order =1) 
0.386 [0.534] 
3.614 [0.057] 
4.852 [0.027] 
1.021 [0.312] 
In(W' / p •• In(YfW) 
-0.0811 -0.1226 
(2.80) (2.66) 
-0.2015 -0.3184 
(3.89) (3.86) 
-0.0415 -0.0488 
(3.03) (2.24) 
0.3240 0.4898 
_(5.91) .(5.62) 
SE of 
regression 
0.0111 
0.0199 
0.0053 
0.0210 
LM Serial Correlation 
(Order =2) 
3.101 [0.212] 
15.099 [0.000] 
8.997 [0.011] 
6.678 [0.035] 
Further, in order to derive plausible estimates for price parameters, Model 1 is restricted 
by imposing -0.38 on the own price coefficient in ER share equation. The -0.38 imposed 
model is Model 2. We will now look at Model 1 and Model 2 in detail (including how we 
determine -0.38 in Model 2). 
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5.4.4 Modell and Model 2 
The estimates of Model 1 and 2 are found in Table 5.5. Both models are estimated with 
White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error adjusted due to heteroskedasticity. 
But we do not pursue the correction of the autocorrelation, as it is difficult without 
violating the portfolio constraints (Hay and Louri, 1989), and our principle concern is to 
find the economically sensible equilibrium relationship of variables in the long-run. Also, 
even with some autocorrelation long-run estimates are super-consistent if cointegration is 
found. Engle-Granger (EG) and Augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) test for the residuals 
are found in Table 5.6. The Johansen test results are presented in Table 5.7. Since the 
explanatory variables are the same for both models, so are the Johansen test results. 
Engle-Granger and Johansen Cointegration Tests 
Critical values for EG and AEG tests depend on the number ofl(l) endogenous variables 
on the right-hand side of the co integrating regression; each share equation contains four 
1(1) endogenous variables. With the asymptotic critical values for cointegration by 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), there appears to exist in both models a cointegation 
vector in ER share equation: the EG and AEG test statistics are significant at a 5% and 
10% level respectively. This test result provides some confidence in Model 2, despite the 
fact that the own-price coefficient for ER is imposed rather than freely-determined. In 
GD, the AEG test rejects the null of unit root in residuals in Model 2 at the 5% level (in 
the case of Model 1 at the 10 %) indicating the existence of a cointegration vector also in 
this share equation. For CS and LA, the null is not rejected. To sum up, Engle-Granger 
test provides evidence of co integration in ER and GD equations, but not in CS and LA 
equations. 
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Table 5.5 Long run equilibrium model: homogeneity and symmetry imposed 
(Adjusted White's Heteroskedasticity-Consistent S.E.) 
a. M d 11 o e L L'k rh d 374606 og 1 e 1 00 : 
In pr lop; In p; Inp; Constant In(W' / pO,) 
(PER) (PGD) (PCS) (PLA) 
I.ER 0.3062 0.1000 0.0017 -0.4079 0.1484 -0.0227 
(0.61) (0.39) (0.11) (1.20) (1.39) (1.74) 
2.GD -0.9950 0.0085 0.8865 0.8076 -0.0502 
(3.08) (0.31 ) (2.50) (2.48) (1.38) 
3.CS -0.0244 0.0143 -0.0289 0.0007 
(2.73) (0.39l (0.4~ (0.09) 
4. LA -0.4929 0.0728 0.0723 
(1.101 (0.181 (1.61) 
CRR SLR Dummy R-squared SSR SE of 
90 regression 
I.ER 0.0075 0 -0.0597 81.29% 0.0065 0.0122 
. (5.93) (3.91) 
2.GD 0 -0.0029 0.0646 58.98 % 0.0281 0.0256 
J1.24) 13.53) 
3. CS 0 0.0037 0 93.29 % 0.0029 0.0083 
(6.67) 
4. LA -0.0075 -0.0077 -0.0050 66.32 % 0.0498 0.0340 
(5.93) (0.31) (0.27) 
b. Model 2 (-0.38 imllosed) Log Likelihood: 374.721 
lopr lop; In p; Inp; Constant In(W' / po,) 
(PER) (PGD) (PCS) (PLA) 
1. ER -0.38 0.3670 0.0031 0.0099 0.134 -0.0178 
(2.05) (0.17) (0.06) (1.18) (1.37) 
2.GD -1.0866 0.0083 0.7113 0.8109 -0.0526 
(4.11) (0.32) (2.34) (2.47) (1.44) 
3. CS -0.0245 0.0131 -0.0298 0.0006 
(3.08) (0.46) (0.47) (0.08) 
4. LA -0.7343 0.0849 0.0698 
(1.77) (0.22) (1.57) 
CRR SLR Dummy R-squared SSR SEof 
90 regression 
1. ER 0.0083 0 -0.0600 80.3% 0.0068 0.0126 
(7.24) (4.02) 
2.GD 0 -0.0029 0.0634 59.3% 0.0279 0.0255 
(1.26) (3.54) 
3. CS 0 0.0037 0 93.3% 0.0029 0.0083 
(6.78) 
4. LA -0.0083 -0.0008 -0.0035 86.6% 0.0495 0.0339 
(7.24) (0.34) (0.20) 
In(Y/w) 
0.0361 
(1.29) 
-0.1209 
(1.54) 
-0.0062 
(0.40) 
0.1631 
(1.67) 
lo(Y/w) 
-0.0382 
(1.31) 
-0.1188 
(1.51) 
-0.0059 
(0.38) 
0.1629 
(1.67) 
t-ratio is in parenthesis. Zeros and -0.38 are imposed. No. of observation: 43 (1951-52 to 1993-94), 
Columns may fail to sum to zero due to rounding. SSR: sum of squared residuals 
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Table 5.6 Engle-Granger Cointegration Tests 
Model 1 Model 2 (-0.38 imposed) 
EG AEG EG AEG 
1. ER 
-5.67 ** -4.06 * -5.26 ** -4.01 * 
2.GD -2.78 -4.05 * -2.78 
-4.11 ** 
3. CS -2.66 -2.59 -2.66 -2.44 
4. LA -2.30 -2.93 -2.31 -2.95 
2 
- ADF is modelled as /).}{;t = a + f3 X t_1 + L 8;/).}{t_; + et . 
;=1 
- Number ofI(l) endogenous variables: n=4 
- Asymptotic Critical Values for Cointegration Tests: 4.10 (5%), 3.81 (10 %) for n=4 (Davidson and 
MacKinnon, 1993, p.722). 
- ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5.7 Johansen Cointegration LR test for Modell and Model 2 
(Order of V AR=l, unrestricted intercept with no trend) 
ER 
Null Maximum Arnax 95%C.V. Trace Atrace 95%C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r=O r=1 56.74 * 39.99 r>= 1 132.01 * 86.42 
r<=l r=2 45.22 * 33.63 r>=2 75.28 * 60.19 
r<=2 r=3 22.18 26.94 r>=3 30.06 38.15 
r<=3 r=4 7.87 19.73 r=4 7.87 19.73 
GD 
Null Maximum Arnax 95%C.V. Trace Atrace 95% C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r=O r= 1 61.10 * 39.99 r>= 1 111.19 * 86.42 
r<=1 r=2 33.36 33.63 r>=2 50.09 60.19 
r<=2 r=3 11.17 26.94 r>=3 16.73 38.15 
r<=3 r=4 5.55 19.73 r=4 5.55 19.73 
CS 
Null Maximum Arnax 95% C.V. Trace Atrace 95% C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r=O r=1 57.34 * 39.99 r>= 1 114.55 * 86.42 
r<= 1 r=2 30.09 33.63 r>=2 57.21 60.19 
r<=2 r=3 17.06 26.94 r>=3 27.12 38.15 
r<=3 r=4 10.06 19.73 r=4 10.06 19.73 
LA 
Null Maximum Arnax 95%C.V. Trace Atrace 95%C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r=O r=1 63.94 * 42.68 r>= 1 127.05 * 95.14 
r<=1 r=2 41.00 * 36.38 r>=2 63.10 66.94 
r<=2 r=3 16.17 29.79 r>=3 22.10 42.73 
r<=3 r=4 5.93 22.19 r=4 5.93 22.19 
-* Significant at the 5% level 
- Order of V AR is determined by SBC or AIC. 
- In the partial VECM, variables are categorised as follows. 
1(1) endogenous 1(1) weakly exogenous 1(0) 
ER ER, PCS, PLA, In(w r / p*r) PER, PGD, In(Y /W), CRR Dummy 90 
GD GD, PCS, PLA, In(w r / pOr) PER, PGD, In(Y/w), SLR Dummy 90 
CS CS, PCS, PLA, In(w r / p*r) PER, PGD, In(Y/w), SLR 
LA LA, PCS, PLA, In(wr / p*r) PER, PGD, In(Y/w), SLR, CRR Dummy 90 
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In the Johansen test, there is a more clear indication of cointegration. Both maximum 
eigenvalue and trace tests demonstrate that there exists at least one co integrating 
relationship for all share equations at a 5 % significance level, as the null of non-
co integrating vectors is rejected on the LR test. For GD and CS (also LA by the trace 
test), there is a unique cointegration vector found. The Johansen result demonstrates that 
the 1(1) variables constitute stationary linear combinations in all four share equations. 
Estimates of Model 1 (Table 5.5a) 
In comparison with the general model, the own price coefficients for GD and LA have 
statistically improved, in particular with the correct negative sign for that of LA. However 
in the case of ER, the result is still counter-intuitive; In p; is positive, whereas the cross-
price effect of In p: is negative. This implies that a fall in the price of ER, or an increase 
in the Bank rate, causes a switch from ER to LA, exhibiting anomalies in price 
coefficients. The influence on ER, of the Bank rate is a key policy claimed in India: a rise 
in the Bank rate is aimed at tightening the monetary position in an economy. Further, it 
could be argued that a rise in Bank rate is interpreted as a signal that the RBI will further 
tighten monetary policy by a subsequent increase in the CRR. This should lead to a switch 
from other assets to reserves in the banking sector rather than the other way round6• 
Therefore, further experiments were undertaken to identify the plausible sign and 
magnitude of this coefficient. 
Estimates of Model 2 (Table 5.5b) 
It can be seen that the coefficient on PER in ER is statistically poorly determined, 
therefore a simulation was conducted by imposing a non-positive own price coefficient in 
the ER share equation. Starting from -0.02, the coefficient was reduced at intervals of 
-0.02 until reaching -0.38, when the estimates indicated gross substitutes in price 
6 Besides, Sen et al. (1996) find the positive relationship between the Bank rate and excess reserves. 
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parameters. We then imposed -0.38 as the coefficient for lnpt; although this is 
somewhat arbitrary the restriction is not rejected by the Likelihood ratio test 
(SSLR=1.35<X; = 3.84 (1) in Figure 5.1) in comparison with Model 1, and is therefore 
consistent with the data. 
See Table 5.5b. As compared with Model 1, theoretically and statistically significant 
improvements are observed, in particular, in the price parameters; i) all the estimated own-
price coefficients are negative with relatively high t-ratios, ii) all the own-price 
coefficients are larger than their respective cross-price effects, iii) all cross-price 
coefficients are positive, and iv) the t-ratio of PGD in ER equation has substantially 
increased from 0.39 to 2.05. In Model 2, the price coefficients are well-determined, 
showing gross substitutes, which is empirically a rare occurrence. On these grounds, we 
choose Model 2 as a preferred long-run model, and use this model for simulation 
experiments. (The detailed interpretation ofthe results is left in Section 5.5.) 
5.4.5 Other Tests for the Long-Run Preferred Model 2 
Table 5.8 shows the results ofthe other tests, taking our preferred model 2 as a maintained 
model (i.e. the null of a restricted model). 
The parameter stability of the model is examined by the Chow tests, splitting the sample 
period at 1961, 1969 and 1980. Parameter instability is observed in ER equations in all 
three cases, though it is not severe; at 1969 this is rejected at a 1 % significance level. For 
other share equations the parameters are stable. (CS at 1980 exhibits parameter instability 
at the 5 % significance level, but this is rejected at the 1 % level.) 
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Table 5.8 Other tests for the preferred long-run model 2 
Chow Tests 1961 1969 1980 
(1951-60 and 1961-93) . (1951-68 and 1969-93) (1951-79 and 1980-93) 
ER 3.773 * 2.603 * 6.939 * 
(df= 9,25) 
GD 0.718 0.341 0.548 
~df=9,25l 
CS 0.429 1.998 2.396 * 
(df= 8,27) 
LA 0.538 2.057 0.747 
(df= 10, 23) 
-Critical value: ER and GD around 2.28 (5%), 3.22 (1 %) and CS and LA around 2.27 (5%), 3.21 (1 %). 
-* Significant at the 5% level 
LR (no. of restrictions) SSLR(no. of Critical value 
restrictions) (at 5% level) 
Homogeneity 30.39 (3) * 26.135 (3) * 7.81 
Symmetry and Homogeneity 36.09 (6) * 31.037 (6) * 12.59 
Symmetry (given Homogeneity) 5.67 (3) 4.876 (3) 7.81 
Weak Separability 14.93 (3) * 12.839 (3) * 7.81 
~Mone~ market rate) 
Homotheticity 3.82 (3) 3.285 (3) 7.81 
(Pi =0, i =1,2,3) 
- Model 2 as a null of restricted model. 
-* Significant at the 5% level 
ER GD CS LA 
Eigenvalues -0.409 -1.264 -0.090 -0.940 
LR test for the joint test of symmetry and homogeneity is rejected at the 5% significance 
level, though the symmetry given homogeneity is not rejected. In the neo-classical 
consumer demand theory approach, 'services,7 from the differentiated attributes of the 
assets are not explicitly modelled and are subsumed in the parameters of the cost function 
(Barnett, 1980). Hence, the failure of homogeneity and symmetry may imply the change 
ofthese attributes (Barr and Cuthbertson, 1991c). 
7 For example, differing degrees of liquidity, different penalties in early withdrawals and perceptions of risk. 
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The weak separability test is perfonned in an ad-hoc manner by including the money 
market rate as an additional explanatory variable. But this is decisively rejected. The joint 
homotheticity test is not rejected, implying that all the wealth elasticities are unity. This 
indicates that weak separability is not entirely rejected, since the unitary wealth elasticities 
mean that the demand function is independent of excluded interest rates. 
Eigenvalues are calculated using the mean values of the shares. The matrix of kij 
coefficients has all negative eigenvalues indicating that negativity is not rejected. 
The overall results are somewhat mixed. Symmetry and homogeneity are rejected, though 
negativity is not rejected. While weak separability is rejected, homotheticity is not. 
However, with parameter stability reasonably satisfied, we move on to draw inference 
from the empirical results. 
5.5 Inference 
5.5.1 Interest Rate, Wealth and Income Elasticities 
Elasticities for the interest rate, wealth and income are derived using the mean values of 
the shares and presented in Table 5.9a. (Recall that there is an inverse relationship 
between price and interest rate elasticities; empirically the own price estimates are 
negative, and that the own interest rate elasticities are positive as shown in the table.) The 
actual impact in tenns ofRs. crore is also presented in Table S.9b. The salient features are 
as follows. 
i) We have found that all the own-price coefficients are larger than their respective 
cross-price effects. This is also the case for elasticities, and this is a quite rational 
behaviour. The own-interest rate elasticities are all above unity, implying that the banking 
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Table 5.9a Elasticities for the preferred model 2 
RI R2 R3 R4 Wealth Income 
1. ER 13.06 -12.14 -0.17 -3.32 0.43 -1.22 
2.GD -1.47 4.90 -0.10 -3.32 0.80 -0.46 
3.CS -0.07 -0.37 1.28 -0.83 1.01 -0.08 
4. LA -0.04 -1.34 -0.09 1.47 0.25 2.33 
R = Interest rate 
- The interest rate elasticities imply the effect of a one percentage point change in the interest rate (R) on the 
percentage change in asset holdings, i.e. (l1a j / a j )* 1 00. 
- Wealth and income elasticities, i.e. [ (~aj / aj)(~ln(WT / p*T)/1n(WT / p*T»-1 land 
[ (l1a j / a j )(l1ln(Y / W) Iln(Y / W)rl ] respectively. (BaIT and Cuthbertson, 1991c) 
Table 5.9b Long-run Impact of Asset Holdings (Rs.Crore) for the preferred model 2 
RI R2 R3 R4 Mean values 
(1951-93) 
1. ER 319.17 -296.54 -4.10 -18.53 2443.64 
2.GD -179.44 597.40 -12.42 -405.54 12197.17 
3.CS -3.65 -18.27 62.46 -40.55 4890.28 
4. LA -9.69 -350.61 -23.84 384.14 16151.09 
R = Interest rate, Rs. crore = 10 million rupees. 
-This shows the effect of a one percentage point change in the rate of return on the holdings of the assets, 
calculated using the mean value of stocks for the sample period 1951-93. 
sector is sensitive to interest rates in the portfolio choice. 
ii) The effect of a one percentage point change in the Bank rate on the percentage 
change in the share of ER turns out to be a very large at 13.06. But this is somewhat 
expected in that, before financial liberalisation, there was a lack of substitutes for the 
short-term liquidity in the banking sector, and commercial banks were very responsive to 
the Bank rate. The own-interest rate elasticity of GD is also a relatively large at 4.90, as 
compared with those of CS and LA. In India, government securities are an attractive asset, 
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hence the banking sector is very sensitive to their yields. 
iii) The impact of RI and R2 in actual values (Table 5.9b) demonstrates relatively 
strong substitute effect between the risk-free assets of ER and GD. A rise in RI increases 
ER (by 319.17) while decreasing GD (by -179.44). On the other hand, a rise in R2 
decreases the holding of ER (by -296.54) while increasing GD (by 597.40). The 
substitute effect between them can be interpreted as a perverse indicator of financial 
repression for a developing economy. Evidence suggests that even though there is a fall in 
either RI or R2, the funds in the banking sector are likely to be stagnated in the 
government sector. 
iv) A strong substitution effect is also observed in the actual holdings in Table 5.9b 
between GD and LA; with an increase in lending rates, banks switch funds from GD to LA 
and vice versa. This is preferable in that by lowering the government securities' yields the 
loanable funds will increase. 
v) The substitution effects between ER vs GD and GD vs LA indicates that the 
change in the bank rate may not exert much impact on delivering funds to the private 
sectors, whereas the change in government securities' yields may do. 
vi) The own-interest rate elasticity for CS is the smallest amongst other assets. In the 
underdeveloped stock market, there is probably a cautious attitude towards the return on 
shares, particularly of banks, who were regulated for much of the period. 
vii) The share of ER, GD and LA appear to be inelastic with respect to wealth given 
less than a unitary elasticity. In respect to ER and GD, the behaviour is quite reasonable, 
since this implies that the investment in the risk-free assets is independent to the level of 
wealth in the banking sector. The wealth elasticity in CS is unity, suggesting that banks 
will invest in the risky asset equi-proportionally as the wealth increases. 
viii) The negative income elasticities in ER and GD imply that they are 'inferior goods': 
as income falls, banks are more willing to invest in the risk-free assets. On the other 
hand, the income elasticity in LA is well above unity, suggesting that LA is a 'luxury 
good'. This is a plausible outcome in that the banks' perception of default on loans will 
decline as the level of income increases, and lending will become active in the banking 
sector. 
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5.5.2 eRR, SLR and Dummy 90 Variables 
The following features for policy and dummy variables can be drawn from the coefficients 
(Table 5.5b for Model 2). 
i) The effect of CRR is contractionary in terms of a flow of loanable funds, since an 
increase in CRR raises ER while reducing LA. 
ii) The negative effect of SLR on the share of GD is counter-intuitive, but the own-
price coefficient is relatively large with a correct sign. It can probably be interpreted as 
follows: SLR was originally designed for commercial banks to maintain adequate liquid 
assets for sound banking practice. It was in the 1980's that the government increasingly 
used the SLR to finance its rapidly increasing deficits (Sen et al. 1996). Therefore, over 
the sample period in general, the effect of the yields may have outweighed the effect of 
SLR on the holding of government securities. Alternatively, commercial banks may have 
voluntarily invested in the risk-free government securities irrespective of the level of SLR. 
SLR is only statistically significant at a lower than 10% level. 
iii) By contrast, SLR exerts a positive significant effect on CS. This indicates that the 
banking sector is forced to increase investment in government-approved (company) 
securities as SLR increases. Company securities are risky assets, therefore as opposed to 
government securities, commercial banks involuntarily invest in CS under SLR. 
iv) The effect of SLR on loans is negative, implying that an increase in SLR is 
contractionary, though the coefficient is statistically and numerically insignificant. 
v) The dummy variable for the post-financial reform is intuitively and statistically 
well-determined. A positive sign on the dummy variable with a relatively high t-ratio in 
the GD share equation is consistent with the experience which commercial banks had after 
the reform. In 1991 the introduction of market-related interest rates for government 
securities raised the yields and attracted banks to invest in zero-risk government securities. 
Also the increased perception of risk prevalent in the banking sector in the 1990s led to a 
shift of funds in favour of risk-free assets. In the counter-part, the (imposed) zero or 
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insignificant effect of the dummy in CS and LA supports such banks' risk-averse 
behaviour. 
vi) A negative sign on the dummy variable in ER is probably due to the development 
of the money market in the post-reform period, widening scope for obtaining short-term 
funds in the banking sector8, thus the need for holding excess reserves declined. This 
implies that the direct effect of the change in the Bank rate on the bank reserves should 
have weakened in the post-reform period. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Demand functions for financial assets in the banking sector are estimated within a 
coherent theoretical framework provided by the AIDS model. Some difficulty was 
experienced in determining prior claims in the financial assets in the banking sector. 
Common to other developing countries, in India a financial system is characterised by a 
captive market, complicated with more than one regulatory reserve ratio, and this is 
combined with credit control. With this situation, it was numerically almost impossible to 
exclude all the involuntary flow of funds as policy-determined from the banking sector's 
assets for empirical application. Despite this, the estimated long-run model (Model 2), 
being imposed of portfolio constraints, provides not only coherent price parameters but 
also economically plausible parameters of policy variables. 
The following are noteworthy: First, a relatively strong impact of own-interest rates is 
found, hence the change in interest rates may exert a significant reshuffle in the portfolio 
choice, separately from conventional monetary policy instruments. Second, the study 
uncovers the fact that ER and GD constitute strong substitutes, suggesting that in order for 
banks to disinvest in the government sector, both interest rates should come down. With 
respect to government securities' yields, the lower yields may increase loanable funds in 
the banking sector. However, this is somewhat ironical; in the post-financial liberalisation 
8 After reforms the market has widened through the participation of non-banking fmancial sectors and the 
introduction of CDs. 
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the yields were raised, making the cost of borrowing expensive with a view to containing 
the increase in government debt in the government sector. The empirical result then 
suggests that an increase in yields will attract the banking sector to invest in the 
government sector. This behaviour is also evident in the effect of the financial reforms 
through Dummy 90 on GD. The evidence in general warns that the fiscal disciplinary 
efforts are needed in the government sector, if the target policy is to increase a flow of 
loans to the private sectors for economic activities. Third, the influence of eRR is 
contractionary by reducing LA, whereas that of SLR is inconclusive given a statistically 
insignificant coefficient in LA. Fourth, the risk-averse portfolio behaviour in the banking 
sector is observed in response to SLR. We find that the influence of the liquidity ratio on 
government securities and government-approved company securities is the contrary. It 
appears that banks voluntarily invest in the former (i.e. the risk-free asset), whereas 
involuntarily in the latter (i.e. the risky asset) under this regulation. 
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Appendix 5.1 
Perron's Unit Root Test 
Perron's Model (C) DF Perron's Model (C) ADF 
k=O Level k=2 Level 
Dummy p t· From Dummy p t. From p Table p Table 
5.3 5.3 
SI (ER) 3 -0.240 2.563 N 3 -0.212 1.964 N 
S2 (GD) 0 -0.189 1.619 N 0 -0.081 0.595 N 
S3 (CS) 3 -0.109 2.563 N 3 -0.126 3.027 N 
S4 (LA) 1 -0.094 1.219 N 3 -0.088 1.103 N 
In PIT (PER) 0 -0.754 4.088 * R 0 -1.013 3.354 R 
Inp; (PGD) 0 -0.729 3.983 * R 0 -0.945 3.177 N 
Inp; (PCS) 3 -0.726 4.013 * R 3 -1.015 3.457 N 
Inp; (PLA) 0 -0.740 4.029 * R 0 -0.940 3.172 N 
In(Wr / pOT) 1 -0.314 2.597 N 0 -0.237 1.640 N 
In(YfW) 0 -0.130 1.409 N 0 -0.157 1.544 N 
CRR 0 0.024 0.172 N 0 0.122 1.210 N 
SLR 1 -0.173 2.268 N 1 -0.216 2.398 N 
- * Significant at a 5% level, N= null of unit root is not rejected at a 5% significance level, R= null of unit 
root is rejected at a 5% significance level. 
k 
- Model (C) : L.\Yt = f.1 + f3t + eDUt + rDT,* + qDTBt + PYt-1 + LO;L.\Yt-i + et 
;=1 
- Null hypothesis: p = 0 and e = f3 = r = 0 
- Alternative hypothesis of a trend stationary process: p <0 and e, f3, r ;j:. 0 
- Dummy: The number of significant dummy coefficients out of e, f3 and r . 
- TB = 1990, T= 4, A = 4/43=0.1 
- Critical Value for p: 3.75 (5%),4.38 (1%) (Perron 1989, p.1377) 
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Chapter 6 A Flow of Funds Approach to the Capital 
Structure for the Private Corporate Business Sector1 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter models the flow of funds for the private corporate business (PCB) sector 
for India. The PCB sector is a deficit sector, so that portfolio behaviour in the financial 
sector amounts to a choice among financial liabilities, which in the main consist of 
equity and debt. Modelling the flow of funds for the PCB sector is therefore equivalent 
to a study of capital structure. 
With the diversified nature of companies in a world of market imperfections, the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the determinant of corporate financial structure 
is extensive (e.g. Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 1984, Jalilvand and Harris, 1984, Mayer, 
1988, AlIen and Mizuno, 1989 and Mayer, 1990). Pecking order hypothesis suggests 
that internal finance is preferred to external finance and debt finance is preferred to 
equity finance. The hypothesis has originated from the market imperfections; i) the 
implication of transaction costs is to establish a preference for internal over external 
finance (Mayer, 1990), ii) a preference of riskless (debt) over risky (equity) finance is 
suggested by agency costs2 and information asymmetries3• There is some evidence that 
corporations in developed countries follow this 'pecking order' and in developing 
economies it is more expected in view of the serious capital market imperfections and 
high share-price volatility (Singh, 1997). Singh and Weisse (1998) argue that firms in 
developing countries shun the stock market due to not only asymmetric information, 
1 This is a revised version of the paper by Moore et al. (2002b), which was presented at the Finance and 
Development conference, Manchester in April,2002. 
2 An increase in leverage increases managers' share of the equity and mitigates the loss from the conflict 
between managers and shareholders (Harris and Raviv, 1991, p.300). 
3 There are a number of examples; i) if firms finance new projects by issuing equity, underpricing may 
cause a net loss of existing shareholders leading to a rejection of the new project, but the 
underinvestment can be avoided ifthe firm uses internal funds or riskless debt (Harris and Raviv 1991, 
p.306), ii) debt financing may be seen as signaling device for a higher quality firm (Harris and Raviv 
1991, p.311), and iii) Mayer (1990) states that financial intermediaries perform a central function in 
reducing asymmetries in information in financial markets, hence debt financing is favoured rather than 
equity financing. 
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but also poor supervision and rampant insider trading. In addition issuing shares tends 
to be costly and restricted in an underdeveloped capital market. 
The company structure and conditions also affect the capital structure as has been 
noted; the behaviour of firms of different sizes and in different industries is far from 
homogenous (Mayer, 1988); the differences in ownership-structure have a profound 
influence (Booth, Aivazian, Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001)4. Chowdhury and Miles 
(1989) find that the most significant differences in behaviour across companies 
occurred when the sample was split by reference to company size. In empirical work 
on India by Cobham and Subramariam (1998), small firms tend to use more equity than 
large firms, on the grounds that when firms are not listed on stock exchanges, less 
information asymmetry and less separation of ownership and control are involved. 
In developing countries, business groups5 seem to dominate the economic landscape 
(Singh and Weisse, 1998) and this is a common feature in India (Manos, Murinde and 
Green, 2001). This structure may alleviate market imperfections, including 
information asymmetries, and so equity issuance involves less problems. In the view 
of Singh (1997), however, family-controlled firms are reluctant to issue equity for fear 
oflosing control. 
Harris and Raviv (1991) comment that the nature of the products which firms produce 
affects capital structure. Furthermore, Spies (l974) argues that there is no reason to 
expect the parameters of the model to be the same for all manufacturing corporations, 
or even for all corporations within a particular industry. Hay and Louri (1989) have 
thus emphasized the disaggregation of different industries in their empirical work, and 
they find that portfolio effects only emerged as significant at the level of industrial 
sectors, and not when the data were pooled across all different industries. Bradley et 
al. (1984) also show a strong finding of intra-industry similarities in firm leverage 
ratios and of persistent inter-industry differences. 
4 Hay and Louri (1989 and 1991) also point out the different portfolio behaviour between quoted and 
unquoted firms. 
5 Many of these groups started as a family business and the family keeps control of the business even 
after the company goes public (Man os, Murinde and Green, 2001). 
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The other issues in the study of corporate finance include those such as corporate tax, 
non-debt tax shields, the rate of growth of firms' capital employed, earnings volatility, 
variability ofa firm's value, corporate control contest and profitability (e.g. Bradley et 
al., 1984, Allen and Mizuno, 1989 and Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
Our approach to corporate finance is different from the pre-existing literature. From 
the theoretical point of view, there is no conventional hypothesis in terms of a capital 
structure set-up. The expected results are based on the axioms of rational choice from 
consumer demand theory and the theoretical model derives from the AIDS cost 
function. In the framework of the AIDS model, the PCB sector will choose financing 
by reference to the AIDS prices and wealth. Macro-economic variables of aggregate 
income, a policy instrument, and dummy variables are added as part of the subsistence 
level in the AIDS cost function. These are, at the same time, postulated to capture the 
generalised effects of firms' growth, profitability, credit rationing and shifts in 
government regulations6. In terms of data for estimation, generally, the use of 
disaggregated panel data drawn from individual firms is a common practice III 
determining corporate structure. However, the estimation reported here is based on: i) 
aggregate flow data (i.e. time series data) of all non-financial companies in India 
irrespective of their size, industries and ownership structure, ii) net transactions, i.e. 
intra-corporate sector transactions are netted out and that external finance means from 
outside the corporate sector7• Thus corporate financial activities between themselves, 
such as take-overs or mergers, are netted outs. 
The study of capital structure as an integral part of a system-wide flow of funds is 
therefore viewed as being a macroeconomic problem. 
6 Dickinson (2000) argues that the agency problems are influenced by macroeconomic variables, such as 
economic growth, the institutional structure ofthe financial system, the nature of financial development 
and the government intervention. 
7 A similar methodology is taken by Mayer (1988) and Cobham and Subhramaniam (1998). 
8 But this can be negligible since such a financial activity may be small in many developing countries 
(Green, Murinde and Suppakitjarak, June 2001). 
152 
In our model, the financing decision is assumed to be independent of the investment 
decision as discussed in Chapter 4 in relation to the theoretical flow of funds model. 
This means that the fixed assets are not modelled in this sector. This may be 
economically reasonable; given profits after tax, a firm decides the level of dividends 
(that are likely to be sticky) and investment, then the composition of financial deficit is 
detennined. In particular, decisions on the productive activities of companies require 
more time than do financing decisions (Chowdhury and Miles, 1989)9. This is also 
consistent with the objective of this thesis, which is to model a flow ofjinancial assets, 
obtain the market clearing endogenous variables and conduct simulation policy 
experiments. Fixed assets is a real use of funds, thereby modelling fixed assets is at 
odds with the objectives of the current study. 
In this respect, there is a strong motivation to utilise the AIDS model among other 
types of portfolio model. The pitfalls type model does not explicitly imply the 
separability ofthe finn's financing and investment decisions, which are inherent with 
utility maximisation (Prasad, 2000). However, applying the mean-variance hypothesis 
to the corporate sector has some limitations. First the assumption of a quadratic or a 
negative exponential utility function may not especially be the case for the behaviour 
of finns. Second, the mean-variance approach postulates that equity and debt are risky 
in themselves, however, this study investigates financial liabilities, and there is no risk 
attached to each liability. In the AIDS model framework, weak separability is implied 
in utility maximisation, facilitating the separability of the finn's financing and 
investment decisions. Further, the risk variable is not the hypothesized variable in the 
AIDS model specification. The advantage of the AIDS model is also that the non-
linear price index is approximated by a linear one, hence it readily allows comparison 
with other empirical studies of the demand for financial liabilities (Prasad, 2000). 
9 However, JaJilvand and Harris (1984) argue that because of market imperfections, interdependence 
between different corporate decisions arises. The empirical evidence on the independence of investment 
and financing decisions is mixed (Chowdhury and Miles, 1989). Chowdhury, Green and Miles (1994) 
take a different view on separability in their study of the determinants of UK-quoted companies: 
Chowdhury et al. hypothesize that the decisions on investment and long-term financing are made first, 
hence their empirical work focuses on the short-term financial decisions, referred to as 'Quick Finance', 
assuming other items are predetermined. A similar approach was taken by Hay and Louri (1996). 
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This chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 clarifies aggregate balance sheets for 
the PCB sector, thereby financial instruments for estimation. Section 6.3 deals with 
explanatory variables. The procedures and results of the estimation are found in 
Section 6.4, and inference is drawn in Section 6.5. Section 6.6 is held for a conclusion. 
6.2 Balance Sheet and Financial Instruments 
Table 6.1a shows the simplified aggregate balance sheet for the PCB sector in India 
(similar to that of Taggart, 1977 and Cobham and Subramaniam, 1998). The liability 
side mainly consists of debt, equity and reserves, whereas the asset side consists of 
fixed assets, inventories and financial assets. This can be re-arranged as in Table 6.1 b. 
Table 6.1a Aggregate Balance Sheet 1 
Liabilities Assets 
Short-term debt Inventories 
Long-term debt Fixed assets 
Equity capital Financial assets (Cash, Deposits, Loans and 
Reserves from retained earnings * Advances, Company Securities, Provident funds, 
Foreign Assets) 
* Equity capital and reserves are the total shareholders' funds. RetaIned earnings are residual after 
dividends payout and other claims on profits. 
Table 6.1 b Aggregate Balance Sheet 2 
Financial items (Sources) Real assets (Uses) 
Short and Long term debt - Loans and Advances Inventories 
Equity capital - Company Securities Fixed assets 
Reserves from retained earnings 
(- ) Deposits 
Table 6.1 b separates finns' real uses of funds from financing sources. The holdings of 
loans and advances and company securities on the asset side are netted from the debt 
and equity capital on the liability side, respectively. Short tenn debt (mainly bank 
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loans) and long term debt (mainly bonds and debentures) are aggregated to derive total 
debt financing. The holdings of deposits are placed on the left side preceded by the 
negative sign, since the drawing down of the liquid asset is considered a source of 
funds (Taggart, 1977). (-) Deposit implies internal financing. Cash, provident funds 
and foreign assets in the PCB sector are negligible, hence these are deleted for 
simplicity. If all the debt and equity financing are directed to investment, then the 
deposits can be seen as part of retained earnings. 
Changes in the balance sheet items in any period are constrained by the net acquisition 
of the financial asset (NAFA)lO, such that, 
.1. Debt + .1. Equity - .1. Deposits = Investment = NAF A 
The aggregate balance sheet is now linked with the theoretical flow of funds model in 
Table 4.1 (Chapter 4). 
It is assumed that the size of the real asset decisions (and also reserves) are exogenous, 
and that we seek to explain the composition of financing. Financial instruments to be 
estimated are, then, debt, equity and depositsl2 shown in Table 6.2 together with the 
mean share values. Not surprisingly, borrowing is the dominant component of the 
capital structure in India over the sample period 13. 
Table 6.2 Financial instruments for the banking sector 
Financial instruments with notations 
CS (Equity) Equity Capital (Company Securities deducted) 
LA (Debt) Short and Long term debt (Loans and advances 
deducted) 
DEP (-) Deposits 
10 Since, the PCB sector is a deficit sector, the NAF A is in a negative sense. 
11 L\Reserves are subsumed in L\Equity. 
Mean shares 
36.0% 
74.5 % 
-10.5 % 
12 In the study by Hay and Louri (1991 and 1989) for UK corporations, equity is not a choice variable, 
instead the flow concept of investment enters in a system of equations. 
13 Booth et al. (2001) also found a high debt proportion of 67.1 % during the period 1980-90 for India. 
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6.3 Explanatory Variables 
The interest rates and non-price sensitive explanatory variables are listed in Table 6.3 
together with the expected sign where appropriate. The interest rates used to 
fonnulate prices in the AIDS model are from the stand-point of investors in other 
sectors. This means that the interest rates are equivalent to the cost of capital for the 
PCB sector, and the derived AIDS prices are then conceptually similar to the return on 
capital employed. Accordingly, the expected sign on the own price coefficients is 
positive (whereas in other sectors they are negative) as shown in Table 6.3: it states 
that an increase in the own price is expected to increase the holdings of the financial 
liabilities. Similarly, in order to satisfy concavity in the cost function (or negativity), 
all the diagonal elements of the calculated matrix, i.e. the eigenvalues of kij in (4.16) 
in Chapter 4 should be positive semi-definite. 
Table 6.3 Price and Other Explanatory Variables 
Variables Notes Expected sign 
In p; = PCS (Price of CS) r1 = The rate of change in share prices +CS 
In p; = PLA (Price of LA) r2 = Lending rate +LA 
In p; = PDEP (Price ofDEP) r3 = Deposit rate + DEP (-) 
In(YfW) Log ofGDP at factor cost deflated by W 
SLR Statutory Liquidity Ratio 
Dummy 69 0: 1951-68 and 1: 1969-93 - LA 
Dummy 90 0: 1951- 89 and 1: 1990-93 + CS 
Under the SLR regulation, banks are required to invest a certain proportion of their 
aggregate deposit liabilities in government securities or government-approved 
securities (issued by OFIs). Since the latter is directed toward the PCB sector, SLR is 
expected to influence corporate finance. Whether the change in SLR affects CS or LA 
is the question to be addressed in estimation. 
With respect to dummy 69, in 1969 the government stipulated bank lending to the 
priority sectors of agriculture, small industry and business and small transport 
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operations. This is expected to decrease bank lending towards the PCB sector and that 
the sign on dummy 69 in the share of debt (i.e. LA) is negative. Dummy 90 is 
associated with financial reforms. With the de-regulation and development of the 
stock market coupled with the contraction of lending in the banking sector in the post-
reform period, it is expected that the share of equity finance would increase, hence the 
sign on CS is positive. 
PCS (Price of Company Securities) 
Among others, the price of CS (or equity) may warrant some explanation. The rate of 
change in share prices is used for the rate of return for company securities, and the 
expected share prices are inversely related to the expected returns. Then the expected 
positive sign on the CS share equation in Table 6.3 implies that as the share prices are 
expected to rise, the corporate sector increases equity finance. This is consistent with 
the principle of Tobin's Q: as the market value of a firm's equity rises relative to its 
'book' value of equity, the cost of issuing equity falls, ceteris paribus, then the firm 
holds more equity (Prasad, 2000). Empirical evidence is in favour of Tobin's Q: it is 
more likely that when a firm's share price is high relative to it's historical standard, 
equity is used more for funding remaining financial needs14• 
Yet, there is a different view of the relationship between share prices and issuing new 
shares. EPS (earning per share) is related to returns both through cash dividends and 
share price appreciation15, then an increase in share prices indicates profit growth and 
firms find it easier to borrow money from banks. Consequently borrowing may 
outweigh issuing shares when share prices rise. 
In the case of developing economies, when the financial market reforms started in the 
1980s in many of the developing countries, firms resorted so much to equity (Cobham 
and Subramaniam, 1998). This is perhaps because an increase in share prices will 
14 See Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), laIilvand and Harris (1984) and Homaifar, loahim and Omar 
(1994). 
IS Gupta and Chowdhury (2000) observe a direct link between EPS and share prices in India. 
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dilute the transaction cost of issuing new shares; the associated rise in PIE ratio reduces 
the cost of capital (Singh, 1997 and Mayer, 1988). 
It appears that whether corporations are timing the issuance of equity to coincide with 
rising stock prices is an empirical issue for India (Homaifar, Joahim and Omar, 1994). 
6.4 Estimation 
A similar procedure is followed as in the case of the banking sector. Starting with unit 
root tests, the overview of the general to specific model is presented. We then examine 
the specific models. 
6.4.1 Unit Root Tests 
The unit root test result is presented in Table 6.4. The table indicates that the null of 
unit root is rejected for the PDEP and In(Y/W) in levels at a 5% significance level in 
DF and ADF tests, and they are stationary ofI(0)16. For all other variables in levels the 
null is not rejected in either the DF or the ADF tests at a 5% significance level, and the 
rejection of the null in the differenced series indicates that these variables satisfy the 
condition ofI(I). The test result suggests that there is a mix ofI(O) and 1(1) explanatory 
variables in a regression, but this is not a concern in pursuing a cointegration vector .. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, it is possible that cointegration is present in this situation 
(Harris, 1995). Using these test results, the variables are categorised as given by: 
1(1) endogenous variables: CS, LA, DEP, PCS, PLA, In(WT I pOT) 
1(1) exogenous variables: SLR, 
1(0) variable: In(Y/W), PDEP, dummy 
The Perron's unit root test is found in Appendix 6.1. The results are in general close to 
the DF and ADF test results. 
16 With the significant time trend, In(YIW) exhibits a trend stationary process. 
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Table 6.4 Order of Integration of the variables 
Level Differenced 
DF ADF DF ADF 
SI (CS) -2.34 -2.02 -2.24 -3.45 * 
S2 (LA) -2.76 -2.00 -4.99 * -3.50 * 
S3(DEP) -1.81 -2.15 -10.15 * -3.72 * 
lnp; (PCS) -3.41 * -2.40 -5.49 * -4.39 * 
lnp; (PLA) -3.43 * -2.30 -5.71 * -3.80 * 
lnp; (PDEP) -4.03 * -3.24 * -5.86 * -3.92 * 
In(WT I pOT) -2.43 (t) -2.28 (t) -6.31 * -3.52 * 
In(Y/w) -4.69 (t) * -4.73 (t) * -4.86 * -2.93 * 
SLR -0.80 -1.20 -3.91 * -2.60 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
2 
Note: 1. ADF is modelled as Mit = a + P Xt-l + L 0iMt_i + et. (t): a deterministic trend is 
i=1 
specified as the trend is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
2. Critical value re (constant, no trend): -3.43 (1 %), -2.86 (5%), -2.57 (10%) 
Critical value ret (constant, trend): -3.96 (1 %), -3.41 (5%), -3.13 (10%) 
by Davidson and MacKinnon, p.708, 1993 
6.4.2 Overview of the General to Specific Model 
Figure 6.1 presents the overview of the general to specific model. The unrestricted 
general model is estimated without homogeneity and symmetry but maintaining 
adding-up. Estimates of the general model and residual diagnostics are given in Table 
6.5. 
The conventional measures of goodness of fit are satisfactorily high, suggesting that 
much of the variance in the regressions is explained by the model. There is no 
suggestion ofheteroskedasticity at a 5% significance level, but there is an indication of 
serial correlation in the static regression in LA, where the LM test statistics in both 
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first- and second-order are significant at a 1 % level. In price parameters, the own-
price coefficients for CS and LA are significant and satisfy the a priori expectations 
with a positive sign. The price coefficients in DEP are, however, statistically and 
numerically insignificant with a wrong sign on the own price coefficient. 
Figure 6.1 General to Specific Model 
! LR=4.10 (2) SSLR=3.53 (2) 
LR= 1.22 (2) 
SSLR=1.05 (2) 
LR= 9.06 (3)* 
SSLR=7.79 (3) 
Homogeneity 
(LL=189.967) 
I LR= 4.96 (1)* 
" SSLR=4.26 (1) * 
Zero impositions in 
SLR and Dum69 in 
DEP. 
(LL=191.408) 
Symmetry and 
Homogeneity 
(LL = 187.489) 
Symmetry given 
Homogeneity 
(LL= 187.489) 
I LR=0.03 (2) 
" SSLR=0.03 (2) 
I ./ LR=0.16 (1) 
" /' SSLR=0.14 (1) 
Model 1 
Zero impositions in 
PCS and PLA in DEP 
(LL = 191.393) 
* Significant at the 5% level 
- LL: Log likelihood 
r-----~----~-. 
Model 2 
Zero imposition in 
In(W r / por) in LA 
(LL = 187.408) 
2 
- LR: Likelihood Ratio (LR) test: L = 2(iu -IT) - X (J) 
where lu (iT) is the log likelihood of the unrestricted (restricted) equation 
and (J) is the number of restrictions. 
- SSLR: The small sample-adjusted LR given by the product ofLR and (T-K)/T, where T=No. of 
observations and K=No. of exogenous regressors in each equation (Bohm, Rieder and Tintner, 1980). 
- Critical values: d.£ 1=3.84 (5%), 6.64 (1%), d.£ 2 = 5.99 (5%), 9.21 (1%), 
d.f. 3 = 7.82 (5%), 11.34 (1 %). 
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Table 6.S Unrestricted (General) Model 
Inp; Inp; In p; Constant In(Wr / p*r) In(Y/W) 
(PCS) (PLA) (PDEP) 
1. CS 0.1271 -1.3143 1.6105 -1.9876 0.2281 0.7276 
(equity) (2.291 (2.17) (2.64) (2.49) (2.32) (5.46) 
2. LA -0.1192 1.2971 -1.5185 2.2661 -0.1498 -0.5405 
(debt) (2.11) (2.10) (2.44) (2.78) (1.49) (3.98) 
3. DEP (-) -0.0078 0.0172 -0.0920 0.7216 -0.0783 -0.1871 
(0.32) (0.06) (0.34) (2.03) (1.79) (3.15) 
SLR Dummy Dummy R-squared SSR SEof 
69 90 
1. CS -0.0236 -0.0417 0.1029 97.57 % 
(equity) (4.44) (1.39) (3.13) 
2. LA 0.0237 0.0290 -0.0752 97.17 % 
(debt) (4.37) (0.95) (2.25) 
3. DEP (-) -0.0001 0.0128 -0.0277 68.51 % 
(0.03) (0.96) (1.89) 
- t-ratio is in parenthesis. 
- No. of observation: 43 (1951-52 to 1993-94), Log Likelihood: 192.019 
-Columns may fail to sum to zero due to rounding. 
-SSR: Sum of squared residuals 
Residual diagnostics (chi-square values) 
1. CS 
2. LA 
3. DEP (-) 
LM Heteroskedasticity 
0.447 [0.50] 
0.433 [0.51] 
2.471 [0.12] 
[ ] is P-value. One tail tests 
LM Serial Correlation 
(Order =1) 
4.931 [0.03] 
9.109 [0.00] 
4.524 [0.03] 
regression 
0.0660 0.0392 
0.0686 0.0399 
0.0131 0.0175 
LM Serial Correlation 
(Order =2) 
7.760 [0.02] 
12.654 [0.00] 
13.833 [0.00] 
After test runs, we arrive at two specific models: Model 1 and Model 2. See Figure 
6.1. In Model 1, zeros are imposed on the statistically insignificant variables in DEP 
share equation. In Model 2, the constraints of homogeneity and symmetry on the price 
coefficients are imposed across equations. The figure indicates that all these 
restrictions on both models are almost accepted by SSLR tests at a 5% significance 
level ('Symmetry given Homogeneity' is rejected at the 5% significance level, but not 
rejected at the 1 % level). 
6.4.3 Model! and Model 2 
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Tables 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 show the estimates, the EG cointegration test and the lohansen 
co integration test respectively for Model 1 and ModeI2I7. The parameter stability and 
other tests are found in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.6a Estimates of Model! 
L L'k rh d 191393 og 1 e 1 00 : 
Inp; Inp; In p; Constant In(W' / pO,) In(Y/W) 
(PCS) (PLA) (PDEP) 
I. CS 0.1239 -1.3074 1.5956 -1.9298 0.2215 0.7186 
(~uity) (2.27) (2.19) (2.66) (2.45) (2.29) (5.47) 
2. LA -0.1239 1.3074 -1.5406 2.3519 -0.1597 -0.5539 
(debt) (2.27) (2.19) (2.57) (2.98) (1.65) (4.12) 
3. DEP (-) 0 0 -0.0550 0.5780 -0.0618 -0.1647 
(1.11) (4.0) (4.76) (6.57) 
SLR Dummy Dummy R-squared SSR SEof 
69 90 regression 
I. CS -0.024 -0.037 0.105 97.56 % 0.0661 0.0392 
(equity) (4.52l (1.24) (3.22) 
2. LA 0.0237 0.0366 -0.0720 97.16 % 0.0687 0.0400 
(debt) (4.52) (1.24) (2.18) 
3. DEP (-) 0 0 -0.0331 67.58 % 0.0135 0.0177 
(2.94) 
Table 6.6b Estimates of Model 2 (Homogeneity and Symmetry imposed) 
L L'k rh d 187408 og 1 e 1 00 : 
Inp; Inp; In p; Constant In(W' / pO,) In(Y/w) 
(PCS) (PLA) (PDEP) 
1. CS 0.0804 -0.0836 0.0032 -0.5613 0.0459 0.4829 
(equity) (1.65) (1.74) (0.16) (3.63) (2.40) (13.87) 
2. LA 0.1573 -0.0737 1.1107 0 -0.3396 
(debt) (0.59) (0.28) (10.35) (13.76) 
3. DEP (-) 0.0705 0.4506 -0.0459 -0.1433 
(0.27) (3.66) (2.40) (5.43) 
SLR Dummy Dummy R-squared SSR SE of 
69 90 regression 
1. CS -0.0102 -0.0630 0.1255 97.00 % 0.0813 0.0434 
(equity) (3.51) (1.95) (4.59)_ 
2. LA 0.0121 0.0476 -0.0928 96.69% 0.0802 0.0432 
(deb!l (4.101) (1.48) (3.46) 
3. DEP (-) -0.0019 0.0155 -0.0327 67.77 % 0.0134 0.0177 
(1.13) (1.15) (2.64) 
Notes: 
- t-ratio is in parenthesis. - No. of observation: 43 (1951-52 to 1993-94). 
-Columns may fail to sum to zero due to rounding. 
-SSR: Sum of squared residuals. -Zeros are imposed. 
17 Model 2 imposed of homogeneity and symmetry looks reasonable, but there are a couple of pitfalls in 
this model as it will be revealed. Model 1 is chosen as a preferred model and used for simulation. 
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Table 6.7 EG co integration tests 
Modell EG AEG Model 2 
1. CS (n = 4) -5.015 ** -3.946 * 1. CS (n = 4) 
2. LA (n=4) 
-4.778 ** -3.023 2. LA (n= 3) 
3. DEP (-) -5.117 ** -3.746 ** 3. DEP (-) 
(n= 2) (n = 4) 
Notes: 
2 
-ADF is modelled as Mit = a + P X t_1 + I6;Mt-i + et . 
;=1 
- n: number ofI(l) endogenous variables 
EG AEG 
3.982 * 3.704 
4.265 ** 3.674 * 
4.797 ** 2.957 
- Asymptotic Critical Values for Cointegration Tests: 3.34 (5%), 3.04 (10%) for n = 2,3.74 (5%), 3.45 
(10%) for n = 3 and 4.10 (5%), 3.81 (10 %) for n=4 (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, p722). 
- ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
Table 6.8a Johansen Cointegration LR test for Modell 
(Order of V AR=l for CS and LA and V AR=3 for DEP, Unrestricted intercept with no trend) 
CS 
Null Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace Atrace 95%C.V. 
Alternative Alternative 
r=O r=1 177.32 * 30.71 r>= 1 266.92 * 58.63 
r<= 1 r=2 64.27 * 24.59 r>=2 89.59 * 38.93 
r<=2 r=3 22.41 * 18.06 r>=3 25.32 * 23.32 
r<=3 r=4 2.90 11.47 r=4 2.91 11.47 
LA 
Null Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace Atrace 95%C.V. 
Alternative Alternative 
r=O r=1 187.06 * 30.71 r>= 1 285.32 * 58.63 
r<= 1 r=2 70.16 * 24.59 r>=2 98.26 * 38.93 
r<=2 r=3 22.91 * 18.06 r>= 3 28.09 * 23.32 
r<=3 r=4 5.17 11.47 r=4 5.17 11.47 
DEP 
Null Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace Atrace 95%C.V. 
Alternative Alternative 
r= 0 r= 1 51.30 * 14.88 r>= 1 56.39 * 17.86 
r<= 1 r=2 5.09 8.07 r=2 5.09 8.07 
Notes: - * Significant at the 5% level 
- In the partial VECM, variables are categorised as follows. 
1(1) endogenous 1(1) weakly 1(0) variables 
exogenous 
1. CS CS, PCS, PLA, In(WT / pOT) SLR PDEP, In(Y/W), Dummy 69, 
Dummy 90 
2. LA LA, PCS, PLA, In(WT / pOT) SLR PDEP, In(Y/w), Dummy 69, 
Dummy90 
3. DEP (-) DEP, In(W T / pOT) PDEP, In(Y/W), Dummy90 
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Table 6.8b Johansen Cointegration LR test for Model 2 
(Order ofVAR=l, Unrestricted intercept with no trend) 
CS 
Nun Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace Atrace 95%C.V. 
Alternative Alternative 
r=O r = 1 177.32 * 30.71 r>= 1 266.92 * 58.63 
r<= 1 r=2 64.27 * 24.59 r>= 2 89.59 * 38.93 
r<=2 r= 3 22.41 * 18.06 r>= 3 25.32 * 23.32 
r<=3 r=4 2.90 11.47 r=4 2.91 11.47 
LA 
Nun Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace Atrace 95%C.V. 
Alternative Alternative 
r=O r= 1 179.60 * 24.59 r>= 1 219.56 * 38.93 
r<= 1 r= 2 33.65 * 18.06 r>= 2 39.95 * 23.32 
r<=2 r=3 6.31 11.47 r=3 6.31 11.47 
DEP 
Nun Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace Atrace 95%C.V. 
Alternative Alternative 
r= 0 r = 1 185.73 * 30.71 r>= 1 280.54 * 58.63 
r<= 1 r=2 59.55 * 24.59 r>=2 94.80 * 38.93 
r<=2 r=3 28.21 * 18.06 r>= 3 35.25 * 23.32 
r<= 3 r=4 7.04 11.47 r=4 7.04 11.47 
Notes: - * Significant at the 5% level 
- In the partial VECM, variables are categorised as follows. 
1(1) endogenous 1(1) weakly 1(0) variables 
exogenous 
1. CS CS, PCS, PLA, In(W' / p.') SLR PDEP, In(Y/w), Dummy 69, 
Dummy90 
2. LA LA,PCS, PLA SLR PDEP, In(Y/w), Dummy 69, 
Dummy 90 
3. DEP DEP, PCS, PLA, In(W' / p.') SLR PDEP, In(Y/w), Dummy 69, 
(-) Dummy 90 
Cointegration Tests 
EG co integration tests in Table 6.7 for Model 1 are indicative of a stable long-run 
relationship in all three equations, since the null is rejected at a 5% significance level, 
though in the AEG tests the indication of cointegration is weaker. The EG test for 
Model 2 also suggests the rejection of the null at a 5 % or at least at a 10 % 
significance level. The tests are supplemented by a more powerful type of lohansen 
test in Table 6.8a for Model 1 and Table 6.8b for Model 2. (Note that the test statistics 
and critical values for CS are the same for both models, as the explanatory variables for 
this share equation are identical.) The null of r = 0 is comfortably rejected in all cases 
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in the maximum eigenvalue and trace tests. It is noticeable that the number of 
co integrating vectors is relatively large; it is all n-l (where n = the number of 1(1) 
endogenous variables). This is perhaps due to the inclusion of 1(0) variables of PDEP 
and In(Y IW) in the model: each 1(0) variable is stationary by itself and it forms a 
linearly independent column in IT of equation (4.38) in Chapter 4. Given these 
cointegration test results, we are fairly confident that there exists a stable long-run 
relationship between 1(1) endogenous variables in the system of equations, and that the 
derived estimates are super-consistent. 
Price Parameters for Model 1 and Model 2 
The following findings, which are derived from the estimated price parameters in 
Table 6.6a and 6.6b, are noteworthy, though the impact on the holding of financial 
liabilities is fully discussed in the form of interest rate elasticities for the preferred 
model in the next section. 
i) With respect to Model 1, the sign on the own price coefficients is the same as 
in the case of the general model. With the negative sign on the cross-price coefficients 
between LA and CS, the substitution effects of equity versus debt are observed. By 
imposing zeros on the cross prices and two other explanatory variables in DEP 
equation, the PDEP in DEP has statistically improved from 0.34 to 1.11 in the I-ratio. 
Statistical improvement is also seen in other explanatory variables in this share 
equation. 
ii) For Model 2, the major change from the general model is that all the own-price 
coefficients satisfy the a priori expectations with a positive sign. Substitute effects of 
equity versus debt and debt versus internal finance (or withdrawing deposits) are 
observed. However, the overall price coefficients are statistically and numerically 
insignificant as compared with Model 1. With the weak price effects, the high R-
squared probably attributes more to the contribution of the wealth, income and other 
explanatory variables than to that of the prices. 
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Parameter Stability and Other Tests 
The parameter stability and other tests for both models are shown in Table 6.9. Chow 
tests are conducted for parameter stability for 1961 (1951-60 and 1961-93), 1969 
(1951-68 and 1969-93) and 1980 (1951-79 and 1980-93). In particular, the 1980s were 
the years that PIE ratios started rising due to the gradual participation of foreign 
institutional investors in India. The table indicates that parameter stability is not 
rejected in almost all share equations (for DEP in Model 2 for 1961, it is rejected at a 
5% significance level, but only marginally). This is quite an achievement considering 
the fact that we have used the aggregated data over such a large time span. 
Although we find positive own-price coefficients for all three equations for Model 2, it 
is disappointing that all the eigenvalues are negative, and that the concavity in the cost 
function is rejected. This is probably due to the numerically small coefficients18• 
Concavity is also rejected in Model 1. 
Weak separability conducted in an ad-hoc manner is not rejected with respect to the 
bank rate and government securities' yields, but with respect to money market rates for 
Model 1. In the case of Model 2, weak separability is not rejected, implying that the 
share equations are independent of these interest rates. By contrast, homotheticity is 
rejected for both models suggesting that wealth elasticities are not unity. 
Model 1 as a Preferred Model 
In both models, we have found a stable long-run equilibrium relationship by 
cointegration tests and parameter stability. With respect to price coefficients, all the 
own-price coefficients show a theoretically expected sign in Model 2. However, given 
numerically small coefficients, the explanatory power is weak and the concavity of the 
cost function is rejected. Further, the signs on the price elasticities are not consistent 
18 The eigenvalue is derived by the mean value of shares, and if a price coefficient is numerically very 
small, the sign between the coefficient and the eigenvalue may not be the same (Chapter 4). 
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Table 6.9 Parameter stability and other tests for the Model! and Model 2 
Chow Tests Model 1 Model 2 
(d.f.) (d.£) 
1961 CS 0.985 1.240 
(1951-60 and 1961-93) (9,25) (9,25) 
LA 1.587 1.504 
(9,25) (8,27) 
DEP 1.430 2.320 * 
(5,33) (9,25) 
1969 CS 0.544 1.407 
(1951-68 and 1969-93) (9,25) (9,25) 
LA 1.434 1.806 
(9,25) (8,27) 
DEP 2.138 2.259 
(5,33) (9,25) 
1980 CS 1.03 1.458 
(1951-79 and 1980-93) (9,25) (9,25) 
LA 2.08 2.042 
(9,25) (8,27) 
DEP 1.39 1.821 
(5,33) (9,25) 
.. 
- Cntlcal values at a 5% slgmficance level for df (9,25)= 2.28, dfl8, 27)= 2.30 and df (5, 33)= 2.50. 
- * Significant at the 5% level. 
Negativity CS LA DEP (-) 
(Eigenvalues) 
Model 1 0.108 1.230 - 0.132 
Model 2 - 0.141 -0.033 - 0.015 
- An expected sign to satisfy negativity is positive in this sector. 
Model 1 Model 2 
LR SSLR LR SSLR 
Weak Separability 
(No. of restrictions = 2) 
Bank rate 0.790 0.671 1.620 1.344 
Gov't securities yields 0.000 0.000 2.470 2.050 
Money market rate 12.494 * 10.869 * 2.708 2.328 
Homotheticity 
Model 1 (PI =0, i =1,2) 21.880 * 19.035 * 
Model 2 (PI=O, i =1) 5.424 * 4.664 * 
.. 
-Cntlcal values: d.£ 1 = 3.84 (5 %), 6.64 (1%), d.£ 2 = 5.99 (5%),9.21 (I %) 
- * Significant at the 5% level. 
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with those on the price estimatesl9; all the own-price elasticities are wrongly-signed on 
a priori grounds. On the other hand, in the case of Model 1, without the constraints of 
homogeneity and symmetry, statistically and numerically significant price coefficients 
are obtained; changes in absolute prices appear to play a major role in explaining the 
capital structure of Indian companies2o. There is no conflict in the signs between the 
own-price estimates and elasticities, maintaining a theoretical expected sign on the 
own-price elasticities in CS and LA. Arguing that the elasticities rather than the 
estimated parameters are more meaningful in the AIDS model in terms of the 
economic concept (Barr and Cuthbertson, 1991a), Model 1 is preferred to Model 2. 
Moreover, another limitation in Model 2 is that of the poor performance in a system-
wide simulation; historical simulation that evaluates a estimated model turns out be 
inferior by using Model 2 as compared with that of Model 121. For these reasons, we 
choose Mode11 as our preferred long-run model. 
6.5 Inference for Model 1 
6.5.1 Interest Rate, Wealth and Income Impact 
Table 6.1 Oa presents the elasticities with respect to interest rates (this is equivalent to 
cost of capital), wealth and income. Table 6.10b shows the impact of changes in the 
interest rates on the actual holdings of assets. 
i) The own-interest rate elasticity in equity finance is negative. This means that a 
fall in the cost of equity capital (i.e. lower RI) increases equity issues. Similarly, a fall 
in the cost of debt capital (i.e. lower R2 ) increases debt financing. These satisfy the 
priori expectations. 
ii) Besides, a fall in the cost of equity capital implies a rise in share prices, and that 
the result is consistent with the Tobin's Q hypothesis. It could be due to the fact that 
19 In 7 out of9 cases, signs are different between the price estimates and elasticities. 
20 Without imposition of homogeneity it implies that the demand for financial liabilities is explained by 
absolute rather than relative prices. 
21 Among others, the Theil's U in solving PCS is 0.26 with Model 1 and it shoots to 0041 with Model 2 
(see Chapter 11 for the definition of Theil's U). 
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the transaction costs of issuing new shares, which tend to be high in developing 
economies, will be reduced as the share prices rise. 
iii) The impact of RI on the actual holdings is however very small. The cross-
interest rate elasticities (i.e. R2 and R3 ), on the other hand, appear to exert a 
significant influence on equity financing. The weak effect of RI (or share prices) 
appear to reflect some developing country-specific features in equity financing. As 
Singh (1997) points out the share prices in emerging markets may be expected to 
fluctuate more than in well-developed markets, and the high degree of variability has a 
detrimental influence on a stock market: i) to the extent that it discourages risk-averse 
investors, it raises the cost of capital to firms and it may discourage risk-averse firms 
from raising funds through the stock market (see also Singh and Weisse, 1998), ii) 
share prices in many emerging markets appear to have deviated considerably from 
fundamentals in the 1980s. Therefore the finding of the weak role of the share prices 
as an instrument of resource allocation is plausible in India. 
iv) The interest rate elasticities suggest that equity and debt are viewed as 
alternative sources; an increase in the cost of equity (RI) leads to a switch from equity 
to debt, while a rise in the cost of debt (R2 ) reduces debt financing and increases 
equity financing. 
v) The effect of R2 is much larger than that of RI on both CS and LA. This 
demonstrates a relatively strong sensitivity to the lending rates in the capital structure 
in India, as opposed to that of the cost of equity capital. 
vi) The own elasticity of debt finance (-1.651) is larger than that of equity finance 
(-0.301). A cross effect of R2 has a greater influence on equity (given the elasticity of 
3.314) than a cross effect of RI on debt (with the elasticity of 0.014). These suggest 
that as both the cost of equity capital and the cost of debt captal rise equi-
proportionally, there is a net increase in equity financing. This is also clear from the 
change in actual holdings in Table 6.10b. It could be possible that the debt market is 
more affected by interest rate restrictions as the lending rate rises. 
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Table 6.10a Interest rate, Wealth and Income Elasticities for Model 1 
RI R2 R3 Wealth Income 
1. CS (Equity) -0.301 3.314 -4.267 1.613 1.995 
2. LA (Debt) 0.014 -1.651 1.904 0.785 -0.744 
3. DEP (-) 0 0 1.256 0.412 -1.566 
- R = Interest rate 
- The interest rate elasticities imply the effect of a one percentage point change in the interest rate (R) on 
the percentage change in asset holdings, i.e. (~aj / a j )*100. 
- Wealth and income elasticities, i.e. [ (~aj / aj )(~ln(WT / pOT)/ln(WT / pOT)rl land 
[ (~al / aJ(~ In(Y / W)/ln(Y /W)r l ] respectively. (BaIT and Cuthbertson, 1991c) 
-Zeros are imposed. 
Table 6.10b Long-run Impact on Asset Holdings for Model 1 (Rs. Crore) 
1. CS (Equity) 
2. LA (Debt) 
3. DEP (-) 
R = Interest rate 
-Zeros are imposed. 
RI R2 
- 9.1 100.2 
3.1 -346.6 
0 0 
R3 Mean 
Value 
-129.1 3,025.4 
399.9 20,996.6 
29.9 -2,381.3 
This shows the effect of a one percentage point change in the rate of return on the holdings ofthe assets, 
using the mean value of stocks for the sample period 1951-93. 
vii) The estimation result in the share of deposit equation provides some aspect of 
the 'pecking order' in the Indian corporate sector. An increase in the deposit rate (or 
cost of using internal finance) leads to a rise in withdrawing deposits. This is counter-
intuitive. It is, however, argued that the net value of deposits (as working capital) is a 
concern to the managers and the short-term creditors of a firm as an indicator of its 
ability to meet immediate obligations and to continue operations (Hay and Louri, 
1991). Therefore, as Spies (1974) argues the primary reason that most corporations 
hold liquid assets is to facilitate adjustment between debt and equity. On this ground 
the drawing down of deposits may be influenced by factors other than the interest rate, 
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(for example income, as we here find a large negative income elasticity). The zero 
elasticities (the zero imposed coefficients) of RI and R2 in the deposit equation are 
also consistent with an indication of the pecking order. 
viii) Further, a one percent proportionate rise in the deposit rate has a negative 
influence on the share of equity (with the elasticity of -4.267) and a positive impact on 
the share of debt (with the elasticity of 1.904) held by firms. This also supports the 
pecking order. 
ix) With respect to wealth and income elasticities, equity is viewed as being a 
luxury good since both elasticities exceed the unity (1.613 and 1.995 respectively). 
When the level of wealth or income rises, finns use more equity to meet the shortage 
of finance. In particular, the stronger income impact on equity financing than that of 
the own interest rate suggests that Indian non-financial companies behave cautiously, 
by not directly responding to volatile share prices, but by following the fundamentals 
(i.e. economic conditions) in issuing new shares. 
x) On the other hand, debt finance is viewed as a necessity (i.e. inelastic) with 
respect to wealth and as an inferior good with respect to income, given the elasticities 
of 0.785 and -0.744 respectively. This is not an unexpected result. Regardless of the 
level of wealth, finns rely on borrowing, and when income falls, firms have to rely on 
borrowing. This reflects the predominant position of debt finance in corporate finance 
in India over the sample period. 
xi) Negative income elasticity (-1.566) is also found for Deposit. This implies that 
as income falls, it becomes difficult to obtain funds externally, hence the PCB sector 
has to use their internal finance. 
6.5.2 Other Explanatory Variables 
In revisiting Table 6.6a for the estimates of SLR and dummies for Model 1, the 
following general features are of interest. 
i) A statistically significant effect of SLR on the PCB sector is found. The 
positive sign on LA and negative sign on CS indicate that the PCB sector obtains funds 
under this regulation in the fonn of corporate debt rather than equity. In this respect, 
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SLR appears to exert the preferable effect in the PCB sector, as debt finance is less 
risky and less costly than equity finance. 
ii) The effect of dummy 69 is positive on LA and negative on CS. This is 
puzzling. It was expected that the credit rationing in favour of the priority sectors 
would reduce bank lending to the PCB sector. The only plausible explanation is that 
the credit rationing may also apply to small industries in this sector. 
iii) With respect to dummy 90, a positive sign on equity finance and a negative sign 
on debt finance variables are found. This symbolises the effect of de-regulation in the 
capital market by easing the issue of new shares for the corporate sector in terms of 
cost and regulation, and this is consistent with the experience that the financial sector 
has had in the post-reform period. Besides, the contraction of bank lending (banks are 
more attracted to the market-related risk-free government debts in the post-reform 
period) may force the corporate sector to diversify their sources of funds from bank 
borrowing more towards the capital markets. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presents a simple, but unique model of capital structure by viewing 
corporate finance as a macroeconomic problem for a developing economy. Although 
aggregate time series data are used for the estimation of the heterogeneous companies 
in the current study, evidence of parameter stability and the stable long-run 
relationship is of significant importance in providing credibility to the approach. In 
this respect, This chapter sheds light on the time series approach of modelling a capital 
structure. 
In the preferred model without the restriction of homogeneity and symmetry, we have 
found a number of economically plausible results. The prices have shown influences 
in determining corporate finance, in which the substitution effect of equity and debt is 
observed. Although firms exhibit a relatively weak sensitivity to the share prices in 
determining corporate finance, Tobin's Q is supported. Further, the 'pecking order' is 
apparent in the share of deposit equation. The loan-dependent firms in India are 
reflected in the income elasticity. The influence of SLR suggests a relatively strong 
policy impact on the capital structure in India. The effect of dummy 69 is unexpected, 
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however dummy 90 reveals evidence of financial liberalisation being associated with 
growth in the capital market. 
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Appendix 6.1 
Perron's unit root test 
Perron's Model (C) DF Perron's Model (C) ADF 
k=O Level k=2 Level 
PCB Sector Dumm p t. From Dumm p t. From p Table y p Table y 
6.4 6.4 
SI (CS) 0 -0.094 0.881 N 1 -0.322 3.622 N 
S2 (LA) 0 -0.183 1.513 N 2 -0.513 4.815 * N 
S3(DEP) 0 -0.651 4.254 * N 0 -0.732 3.459 N 
lnp; (PCS) 0 -0.984 4.301 * R 0 -1.339 3.427 N 
lnp; (PLA) 0 -0.741 3.909 R 0 -0.997 3.129 N 
lnp; (PDEP) 0 -0.796 4.149 R 0 -1.168 3.540 R 
In(Wr 1 p.') 2 -0.384 3.021 N 0 -0.449 3.169 N 
In(Y/W) 0 -0.133 1.226 R 0 -0.212 1.620 R 
SLR 0 -0.162 1.539 N 0 -0.193 1.582 N 
- * Significant at a 5% level, N= null of unit root is not rejected at a 5% significance level, R= null of 
unit root is rejected at a 5% significance level. 
k 
- Model (C) : ~Yt = Jl + f3t + BDUt + rDT,· + ~TBt + fJYt-1 + L 8;~Yt-i + et 
;=1 
- Null hypothesis: p = 0 and B = P = r = 0 
- Alternative hypothesis of a trend stationary process: p <0 and B, P, r "* 0 
- Dummy: The number of significant dummy coefficients out of B, P and r . 
- TB = 1969, T= 18, A= 18/43=0.44 
- Critical Value for tp: 4.21 (5%),4.85 (1%) (Perron 1989, p.1377) 
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Chapter 7 Modelling a flow of funds for Other Financial 
Institutions (OFIs) Sector 
7.1 Introduction 
BaIT and Cuthbertson (1992b) pointed out that obtaining sensible results in non-bank 
financial institutions for a flow of funds model is extremely difficult. For example, 
Ryan (1973) finds the counterintuitive effect of own yields in his study for the UK life 
funds, and also Honohan (1980) faces the statistically poor performance in modelling 
UK insurance companies. 
However, the empirical work of BaIT and Cuthberston (1992b), in which other UK 
financial institutions are estimated using the aggregate data of pension funds, insurance 
companies, unit and investment trusts and financial houses, the methodology has 
yielded sensible empirical results with the AIDS model. 
In this chapter, the portfolio behaviour of major, non-bank financial institutions in 
India is examined. In India, there was a rapid development of OFIs over the sample 
period: soon after Independence, the Government of India set up major financial 
institutions one by one, l and with the share market boom that started in the 1980s, 
there was a massive shift towards unit and mutual fund products especially in the 
1990s (Gupta, 1993). 
For this sector, estimation is conducted in two ways. One is by using the data of net 
transactions of sources and uses of funds as is the case for other sectors. The other is 
by using the data of uses only, i.e. assets only. The reason is that the intra-transactions 
frequently found within the OFIs make it difficult to arrive at a credible and unbiased 
conclusion with the estimation by using net transactions only, hence estimation is 
I For example, ICIC (Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation oflndia) was set up in 1955, LIC 
(Life Insurance Companies) in 1956, !DBI (Industrial Development Bank oflndia) in 1964, and UTI 
(Unit Trust oflndia) in 1964. 
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conducted with uses as a complement. For simulation experiments, the model with net 
transactions is used as it generates better tracking performance. 
The rationale in utilising the AIDS model in this sector is similar to that for the 
banking sector: positive relationship between the holdings of financial assets and the 
own interest rates is asserted to the case in the financial institutions in pursuit of 
profitability (refer to the introduction in Chapter 5). In particular, the majority of the 
OFIs are government-owned, hence the solvency is somewhat protected. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Financial instruments and explanatory variables 
for estimation are clarified in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 deals with the estimation, and 
inference is drawn in Section 7.4. The conclusion is found in Section 7.5. 
7.2 Financial Instruments and Explanatory Variables 
Table 7.1a shows the aggregate balance sheet for the OFIs sector, including term 
lending institutions, insurance companies and unit trusts and mutual funds. There are 
three major streams of financial transactions with other sectors: 
i) The financial sources of the term lending institutions have been for the majority 
from commercial banks by issuing government approved securities (this is under the 
provision of SLR); this forms share capital and/or bonds and debentures in sources. 
These funds are then invested in the PCB sector; this constitutes company securities 
and/or loans and advances in uses2. 
ii) Since the 1980, when financial assets in the capital market became more 
popular, especially due to the development of unit trusts and mutual funds, sources are 
obtained from wider range of sectors. This forms share capital in sources. 
2 It is not clear from the published flow account, in which financial assets the government approved 
securities are nominated in the OFIs sector, either share capital or bond and debentures in sources and 
either company securities or loans in uses. In respect of sources, the empirical evidence in the Banking 
sector in Chapter 5 indicates that it takes the form of share capital, whereas in the case of uses, the 
evidence in the PCB sector in Chapter 6 suggests that it takes the form ofloans. 
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iii) Provident, life and pension funds of insurance companies are consolidated into 
Provident Funds, which are obtained from the household sector. The provident fund 
constitutes the major sources, more than half of total sources in the OFIs. The majority 
of the provident fund is directed towards the government sector. 
The intra-transactions are mainly held in the form of shares, bonds and debentures: 
term lending institutions or insurance companies invest in mutual funds and unit trusts. 
Table 7.1b is the adjusted balance sheet; share capital and bonds and debentures in 
sources are netted out from company securities and loans and advances in uses 
respectively. LHS now consists of only Provident Funds, which is demand-
determined. 
Table 7.1a Aggregate Balance Sheet for the OFls 
Liabilities (Sources) Assets (Uses) 
Share Capital Company Securities 
Bond and Debentures Loans and Advances 
Provident Fund Government debt 
- The OFIs is comprised ofterm lending institutions, Insurance compames, unit trust and mutual funds. 
- Share capital includes paid-up capital and unit trust capital. 
- The holdings of cash, deposits and foreign assets are negligible, hence excluded. 
Table 7.1b Adjusted Aggregate Balance Sheet for the OFIs 
Sources (deducted of share capital and bonds Net transactions of assets 
and debentures) 
Provident Fund Company Securities - Share Capital 
Loans and Advances - Bonds and Debentures 
Government debt 
We model a flow of funds using two different data series: one is from the net 
transactions of assets (Net uses, hereafter) in Table 7.1 b on the right side, and the other 
is from uses (Gross uses, hereafter) in Table 7 .1a on the right side. 
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Table 7.2a indicates the financial instruments to be modelled together with the mean 
share values over the sample period 1951 to 1993. Noticeably, the mean value of CS 
in Net uses is numerically very small (0.2 %). This is due to the intra-ssector 
transactions. CS is maintained in the system of equations on the grounds that not only 
is CS one of the major financial instruments in the OFIs, but also the exclusion of the 
CS out of the system results in statistically inferior estimates than otherwise would be 
the case. 
Although the mean value of CS in Net uses is a positive, we will pursue the properties 
of CS in the source side with negative sign of (-) on the following reason. The share 
value ranges from - 17% to 0.8%, and in the last 10 years of the sample period, the 
share starts rising in negative terms. It may be therefore more plausible to treat CS in 
Net uses as a liability. 
Table 7.2b presents the derivation of the stock data used for estimation (a similar 
methodology as in Chapter 4). The benchmark stock data on 31 s1 March, 1951 are 
incremented with the annual flow data to arrive at the stock data on 31 sI March, 1952. 
By repeating this process, we derive the whole time series for the stock data. The 
figure in Net uses is reproduced for the OFIs in 'Flow/Stock data for behavioural 
equations' in Table 4.2, Chapter 4. GD has the same figure for Net uses and Gross 
uses, as there is no GD as a source of funds in the OFIs. The stock data on 31 sI March, 
1952 is the first observation. 
Table 7.2a Financial instruments to be modelled for the OFIs 
Model Financial Instruments with notations Mean (%) 
Net uses GD Government Debt 65.3 
CS Company Securities - Share 0.2 
Capital 
LA Loans and Advances - Bonds and 34.5 
Debentures 
Gross uses GD Government Debt 52.1 
CS Company Securities 8 
LA Loans and Advances 39.9 
- Mean (%): a proportIon of total wealth 
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Table 7.2b Flow/Stock data for the financial instruments for the OFls 
1) Stock data on 31st March 1951 Rs. crore 
Net uses Gross uses 
CUR 
R 
DEP 
GD 292.3 292.3 
CS -40.0 40.0 
LA 299.8 349.84 
PF (-508.5) 
Net Worth 43.6 / 
2) Flow data during 1st April 1951 to 31st March 1952 Rs. crore 
Net uses Gross uses 
CUR 
R 
DEP 
GD 32.7 32.7 
CS 2.2 3.5 
LA 16.1 10.1 
PF (-39.6) 
Net Worth 11.4 / 
3) Stock data on 31st March 1952 Rs. crore 
Net uses Gross uses 
CUR 
R 
DEP 
GD 325.0 325.01 
CS -37.8 43.5 
LA 315.9 350.94 
PF (-548.1 ) 
Net Worth 55.0 / 
- CUR=Currency, R=Bank reserves, DEP=Deposit, GD=Govemment debt, CS=Company securities 
LA=Loans and advances, PF=Provident funds 
- Negligible components are ignored for simplicity. 
- ( )= Demand determined 
- Stock data sources: RBI Bulletin various issues 
- The figure in Net uses is the reproduction ofthe OFIs in 'Flow/Stock data for behavioural equations' in 
Table 4.2, Chapter 4. 
- Rs. crore=lO million rupees 
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The interest rates used to formulate the AIDS prices (In Pt ' i = 1, 2 and 3) are the same 
as other sectors. Table 7.3 presents the explanatory variables used for estimation. 
Table 7.3 Explanatory variables 
Variables Notes 
In P; = PGD (Price of GD) r1 = Government securities yields 
In P; = PCS (Price of CS) r2 = Return on shares (The rate of growth in share prices) 
In p; = PLA (Price of LA) r3 = Lending rate 
Ln(YIW) Log of GDP at factor cost deflated by W 
Dummy 69 0: 1951-68 and 1: 1969-93 
Dummy 90 0: 1951- 89 and 1: 1990-93 
In this sector, the effect of SLR on the share of financial assets should be insignificant; 
if the role of the OFIs is to transfer funds from the banking sector to the PCB sector, 
then the net transaction should be unaffected. The test run for Net uses including SLR 
with homogeneity and symmetry imposed is found in Appendix 7.1, in which the long-
run model generates numerically and statistically insignificant coefficients for SLR in 
all three equations. Hence SLR is excluded in the model specification in this sector. 
7.3 Estimation 
Starting with unit root tests, we present the overview of the general to specific model. 
Specific models are then thoroughly examined. 
7.3.1 Unit Root Tests 
Table 7.4a and 7.4b present the unit root tests for each share of assets, wealth and 
income variables for Net uses and Gross uses respectively. In respect of prices, please 
refer to the banking sector in Chapter 5 (it is reported that the prices are 1(1) for PGD, 
PCS and PLA). The DF and ADF statistics in levels indicate that none of the series are 
1(0). 
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Table 7.4a Order of Integration of the variables: Net uses 
Level Differenced 
DF ADF DF ADF 
SI (GD) -0.39 -0.99 -4.55 * -1.87 
S2 (CS) 0.70 -2.52 -3.52 * -2.24 
S3 (LA) 1.49 -0.41 -2.92 * -2.24 
In(WT / pOT) -2.06 (t) -1.43 (t) -6.00 * -3.77 * 
In(YIW) -0.23 -0.24 -5.96 * -2.79 
Table 7.4b Order of Integration of the variables: Gross uses 
Level Differenced 
DF ADF DF ADF 
SI (GD) -0.60 -0.52 -4.15 * -2.52 
S2 (CS) -0.49 -1.79 -2.87 * -2.50 
S3(LA) -1.00 -0.99 -3.32 * -2.74 
In(WT / pOT) -1.86 (t) -1.21(t) -6.17 * -3.64 * 
In(YIW) -1.06 -1.11 -5.99 * -2.88 * 
Notes: 
- * Significant at the 5% level. 
2 
- ADF is modelled as Mit = a + P X t_1 + L 0iMt_i + et· (t): a deterministic trend is 
i=1 
specified as the trend is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
- Critical value re (constant, no trend): -3.43 (1 %), -2.86 (5%), -2.57 (10%) 
Critical value ret(constant, trend): -3.96 (1%), -3.41 (5%), -3.13 (10%) 
by Davidson and MacKinnon, p708, 1993 
In testing differenced series, the DF tests suggest that all the series are stationary at a 
5% significance level, though the share variables (GD, CS and LA in both tables) tend 
to exhibit non-stationary according to the ADF tests. We would resort to the DF test 
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results in determining the l{l) of the share variables. The level of In(WT / pOT) in both 
Net uses and Gross uses suggests an existence of a deterministic trend. 
The Perron's unit root test results are found in Appendix 7.2. In the main, the 
variables do not reject a null of unit root test. There does not appear to be much 
contribution of the structural break in the Perron's model in determining the unit root 
in the variables. 
Based on the unit root tests, variables are categorised in the following (common to both 
Net uses and Gross uses: 
1(1) endogenous variables: GD, CS, LA, PCS, PLA, In(WT / pOT) 
1(1) exogenous variables: PGD, In(Y/W) 
1(0) variable: Dummy 
7.3.2 Overview of the General to Specific Model 
Figures 7.1a and 7.1b show the overview of the general to specific model with the 
likelihood ratio tests for Net uses and Gross uses respectively, whereas Tables 7.5a and 
7.5b show the estimates and residual diagnostics of the general model (with an adding-
up restriction). 
Both general models suffer from serial correlation. Net uses satisfies homoskedasticity 
in all share equations, whereas Gross uses exhibits heteroskedasticity in GD and LA at 
a 5% significance level. Common to both models is that the own price coefficients for 
GD and LA satisfy the a priori expectations with a negative sign, but that for CS is 
wrongly-signed being positive. However, as compared with GD and LA the CS share 
equation as a whole is statistically well-determined, accompanied with a relatively high 
R-squared 74.21 % and 73.0% respectively. 
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Figure 7.1a General to Specific model with likelihood ratio tests: Net uses 
LR=13.1O (3) * 
SSLR=I1.52(3) * 
LR=3.21 (2) 
SSLR=2.82 (2) 
LR=9.89 (1) * 
SSLR=8.70 (1) * 
Symmetry and Homogeneity Symmetry given 
Homogeneity 
(LL=I72.800) (LL=I72.800) 
~ / LR= 0.002 (1) 
.----______ --, SSLR=0.0017 (1) 
Preferred Model (Net) 
Zero restriction 
(LL=I72.790) 
Figure 7.1h General to specific model with likelihood ratio tests: Gross uses 
LR=23.56 (3) * 
SSLR=20.73 (3) * 
Symmetry and Homogeneity 
(LL= 194.596) 
LR=20.85 (2) * 
SSLR=18.35 (2) * 
LR=2.71 (1) 
SSLR=2.38 (I) 
Symmetry given 
Homogeneity 
(LL= 194.596) 
~ / LR= 9.36 (3) * 
,.--______ ---, SSLR=8.33 (3) * 
Notes: 
-LL: Log likelihood 
-LR: Likelihood Ratio (LR) test 
Preferred Model(Gross) 
Zero restrictions 
(LL=189.914) 
-SSLR: The small sample-adjusted LR given by the product ofLR and (T-K)/T, where T=No. of 
observations and K=No. of exogenous variables in each equation (Bohm, Rieder and Tintner, 1980). 
-Critical values: d.f. 1=3.84 (5%), 6.64 (1%), d.f. 2 = 5.99 (5%), 9.21 (1%), 
d.f. 3 = 7.82 (5%), 11.34 (1 %) 
- * Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 7.5a Unrestricted (General) Model: Net uses 
L L'k rh d 179354 og 1 e 1 00 : 
Inp; Lnp; In p; Constant 1n(WT / pOT) In(Y/w) 
(PGD) (PC~ (PLA) 
I. GD -1.2349 0.0151 1.4911 0.4870 0.0036 -0.0285 
(2.21 ) (0.28) (2.68) (0.61) (0.04) (0.18) 
2. CS (-) 1.5551 0.0379 -1.3935 -1.0263 0.0660 0.2414 
(3.78) (0.96) (3.41 ) (1.74) (1.05) (2.07) 
3. LA -0.3202 -0.0529 -0.0977 1.5393 -0.0696 -0.2129 
_(0.34) (0.59) (0.11) (1.16) (0.49) (0.81) 
Dummy Dummy R-squared SSR SEof 
69 90 regression 
1. GD -0.0212 -0.0547 46.20% 0.0942 0.0468 
(0.60) (1.44) 
2. CS (-) 0.0236 -0.1031 74.21 % 0.0507 0.0344 
(0.91) . (3.7Ql 
3. LA -0.0024 0.1577 47.17 % 0.2593 0.0776 
(0.04) (2.50) 
- t-ratio is in parenthesis. 
- No. of observations: 43 (1951-52 to 1993-94) 
-Columns may fail to sum to zero due to rounding. 
-SSR: Sum of squared residuals 
Residual diagnostics (chi-square values): Net uses 
LM Heteroskedasticity LM Serial Correlation 
(Order =1) 
LM Serial Correlation 
(Order =2) 
1. GD 
2. CS (-) 
3. LA 
2.555 [0.11] 
1.058 [0.30] 
2.384 [0.12] 
[ ] is P-value. One tail tests 
32.329 [0.00] 
28.220 [0.00] 
36.685 [0.00] 
32.219 [0.00] 
29.419 [0.00] 
36.735 [0.00] 
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Table 7.Sb Unrestricted (General) Model: Gross uses 
L L·k rh d 206378 og 1 e 1 00 : 
Inp; Inp; In p; Constant In(WT / pOT) In(Y/w) 
(POD) (PCS) (PLA) 
1. OD -0.2914 0.0066 0.4781 0.1376 0.0167 0.0906 
(0.52) (0.12) (0.83) (0.14) (0.15) (0.48) 
2. CS 0.3052 0.0365 -0.1450 -1.0595 0.1111 0.2272 
(2.54) (3.01) (1.18) (5.04) (4.74) (5.61) 
3. LA -0.0138 -0.0432 -0.3331 1.9218 -0.1277 -0.3178 
(0.02) (0.68) (0.52) (1.76) (1.05) (1.51) 
Dummy Dummy R-squared SSR SEof 
69 90 regression 
1. OD -0.0430 -0.0765 66.38 % 0.1082 0.0502 
(1.14) (1.90) 
2. CS 0.0123 0.0298 73.00% 0.0049 0.0107 
(1.52) (3.46) 
3. LA 0.0307 0.0467 58.48 % 0.1336 0.0557 
(0.73) (1.04) 
- t-ratio is in parenthesis. 
- No. of observations: 43 (1951-52 to 1993-94) 
-Columns may fail to sum to zero due to rounding. 
-SSR: Sum of squared residuals 
Residual diagnostics (chi-square values): Gross uses 
LM Heteroskedasticity LM Serial Correlation 
(Order =1) 
LM Serial Correlation 
(Order =2) 
1. OD 
2. CS 
3. LA 
[ ] is P-value. One tail tests 
8.097 [0.00] 
1.419 [0.23] 
5.213 [0.02] 
37.994 [0.00] 
7.419 [0.01] 
38.557 [0.00] 
37.295 [0.00] 
6.836 [0.03] 
38.767 [0.00] 
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We impose symmetry and homogeneity in the general models, and further zeros on the 
statistically insignificant variables. The likelihood test results for symmetry and 
homogeneity are mixed. Figure 7.1a for Net indicates that the joint test of 'symmetry 
and homogeneity' is rejected given SSLR=11.52 at a 5% significance level, but it is 
only marginally rejected at a I % level. The 'homogeneity' on its own is not rejected. 
Figure 7.lb for Gross shows that the joint test is rejected given SSLR=20.73, however, 
'symmetry given homogeneity', is not rejected at a 5% level. Zero restrictions in Gross 
uses are rejected at a 5% level, but not rejected at a 1 % level. 
Specific models imposed of symmetry and homogeneity yielded statistically far more 
significant coefficients than did the general models. We therefore maintain the 
restrictions, and determine the specific models as our preferred models, to which we 
nowtum. 
7.3.3 Preferred Models 
Tables 7.6a and 7.6b show the estimates of the preferred model for Net and Gross 
respectively. Table 7.7 presents the EG cointegration test, and Table 7.8, the 10hansen 
co integration test. 
Cointegration Tests 
The Engle-Granger cointegration test results are disappointing in that there is no 
indication of cointegration in all the share equations in both Net and Gross, since none 
of the tests reject null of unit root in residuals. However, this result is reversed by the 
10hansen co integration test. The maximum eigenvalue and trace tests both strongly 
suggest the presence of at least one cointegrating vector for each equation. In LA of 
Gross uses (in Table 7 .8b), there are n = r (i.e. the number ofI(l) variables are equal to 
that of cointegration vectors). If n = r, it is argued that variables are all stationarity; 
but surely we find that there are 1(1) variables in LA by the unit root test, hence the 
finding of cointegration may still be legitimate. 
186 
Table 7.6a Long-run preferred model: Net uses (homogeneity and symmetry imposed) 
L L·k rh d 172 790 og I e I 00 : 
Inp; Inp; In p; Constant In(W' I p.') In(YIW) 
(PG D) (PCSt (PLA) 
1. GD -2.9578 0.0772 2.8806 2.0329 -0.1425 -0.3359 
(9.43) (1.35) (8.89) (6.94) (3.73) (4.92) 
2. CS (-) 0.0862 -0.1634 0.1657 -0.0462 0 
(2.00) (1.69) (3.11) (3.32) 
3. LA -2.717 -1.1985 0.1886 0.3359 
(7.44) (3.881 (4.12) (4.92) 
Dummy Dummy R-squared SSR SEof 
69 90 regression 
1. GD 0.0589 -0.0676 36.92 % 0.1197 0.0528 
(1.95) (1.84) 
2. CS (-) 0.0898 -0.1179 65.24 % 0.0684 0.0399 
(4.25) (4.38) 
3. LA -0.1487 0.1855 32.80 % 0.3448 0.0895 
(3.05) (3.03) 
Table 7.6b Long-run preferred model: Gross uses (homogeneity and symmetry imposed) 
(Adjusted White's Heteroskedasticity-Consistent S.E.'s) 
Log Likelihood· 189914 
Inp; Inp; In p; Constant In(W' I p.') In(YIW) 
(PGD) (PCS) (PLA) 
1.GD -1.8829 0.0383 1.8446 0.8866 -0.0313 -0.0795 
(6.34) (0.70) (5.79) (7.64) (2.08) (3.20) 
2. CS 0.0362 -0.0744 -0.2300 0.0313 0.0795 
(2.39) (1.24) (2.05) (2.08) (3.20) 
3. LA -1.7702 0.3434 0 0 
(5.07) (18.85) 
Dummy Dummy R-squared SSR SEof 
69 90 regression 
1. GD 0 -0.1664 54.93 % 0.1451 0.0581 
(9.40) 
2. CS 0.0308 0.0236 52.02 % 0.0088 0.0143 
(3.63) (2.17) 
3. LA -0.0308 0.1428 40.64 % 0.1914 0.0667 
(3.63) (7.39) 
Notes: 
- t-ratio is in parenthesis. 
- No. of observations: 43 (1951-52 to 1993-94) 
-Columns may fail to sum to zero due to rounding. 
-SSR: Sum of squared residuals 
-Zeros are imposed. 
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Table 7.7a EG Cointegration Tests: Net uses 
EO AEO 
1. OD (n =4) -3.240 -3.186 
2. CS (-) (n = 4) -2.860 -2.670 
3. LA(n=4) -2.870 -2.979 
Table7.7b EG Cointegration Tests: Gross uses 
EO AEO 
1. OD (n =4) - 2.614 - 2.879 
2. CS (n=4) - 2.675 - 1.849 
3. LA (n= 3) - 2.417 - 2.977 
Notes: 
2 
-ADF is modelled as Mit = a + P X t-t + L 0iM/-i + et . 
- n : Number ofI(l) endogenous variables 
- Asymptotic Critical Values for Cointegration Tests: for n = 3, 3.74 (5%), 3.45 (10%), and for n=4 4.10 
(5%),3.81 (10%) (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993, p722), 
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Table7.8a Johansen Cointegration LR test for the preferred Model: Net uses 
(Order of V AR=l, Unrestricted intercept with no trend) 
GD 
Null Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace A/race 95%C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r=O r= 1 97.69 * 33.87 r>= 1 160.40 * 68.06 
r<= 1 r=2 31.16 * 27.75 r>=2 62.71 * 46.44 
r<=2 r=3 26.83 * 21.07 r>=3 31.55 * 28.42 
r<= 3 r=4 4.71 14.35 r= 4 4.71 14.35 
CS (-) 
Null Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace Arrace 95%C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r=O r= 1 83.01 * 33.87 r>= 1 145.72 * 68.06 
r<= 1 r=2 31.07 * 27.75 r>=2 62.70 * 46.44 
r<=2 r=3 19.54 21.07 r>=3 31.64 * 28.42 
r<=3 r=4 12.10 14.35 r=4 12.10 14.35 
LA 
Null Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace A/race 95%C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r=O r= 1 90.50 * 33.87 r>= 1 165.76 * 68.06 
r<= 1 r=2 39.79 * 27.75 r>=2 75.27 * 46.44 
r<=2 r= 3 29.94 * 21.07 r>=3 35.47 * 28.42 
r<=3 r=4 5.53 14.35 r=4 5.53 14.35 
-In the partial VECM, variables are categorised as follows. 
l(l) endogenous 1(1) weakly exogenous 1(0) 
OD OD, PCS, PLA, In(W t / pOt) POD,ln(Y/W) Dum 69, Dum90 
CS (-) CS, PCS, PLA, In(W t / pOt) POD,ln(Y/w) Dum 69, Dum90 
LA LA, PCS, PLA, In(W t / pOt) POD,ln(Y/w) Dum 69, Dum90 
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Table 7.8b Johansen Cointegration LR test for the preferred Model: Gross uses 
(Order of V AR=l for GD and CS and V AR=2 for LA, unrestricted intercept with no trend) 
GD 
Null Maximum Amax 95% C.V. Trace A/race 95%C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r=O r= 1 90.62 * 33.87 r>= 1 179.57 * 68.06 
r<= 1 r=2 54.50 * 27.75 r>=2 88.95 * 46.44 
r<=2 r= 3 27.60 * 21.07 r>= 3 34.45 * 28.42 
r<= 3 r=4 6.85 14.35 r=4 6.85 14.35 
CS 
Null Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace Atrace 95%C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r= 0 r= 1 89.14 * 33.87 r>= 1 138.85 * 68.06 
r<= 1 r=2 32.55 * 27.75 r>=2 49.71 * 46.44 
r<= 2 r=3 15.20 21.07 r>= 3 17.16 28.42 
r<= 3 r=4 1.95 14.35 r=4 1.95 14.35 
LA 
Null Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace A/race 95%C.V. 
Alternative Alternative 
r= 0 r= 1 26.13 * 24.59 r>= 1 64.10 * 38.93 
r<= 1 r= 2 24.79 * 18.06 r>=2 37.97 * 23.32 
r<=2 r= 3 13.18 * 11.47 r=3 13.18 * 11.47 
-In the partial VECM, variables are categorised as follows. 
l(l) endogenous 1(1) weakly exogenous 1(0) 
GD GD, PCS, PLA, In(W' / pO,) PGD,ln(Y/w) Dum90 
CS CS, PCS, PLA, In(W' / pO,) PGD,ln(Y/w) Dum 69, Dum90 
LA LA,PCS, PLA PGD Dum 69, Dum90 
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Estimates of the Preferred Models 
Net uses and Gross uses generate broadly comparable price effects; the sign on the 
price parameters are the same indicating that the estimates in Net uses are unbiased. 
The following general features common to both Net uses and Gross uses are of interest 
in the long-run share equations (see Table 7.6a and 7.6b). 
i) Overall R-squared fell as compared with the general models. Yet, with the 
imposition of symmetry and homogeneity, there is a substantial improvement in the 
statistical significance. Notably, almost all explanatory variables in GD and LA are 
highly significant, where the general model generated relatively poor results. 
ii) The own-price coefficients in GD and LA satisfy a priori expectations and the 
own-price parameter for GD is larger than cross price parameters. 
iii) Substitution effects between GD and LA are observed, given a positive cross-
price effect ofPLA and PGD respectively. 
iv) The sign on the own price coefficients in CS is persistently positive in the 
specific model, but we do not pursue the imposition of negative own price effect, as 
this is not implausible. The positive sign means that as PCS increases (or the return on 
shares falls), in the case of Net the sector increases its net holdings of CS, and in the 
case of Gross the OFIs increase its gross holdings of CS. This is intuitively acceptable: 
a fall in the return on shares means an increase in share prices, hence the OFls increase 
the holdings of CS as an asset. The detail is left in Section 7.4 for inference. 
Parameter Stability and Other Tests 
Tables 7.9a and 7.9b present the test results of parameter stability, axioms of rational 
choice, weak separability and homotheticity for Net uses and Gross uses respectively. 
Chow tests for parameter stability are conducted for three different periods of 1) 1951-
60 and 1961-93,2) 1951-68 and 1969-93, and 3) 1951-79 and 1980-93. The stability 
is rejected in five out of nine cases in Net uses at a 5% significance level. However, 
the instability is not severe since at a 1 % significance level there is only one case being 
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rejected. In the case of Gross uses, three cases are rejected at a 5% level, and only one 
at a 1 % level. 
The axioms of negativity in consumer demand theory are rejected in Net uses given a 
positive sign for CS in eigenvalues, however they are not rejected in Gross uses. 
Taking the preferred model as a restricted model, the small-sample adjusted LR 
indicates that the joint test of homogeneity and symmetry (at the 1 % significance level) 
and weak separability (at the 5% significance level) are not rejected in Net uses, 
whereas they are decisively rejected in Gross uses. Conversely, homotheticity is 
decisively rejected in Net uses, whereas it is not in Gross uses. 
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Table 7.9a Other tests for the preferred long-run model: Net uses 
Chow Tests F-test 
1) 1951-60 and 1961-93 GD 1.386 
CS (-) 2.549 * 
LA 1.726 
2) 1951-68 and 1969-93 GD 2.953 * 
CS (-) 3.454 * 
LA 3.137 * 
3) 1951-79 and 1980-93 GD 2.004 
CS (-) 3.016 * 
LA 2.330 
- * Significant at the 5% level. 
- Degrees of freedom for GD and LA is (8, 27) and for CS (7, 29). 
- Critical values are almost the same for both degree of freedoms: 2.34 at a 5% significance level and 
3.33 at a 1 % level. 
Negativity GD CS (-) LA 
Eigenvalues -3.092 0.043 -2.780 
LR (No. of restrictions) SSLR (No. of restrictions) 
Homogeneity 0.526 (2) 0.428 (2) 
Symmetry (given Homogeneity) 8.520 (1) * 7.582 (1) * 
Symmetry and Homogeneity 9.046 (3) * 8.050 (3) * 
Weak Separability 1.282 (2) 1.102 (2) 
Bank rate 
Weak Separability 1.268 (2) 1.128 (2) 
Money market rate 
Homotheticity 15.956 (2) * 14.200 (2) * 
(/l;=0,i=1,2) 
- * Significant at the 5% level. 
- We take the preferred model as a maintained model. 
- Critical values: d.f. 1 = 3.84 (5 %), 6.64 (1 %), d.f. 2 = 5.99 (5%), 9.21 (1 %), d.f. 3 = 7.82 (5%), 
11.34 (1%). 
- SSLR: The small sample-adjusted LR 
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Table 7.9b Other tests for the preferred long-run model: Gross uses 
Chow Tests F-test 
1) 1951-60 and 1961-93 GD 2.178 
CS 2.502 * 
LA 1.945 
2) 1951-68 and 1969-93 GD 2.377 * 
CS 1.515 
LA 1.335 
3) 1951-79 and 1980-93 GD 0.173 
CS 4.054 * 
LA 0.001 
- * Significant at the 5% level 
- Degree of freedom for GD (7, 36), CS (8, 27) and LA (6, 31). 
- Critical values for GD and CS: 2.30 (5%) and 3.20 (1 %), and for LA: 2.42 (5%) and 3.47(1 %). 
Negativity GD CS LA 
Eigenvalues -2.128 -0.033 -0.043 
LR (No. of restrictions) SSLR (No. of restrictions) 
Homogeneity 23.504 (2) * 19.038 (2) * 
Symmetry (given Homogeneity) 0.006 (1) 0.005 (1) 
Symmetry and Homogeneity 23.510 (3) * 19.043 (3) * 
Weak Separability 21.078 (2) * 17.073 (2) * 
Bank rate 
Weak Separability 29.086 (2) * 23.559 (2) * 
Money market rate 
Homotheticity 4.288 (1) * 3.473 (1) 
(/3i=O,i=l) 
- * Significant at the 5% level. 
- We take the preferred model as a maintained model. 
- Critical values: d.f. 1 = 3.84 (5 %), 6.64 (1%), d.f. 2 = 5.99 (5%), 9.21 (1%), d.£ 3 = 7.82 (5%), 
11.34 (1%) 
- SSLR: The small sample-adjusted LR 
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7.4 Inference for Net uses and Gross uses 
7.4.1 Interest Rate, Wealth and Income Impact 
Interest rate, wealth and income elasticities are presented in Tables 7.10a and 7.10b for 
Net uses and Gross uses respectively. Tables 7.11a and 7.11b show the impact of 
changes in the interest rates on the actual holdings of assets. The salient features are as 
follows: 
i) We have found the same sign on the own-price parameters of CS in Net uses 
and Gross uses (recall Tables 7.6a and 7.6b), however the sign on the own-interest rate 
elasticities is not the same between them. With the negative sign in Net uses, the same 
argument applies as in the case of the price estimate; an increase in R2 or a fall in 
share prices reduces the net holdings of CS. This could be due to the fact that, given a 
fall in share prices, the contraction in subscribing to CS as an asset outweighs the 
contraction in issuing CS as a liability; consequently this may have resulted in the fall 
of the net holdings of CS. Alternatively, it could be argued that the OFIs may perceive 
that a fall in share prices is a good time to issue more shares, unit trusts and mutual 
funds, so that they can be sold cheaply and easily on the stock market. This leads to an 
increase in issuing CS as a liability, thereby to a fall of the net holding of CS. This 
behaviour may be reasonable for financial companies, being contrasted with the one 
found for the non-financial corporate sector in Chapter 6. 
ii) As opposed to the negative sign in Net uses, a positive sign is found on the 
own-interest rate effect in CS in Gross uses. The positive sign is due to the 
numerically small coefficient of 0.036 in Gross (Table 7.6b) as compared with 0.086 in 
Net (in Table 7.6a), therefore the inconsistent sign is not unduly troublesome. 
iii) With respect to government debt, the sensitivity to government securities' 
yields (RI) of the own-interest rate is similar to that in the banking sector, and this is 
not trivial given a relatively large interest rate elasticity of 4.7 in Net uses and 4.0 in 
Gross uses. 
iv) As government securities' yields (RI) rise, there is a move out of CS and LA 
into GD. Conversely, when lending rates (R3) increase, there is a switch from GD to 
195 
CS and LA. This is observed in all tables of7.10a, 7.10b, 7.11a and 7.11b. The GD is 
therefore a substitute for the CS and LA. In particular a close substitute with the LA 
gives insight into policy effectiveness, in that a fall in government securities' yields 
may exert a substantial impact on loanable funds in this sector. On the other hand, LA 
is a complement to CS. In this sense, there appears to be a distinctive behaviour 
between risk-free assets and risky assets in the OFIs. 
v) It is observed that there is a large impact of the lending rate on holding loans in 
this sector with the own-interest rate elasticity of 8.06 in Net uses and 5.04 in Gross 
uses. This is a much larger impact as compared with that of banks at 1.47 (in Table 
5.9a, Chapter 5). 
Table 7.l0a Real interest rate, wealth and income elasticities: Net uses 
RI R2 R3 Wealth Income 
1. OD 4.733 -0.221 -4.567 0.782 -0.514 
2. CS (-) -2.550 -0.754 3.249 0.184 0 
3. LA -8.649 0.533 8.062 1.547 0.974 
Table 7.l0b Real interest rate, wealth and income elasticities: Gross uses 
RI R2 R3 Wealth Income 
1. OD 4.084 -0.145 -3.939 0.940 -0.153 
2. CS -0.944 0.412 0.531 1.391 0.993 
3. LA -5.144 0.106 5.038 1 0 
Notes for Table 7.9a and 7.9b: 
- The interest rate elasticities imply the effect of a one percentage point change in the interest rate (R) on 
the percentage change in asset holdings, i.e. (I!.a j / a j )*100. 
- Wealth and income elasticities, i.e. [ (I!.a j / aJ(l!.ln(Wr / por) Iln(Wr / pOr)r l land 
[ (l!.aJ aj )(l!.ln(Y / W) Iln(Y / W)r l ] respectively. (BaIT and Cuthbertson, 1991c) 
- Zeros are imposed. For the wealth elasticity, the zero imposition on the coefficient implies a unitary 
elasticity by definition. 
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Table 7.11a Long-run Impact of Asset Holdings (Rs.Crore): Net uses 
RI R2 R3 Mean 
Value 
1. GD 770.4 -35.9 -743.4 16277.6 
2. CS (-) 
-66.3 -19.6 84.5 2600.2 
3. LA 
-1097.1 67.6 1022.6 12684.3 
Table 7.11b Long-run Impact of Asset Holdings (Rs.Crore): Gross uses 
RI R2 R3 Mean 
Value 
1. GD 664.8 -23.6 -641.3 16277.6 
2. CS 
-32.3 14.1 18.1 3417.2 
3. LA 
-1034.9 21.4 1013.5 20118.1 
Notes for Table 7.1 Oa and 7. lOb: 
R = Interest rate, Rs. crore=1O million rupees. 
This shows the effect of a one percentage point change in the rate of return on the holdings of the assets, 
using the mean value of stocks for the sample period 1951-93. 
vi) The wealth elasticities in Net uses and Gross uses suggest that GD is inelastic 
with the elasticity less than unity (though close to unity in the case of Gross uses), 
whereas LA in Net uses and CS in Gross uses are elastic with the elasticities above 
unity. This is intuitively plausible; irrespective of the level of wealth, OFIs invest in a 
risk-free asset ofGD and as wealth increases, investment in risky assets increases. 
v) With respect to income elasticities, in both Net uses and Gross uses, GD is seen 
as an inferior good with a negative income elasticity. A 'near' unity elasticity is found 
in LA in Net uses and CS in Gross uses. This result is somewhat similar to the one 
with respect to wealth indicating a risk-averse behaviour, in that as the income falls, 
the OFIs increase the holdings of risk-free asset. 
vi) In general the findings of the wealth and income elasticities for the OFIs are 
broadly the same as those found in the banking sector: the perception of risk in loans or 
equity will decline as the level of wealth or income increases, and that the lending or 
the subscription of equity will increase in the OFIs. 
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7.4.2 Dummy Variables 
In Table 7.12 the coefficients of dummy variables for Net uses and Gross uses are 
reproduced from Tables 7.6a and 7.6b, in which the sign direction is the same, except 
dummy 90 on CS. 
Table 7.12 Dummy variables for Net uses and Gross uses 
Dummy 69 Dummy 69 Dummy 90 Dummy 90 
(Net uses) (Gross uses) (Net uses) (Gross uses) 
I. GD 0.0589 0 -0.0676 -0.1664 
(1.95) (1.84) (9.40) 
2. CS (-) for Net 0.0898 0.0308 -0.1179 0.0236 
CS for Gross (4.25) (3.63) (4.38) (2.17) 
3. LA -0.1487 -0.0308 0.1855 0.1428 
(3.05) (3.63) (3.03) (7.39) 
. . 
- t-ratIo IS In parenthesIs . 
- Reproduced from Tables 7.6a and 7.6b. 
i) A negative effect of dummy 69 on LA means a decline in lending since 1969. 
It is interesting to observe that as credit rationing towards priority sectors started in the 
banking sector, loans fell in this sector. It may reflect that the demand for loans from 
the priority sectors falls. 
ii) By contrast, there is a positive effect of dummy 90 on LA. This can be due to 
the contraction of the loans in the banking sector in the post-reform period, hence the 
demand for loans from the corporate sector may have increased. This illustrates a 
somewhat compensating role in the credit market by the OFIs, where banks fail to fulfil 
the demand for loans. 
iii) With respect to the negative dummy 90 on GD, financial liberalisation led the 
OFIs to switch from GD to other assets in their holdings of assets. This behaviour is 
contrasted with the commercial banks, which have increased their holdings of the risk-
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free assets since 1990. There appears to be a difference in risk-perception between the 
two financial institutions after the financial liberalisation. 
iv) The effect of dummy 90 on CS between Net uses and Gross uses is in the 
opposite direction: negative in Net uses and positive in Gross uses. However, this is 
not a contradictory outcome. The implication is that the OFIs have increased issuing 
shares owing to the gradual de-regulation of equity markets, and also to the fact that in 
the post-reform period with a contraction of subsidised sources (under the SLR), term 
lending institutions have to raise resources directly from the market; these are relevant 
to the negative sign in Net uses (i.e. an increase of CS as a liability). Simultaneously, 
OFIs have increased their investment in CS relative to other financial assets in the 
post-reform period; this is relevant to the positive sign in Gross uses (i.e. an increase of 
CS as an asset). 
7.5 Conclusion 
For the OFIs, in which intra-transactions are commonly found, we have conducted 
estimations of Net uses and Gross uses. Overall, both preferred models with imposed 
symmetry and homogeneity yielded statistically and economically significant 
coefficients. Although cointegration is not found in the share equations by the Engle-
Granger test, this is reversed by the more powerful 10hansen test. 
Comparing Net uses and Gross uses, the direction and magnitude of the sign on the 
parameters are almost the same; the estimation results of Net uses are supported by 
those of Gross uses indicating some robustness. In this sense, we are fairly confident 
in applying the long-run model of Net uses to simulation experiments. 
The study highlights that while the OFIs show risk-averse behaviour similar to the 
banks, their portfolio behaviour appears to be less restrictive than the banks: Evidence 
of a high sensitivity to the lending rate, on holding loans suggests that OFIs sector may 
exert a more significant impact in the credit market than the banking sector. This may 
be due to a more rational view by banks of the market interest rate. This suggests that 
the impact of direct regulations on banks attenuates the lending activities in the 
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banking sector: the credit market in the banking sector is seen as a captive market and 
the funds at their discretion are limited, consequently the sensitivity to the lending rate 
should be less than the one found in the OFls sector. 
We also find a relatively strong sensitivity to the government securities' yields in 
determining the share of government securities, and government securities are a close 
substitute for loans. There is therefore scope for the yields as a policy instrument in 
influencing the portfolio behaviour in this sector: a decrease in government securities' 
yields would potentially encourage the OFIs sector to invest in the private sector. 
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Appendix 7.1 
Long-run model with SLR (Net uses): homogeneity and symmetry imposed 
Inp! Inp; In p; Constant In(W' / p.') In(Y/w) 
(POD) (PCS) (PLA) 
I. OD -2.9334 0.0771 2.8564 2.0932 -0.1486 -0.3496 
(-8.46) (1.34) (8.04) (3.81) (2.15) (2.72) 
2. CS (-) 0.0866 -0.1637 0.2194 -0.0530 -0.0127 
(2.00) (1.69) (0.53) (1.03) (0.13) 
3. LA -2.6926 -1.3126 0.2015 0.3623 
(6.86) (1.42) (1.74) (1.68) 
SLR Dummy Dummy R-squared SSR SEof 
69 90 regression 
1. OD -0.0003 -0.0608 -0.0658 37.19 % 0.1191 0.0526 
(0.06) (1.45) (1.73) 
2. CS (-) 0.0001 0.0903 -0.1168 65.25 % 0.0684 0.0399 
(0.02) (2.87) (4.14) 
3. LA 0.0002 -0.1511 0.1826 32.98 % 0.3436 0.0894 
(0.03) (2.14) (2.87) 
.. 
- t-ratlo IS In parenthesIs. 
- No. of observation: 43 (1951-52 to 1993-94), Log Likelihood: 172.808 
-Columns may fail to sum to zero due to rounding. 
-SSR: Sum of Squared Residuals 
Residual diagnostics (chi-square values) 
1. OD 
2. CS (-) 
3. LA 
LM Heteroskedasticity 
1.378 [.240] 
2.765 [.096] 
1.424 [.233] 
[ ] is P-value. One tail tests 
LM Serial Correlation 
(Order =1) 
33.845 [0.00] 
30.935 [0.00] 
35.621 [0.00] 
LM Serial Correlation 
(Order =2) 
32.579 [0.00] 
32.788 [0.00] 
35.475 [0.00] 
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Appendix 7.2 
Perron's Unit Root Test 
DF ADF 
Perron's Model (C) Level Perron's Model (C) Level 
k=O k=2 
OFI Sector Dummy p t· From Dummy p t. From (Net uses) p Table p Table 
7Aa 7Aa 
SI (OD) 1 -0.104 1.666 N 0 -0.184 20405 N 
S2 (CS) 1 -0.177 2.630 N 2 -0.220 3.181 N 
S3(LA) 0 -0.088 1.875 N 0 -0.141 2.381 N 
In(WT 1 pOT) 2 -0.540 3.919 N 2 -0.712 3.639 N 
In(Y/W) 1 -0.231 2.361 N 1 -0.268 1.955 N 
DF ADF 
Perron's Model (C) Level Perron's Model (C) Level 
k=O k=2 
OFI Sector Dummy p tp From Dummy p t. From (Gross uses) Table p Table 
7Ab 7Ab 
SI (OD) 3 -0.070 1.965 N 0 -0.135 3.156 N 
S2 (CS) 1 -0.157 1.745 N 0 -0.143 1.161 N 
S3(LA) 1 -0.051 1.094 N 0 -0.124 2.365 N 
In(WT 1 pOT) 2 -0.583 4.212 * N 2 -0.744 4.001 N 
In(YIW) 1 -00409 3.327 N 1 -0.118 1.490 N 
- * Significant at a 5% level, N= null of unit root is not rej ected at a 5% significance level, R= null of 
unit root is rejected at a 5% significance level. 
k 
- Model (C) : ~Yt = J.l + f3t + BDUt + rDr;o + 9JTBt + PYt-1 + I 8i~Yt-i + et 
i=1 
- Null hypothesis: p = 0 and B = P = r = 0 
- Alternative hypothesis of a trend stationary process: p <0 and B, p, r "* 0 
- Dummy: the number of significant dummy coefficients out of B, P and r . 
- TB = 1969, T= 18, A. = 18/43=0.44 
- Critical Value for t p: 4.21 (5%),4.85 (1%) (Perron 1989, p.1377) 
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Chapter 8 A Flow of Funds Model for the Household 
Sector and the Demand for Money for India 1 
8.1 Introduction 
A stable demand for money function provides a reliable link between changes in 
monetary aggregates and changes in variables included in the demand for money 
function (Siddiki, 1984). This suggests that it facilitates the monetary control, and 
therefore it is of significant importance in applying macroeconomic policies. The 
study of demand for money, which is based on the hypotheses of the transactions 
motive and asset motive for holding money, has gone through different phases in its 
development. The traditional study of demand for money function is typically 
specified by income in order to capture the transaction motive and a representative 
interest rate and sometimes also an inflation rate2 as opportunity costs. The traditional 
demand for money is confined to a closed economy framework. In the recent study, 
open economy factors have become very important in the determination of money 
demand, subsequently foreign interest rates and exchange rates have significant 
implications for the effectiveness of monetary policy. This is also the case for 
developing countries with the rapid financial market liberalisation in the last decade 
(Khalid 1999).3 Empirical results tend to show the significant effects of the foreign 
variables in the money demand function (e.g. Arize 1994 and Weliwita and Ekanayake 
1998). 
The traditional specifications of money demand also fail to take into account the non-
stationary behaviour of macroeconomic time series resulting in what has become 
known as 'spurious regression'. With a development of co integration techniques, 
empirical evidence tends to show a stable long-run linear combination among a 
monetary aggregate and its arguments in the demand function for developing 
1 This chapter is a revised version of the paper by Moore et al. (2002a). The paper was presented at the 
Finance and Development conference, Manchester in April,2002. We acknowledge, with thanks, the 
valuable comments made by an anonymous referee of Journal of Development Studies on the paper. 
2 Inflation is viewed as a proxy for real assets. 
3 Foreign currency deposits held abroad by residents of developing countries rose from about 
US$80billion in 1981 to U8$450 billion by the end of 1990, an annual average rate of increase of nearly 
50%, according to IFS (Agenor and Khan, 1996). 
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economies (e.g. Bahmani-Oskooee and Rhee, 1994, Arrau, Gregorio, Reinhard and 
Wickham, 1995 and Weliwita and Ekanayake, 1998). 
In this chapter, we model a flow of funds for the household sector in India. One of the 
central issues in modelling portfolio behaviour for this sector is that the demand for 
narrow and broad money is analysed. The methodology undertaken in this chapter 
follows the recent trend by incorporating a foreign variable with a cointegration 
technique; but it departs from the existing literature. First, the demand for money is 
examined as an integral part of the portfolio behaviour for the household sector in a 
system of equations, rather than in an aggregate single equation framework. Hence the 
substitution effect between money and other financial assets is examined in a rigorous 
manner. Second, a theoretical framework of almost ideal demand system (AIDS) is 
utilised in model specification. Hence, the demand for money is analysed from the 
standpoint of neoclassical demand theory, rather than considering explicit motives for 
holding money. Yet, the AIDS model allows one to examine the asset motive in a 
richer fashion: the opportunity cost includes all the interest rates that are relevant to the 
household sector's holding of financial assets, and the role of each interest rate is 
rigorous with each being the own-interest rate for the asset in question in a system of 
equations. Besides, the AIDS model is consistent with the transactions motive as the 
variable of transactions can be added to the model specification. This is theoretically 
regarded as part of a subsistence level in demand theory. Third, it is needless to say, 
the data used for estimation are derived from the household sector in the complete flow 
of funds matrix, rather than aggregated data. 
The application of the neo-classical demand theory into modelling portfolio behaviour 
in the household sector has direct relevance to the assertion by Friedman (1956): he 
argues that the demand for assets, in particular, focusing on the demand for money, 
should be based on axioms of consumer choice. There are some specific motivations 
in applying the AIDS model to the household sector. Thomas (1985) notes that the 
weakness of the system of demand equations is to take into account the heterogeneous 
characteristics of different households. The problem may be circumvented by utilising 
the AIDS model, since the AIDS cost function belong to the PIGLOG class which has 
a desirable aggregation property: it allows the presentation of market demand as if they 
were the outcome of decisions by a rational representative consumer (Chapter 2). 
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Besides, the AIDS model theoretically allows the inter-relationship between the assets 
and the expenditure to take place by incorporating the expenditure in a theoretically 
acceptable form. It is argued that different assets are perceived by individuals to offer 
different liquidity services when planning transactions in goods and services (for 
example, if you plan to purchase some holiday package near future, you need to hold 
some portion of your wealth in more liquidity form, e.g. current account saving, rather 
than a time deposit). Thus it is expected that the marginal rate of substitution between 
any two assets at time t to depend on the level of transaction expected to prevail in 
period t + 1 (Barr and Cuthbertson, 1991). 
The objective of this chapter is to examine scope for policy implications by obtaining 
an economically sensible equilibrium relationship of variables, and at the same time to 
investigate the extent to which the demand for money in a system of a flow of funds 
model is robust. 
The system of the dynamic AIDS model is applied to the demand for money by Weale 
(1986) and Barr and Cuthburtson (1991a) both for the UK and Adam (1999), for 
Kenya. The model presented here shares a common core with theirs except in the 
following respects: Given only a low frequency flow data, our model is limited to 
being static. In this respect our approach may be less rigorous, but in other aspects our 
model scores highly. In the work of Barr and Cuthbertson, the data are taken from a 
complete flow of funds matrix, however the financial instruments are restricted to be 
capital certain assets. This restricts the substitution effect among financial assets, in 
particular, the inflation hedge activities are limited; here we include both capital 
certain and uncertain financial assets. Moreover, for the UK as a small open economy, 
the effect of foreign variables on the demand for money has not been examined. A 
similar drawback applies to the study of Weale. In the empirical work of Adam, the 
asset portfolio consists not only of financial assets, but also real assets. However, as 
we discussed in Chapter 2 there are two limitations in terms of data. First, the 
consolidated data of the household and corporate sectors are used for estimation. 
Second, the data for real assets are aggregated data. 
The remaining chapter is organised in the following manner. Section 8.2 is a 
clarification of financial instruments that are modelled for the household sector. Non-
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price sensitive explanatory variables are dealt in Section 8.3. Unit root tests, general 
models and specific models are reported in Section 8.4. The estimation results are 
analysed in Section 8.5. In Section 8.6, our result is compared with the existing 
empirical evidence of the demand for money in a single equation framework for 
developing countries. A conclusion drawn from the empirical work is found in Section 
8.7. 
8.2 Financial Instruments 
Table 8.1 shows the simplified aggregate financial liabilities and assets for the 
household sector in India. 
Table 8.1 Liabilities and Assets in the Household sector 
Liabilities (Sources) and Net Worth Assets (Uses) 
Borrowing (deducted Corporate Bonds and Currency 
Debentures) 
Net Worth Deposits (Demand and Timet 
Government Debt (including Provident Funds) 
Company Securities 
The liability consists of borrowing. The holdings of corporate bonds and debentures 
are netted from the borrowings on the liability side. The household sector includes not 
only income-earning and saving entities, but also non-corporate enterprises, which are 
net users of funds, hence bank loans are primarily for production purposes. Some 
component of the loans is involuntary under the 'priority sector lending requirement' 
to the household sector from the banking sector. 
'Provident Funds', which include the provident, life and pension funds, are 
consolidated into 'Government Debt', since the contributions of the provident funds 
are predominantly invested in the government sector. The RBI (various issues) reports 
4 The separate flow data for time and demand deposits are available only until 1977, so both are 
consolidated together as deposits. 
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that the quantitative ratio of the life and pension funds to provident funds IS 
approximately 1 : 2, and these funds are roughly invested as given by: 
Life and pension funds (100%) = Gov't Securities (50%) + Loans & Advances (50%) 
Provident fund (100%) = Gov't Securities (80%) + Small Savings5 and Bank Deposits 
(20%) 
Hence, instruments floated by insurance companies or provident funds are similar to 
those classified under 'Government Debt' with respect to the rate of return, the degree 
of risk and date of maturity. 
In the present approach, decisions in the real sector are made first, and therefore the 
size ofthe saving is exogenous. We seek to explain the composition of net worth. The 
financial instruments to be modelled are listed in Table 8.2 together with the mean 
value of the share. CUR, DEP and GD are the major holdings of the financial assets in 
the household sector over the sample period. In the early period, the share of currency 
is the largest (around 60%). This is probably due to the higher transaction costs in a 
financially repressed economy as a consequence of the higher degree of inefficiency 
among financial intermediaries, and also the relatively underdeveloped nature of 
payment technology (Sen and Vaidya, 1997). 
Table 8.2 Financial instruments and the mean share values 
Financial Instruments with notations Mean (%) 
CUR Currency 34.2 
DEP Deposits 46.0 
GD Government Debt 48.5 
CS Company Securities 9.5 
LA(-) Borrowing * -38.2 
- Mean (%): a proportIon of total wealth 
* Bank loans in sources deducted the corporate bonds and debentures in uses. 
5 Small savings are claims on government. 
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The nominal interest rates used for the AIDS prices are in Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3 Interest rates used for the AIDS prices 
AIDS prices Interest rates 
In p; = PCUR (Price of CUR) rl =0 
Inp; = PDEP (Price ofDEP) r2 = Deposit rate 
Inp; = PGD (Price ofGD) r3 = Government securities yields 
In p; = pes (Price of CS) r4 = Return on shares (=The rate of growth in share prices) 
Inp~ = PLA (Price of LA) rs = Lending rate 
.. 
- The CPI IS used for denvlng the rate oflnflatJOn. The nominal rate of return for cash IS zero, hence the 
PCUR is derived as given by pr = [(1- g)]-I. 
8.3 Non-Price Sensitive Explanatory Variables and the Hypotheses 
Non-price sensitive explanatory variables are listed in Table 8.4 with the expected sign 
where appropriate. Appendix 8.1 briefly inform readers of some estimation trials by 
using different explanatory variables, so that it justifies the choice of explanatory 
variables listed in this table. 
The expenditure (lnEXP) variable is a causal link with the real sector, at the same time 
this variable is to capture the transaction requirements associated with the transaction 
demand hypothesis. If the hypothesis is supported, the sign on CUR is expected to be 
positive. The effect of dummy 69 on LA( -) is expected to be negative; with the credit 
ration to priority sectors, it is expected that borrowing will increase6• The effect of 
dummy 90 in the portfolio behaviour of the household sector remains to be seen. 
It may be argued that modelling India as a small open economy by specifying the 
exchange rate in the AIDS model is not appropriate, since there were strict foreign 
exchange controls prevailing in India over the sample period (1951-52 to 1993-94) by 
the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. In particular, foreign exchange was rationed 
6 Recall that negative implies an increase in liability of LAC -). 
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out strictly according to availability, and purchase and sale of foreign securities by 
Indians were strictly controlled. It was only in the early 1990's that the government 
started relaxing the foreign exchange regulations. 
Table 8.4 Non-price sensitive explanatory variables 
Variables Expected sign 
InEXP Log of constant consumer spending +CUR 
InREXC Log of real exchange rates* + CUR 
Dummy 69 0: 1951-68 and 1: 1969-93 
- LA (-) 
Dummy 90 0: 1951- 89 and 1: 1990-93 
* Real exchange rates are expressed as ep *Ip, where e = the number of natIOnal umts of currency per US 
dollar. p* = US CPI, and p = India CPI. 
Yet, Simmons (1992) argues that it is possible that currency substitution occurs with 
variations in the timing of conversion of foreign exchange earned abroad (e.g. worker's 
remittances) or export earnings into local currency even under the regime of exchange 
control. In the context of India, it is assumed that, whilst the conversion from the 
domestic currency to foreign currency is constrained, conversion from foreign money 
to Indian rupees can be freely determined by the agents. From this perspective, we 
present an open economy model with the exchange rate together with a closed 
economy model without the exchange rate. This is important, not only in identifying 
any possible missing variables, but also to test the hypothesis that authorities are able 
to influence the household portfolio behaviour by exchange rate policy. 
There are two hypotheses about the effect of the exchange rate on the demand for 
money in terms of the portfolio behaviour7: First, the depreciation of the domestic 
currency increases the value of foreign currencies held by domestic residents, and if 
the conversion from foreign money to domestic money takes place and if this is 
perceived as an increase in residents' wealth, their demand for domestic currency will 
increase (Weliwita and Ekanayake, 1998). Second, the depreciation of the domestic 
currency raises the expected return from holding foreign money, hence it lowers the 
7 The discussion is confined to the choice of portfolio. The effect of depreciation on money through 
fundamentals is beyond scope of this chapter. 
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demand for domestic money. Without exchange control, this would lead individuals to 
substitute foreign currency for domestic money. (Chowdhury, 1997, Simmons, 1992 
and Bahmani-Oskooee and Pourheydarian, 1990). With exchange control, if this 
hypothesis holds, the effect of the exchange rate should be insignificant on domestic 
money, since individuals are unable to convert freely from domestic money to foreign 
currency. 
In the case of India under the exchange control regime, the first hypothesis is more 
appropriate. Hence the sign on the exchange rate in the share of currency equation is 
expected to be positive for India, and in order to capture the timing effect the level of 
InREXC is used8• 
8.4 Estimation 
Like other sectors, starting with unit root tests, we present the overview of the general 
to specific model. We report two long run models; one is a closed-economy model, 
Model 1 and the other one is an open-economy model, Model 2. Specific models of a 
closed economy and an open economy are then thoroughly examined. 
8.4.1 Unit Root Tests 
Table 8.5 presents the unit root tests. The DF test indicates that the null of unit root for 
the share of financial assets is not rejected in level at a 5% significance level, whereas 
it is rejected in differenced. We take this result as an implication of 1(1) for these 
variables. With respect to price, the null is rejected in the levels of PCUR and PDEP 
in both AD and ADF tests at the 5 % significance level, suggesting that they are 
stationaritl. Other prices appear to be 1(1) (see the banking sector in Chapter 5 for the 
comments). The unit root tests also indicate that In(Wr / p.r), InREXC and lnEXP are 
1(1). 
8 The second hypothesis is examined by using the rate of change in real exchange rates, i.e. 
!1REXC / REXC , which is more consistent with the expectation hypothesis than the level oflnREXC. 
We find a decisively statistical1y insignificant effect of !1REXC / REXC in all share equations. 
9 The stationarity of the rate of inflation is also found in the study of demand for money for India ( 
Pradhan and Subramanian, 1999). 
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Perron's unit root test is found in Appendix 8.2. Note that InEXP variable rejects a 
null of unit root in terms of p; this may be the example of what Perron (1989) argues 
that trend stationary with one-structural change reject the null, where trend stationary 
without structural change may not. For others, the results are the same as those of 
either DF or ADF test results. 
Table 8.5 Order of Integration of the variables 
Level Differenced 
DF ADF DF ADF 
SI (CUR) -1.86 -2.08 -6.65 * -3.35 * 
S2 (DEP) -1.77 -1.91 -3.09 * -2.62 
S3 (GD) -2.87 * -1.90 -4.18 * -2.68 
S4 (CS) 1.44 -0.28 -4.06 * -3.31 * 
SS (LA) 1.12 -0.60 -4.27 * -2.92 * 
lnp; (PCUR) -4.02 * -3.33 * -5.75 * -3.78 * 
lnp; (PDEP) -4.03 * -3.24 * -5.86 * -3.92 * 
Inp;(PGD) -3.84 * -2.84 -5.77 * -3.79 * 
lnp; (PCS) -3.41 * -2.40 -5.49 * -4.39 * 
lnp; (PLA) -3.43 * -2.30 -5.71 * -3.80 * 
In(W' / p.') -1.97 (t) -0.98 (t) -6.52 * -4.48 * 
InEXP -2.16 -1.12 -6.15 * -6.19 * 
InREXC -1.44 (t) -0.02 (t) -8.42 (t) * -4.33 (t) * 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
2 
Notes: 1. ADF is modelled as Mit = a + f3 X t_1 + L 0iM/-i + et' (t): a deterministic trend is 
i=1 
specified as the trend is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
2. Critical value 'c (constant, no trend): -3.43 (1 %), -2.86 (5%), -2.57 (10%) 
Critical value 'ct (constant, trend): -3.96 (1%), -3.41 (5%), -3.13 (10%) 
by Davidson and MacKinnon, p708, 1993 
211 
Based on the test results, we categorise the dependent and independent variables in the 
following manner: 
1(1) Endogenous variables: CUR, DEP, GD, CS, LA, PCS, PLA, In(W' I p.') 
1(1) Exogenous variables: PGD, lnEXP, InREXC 
1(O)Exogenous variables: PCUR, PDEP, Dummy 
8.4.2 Overview of General to Specific Model 
Figures 8.la and 8.lh show the overview of the general to specific model with the 
likelihood ratio tests for Model I and Model 2 respectively. Tables 8.6a and 8.6b 
present the estimates of the general model (with an adding-up restriction) and residual 
diagnostics. Model I and 2 both have arrived by and large at similar estimates. 
For both general models, the LM test indicates heteroskedasticity for GD, CS and LA. 
Serial correlation is also observed in the share of equations. Both models exhibit 
relatively high R-squared, especially for CUR and DEP given around 97 to 98 %. The 
estimates of the own price are, however, very poor. Except LA in Model I and CUR 
and LA in Model 2, the own-price coefficients are wrongly signed, and many of them 
are statistically insignificant. The anomalies in the own-price coefficients are perhaps 
an indication of muIticollinearity. 
The parsimonious specific model is pursued in order to obtain economically sensible 
price coefficients. We impose symmetry and homogeneity in the general models, and 
further zeros on the explanatory variables (see Figures 8.la and 8.1 b), though the joint 
test of symmetry and homogeneity is rejected. The restriction is, however, one way to 
alleviate the problem of multicolinearity by reducing the number of explanatory 
variables in the system of equations, hence we maintain homogeneity and symmetry. 
The zero restrictions on the non-price sensitive explanatory variables are not rejected 
with the likelihood ratio (LR) tests. 
Some cross-price coefficients are imposed at zero, namely PCS in CUR, PGD and 
PLA in DEP (further PLA in GD in Model 2). This is however rejected by the LR test, 
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In particular, the deletion of PLA in DEP may be most responsible as it was 
statistically highly significant (t-ratio: 9.24 in Model 1 and 9.88 in Model 2). 
Nevertheless the zero impositions are maintained in the specific model on the 
following grounds: First, this greatly contributed to a correct sign on almost all the 
own-price coefficients with a statistical significance. Second, it doesn't make any 
economic sense that, with a negative significant effect of PLA on DEP in the general 
models; it implies that an increased lending rate will exert a significant influence by 
increasing the holdings of deposits in the household sector. It can be assumed that 
PLA spuriously picked up the effect on DEP where the own price of PDEP should 
have come into play. In addition, as it will be revealed later in Section 8.5, the pattern 
of zero restrictions implies some differentiation between liquid assets (i.e. CUR and 
DEP) and assets in the capital market (i.e. GD and CS); CURlDEP constitutes 
substitutes, GD/CS constitutes compliments, and CURlDEP and GD/CS form 
substitutes as blocks. This is quite a plausible pattern. 
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Figure S.la Unrestricted general to specific model: Modell (closed economy) 
LR=51.462 (lO) * 
SSLR=42.713 (lO) * 
Symmetry and Homogeneity 
(LL=480.887) 
LR=14.852(4) * 
SSLR=12.827(4) * 
Homogeneity 
(LL=499.192) 
LR=36.6lO (6) * 
SSLR=30.386 (6) * 
Symmetry given 
Homogeneity 
(LL=480.887) 
~ / LR=lO.458(5) 
,.-______ -, SSLR=8.784 (5) 
- * Significant at the 5% level. 
-LL: Log likelihood 
Zero restrictions to non-
price sensitive 
explanatory variables 
(LL=475.658) 
Specific Modell 
Zero restrictions to 
Price variables 
(LL=458.204) 
2 
LR=34.908 (3) * 
SSLR=30.020 (3) * 
-LR: Likelihood Ratio (LR) test: L = 2«( -I r) - X (J) 
where lu (lr) is the log likelihood of the unrestricted (restricted) equation 
and (J) is the number of restrictions. 
-SSLR: The small sample-adjusted LR given by the product ofLR and (T-K)/T, where T=No. of 
observations and K=No. of exogenous variables in each equation (Bohm, Rieder and Tintner, 1980). 
- Critical values: d.f. 3 = 7.82 (5%), 11.34 (1%), d.f. 4 = 9.49 (5%),13.28(1%), 
d.f. 5 = 11.07 (5%), 15.09 (1 %), d.f. 6 = 12.59(5%), 16.81 (1 %), d.f. 10 = 18.31 (5%),23.21 (1 %) 
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Figure 8.th Unrestricted general to specific model: Model 2 (Open economy) 
LR=36.603 (10) * 
SSLR=29.648 (10) * 
Symmetry and Homogeneity 
(LL=493.353) 
LR=7.632 (4) 
SSLR= 6.198 (4) 
Homogeneity 
(LL=5 07.838) 
LR= 28.97 (6) * 
SSLR= 23.46 (6) * 
Symmetry given 
Homogeneity 
(LL=493.353) 
~ / LR= 1.944 (3) 
.--______ -, SSLR=1.594 (3) 
- * Significant at the 5% level. 
-LL: Log likelihood 
Zero restrictions to non-
price sensitive 
explanatory variables 
(LL=492.381) 
Specific Model 2 
Zero restrictions to 
Price variables 
(LL=47 1.466) 
2 
LR=41.830 (4) * 
SSLR=35.137 (4) * 
-LR: Likelihood Ratio (LR) test: L = 2«( -IT) 
- X (J) 
where ((IT) is the log likelihood of the unrestricted (restricted) equation 
and (1) is the number of restrictions. 
-SSLR: The small sample-adjusted LR given by the product ofLR and (T-K)/T, where T=No. of 
observations and K=No. of exogenous variables in each equation (Bohm, Rieder and Tintner, 1980). 
- Critical values: d.f. 3 = 7.82 (5%), 11.34 (1 %), d.f. 4 = 9.49 (5%), 13.28(1%), 
d.f. 6 = 12.59(5%), 16.81 (1 %), d.f. 10 = 18.31 (5%),23.21 (1%). 
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Table 8.6a Unrestricted General Modell (Closed-economy) 
Inp; Inp; In p; 
(PCUR) (PDEP) (PG D) 
1. CUR 0.4035 0.6632 -1.9319 
(0.54) (1.03) (2.64) 
2. DEP 0.0400 0.9510 1.1968 
(0.08) (2.10) (2.32) 
3.GD -2.3989 -2.1160 3.4000 
(2.81) (2.88) (4.08) 
4. CS 1.0583 0.4610 -1.7010 
(3.12) (1.58) (5.13) 
5. LA(-) 0.8970 0.0409 -0.9639 
(2.06) (0.11) (2.26) 
InEXP Dummy Dummy 
69 90 
1. CUR 0.0290 -0.0330 0.0278 
(1.20) (2.10) (1.36) 
2.DEP 0.0077 0.0709 -0.1011 
(0.46) (6.39) (7.02) 
3.GD -0.0668 0.0216 -0.0310 
(2.44) (1.20) (1.33) 
4. CS 0.0122 -0.0152 0.0287 
(1.11) (2.12) (3.09) 
5. LA(-) 0.0180 -0.0443 0.0756 
(1.28) (4.82) (6.34) 
.. 
-LA(-): liabIlIty. 
- t-ratio is in parenthesis. 
- No. of observation: 43 (1951-52 to 1993-94) 
- Columns may fail to sum to zero due to rounding. 
- SSR: sum of squared regression 
Residual diagnostics (chi-square values) 
1. CUR 
2. DEP 
3.GD 
4. CS 
5. LA(-) 
LM Heteroskedasticity 
2.047 [0.15] 
0.066 [0.80] 
4.294 [0.04] 
5.372 [0.02] 
7.292 [0.01] 
[ ] is P-value. One tail tests 
lnp; lnp~ 
(PCS) (PLA) 
-0.0448 0.5924 
(1.57) (1.79) 
0.0001 -2.1601 
(0.00) (9.24) 
0.0105 1.5683 
(0.32) (4.15) 
0.0034 0.0438 
(0.26) (0.29) 
0.0308 -0.0444 
(1.86) (0.23) 
R-squared SSR 
97.31 % 0.0227 
98.14 % om 13 
64.51 % 0.0295 
80.81 % 0.0047 
87.21 % 0.0077 
LM Serial Correlation 
(Order =1) 
26.317 [0.00] 
3.389 [0.07] 
25.621 [0.00] 
22.964 [0.00] 
6.259 [0.01] 
Log Likelihood' 506 618 
Constant In(W' I p., 
1.3362 -0.1717 
(4.30) (5.87) 
-0.0475 0.0519 
(0.22) (2.52) 
-0.0245 0.1662 
(0.07) (4.98) 
0.2554 -0.0380 
(1.81) (2.86) 
-0.5195 -0.0084 
(2.86) (0.49) 
SE of 
Regression 
0.0230 
0.0162 
0.0262 
0.0104 
0.0134 
LM Serial Correlation 
(Order =2) 
27.306 [0.00] 
8.042 [0.02] 
26.621 [0.00] 
23.190 [0.00] 
6.294 [0.04] 
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Table 8.6b Unrestricted General Model 2 (Open-economy) 
lnp; lnp; In p; 
(PCUR) (PDEP) (PGD) 
1. CUR -0.5410 0.1329 -0.5301 
(0.72) (0.22) (0.65) 
2.DEP 0.5233 1.2223 0.4795 
(0.94) (2.70) (0.79) 
3.GD -1.4735 -1.5965 2.0267 
(1.67) (2.22) (2.11 ) 
4. CS 0.6144 0.2118 -1.0423 
(1.81) (0.76) (2.82) 
5. LA(-) 0.8768 0.0295 -0.9338 
(1.82) (0.08) (1.78) 
InEXP InREXC Dummy 
69 
1. CUR 0.0319 0.1211 -0.0422 
(1.45) (2.94) (2.87) 
2.DEP 0.0063 -0.0620 0.0756 
(0.39) (2.04) (6.97) 
3.GD -0.0697 -0.1186 0.0306 
(2.71) (2.46) (1.78) 
4. CS 0.0135 0.0569 -0.0195 
(1.37) (3.06) (2.94) 
5. LA(-) 0.0180 0.0026 -0.0445 
(1.28) (0.10) (4.73) 
.. 
-LA(-): hablhty. 
- t-ratio is in parenthesis. 
- No. of observation: 43 (1951-52 to 1993-94) 
- Columns may fail to sum to zero due to rounding. 
- SSR: sum of squared regression 
Residual diagnostics (chi-square values) 
1. CUR 
2.DEP 
3.GD 
4. CS 
5. LA(-) 
LM Heteroskedasticity 
1.543 [0.22] 
0.002 [0.96] 
3.572 [0.06] 
4.458 [0.04] 
7.057 [0.01] 
[ ] is P-value. One tail tests 
Log Likelihood· 511 654 
Inp; Inp; 
(PCS) (PLA) 
-0.0303 0.7983 
(1.15) (2.57) 
-0.0073 -2.2654 
(0.38) (9.88) 
-0.0036 1.3666 
(0.12) (3.76) 
0.0102 0.1405 
(0.86) (1.00) 
0.D311 -0.040 
(1.84) (0.20) 
Dummy R-squared 
90 
0.0080 97.75 % 
(0.40) 
-0.0910 98.30% 
(6.22) 
-0.0116 68.89 % 
(0.50) 
0.0193 84.25 % 
(2.16) 
0.0752 87.21 % 
(5.93) 
LM Serial Correlation 
(Order =1) 
21.049 [0.00] 
0.922 [0.34] 
24.218 [0.00] 
18.811 [0.00] 
7.682 [0.01] 
Constant In(WT / p'T 
0.8751 -0.1573 
(2.70) (5.79) 
0.1884 0.0445 
(0.79) (2.22) 
0.4272 0.1521 
(1.13) (4.79) 
0.0387 -0.0312 
(0.27) (2.55) 
-0.5294 -0.0081 
(2.55) (0.46) 
SSR SE of 
Regression 
0.0189 0.2098 
0.0103 0.0155 
0.0258 0.0245 
0.0038 0.0094 
0.0077 0.0134 
LM Serial Correlation 
(Order =2) 
20.488 [0.00] 
6.502 [0.04] 
25.864 [0.00] 
19.599 [0.00] 
7.512 [0.02] 
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8.4.3 Specific Model: Model! and Model 2 
Table 8.7a and 8.7b show the estimates of the specific model for Model 1 and Model 2 
respectively. Table 8.8 presents the EG cointegration test, and Table 8.9a and 8.9b, the 
lohansen cointegration test for both models. 
Table 8.7a Specific model 1 (closed economy): homogeneity, symmetry and zeros imposed 
(Adjusted White's Heteroskedasticity-Consistent S.E. 's) 
Inp; Inp; 
(PCUR) (PDEP) 
1. CUR -1.9850 0.4092 
(8.15) (1.92) 
2.DEP -0.4255 
(1.93) 
3. OD 
4. CS 
5. LA(-) 
InEXP Dummy 
69 
1. CUR 0.0526 -0.0589 
(2.04) (4.22) 
2.DEP 0 0.1118 
(6.47) 
3.00 -0.0723 0.0365 
(2.38) (1.65) 
4. CS 0.0197 -0.0317 
(2.41) (5.39) 
5. LA(-) 0 -0.0577 
(8.98) 
. . LA(-): liability. Zeros are Imposed . 
t-ratio is in parenthesis. 
-SSR: sum of squared regression. 
In p; 
(POD) 
0.9990 
(3.55) 
0 
-0.8050 
(2.74) 
Dummy 
90 
0.0837 
(5.30) 
-0.1665 
(7.55) 
-0.0720 
(3.92) 
0.0593 
(6.72) 
0.0955 
(6.06) 
-No. of observation: 43 (1951-52 to 1993-94) 
-Columns may fail to sum to zero due to rounding. 
L L'k rh d 458204 og I e I 00 : 
lnp; lnp; Constant In(WT / p·T 
(PCS) (PLA) 
0 0.5768 0.4958 -0.0908 
(5.30) (1.94) (10.98) 
0.0163 0 -0.1214 0.0908 
(0.56) (2.84) (10.98) 
-0.0570 -0.1371 1.1272 0 
(2.63) (0.70) (3.83) 
0.0193 0.0214 -0.0895 0 
(1.62) (1.17) (1.13) 
-0.4612 -0.4121 0 
(3.27) (79.76) 
R-squared SSR SE of 
Regression 
95.91 % 0.0345 0.0283 
92.78 % 0.0437 0.0319 
33.92 % 0.0552 0.0358 
66.79 % 0.0081 0.0137 
83.07 % 0.0103 0.0154 
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Table 8.7b Specific model 2 (open economy): homogeneity, symmetry and zeros imposed 
(Adjusted White's Heteroskedasticity-Consistent S.E.'s) 
og I e I 00 : L L'k rh d 471 466 
lnp; lnp; In p; lnp; lnp; Constant In(WT / p·T 
(PCUR) (PDEP) (PGD) (PCS) (PLA) 
1. CUR -1.8786 0.5764 0.9063 0 0.3959 0.3932 -0.1316 
(7.70) (2.24) (2.88) (4.08) (2.00) (10.81) 
2. DEP -0.5831 0 0.006632 0 -0.0042 0.0975 
(2.24) (0.24) (0.05) (6.12) 
3.GD -0.8489 -0.0573 0 1.4103 0.0502 
(2.69) (2.48) (6.21) (2.48) 
4. CS 0.0203 0.0304 -0.1729 -0.0160 
(1.99) (1.63) (2.19) (2.29) 
5. LA(-) -0.4263 -0.6264 0 
(4.73) (6.68) 
InEXP InREXC Dummy Dummy R-squared SSR SE of 
69 90 Regression 
1. CUR 0.0449 0.1715 -0.0591 0.0235 97.24 % 0.0233 0.0233 
(2.22) (5.12) (4.96) (1.54) 
2.DEP 0 -0.0723 0.1130 -0.1392 93.36 % 0.0402 0.0306 
(1.67) (5.95) (4.99) 
3.GD -0.0795 -0.2093 0.0391 0 55.86 % 0.0367 0.0292 
(3.17) (5.57) (2.57) 
4. CS 0.D172 0.0865 -0.0316 0.0273 80.18 % 0.0048 0.0106 
(1.97) (5.56) (6.11) (4.17) 
5. LA(-) 0.0174 0.0236 -0.0615 0.0885 83.99 % 0.0097 0.0150 
(1.83) (1.19) (10.55) (4.82) 
. . .. LA(-): lIabIlIty. Zeros are Imposed. t-ratIo IS In parentheSIS. No. of observatIOn: 43 (1951-52 to 1993-
94). Columns may fail to sum to zero due to rounding. SSR: sum of squared regression 
Table 8.8 Engle-Granger tests 
Model 1 EG AEG Model 2 
(Closed economy) (Open economy) 
1. CUR (n= 3) -2.838 -2.327 1. CUR (n= 3) 
2. DEP (n= 3) -3.230 -2.886 2. DEP (n= 3) 
3.GD (n = 3) -3.006 -2.770 3.GD (n= 3) 
4. CS (n=3) -3.540 * -2.950 4. CS (n=4) 
5. LA(-) (n = 3) -4.580 ** -3.288 5. LA(-) (n = 3) 
Notes: 
- * , ** Significant at the 10% and 5% level respectively. 
2 
- ADF is modelled as Mit = a + f3 X t_1 + I5i M t - i + et . 
i=1 
- n: number ofI(l) endogenous variables. 
EG AEG 
-3.450 * -3.902 ** 
-3.140 -3.147 
-3.782 ** -3.128 
-4.103 ** -4.760 ** 
-4.668 * * -3.007 
- Asymptotic Critical Values for Cointegration Tests: 3.74 (5%), 3.45 (10%) for n = 3 and 4.10 (5%), 
3.81 (10%) for n = 4 (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, p722). 
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Table 8.9a Johansen Cointegration LR test for Modell 
(Order of V AR=l except DEP of V AR=2, Unrestricted intercept with no trend) 
CUR 
Nun Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace A/race 95% C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r=O r= 1 175.47 * 27.75 r>= 1 185.25 * 46.44 
r<= 1 r=2 6.52 21.07 r>= 2 9.77 28.42 
r<= 2 r= 3 3.25 14.35 r=3 3.25 14.35 
DEP 
Nun Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace Atrace 95% C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r=O r= 1 49.47 * 24.59 r>= 1 58.16 * 38.93 
r<= 1 r=2 6.60 18.06 r>= 2 8.68 23.32 
r<=2 r= 3 2.07 11.47 r=3 2.07 11.47 
GD 
Nun Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace Atrace 95% C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r= 0 r= 1 144.76 * 27.75 r>= 1 187.78 * 46.44 
r<= 1 r=2 34.73 * 21.07 r>= 2 43.02 * 28.42 
r<=2 r= 3 8.29 14.35 r=3 8.29 14.35 
CS 
Null Maximum Amax 95% C.V. Trace Atrace 95%C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r= 0 r= 1 162.52 * 27.75 r>= 1 205.53 * 46.44 
r<= 1 r=2 35.80 * 21.07 r>=2 43.00 * 28.42 
r<=2 r=3 7.20 14.35 r=3 7.20 14.35 
LA (-) 
Nun Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace A.trace 95%C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r= 0 r= 1 153.05 * 24.59 r>= 1 195.89 * 38.93 
r<= 1 r=2 30.22 * 18.06 r>=2 42.84 * 23.32 
r<= 2 r= 3 12.62 * 11.47 r=3 12.62 * 11.47 
- Notes: In the partial VECM, variables are categorised as fonows. 
1(1) endogenous 1(1) exogenous 1(0) 
CUR CUR, PLA, In(WT / pOT) POD,lnEXP PCUR, PDEP, Dummy 69, Dummy 90 
DEP DEP, PCS, In(WT / pOT) InEXP PCUR, PDEP, Dummy 69, Dummy 90 
OD OD, PCS,PLA POD,InEXP PCUR, Dummy 69, Dummy 90 
CS CS, PCS, PLA POD,InEXP PDEP, Dummy 69, Dummy 90 
LA LA, PCS, PLA POD PCUR, Dummy 69, Dummy 90 
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Table 8.9b Johansen Cointegration LR test for Model 2 
(Order of VAR=l for CUR, CS and LA, VAR=2 for DEP and GD, Unrestricted intercept with no 
trend) 
CUR 
Null Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace Atrace 95% C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r=O r= 1 177.69 * 30.74 r>= 1 187.93 * 53.41 
r<= 1 r=2 6.95 24.22 r>=2 10.23 33.35 
r<=2 r=3 3.28 16.90 r= 3 3.28 16.90 
DEP 
Null Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace Atrace 95% C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r=O r=1 49.83 * 24.59 r>= 1 56.78 * 38.93 
r<= 1 r=2 2.45 18.06 r>=2 6.94 23.32 
r<=2 r=3 2.36 11.47 r= 3 2.36 11.47 
GD 
Null Maximum Amax 95% C.V. Trace Atrace 95% C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r=O r=1 53.64 * 30.74 r>= 1 87.26 * 53.41 
r<= 1 r=2 25.82 * 24.22 r>=2 33.61 * 33.35 
r<=2 r=3 7.78 16.90 r= 3 7.79 16.90 
CS 
Null Maximum Amax 95%C.V. Trace A/race 95% C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r=O r= 1 179.92 * 37.08 r>= 1 243.30 * 77.21 
r<= 1 r=2 45.85 * 30.74 r>=2 63.38 * 53.41 
r<=2 r=3 16.41 24.22 r>= 3 17.52 33.35 
r<=3 r=4 1.10 16.90 r= 4 1.10 16.90 
LA{-} 
NulI Maximum Amax 95% C.V. Trace Atrace 95%C.V. Alternative Alternative 
r=O r= 1 119.57 * 27.75 r>= 1 173.22 * 46.44 
r<= 1 r=2 37.98 * 21.07 r>=2 53.64 * 28.42 
r<=2 r=3 15.65 * 14.35 r=3 15.65 * 14.35 
- Note: In the partial VECM, variables are categorised as follows. 
1(1) endogenous 1(1) exogenous 1(0) 
CUR CUR, PLA, In(Wt / pOt) PGD,lnEXP, PCUR, PDEP, Dummy 69, Dummy 90 
InREXC 
DEP DEP, PCS, In(Wt / pOt) InREXC PCUR, PDEP, Dummy 69, Dummy 90 
GD GD, PCS, In(W t / pOt) PGD,lnEXP, PCUR, Dummy 69, Dummy 90 
InREXC 
CS CS, PCS, PLA, In(Wt / pOt) PGD,lnEXP, PDEP, Dummy 69, Dummy 90 
InREXC 
LA LA,PCS, PLA InEXP,lnREXC PCUR, Dummy 69, Dummy 90 
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Cointegration Tests 
In respect of the Engle-Granger test in Table 8.8, the inclusion of the exchange rate 
seems to improve the test statistics. The EG statistics indicate that in Model 1, the 
linear combination of the 1(1) variables are stationary in the share of LA equation at a 
5 % significance level. In Model 2, a stable long-run relationship appears to exist in 
all share equations, except DEP, in either EG or AEG tests. 
Both maximum eigenvalue and trace tests of the 10hansen cointegration test (in Tables 
8.9a and 8.9b) reveal that in both models there is at least one cointegrating relationship 
existing for all share equations, as the null of non-cointegrating vectors is rejected by 
the LR test. A unique cointegration vector is found in CUR and DEP in both models. 
Estimates of the Specific Models 
We have obtained very similar results in terms of the magnitude and direction of the 
variables for both models. The following properties which are common to both are 
noteworthy. (The impact of the explanatory variables will be discussed in detail in the 
next section.) 
i) There is a substantial improvement in the own-price coefficients as compared 
with the general model. The own price effect for CUR, DEP, GD and LA are 
acceptable on the a priori grounds with the correct sign, where the own price 
coefficients on DEP, GD (and also CUR in the case of Model 1) were wrongly-signed 
in both general models. Noticeably, the own price effect of CUR becomes 
statistically highly significant with the I-ratio of 8.15 and 7.70 in Model 1 and 2 
respectively. The statistical improvement is also observed in LA: I-ratio from 0.23 to 
3.27 for Model 1 and from 0.20 to 4.73 for Model 2. 
ii) With respect to deposits, it is argued that in developing countries any positive 
link between real rates of interest and personal saving is empirically much less 
apparent to warrant a definitive statement (McKinnon, 1988). Fry (1995) however 
indicates that there tends to be an aggregation error in dependent variables (e.g. the 
inclusion of government savings), and it may well be the cause for the perverse results. 
In the case of our study, a positive relationship between the real deposit rates and the 
222 
holdings of deposits is found with a statistical significance, given a negative sign on 
the own price in DEP. This is consistent with the finding by Sen et al. (1996) in their 
flow of funds study for India. Further, the aggregation error is unlikely, since the 
deposits include time and demand deposits, disaggregated from other type of savings. 
iii) There is one positive on-diagonal price coefficient, that is, the own price effect 
on CS, implying that as the return on shares falls the household sector holds more 
company securities. This is not, however, implausible on the following reason. An 
increase in the rate of return means a fall in share prices, and if the household sector 
has extrapolative expectations and speculations in stock market, it increases the 
perception of risk in holding shares, hence the household disinvests itself of shares. 
iv) The non-price sensitive explanatory variables comply with our prediction for 
the sign on the coefficients (see Table 8.4). 
Parameter Stability 
Parameter stability of the model (see Table 8.10) is examined by the Chow test for the 
three period settings: 1) 1951-60 and 1961-93, 2) 1951-68 and 1969-93, and 3) 1951-
79 and 1980-93. For Model 1, 6 out of 15 test statistics exceed the critical values at a 
5 % significance level, but it is reduced to 3 out of 15 at a 1 % significance level. In 
the case of Model 2, 7 out of 15 share equations exhibit parameter instability at a 5% 
significance level, and 5 out of 15, at a 1 % significance level. Notably, LA tends to 
show the instability. 
Further Tests for the Long-Run Specific Model 
Table 8.11 presents tests for negativity, homogeneity, symmetry, weak separability and 
homotheiticy. The eigenvalues of the price parameters satisfy negative semi-definite, 
implying that the cost function is concave lO• With the specific model being taken as a 
null, 'Homogeneity', 'Symmetry given Homogeneity' and the 'Joint test for 
Homogeneity and Symmetry' are all comfortably accepted in the LR and the small 
sample-adjusted LR tests. This is contrasted with the results in the general model in 
10 One may argue that this conflicts with the finding of the positive own price effect on CS. But as we 
mentioned in the PCB sector in Chapter 6, if a price coefficient is numerically very small, it is possible 
that the sign between the coefficient and the eigenvalue (and also the price elasticity) is not the same. 
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Figure 8.1. These test results appear to support the hypotheses of axioms of rational 
choice in consumer demand theory embedded in the AIDS model. 
Weak separability with respect to bank rate and money market rate is not rejected, 
though homotheticity is rejected in both models. 
Table 8.10 Parameter stability tests for Model 1 and Model 2 
Chow Tests Model 1 Model 2 
1) 1951-60 and 1961-93 CUR 2.295 * 1.543 
DEP 2.821 * 2.220 
GD 1.507 0.306 
CS 0.183 1.746 
LA 1.743 4.010 * 
2) 1951-68 and 1969-93 CUR 0.505 0.640 
DEP 5.707 * 6.390 * 
GD 1.143 7.133 * 
CS 0.209 1.837 
LA 5.550 * 8.930 * 
3) 1951-79 and 1980-93 CUR 0.487 2.987 * 
DEP 3.045 * 2.732 * 
GD 0.711 0.555 
CS 0.797 1.720 
LA 4.020 * 3.500 * 
* SIgnIficant at the 5% level 
-Chow test Critical Values for F-test (d.f. : degree of freedom) 
Model 1 CUR DEP GD CS LA 
d.t: 9,25 7,29 8,27 8,27 7,29 
5%c.v. 2.28 2.33 2.31 2.31 2.33 
l%c.v. 3.22 3.30 3.24 3.24 3.30 
Model 2 CUR DEP GD CS LA 
d.f. 10,23 8,27 8,27 10,23 8,27 
5%c.v. 2.27 2.31 2.31 2.27 2.31 
l%c.v. 3.21 3.25 3.25 3.21 3.25 
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Table 8.11 Other tests for Modell and Model 2 
Eigenvalues CUR DEP GO CS 
Model 1 -2.164 -0.628 -1.055 -0.067 
Model 2 -2.006 -0.779 -1.085 -0.065 
Model 1 Model 2 
LR (no. of SSLR(no. of LR(no. of 
restrictions) restrictions) restrictions) 
Homogeneity 1.82 (4) 1.56 (4) 0.31(4) 
Symmetry 7.99 (4) 6.87 (4) 7.75 (4) 
(given Homogeneity) 
Joint test for Homogeneity 9.81 (8) 8.43 (8) 7.44 (8) 
and Symmetry 
Weak Separability 
Bank rate 2.79 (4) 2.34 (4) 1.43 (4) 
Money market rate 3.39 (4) 2.91 (4) 3.06 (4) 
Homotheticity 
Pi =O,i=l 55.76 (1) * 42.74 (1) * 
Pi = 0, i = 1,2,3 50.42 (3) * 
- * Slgmficant at a 5% level. 
- The specified Model 1 and 2 being taken as null. 
- Critical values: d.£ 3 = 7.82 (5%), 11.34 (1 %), d.£ 4 = 9.49 (5 %), 13.28 (1%), 
d.f. 8 = 15.5 (5%),20.09 (1%) 
- LR: Likelihood Ratio test 
- SSLR: Small sample-adjusted LR test 
LA 
-0.697 
-0.662 
SSLR(no. of 
restrictions) 
0.26 (4) 
6.51 (4) 
6.25 (8) 
1.17 (4) 
2.57 (4) 
37.37 (3) * 
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8.5 Inference 
8.5.1 Elasticities for Model 1 and Model 2 
The impact of interest rates, wealth and expenditure on the holding of assets derived 
from the mean value of shares is found in Tables 8.l2a and 8.l2b for elasticities and 
Tables 8.13a and 8.13b for actual holdings for Model 1 and Model 2 respectively. As 
in the case of parameters, the magnitude and the sign of the elasticites are broadly 
similar between the two models. The following comments common to both models are 
drawn from the tables (Note that RI (=the real interest rate for currency) is the inverse 
of the rate of inflation): 
i) The own-interest rate elasticities are larger than the respective cross interest 
rates for almost all asset holdings. In terms of actual holdings (in Tables 8.13a and 
8.13b) a similar argument applies. This is intuitively expected. 
ii) Currency appears to be the most sensitive asset to a relative change in the own 
and some cross interest rates. In particular, the own long-run interest elasticity 
suggests that a 1 % increase in RI (or a fall in the rate of inflation) induces domestic 
residents to increase the holding of CUR by 6.33 % for Model 1 and 5.87 % for Model 
2. This is anticipated in a developing economy, where the holding of currency is 
relatively high, due to the under-developed financial instruments and financial 
intermediaion. 
iii) It is observed in any of the four tables that a relative rise in RI leads investors 
to switch from DEP and GD to CUR, by contrast a relative increase in Rz (deposit 
rate) and R3 (government securities yields), from CUR to DEP and GD respectively. 
This constitutes a substitution effect between risk-free assets. In particular, the cross 
impact of RI on GD is the largest, (2.40 and 2.13 in Model 1 and 2 respectively), 
implying that as the rate of inflation increases (i.e. a lower RI)' the GD seems to offer 
the safest hedge against inflation 11. 
iv) Furthermore, a fall in the rate of inflation (i.e. an increase in RI) increases 
borrowing (given by negative effect on LA( -». This is counter-intuitive, as it falls, the 
11 Adam (1999) and Jenkins (1999) find a similar result in the portfolio study for Kenya and Zimbabwe 
respectively. 
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real cost of borrowing increases. However, to the extent that the household sector, 
which encompasses informal sector, borrows money for production purposes (as we 
discussed in Section 8.2), the lower level of inflation helps lower the risk attached in 
any additional investment, then the expansion of capital formation by loans is more 
likely to occur, when the rate of inflation is at a lower levell2. 
v) The CUR is more sensitive to R3 (indicating at -3.409 and -3.029 for Model 1 
and 2 respectively) than toR2 (-1.523 and -1.937) and Rs (-2.071 and -1.541), 
suggesting that government securities' yields may be an effective policy instrument in 
controlling the level of narrow money. 
vi) The positive own interest rate elasticity on the holdings of DEP and GD also 
indicates some policy implications, in particular, a relatively large magnitude of own-
interest rate elasticity in GD (2.174 and 2.235 for Model 1 and 2 respectively). In 
order to increase financial saving for private economic activities, real deposit rates 
should be positive, rather than being repressed, and the real government securities' 
yields may well be maintained at a lower level. (As we discussed in the banking 
sector, this is ironical as the financial reform envisaged market-related yields and this 
resulted in a rise in nominal government securities' yields.) 
vii) GD and CS are complimentary with respect to R3 and R4 as both elasticities 
are positive in both equations. It can be argued by Sen et al. (1996) that in India, 
government bonds are an attractive 'store of wealth' because of their assured returns, 
hence an increase in R3 could be leading to a substantial wealth effect, and this may be 
inducing households to invest in the relatively risky assets of company securities. On 
the other hand a rise in R4 (the rate of growth in share prices), hence a fall in share 
prices, increases the perception of the risk in holding shares, hence they diversify their 
risk by investing in 'safe' assets of government securities. 
viii) The holding of LA appears to be sensitive to changes in the own interest rate 
with elasticities being above unity. This is expected since the informal sector faces a 
high lending rate from the moneylender. Therefore, if the lending rate falls in the 
organised financial institutions, the demand for loans increases. The implication is that 
lending rates matter, even though credit rationing is prevalent in the household sector. 
12 In the presence of higher inflation, returns on capital are quite unpredictable (Perraudin, 1987, p.755). 
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ix) The wealth elasticity of DEP (1.197 for Model 1 and 1.211 for Model 2) 
exceeds that of CUR and is a 'luxury good', implying in the long run, any additional 
wealth is held primarily in DEP (and also GD in Model 2). 
x) With respect to the expenditure elasticity, currency has a positive sign. This 
supports the hypothesis of 'transaction demand for money' . 
Table 8.12a Model 1: Real interest rate, wealth and income elasticities 
RI R2 R3 R4 R5 Wealth Expenditu 
re 
1. CUR 6.333 -1.523 -3.409 0 -2.071 0.734 0.154 
2.DEP -1.131 1.365 0 -0.l31 0 1.197 0 
3.GD -2.400 0 2.174 0.022 -0.100 1 -0.149 
4. CS 0 -0.631 0.112 0.703 -0.607 1 0.207 
5. LA -1.850 0 -0.127 -0.151 1.824 1 0 
Table 8.12b Model2: Real interest rate, wealth and expenditure elasticities 
RI R2 R3 R4 R5 Wealth Expenditu 
re 
1. CUR 5.873 -1.937 -3.029 0 -1.541 0.615 0.132 
2.DEP -1.439 1.691 0 -0.091 0 1.211 0 
3.GD -2.l33 0 2.235 0.032 0 1.103 -0.164 
4. CS 0 -0.438 0.164 0.677 -0.701 0.831 0.180 
5. LA -1.377 0 0 -0.175 1.733 1 0.045 
(-) 
Notes for Tables 8.12a and 8.12b: 
- The interest rate elasticities imply the effect of a one percentage point change in the interest rate (R) on 
the percentage change in asset holdings, i.e. (!:!.a j / aj )* 1 00. 
- Wealth and income elasticities, i.e. [ (!:!.a j / aj)(!:!.ln(W' / P·')/ln(W' / p.r)r l land 
[ (!:!.a j / aj )(!:!.lnEXP /lnExpr l ] respectively. (BaIT and Cuthbertson, 1991c) 
- Zeros are imposed. For the wealth elasticity, the zero imposition on the coefficient implies a unitary 
elasticity by definition. 
- RI: the inverse of the rate of inflation 
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Table 8.13a Model 1: Long-run Impact of Asset Holdings (Rs.Crore) 
RI R2 R3 R4 R5 Mean 
Value 
1. CUR 887.5 -213.4 -477.7 0 -290.1 14013.5 
2. DEP -454.3 548.1 0 -52.5 0 40162.5 
3.GD -873.6 0 791.1 8.0 -36.4 36392.7 
4. CS 0 -54.5 9.7 60.7 -52.4 8636.3 
5. LA -458.8 0 -31.4 -37.5 452.2 -24797.4 
(-) 
Table 8.13b Model2: Long-run Impact of Asset Holdings (Rs.Crore) 
RI R2 R3 R4 R5 Mean 
Value 
1. CUR 823.0 -271.5 -424.5 0 -108.8 14013.5 
2.DEP -577.9 679.5 0 -36.5 0 40162.5 
3.GD -776.4 0 813.5 11.7 0 36392.7 
4. CS 0 -37.8 14.1 58.4 5.5 8636.3 
5. LA -341.5 0 0 -43.4 429.6 24797.4 
(-) 
Notes for Tables 8.13a and 8.13b: 
- R = Interest rate, Rs.crore= 1 0 million rupees. 
- Zeros are imposed. 
- This shows the effect of a one percentage point change in the rate of return on the holdings of the 
assets, using the mean value of stocks for the sample period 1951-93. 
- RI: the inverse of the rate of inflation 
xi) In India it is argued that consumption is exclusively financed by own income; 
purchases of consumer durables by means of bank credit are still relatively 
insignificant. This is reflected in that the impact of expenditure on LA is very small 
(with the elasticity of 0 for Model! and 0.045 for Model 2). 
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8.5.2 Dummy and Exchange Rate Variables 
Refer to Tables 8.7a and 8.7b for the coefficients on the dummy variables and Table 
8.7b for the exchange rate coefficient. The salient common features for Models 1 and 
2 are as follows: 
i) The effect of dummy 69 appears to reflect the portfolio behaviour in two ways 
for the heterogenous household sector. With respect to non-corporate enterprises in 
this sector, the significant negative impact on LA( -) implies that they increase 
borrowing, as the credit rationing in favour of the priority sectors (or informal sector) 
increases, and this is consistent with the experience that India has had since 1969. 
Meanwhile, the wealthy popUlation sector with a financial surplus increases DEP and 
GD, because in general credit rationing would push up interest rates. 
ii) The dummy 90 on CS is statistically significant, indicating an increase in 
investing in CS as the equity market, in particular mutual and unit trust funds, has 
developed in the post-reform period. This appears to be consistent throughout all 
sectors in India. 
iii) The effect of dummy 90 on LA( -) is positive, and this means a fall in 
borrowing. This could be due to the contraction of bank: lending towards the private 
sector in the post-reform period. There is another argument to support this result. 
Recall that LA(-) is 'Borrowing deducted corporate bonds and debentures' (in Table 
8.1). Therefore the positive dummy effect also implies an increase in the holdings of 
bonds and debentures. It is conceivable that the development of these capital market 
products since the early 1990's stimulated the holding of LA on the asset side in the 
household sector. 
iv) The household sector-specific influence of financial liberalisation is also 
observed through dummy 90. The positive sign on CUR and the negative sign on DEP 
are in line with the finding by Sen and Vaidya (1997) who studied the demand for 
money in India for the sample period 1955-93, using the dummy variable for 1991-93. 
From the result, they argue that, i) there has been little change in payments technology 
(even credit cards or ATMsl3 are not commonly used), therefore it is hardly surprising 
that the dummy variable is positive on the demand for narrow money, on the other 
13 Automated Teller Machines. 
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hand ii) there has been a proliferation of new assets that are close to time deposits, 
particularly since 1991; this seems to have led to a negative impact of the dummy on 
deposits. The former is associated with the stability in narrow money, whereas the 
latter, the instability in broad money. It appears that the financial liberalisation process 
has developed the property of the demand for money as a store of wealth, rather than 
as a medium of exchange for India (Sen and Vaidya, 1997). 
v) The real exchange rate in Model 2 appears to be a valid explanatory variable in 
the share equations. The statistically significant positive sign in CUR complies with 
the view; that the depreciation of the domestic currency increases the value of foreign 
currencies held by domestic residents; and that this in turn increases the demand for 
domestic currency, through the conversion from foreign money to domestic money or 
the perception of the increase in wealth (Weliwita and Ekanayake, 1998). 
vi) With respect to other assets, the depreciation induces the domestic agents to 
hold more of CS and LA as an asset as indicated by the positive sign, whereas less of 
DEP and GD by the negative signs. This is probably due to the fact that the 
improvement of price competitiveness in domestic products attracts investors to invest 
in the industrial sectorl4• 
8.6 Comparison with Other Empirical Evidence for Developing Economies 
The long-run elasticities derived from Models 1 and 2 can be compared with the 
studies of money demand in other developing economies. Table 8.14 shows the 
summary of selected empirical works in an aggregated single equation framework 15, 
except the study of Adam (1999) and the models developed here. The latter is based 
on a system of equations, and narrow money (MO) is approximated by CUR and broad 
money (M3), the total of CUR and DEPI6. 
14 It is assumed that the Marshall-Lemer condition holds, that is, the total price elasticities of demand for 
exports and imports are larger than unity. 
IS Evidence of cointegration in the money function is found in almost all these empirical works by either 
the Engle-Granger or the lohansen test. 
16 In India, Ml = currency + demand deposit, M2 = Ml + post office saving and M3 = Ml + time 
deposit (Datt and Sundharam, 2000). 
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Unitary value of long-run income elasticityl7 is supported for Congo, Mauritius, 
Tunisia (Simmons, 1992), Pakistan (Ariza, 1994) and India (Arrau et al.,1995). Some 
countries exhibit much higher than unitary income elasticities, in particular a value of 
3.26 in Bangladesh for broad money (Siddiki, 1984). For these countries money is a 
luxury good, and such values are not unexpected in a developing country (Simmons, 
1992): the long-run income elasticity greater than unity suggests that the demand for 
money is expected to rise at a faster rate than does income, due to limited opportunities 
to economize the cash balances, and little availability of other financial assets in 
developing countries. Simmons hypothesizes that as financial development proceeds, 
with greater availability of alternative financial assets as a substitute for money, the 
long-run income elasticity should fall towards unity or below as is the case in 
developed countries. The economies of scale in money holdings are then to emerge. 
In the case of our Models 1 and 2, the income elasticity for MO is less than but close to 
unity, whereas the income elasticity for M3 is above unity. In this respect, the 
financial development may be moderate in India over the sample period. 
For some African developing counties (Simmons, 1992) and Singapore (Arize, 1994), 
an inflation impact is insignificant (the sign / implies that the coefficients are 
statistically insignificant). This provides limited support for the role of expected 
inflation as an opportunity-cost variable. On the other hand, a strong inflation impact 
is found for Korea for M2 (-9.15) and Pakistan for Ml (-5.48) and M2 (-7.88) in the 
study of Arize, implying that real assets are the principle substitute for money. In the 
context of our models, large inflation elasticities are found, -6.33 and -5.87 for MO, but 
they are accompanied by a significant interest rate impact. Hence, unlike in the case of 
Pakistan, not only real assets but also other financial assets are substitutes for money in 
India. The role of the substitution effect in real assets has been possibly diminishing 
over time as financial development proceeds in India. This is shown in the small 
magnitude of the inflation effect on money in the study of Sen and Vaidya (1997) for 
India (-0.29 for Ml), in which the sample period (1980-94) starts much later than that 
of our model. 
17 Unity income elasticity is typically found in traditional demand functions (e.g. Chow, 1966 and 
Laidler, 1966). 
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Table 8.14 Summary of the Selected Study of the demand for money for the developing 
economies 
Country Period Money Income Inflation Interest rate 
Model I India 1951-93 MO 0.88 * -6.33 -1.52 (real) 
" 
M3 1.12 * - 0.74 0.64 (real) 
Model 2 India 1951-93 MO 0.75 * - 5.87 -1.94 (real) 
" 
M3 1.10* - 0.39 0.78 (real) 
Siddiki Bangladesh 1975- 95 M3 3.26 -0.088 
(1984) Per capita 
income 
Arestis and Cyprus 1963-88 Ml 0.90 -0.72 0.24 
Demetriades Consumption 
(1991) 
" 
M3 0.89 -0.66 0.23 
Consum~tion 
Simmons Congo 1972- 88 Ml 1.00 / 
(1992) 
Cote d'lvoire 
" 
Ml 1.49 / -0.36 
(discount 
rate) 
Mauritius 
" 
Ml 1.00 / -0.89 
Morocco 
" 
Ml 1.43 -0.13 -0.3 
Tunisia 
" 
Ml 1.00 / 
Arize Korea 1973: 1 to Ml 0.57 / -0.034 ** 
(1994) 1990: 1 
" 
M2 1.16 -9.15 / 
Pakistan 
" 
Ml 1.03 -5.48 / 
" 
M2 0.77 -7.88 / 
Singapore Ml 0.71 / -0.11 *** 
" 
M2 1.12 / -0.03 *** 
" 
Huang China 1979: 1 to M2 2.12 1.56 -0.29 
(1994) 1990:4 (GNP) 
Arrau et al. India 1971:1 to Ml 0.59 -2.53 
(1995) 1988:3 Industrial 
Production 
India (with 
" 
Ml 1.00 -2.83 
time trend) Industrial 
Production 
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Country Period Money Income Inflation Interest rate 
Lee and Korea 1973:1 to Ml 0.37 -0.64 
Chung 1990:4 (GNP) (curb market 
(1995) rate) 
" 
M2 0.60 -0.85 
( " ) 
Chowdhury Thailand 1974:2 to Ml 0.91 -1.57 
(1997) 1993:3 
" 
M2 1.29 -0.89 
Sen and India 1980-94 Ml 0.16 -0.29 -3.16 
Vaidya 
(1997) 
" 
M3 0.22 -0.34 / 
Weliwita and Sri Lanka 1978:1 to Ml 0.427 -0.194 
Ekanayake 1994:1 
(1998) 
" 
M2 0.768 -0.71 
Pradhan and India 1960-93 Ml 1.14 -0.16 
Subramanian 
(1999) 
" 
M3 2.00 -0.40 
Adam (1999) Kenya 1973: 1 to MO 0.70 -2.43 - 5.27 
1996:4 
" M3 1.77 -1.60 12.72 
lenkins Zimbabwe 1976:1 to MO 0.88 -3.50 
(1999) 1997:4 (GOY) (real) 
M2 0.78 -2.45 
-0.65 **** 
(GOY) 
1. Annual data are mdlcated by year only, whereas quarterly data are mdlcated by year and quarter for the 
sample period. 
2. No entry means that the variables are not specified in the model, whereas the sign / implies that the 
variables are specified in the model, but deleted from the model due to statistically insignificant 
coefficients. 
3. As a proxy for income, real GOP is used, unless otherwise noted. GOY=gross domestic income. 
4. For interest rates, nominal deposit rates are used, unless otherwise noted. 
5. For M3 ofMode11, Model 2 and Adam, elasticities are means (weighted by the share of mean values) 
of CUR and OEP. 
* The total of wealth and expenditure elasticities (BaIT and Cuthbertson, 1991a, p.864). 
** Average of corporate bond yields, lending rate and deposit rate 
*** Average of call money rate and three months fixed deposit rate 
**** Spread between deposit rates and Treasury Bills rate 
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The interest rate elasticities of -1.52 and -1.94 for Model 1 and 2 respectively for MO 
are relatively high. However, such high interest rate elasticities are also found in the 
study of Arrau et al. (1995) and Sen and Vaidya (1997) for India for narrow money 
(from around 2.5 to 3.0). Further, in the study for Kenya (Adam, 1999) and Zimbabwe 
(Jenkins, 1999), the interest rate elasticities are also very high. For these countries, the 
change in interest rate structure may exert a substantial effect in demand for money. 
For other developing countries, the interest rate elasticity is well below unity. 
8.7 Conclusion 
The portfolio behaviour for the household sector is estimated for the closed and open 
economy models. The finding of analogous results in both long-run models gives 
some confidence in the robustness ofthe estimates. 
From the study, two main policy implications are drawn: First, given a strong 
influence of interest rates on the portfolio behaviour, the financial sector reform on 
interest rate structure proves to exert significant impact on the financial saving, loans 
and demand for money in India. The finding of a relatively strong sensitivity to the 
lending rate on borrowing in this sector implies that the there is scope for government 
policy to increase the funds toward the informal sector from the organised financial 
institutions. Second, the evidence of the significant exchange rate effect on the share 
equations in Model 2 may raise concerns about the closed-economy focus on money 
demand even in India, which was dominated by strict exchange controls; the monetary 
authorities should consider the response of domestic money demand to the foreign 
factor in formulating monetary policy. 
The current study sheds light on modelling demand for money as an integral part of a 
flow of funds model for a developing economy. It presents portfolio opportunities in a 
rigorous fashion as compared with the single equation study, particularly, the inflation 
effect on demand for money is interpreted not only as a move from money into goods, 
but as a switch into an array of financial assets. This approach provides wider scope in 
assessing the substitution effect among financial assets. Yet, the brief survey 
conducted here reveals that the size of the overall elasticities for money in Models 1 
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and 2 is not significantly different from that in other studies for developing economies 
in a single equation framework. 
Finally, with the exchange rate being a valid explanatory variable we choose to utilise 
the specific Model 2 for the simulation experiments. 
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Appendix 8.1 
Empirical Trials 
The following test runs are conducted for the long-run model with the restriction of 
symmetry and homogeneity, including dummy 69 and dummy 90. 
1. In the work of Arrau, Gregorio, Reinhard and Wickkham (1995), a time trend is 
used as a proxy for financial innovation, assuming that the innovation has a 
permanent effect on the demand for money (see also Jenkins, 1999). The financial 
innovation captures the improvements in the financial sector's ability to provide 
liquidity services that are alternatives to currency and demand deposits. Arize 
(1989) also employed a time trend, postulating that technological improvements 
will reduce over time the real cost of transactions in the management of money 
balances. Barr and Cuthberston (1991a) used a time trend to model the 'learning 
period' associated with a rapid growth in the interest bearing element of demand 
deposits. In order to test for the possibility that the trend may have been omitted 
from the equations, a simple time trend is included in the system. In the test run, 
the negative significant time trend that is consistent with the arguments, but the 
incorrect positive sign on the own price coefficient is found in the currency 
equationl8. It seems that the former is obtained at the expense of the perverse 
outcome of the latter, hence a time trend is not considered in the model 
specification. 
2. In order to capture the transactions demand for money, Y (GDP) and EXP 
(consumption) are tested, and the EXP was chosen since this supported the 
transaction demand hypothesis. Since lnEXP (= log of constant price 
consumption) yields the better estimates than In(EXPIW) (= log of constant price 
consumption deflated by each sector's wealth) in general terms, it is maintained as 
an explanatory variable in the model. 
3. There is a motive to incorporate a wage variable in the model. As an extention of 
Baumol's (1952) optimal cost minimising transaction demand for money, Dowd 
18 Sen et al. (1996) also found the negative trend on the share of currency equation for the household 
sector in India. 
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(1990) advocates wages as a component of brokerage costs19. In addition, a 
significant part of the wages and salaries in India are paid in cash (Bhattachavya 
and Joshi, 2001), indicating the relevance of wages in the demand for narrow 
money. Wages are, however, very likely to cause muIticollinearity in relation to 
the AIDS wealth and expenditure, as they depend on wages. In addition, if the 
cost-push (wage-push) cause of inflation is strong in India, then the wage and 
inflation variables would also exhibit some form of muIticollinearity. It is 
therefore plausible to postulate that the wage effect is subsumed in the AIDS 
wealth, expenditure or inflation variables. 
When the wage is replaced for the expenditure lnEXP, statistically significant wage 
coefficients are obtained, but in this case the transactions motive for holding 
money is rejected, and the other variables are poorly-determined. 
19 Dowd argued in his paper 'Shopping Time Model' that true brokerage costs may vary with the real 
wage, i.e. the brokerage cost includes not only fee but also time and inconvenience, hence wages and 
money holdings are hypothesized to have a positive relationship. 
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Appendix 8.2 
Perron's Unit Root test 
Perron's Model (C) DF Perron's Model (C) ADF 
k=O Level k=2 Level 
Household Dummy p t· From Dummy p t. From 
Sector p Table p Table 
8.5 8.5 
SI (CUR) 0 -0.283 2.375 N 0 -0.220 1.584 N 
S2 (DEP) 1 -0.006 0.159 N 1 -0.037 0.683 N 
S3 (GD) 1 -0.271 2.515 R 2 -0.512 4.345 * N 
S4 (CS) 0 -0.027 0.444 N 0 -0.084 1.176 N 
S5 (LA) 0 0.003 0.029 N 1 -0.l34 0.747 N 
lnp; (PCUR) 0 -0.799 4.837 * R 0 -1.432 4.067 R 
lnp~ (PDEP) 0 -0.796 4.149 R 0 -1.168 3.540 R 
lnp; (PGD) 0 -0.810 4.927 * R 1 -1.142 4.091 N 
lnp~ (PCS) 0 -0.984 4.301 * R 0 -1.339 3.427 N 
lnp~ (PLA) 0 -0.741 3.909 R 0 -0.997 3.129 N 
In(WT 1 pOT) 2 -0.629 4.235 * N 2 -0.790 3.849 N 
InEXP 0 -0.757 4.678 * N 1 -1.331 4.853 * N 
InREXC 1 -0.477 3.186 N 0 -0.319 1.423 N 
- * Significant at a 5% level, N= null of unit root is not rejected at a 5% significance level, R= null of 
unit root is rejected at a 5% significance level. 
k 
- Model (C) : ~Yt = J..I + f3t + BDUt + rDr;* + ifJTBt + fJYt-1 + L 8i~Yt-i + et 
i=1 
- Null hypothesis: p = 0 and B = P = r = 0 
- Alternative hypothesis of a trend stationary process: p <0 and B, p, r "* 0 
- Dummy: The number of significant dummy coefficients out of B, P and r. 
- TB = 1969, T= 18, A= 18/43=0.44 
- Critical Valuefor t p : 4.21 (5%),4.85 (1 %)(Perron 1989, p.l377) 
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Chapter 9 A Flow of Funds Simulation Experiments in the 
Financial Sector for India: Policy Analysisl 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter uses simulation techniques to examme the effect of policy and real 
variables in the financial sector by utilising the long-run models estimated for all four 
sectors. As discussed in Chapter 3, the financial system in India, in common with 
other developing economies, tends to be characterised by a range of restrictions such 
as regulated interest rates, cash and liquid reserve requirements and controlled credits. 
Faced with such constraints, one of the principal concerns in policy analysis for 
economic development for a developing country is whether adequate funds are 
directed to economic activities, rather than remaining locked inside banking or 
government sectors by a captive market in credit allocation. The policy experiments 
'" 
are therefore expansionary with a view to delivering funds to sectors, which indulge in 
economic activities, thereby contributing to a nation's gross product. This, at the same 
time, refers to the importance of the cost of capital. The main strength of the current 
study is that both the cost of capital and loanable funds can be investigated 
simultaneously. 
There are three contributions in this chapter. First, it is associated with the scale of 
simulation for a developing economy. The policy simulation experiments are 
conducted with fifteen long-run models and five market clearing identities, constituting 
a system-wide model for a whole financial sector. A policy study has never been 
empirically conducted on this scale in the financial sector for a developing economy. 
Second, the simulated policy analysis conducted here is closely associated with the 
programme of the financial reforms, which were designed to mitigate constraints in the 
financial sector by lowering the reserve requirements, removing interest rate 
restrictions, introducing market-determined government securities' yields; clear 
understanding of the policy effects is of significant importance to re-design the 
1 This chapter is a revised version of the paper by Moore et al. (2002c) presented at the Finance and 
Development conference, Manchester in April, 2002. 
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financial reform programme. Third, the simultaneous solutions for endogenous 
variables by combining all the long-run models give estimates of the impact of 
interactions among the portfolio behaviour of the different sectors, which are not 
captured in a single sector study. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 9.2, the theoretical flow of funds 
model in the financial sector is reviewed, followed by behavioural equations and 
market clearing identities. In Section 9.3, the evaluation of the tracking performance 
of the historical simulation is fully conducted in this section. In Section 9.4, 
expansionary simulation experiments are implemented to see the impact of changes in 
monetary policy instruments, interest rates and real variables on the financial sector. 
In Section 9.5, the contractionary effect by reversing the simulated policy shocks is 
examined. This is a digression from our main objective, yet it provides an interesting 
perspective in terms of the magnitude of policy effects. Summary and concluding 
remarks are found in Section 9.6. 
This chapter involves a relatively large number of symbols. Table 9.1 lists the 
notations, starting with the financial instruments, then the sector variables, prices, 
interest rates and market clearing variables. This notation also apply to subsequent 
simulation chapters, Chapters 10 and 11. 
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Table 9.1 Notation for Chapter 9 
CUR Currency 
ER Excess reserves 
GD Government debt 
CS Company securities 
LA Loans and advances 
B Banking Sector 
BW Wealth in the Banking sector 
BER Share or holding of excess reserves in B 
BGD Share or holding of government debt in B 
BCS Share or holding of company securities in B 
BLA Share or holding of loans and advances in B 
PCB Private corporate business sector 
PCBW Wealth in the PCB sector 
PCBCS Share or holding of company securities in PCB 
PCBLA Share or holding of loans and advances in PCB 
PCBDEP Share or holding of deposits in PCB 
OFI Other financial institutions sector 
OFIW Wealth in the OFI sector 
OFIGD Share or holding of government debt in OFI 
OFICS Share or holding of company securities in OFI 
OFILA Share or holding of loans and advances in OFI 
H Household sector 
HW Wealth in the household sector 
HCUR Share or holding of currency in H 
HDEP Share or holding of deposits in H 
HGD Share or holding of government debt in H 
HCS Share or holding of company securities in H 
HLA Share or holding of loans and advances in H 
PCUR Price of Currency (Rate ofIntlation) 
PER Price of Excess reserves (Bank rate) 
PDEP Price of Deposits (Deposits rate) 
PGD Price of Government Debt (Government Securities Yields) 
PCS Price of Company Securities (Return on shares) 
PLA Price of Loans and Advances (Lending rate) 
RS Return on Shares (the rate of growth in share prices) 
GSY Government securities yields 
LR Lending rate 
DR Deposit rate (relevant to Chapter lO) 
GER Bank excess reserves at the RBI 
DEP Total deposit liabilities at commercial banks, cooperative banks and credit societies and 
OFIs 
GGD Total government debt 
SI Government debt endogenous in the government debt market 
S2 Government securities yields endogenous in the government debt market 
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9.2 Theoretical Flow of Funds Model, Behavioural Equations and Market 
Clearing Conditions 
9.2.1 Theoretical Flow of Funds Model 
Table 9.2 presents the simplified theoretical flow of funds model in the financial sector 
for India based on Table 4.1 in Chapter 4. 
Table 9.2 Theoretical flow of funds model in the financial sector for India 
Gov't Bank OFI PCB House- Endogenous 
(G) (B) hold (H) Variables 
CUR -GCUR +HCURO =0 
ER -GER +BERO =0 GER 
DEP -BDEP +PCBDEPO +HDEPO =0 DEP 
GD -GGD +BGD (-) +OFIGD(·) +HGDO =0 GGDorPGD 
CS +BCS (-) -OFICSO -PCBCSO +HCS 0 =0 PCS 
LA +BLAO +OFILA(·) -PCBLAO -HLA 0 =0 PLA 
Net 
-
0 0 
-
+ =0 
Worth 
.. CUR=Currency, ER=Excess reserves, DEP=Deposlt, GD=Government debt, CS=Company sec unties, 
LA=Loans and advances 
- (-) marked: behavioural equations 
- Negative sign implies liability. 
- RBI is consolidated into the government sector. 
- Cooperative banks and credit societies and the foreign sector are treated as exogenous. 
- Negligible components of the assets are treated as exogenous and ignored in the table. 
- Provident funds market is consolidated into government debt market. 
- Required reserves are excluded since it does not involve a behavioural equation. 
In the system-wide model, there are assumed to be six financial markets in India, 
which are endogenously determined, namely; Currency (CUR), Excess reserves (ER), 
Deposits (DEP), Government debt (GD), Company securities (CS) and Loans and 
advances (LA). The six markets provide five independent market-clearing conditions, 
hence the five endogenous variables are obtained by simultaneous solution (Backus, 
Brainard, Smith and Tobin, 1980 and Green 1984). Since the nominal interest rate of 
CUR is zero, the currency market is postulated to be the sixth market, i.e. the market 
clearing condition in the CUR market is excluded from the simulation. 
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9.2.2 The Behavioural Equations 
The preferred long-run models for the four sectors of Banking, PCB, OFIs and 
Household sectors are reproduced in Table 9.3. The sign in the PCB is reversed from 
the original presentation in Table 6.6a of Chapter 6, as this sector is a deficit sector. 
Since, we faced the difficulty in solving for the price of company securities (PCS) in 
the market solution (it will be discussed in detail in the next section), in order to avoid 
bias in simulation results, we derived another set of behavioural equations that are 
standard-error adjusted: the original behavioural equations (Original, hereafter) are 
supplemented by the standard error-adjusted behavioural equations (SE-adjusted, 
hereafter). The SE-adjusted equations are constructed by augmenting the coefficient 
of pes in a CS equation in each sector by twice the standard errors, i.e. to the size of 
the confidence interval suggested by the long-run estimates. In order to maintain the 
homogeneity and symmetry constraints for the CS equation, the equivalent of 2SE is 
deducted equally from the surrounding cross price coefficients. See Appendix 9.1 for 
the detailed derivation. 
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Table 9.3 The long-run models of the four sectors for the simulation experiments (reproduced) 
Bank lnp; lnp; lnp; lnp; Constant In(W' / pO,) In (YITfJ CRR SLR Dummy R2 Standard 
Model 2 (PER) (POD) (PCS) (PLA) 90 Error 
1. BER -0.38 * 0.3670 0.0031 0.0099 0.134 -0.0178 -0.0382 0.0083 0 -0.0600 80.3% 0.0126 
(2.05) (0.17) (0.06) (1.18) (1.37) (1.31) (7.24) (4.02) 
2. BOD -1.0866 0.0083 0.7113 0.8109 -0.0526 -0.1188 0 -0.0029 0.0634 59.3% 0.0255 
(4.11) (0.32) (2.34) (2.47) (1.44) (1.51) (1.26) (3.54) 
3. BCS -0.0245 0.0131 -0.0298 0.0006 -0.0059 0 0.0037 0 93.3% 0.0083 
(3.08) (0.46) (0.47) (0.08) (0.38) (6.78) 
4. BLA -0.7343 0.0849 0.0698 0.1629 -0.0083 -0.0008 -0.0035 86.6% 0.0339 
(1.77) (0.22) (1.57) (1.67) (7.24) (0.34) (0.20) 
PCB lnp; lnp; lnp; Constant In(W' / pO,) In (YITfJ SLR Dummy Dummy R2 Standard 
Modell 69 90 Error (PCS) (PLA) (PDEP) 
1. PCBCS (-) -0.1239 1.3074 -1.5956 1.9298 -0.2215 -0.7186 0.024 0.037 -0.105 97.56 % 0.0392 
(2.27) (2.19) (2.66) (2.45) (2.29) (5.47) (4.52) (1.24) (3.22) 
2. PCBLA (-) 0.1239 -1.3074 1.5406 -2.3519 0.1597 0.5539 -0.0237 -0.0366 0.0720 97.16 % 0.0400 
(2.27) (2.19) (2.57) (2.98) (1.65) (4.12) (4.52) (1.24) (2.18) 
3.PCBDEP 0 0 0.0550 -0.5780 0.0618 0.1647 0 0 0.0331 67.58 % 0.0177 
(1.11 ) (4.0) (4.76) (6.57) (2.94) 
OFI lnp; lnp; lnp; Constant In(W' / pO, In(YITfJ Dummy Dummy R2 Standard 
Net 69 90 Error (POD) (PCS) (PLA) 
1. OFIGD -2.9578 0.0772 2.8806 2.0329 -0.1425 -0.3359 0.0589 -0.0676 36.92% 0.0528 
(9.43) (1.35) (8.89) (6.94) (3.73) (4.92) (1.95) (1.84) 
2. OFICS (-) 0.0862 -0.1634 0.1657 -0.0462 0 0.0898 -0.1179 65.24% 0.0399 
(2.00) (1.69) (3.11) (3.32) (4.25) (4.38) 
3.0FILA -2.717 -1.1985 0.1886 0.3359 -0.1487 0.1855 32.80% 0.0895 
(7.44) (3.88) (4.12) (4.92) (3.05) (3.03) 
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Household lnp; lnp; lnp; lnp; lnp~ Constant In(W' / p" lnEXP InREXC Dummy Dummy Model 2 (PCUR) (PDEP) (PGD) (PCS) (PLA) 69 90 
1. HCUR -1.8786 0.5764 0.9063 0 0.3959 0.3932 -0.l316 0.0449 0.1715 -0.0591 0.0235 
(7.70) (2.24) (2.88) (4.08) (2.00) (10.81) (2.22) (5.12) (4.96) (1.54) 
2.HDEP -0.5831 0 0.006632 0 -0.0042 0.0975 0 -0.0723 0.1l30 -0.l392 
(2.24) (0.24) (0.05) (6.12) (1.67) (5.95) (4.99) 
3.HGD -0.8489 -0.0573 0 1.4103 0.0502 -0.0795 -0.2093 0.0391 0 
(2.69) (2.48) (6.21) (2.48) (3.17) (5.57) (2.57) 
4.HCS 0.0203 0.0304 -0.1729 -0.0160 0.0172 0.0865 -0.0316 0.0273 
(1.99) (1.63) (2.19) (2.29) (1.97) (5.56) (6.11) (4.17) 
5.HLA(-) -0.4263 -0.6264 0 0.0174 0.0236 -0.0615 0.0885 
(4.73) (6.68) (1.83) (1.19) (10.55) (4.82) 
Household R2 Standard 
Model 2 Error 
1. HCUR 97.24% 0.0233 
2. HDEP 93.36% 0.0306 
3.HGD 55.86 % 0.0292 
4.HCS 80.18 % 0.0106 
5. HLA (-) 83.99 % 0.0150 
- t-ratlO In parenthesIs. 
- ( - ) : The assets are explained as liabilities. 
- Except PCB sector, homogeneity and symmetry are imposed. 
- 0 and -0.38 * is imposed. 
- For PCB sector, the sign is reversed from Table 6.6a in Chapter 6. 
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9.2.3 The Market Clearing Identities 
The five market clearing identities are as follows: the LHS indicates supply of an asset 
and the RHS implies demand for an asset. The negligible and unidentified components 
ofthe financial asset holdings are taken as exogenous supply (EXOGS) and exogenous 
demand (EXOGD). 
ER market GER=BER(·) 
DEP market DEP = PCBDEPO + HDEP(·) + EXOGD 
GD market GGD = BGDO + OFIGDO + HGDO + EXOGD 
CS market OFICSO + PCBCS(·) + EXOGS = BCS(·) + HCS(·) + EXOGD 
LA market PCBLAO + HLA(·) + EXOGS = BLA(·) + OFILA(·) + EXOGD 
Note: In GD market, PF (provident funds) are consolidated. Hence it can be expressed more precisely 
as given by : GGD = BGDO + OFIGD(·) + HGDO + HPF(·) - OFIPF + EXOGD 
where OFIPF=the holding of the provident funds in the OFIs sector as a liability, HPF=the holding of 
the provident funds in the Household sector as an asset. OFIPF is determined as part of the consolidated 
behavioural equation of HGD + HPF in the household sector, and the majority of OFIPF is invested as 
OFIGD to the government sector, hence OFIPF needs to be deducted from RHS. (See Table 4.1, 
Chapter 4) 
The first two market clearing identities determine the holdings of the excess reserves 
(GER) in the RBI, and the holdings of the deposits (DEP) in the commercial banks, co-
operative banks and credit societies and OFIs. GER and DEP are assumed to be in 
infinitely elastic supply (Green, 1982). In the CS and LA markets, the prices of CS 
and LA are determined by market clearing identities, given supply-demand interaction 
of a full structural model2• With respect to the GD market, as mentioned in Chapter 3, 
before the financial reforms, the Indian government manipulated government 
securities' yields, hence the total government debt (GGD) is endogenous. However, 
when financial liberalisation started in the early nineties, the yields were more nearly 
market-determined, then the price of GD (PGD) is the one to clear the market. 
For this reason, simulation is conducted in two ways; in Simulation 1 (SI, hereafter), 
GGD is an endogenous variable and PGD is an exogenous variable, conversely in 
Simulation 2 (S2, hereafter), the PGD is an endogenous variable and GGD is an 
2 A similar approach was taken by Friedman (1977), Backus, Brainard, Smith and Tobin (1980) and 
Green (1982). 
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exogenous variable. The underlying hypothesis of the difference between SI and S2 is 
that controlled government securities' yields in SI may dampen the credit and stock 
markets by preventing, to some degree, the free movement of market-determined 
interest rates. In this respect, the changes in pes (or the return on shares) and PLA (or 
the lending rate) by policy shock in SI are hypothesised to be smaller than those in S2. 
9.3 Historical Simulation of the Behavioural Equations and the Solution of the 
Five Markets 
The historical simulation3 will enable us to examine how closely each endogenous 
variable tracks the historical data, and provide a way to evaluate the estimated model. 
9.3.1 Methodology 
An individual system of equations of four sectors (15 equations in Table 9.3) is 
combined to form a simultaneously determined system-wide model accompanied by 
the market clearing identity (5 identities). The Gauss-Seidel method was used to solve 
for the endogenous variables. Given a model of Ax=b, where A is a matrix of 
coefficients, x is the set of endogenous variables and b is a vector of exogenous 
elements. x is solved by inverting A, i.e.x = A-1b (Bahra, Green and Murinde, 1999). 
The historical simulation was conducted for all the endogenous variables for the 
historical period of 1951-52 to 1993-94. The simultaneously determined AIDS share 
equations in a system-wide model can be described in chain-like paths. Figure 9.1 
shows the solution in the case of regime S2 (PGD being endogenous in the GD 
market). 
3 By historical simulation, this means that the simulation is conducted over the sample period of the 
model. 
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Figure 9.1 The System-Wide Simultaneous Solution (Case: S2) 
- Exogenous variables 
(PCUR, PER, PDEP, W T , 
Policy variables and Dummies) 
-15 AIDS share equations 
- Price Endogenous variables 
(PCS, PLA, PGD and 
In(WT / pOT» 
Si =ai + I:rij Inp; + Pi In(W' / p.'), + L:"i.Z• 
j • 
-5 Market clearing identities 
- Share Endogenous variables 
( 15 shares of holding financial 
assets) 
- Asset Endogenous variables 
(GER and DEP) 
First, the actual time series for 1951-52 to 1993-94 are given for all the exogenous 
variables, but only initial values (i.e. base-year value of 1951-52) are specified for the 
endogenous variables. Then, given parameters in the AIDS share equations and the 
market clearing identities, the simultaneous solution will provide the simulated time 
series for the endogenous variables. The 15 AIDS share equations of holdings of 
financial assets, GER, DEP, PCS, PLA and PGD are all simultaneously determined. 
PCS, PLA and PGD are to be fed back into the AIDS share equations. In this context, 
we can investigate the property of the endogenous interest rates in two opposing 
directions in policy analysis: the effect of the endogenous interest rates on the flow of 
funds, and the effect of the supply of and demand for the funds on the endogenous 
interest rates. 
Note that the sector wealth (= WT) is exogenous, yet the AIDS wealth (= In(WT / pOT) 
is endogenous, since pOT is endogenous. In(WT / pOT) is therefore solved in 
simulation. 
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9.3.2 Evaluation of the Historical Simulation 
Root Mean Square Error and Theil's U 
Tracking performance of a historical simulation can be evaluated by the root mean 
square (RMS) error, mean simulation error and Theil's inequality coefficient (U) given 
by: (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991, p.338 and p.340): 
1 T 
RMS error = - L (St - At )2 
T t=1 
Mean simulation error = -.!.. I(St - A,) 
T t=1 
where 
St = simulated time series 
At = actual time series 
T = number of periods in the simulation 
(9.1) 
(9.2) 
(9.3) 
The RMS error is a measure of the deviation of a simulated variable from its actual 
values. It can therefore be compared with the standard errors of the estimated 
equation. It is argued that mean simulation errors are a meaningless measurement 
because they may be close to zero if positive and negative errors cancel each other out. 
It is, however, useful as an indication of systematic bias. The numerator of Theil' s U 
is exactly the same as the RMS error and the scaling of the denominator will normalise 
if. U can be decomposed into the proportion of bias (Um), variance (Uv) and 
covariance (Uc), hence Um + Uv + Uc = 1 (Theil, 1961, p.35). Um measures a system 
4 U always falls between zero and one (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991, p.340). 
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error and Uv indicates the ability of the simulated model to replicate the variation of 
the actual value. The implication is that the large values of Urn and Uv are troubling. 
The component of Uc measures unsystematic error. Pindyck and Rubinfeld indicate 
the ideal distribution of inequality over the three sources as Urn=Uv=O and Uc=l. 
Evaluation of the Historical Simulation by RMS and Theil's U 
Tables 9.4a (for SI) and 9.4b (for S2) present the tracking performance of the share of 
holding of financial assets based on Original, whereas Tables 9.4c (for SI) and 9.4d 
(for S2), based on SE-adjusted. Table 9.4e shows the tracking performance of the five 
market solutions for Original and SE-adjusted. RMS errors are scaled by the mean and 
standard deviation of the actual time series. 
Common to all the four tables (Table 9.4a-d) is that the result of Theil's U is quite 
satisfactory, except that of OFICS, being around or below 0.1. 
With respect to the performance of Original, all Urn are very small being below 0.03. 
This implies that in a system-wide model there is hardly bias in the simulated values, 
and this is also clear from the very small mean error (all less than 0.02). In terms of 
the fluctuation, Uv, in Original, Table 9.4a for SI indicates a modest fluctuation with 
all less than 0.17, whereas Table 9.4b for S2 shows a relatively large value of Uv for 
BCS, OFIGD and OFILA (0.36, 0.51 and 0.42 respectively), and this is mirrored in a 
relatively low value of Uc. 
With respect to the SE-adjusted, as compared with Original the magnitude of Uv is 
much more suppressed for both SI and S2; the largest is 0.16 in OFIGD of S2 in Table 
9.4d. However, in terms of Urn, PCBLA and OFILA for both SI and S2 tend to 
exhibit a large bias. 
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Table 9.4a Tracking Performance for the share of the financial assets in static simulations (SI: Original) 
Variables RMS error RMS error RMS error Mean Error Theil's U Urn Uv Uc 
% of mean %of S.D. 
BER 0.0122 38.99 42.66 0.0005 0.1511 0.0016 0.1153 0.8830 
BGD 0.0332 12.91 82.45 0.0021 0.0639 0.0043 0.0561 0.9394 
BCS 0.0148 21.03 45.90 -0.0015 0.0935 0.0114 0.1333 0.8551 
BLA 0.0351 5.48 59.69 -0.0011 0.0273 0.0010 0.1716 0.8274 
PCBCS 0.0673 18.68 26.48 0.0075 0.0762 0.0125 0.0755 0.9119 
PCBLA 0.0679 9.11 28.26 -0.0072 0.0430 0.0115 0.0838 0.9046 
PCBDEP 0.0156 14.80 49.54 -0.0002 0.0713 0.0002 0.0289 0.9708 
OFIGD 0.0595 9.11 92.17 0.0043 0.0454 0.0054 0.1231 0.8714 
OFICS 0.0558 97.89 81.52 0.0042 0.3715 0.0056 0.0710 0.9227 
OFILA 0.1046 30.33 96.77 -0.0085 0.1407 0.0067 0.1478 0.8455 
HCUR 0.0283 8.28 19.97 0.0013 0.0384 0.0023 0.0002 0.9974 
HDEP 0.0309 6.72 25.74 -0.0002 0.0326 0.0000 0.0168 0.9831 
HGD 0.0469 9.67 105.44 -0.0041 0.0479 0.0076 0.0002 0.9921 
HCS 0.0151 15.80 62.53 0.0014 0.0776 0.0095 0.0781 0.9123 
HLA 0.0673 17.60 177.48 0.0075 0.0762 0.0125 0.0755 0.9119 
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Table 9.4b Tracking Performance for the share of the financial assets in static simulations (S2: Original) 
Variables RMS error RMS error RMS error Mean Error Theil's U Urn Uv Uc 
% of mean % of S.D. 
BER 0.0096 30.68 33.57 0.0001 0.1148 0.0017 0.0040 0.9944 
BGD 0.0424 16.43 104.92 0.0034 0.0817 0.0073 0.0007 0.9919 
BCS 0.0153 21.74 47.45 -0.0024 0.0954 0.0234 0.3622 0.6144 
BLA 0.0376 5.87 63.95 -0.0011 0.0292 0.0019 0.1669 0.8311 
PCBCS 0.0849 23.56 33.40 0.0152 0.0961 0.0298 0.1134 0.8568 
PCBLA 0.0890 11.95 37.05 -0.0146 0.0560 0.0271 0.1313 0.8415 
PCBDEP 0.0151 14.33 47.95 -0.0006 0.0692 0.0015 0.0000 0.9983 
OFIGD 0.0718 10.99 111.22 0.0064 0.0542 0.0080 0.5121 0.4798 
OFICS 0.0628 110.18 91.75 0.0071 0.3960 0.0131 0.1354 0.8514 
OFILA 0.1247 36.16 115.37 -0.0136 0.1628 0.0119 0.4265 0.5615 
HCUR 0.0302 8.84 21.31 -0.0005 0.0408 0.0003 0.0006 0.9989 
HDEP 0.0308 6.69 25.66 -0.0000 0.0325 0.0000 0.0168 0.9831 
HGD 0.0418 8.61 93.98 -0.0050 0.0427 0.0145 0.0037 0.9817 
HCS 0.0180 18.89 74.74 0.0022 0.0931 0.0153 0.0121 0.9726 
HLA 0.0247 6.46 65.14 0.0032 0.0321 0.0172 0.0178 0.9648 
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Table 9.4c Tracking Performance for the share of the financial assets in static simulations (SI: SE adjusted) 
Variables RMS error RMS error RMS error Mean Error Theil's U Urn Uv Uc 
% of mean % of S.D. 
BER 0.0128 40.92 44.78 -0.0007 0.1551 0.0036 0.0845 0.9118 
BGD 0.0365 14.13 90.27 -0.0148 0.0680 0.1647 0.0480 0.7873 
BCS 0.0139 19.81 43.24 0.0044 0.0923 0.1037 0.0071 0.8891 
BLA 0.0372 5.82 63.35 -0.0053 0.0288 0.0205 0.1425 0.8369 
PCBCS 0.0554 15.38 21.81 -0.0236 0.0615 0.1819 0.0044 0.8136 
PCBLA 0.1117 14.99 46.48 0.0996 0.0759 0.7969 0.0014 0.2016 
PCBDEP 0.0162 15.36 51.42 0.0021 0.0733 0.0176 0.0645 0.9178 
OFIGD 0.0483 7.40 74.86 0.0321 0.0377 0.4439 0.0020 0.5539 
OFICS 0.0511 89.72 74.72 -0.0148 0.3584 0.0839 0.0114 0.9045 
OFILA 0.0901 26.13 83.37 0.0619 0.1360 0.4730 0.0015 0.5254 
HCUR 0.0274 8.01 19.30 -0.0004 0.0371 0.0002 0.0097 0.9900 
HDEP 0.0304 6.61 25.32 -0.0017 0.0319 0.0033 0.0205 0.9761 
HGD 0.0387 7.97 86.94 0.0172 0.0404 0.1980 0.1009 0.7010 
HCS 0.0140 14.69 58.16 -0.0046 0.0699 0.1109 0.0434 0.8456 
HLA 0.0170 4.46 44.93 0.0107 0.0218 0.3980 0.0115 0.5904 
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Table 9.4d Tracking Performance for the share of the financial assets in static simulations (S2: SE adjusted) 
Variables RMS error RMS error RMS error Mean Error Theil's U Urn Uv Uc 
% of mean % of S.D. 
BER 0.0108 34.54 37.79 0.0047 0.1334 0.1900 0.0000 0.8099 
BGD 0.0490 18.97 121.16 -0.0260 0.0893 0.2832 0.0002 0.7164 
BCS 0.0157 22.35 48.79 0.0082 0.1060 0.2736 0.0261 0.7002 
BLA 0.0391 6.11 66.49 -0.0031 0.0303 0.0063 0.1318 0.8618 
PCBCS 0.0805 22.34 31.68 -0.0447 0.0878 0.3093 0.0003 0.6902 
PCBLA 0.1391 18.67 57.90 0.1224 0.0959 0.7751 0.0006 0.2241 
PCBDEP 0.0154 14.65 49.04 0.0001 0.0704 0.0001 0.0292 0.9706 
OFIGD 0.0353 5.40 54.68 0.0098 0.0270 0.0785 0.1603 0.7611 
OFICS 0.0621 108.87 90.66 -0.0295 0.4052 0.2266 0.0362 0.7371 
OFILA 0.1205 34.94 111.48 0.0980 0.1885 0.6623 0.0308 0.3068 
HCUR 0.0334 9.78 23.58 0.0158 0.0462 0.2245 0.0031 0.7723 
HDEP 0.0306 6.65 25.48 0.0017 0.0321 0.0032 0.0203 0.9763 
HGD 0.0283 5.83 63.55 0.0103 0.0293 0.1328 0.1427 0.7244 
HCS 0.0182 19.11 75.66 -0.0090 0.0888 0.2441 0.0014 0.7544 
HLA 0.0141 3.68 37.13 0.0054 0.0181 0.1489 0.0103 0.8407 
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Table 9.4e Tracking Performance for the market solutions in static simulations 
Variables RMS error RMS error RMS error Mean Error Theil's U Urn Uv Uc 
% of mean %of S.D. 
SI: Original 
GER 1439.01 58.89 35.72 -117.46 0.1604 0.0066 0.0654 0.9279 
GGD 2860.77 6.12 3.66 706.63 0.0157 0.0610 0.1020 0.8369 
DEP 3799.15 7.14 4.33 475.17 0.0185 0.0169 0.2579 0.7251 
pes 0.5614 55.36 354.56 0.0652 0.2614 0.0135 0.6159 0.3706 
PLA 0.0178 1.77 25.91 0.0010 0.0091 0.0037 0.0054 0.9909 
S2: Original 
GER 1356.77 55.52 33.68 -9.98 0.1487 0.0000 0.0358 0.9641 
PGD 0.0249 2.46 36.04 -0.0015 0.0123 0.0036 0.0275 0.9687 
DEP 3725.51 6.99 4.25 500.70 0.0181 0.0180 0.2698 0.7121 
pes 0.6889 67.92 435.04 0.1003 0.3148 0.0211 0.6653 0.3135 
PLA 0.0241 2.38 34.88 -0.0004 0.0123 0.0004 0.0047 0.9948 
SI: SE ad.iusted 
GER 1787.97 73.17 44.38 35.67 0.1931 0.0003 0.0047 0.9948 
GGD 4823.99 10.33 6.18 -1395.29 0.0272 0.0836 0.4241 0.4921 
DEP 3416.24 6.42 3.90 480.54 0.0166 0.0197 0.2377 0.7425 
pes 0.3139 30.95 198.23 -0.1034 0.1439 0.1085 0.1781 0.7133 
PLA 0.0186 1.91 26.79 -0.0048 0.0094 0.0671 0.0136 0.9192 
S2: SE adjusted 
GER 1447.05 59.22 35.92 -176.77 0.1638 0.0149 0.1167 0.8683 
PGD 0.0275 2.72 39.81 0.0150 0.0136 0.2985 0.0202 0.6812 
DEP 3361.61 6.31 3.83 449.06 0.0163 0.0178 0.224 0.7581 
pes 0.3881 38.26 245.06 -0.1853 0.1708 0.2280 0.2125 0.5594 
PLA 0.0222 2.28 31.96 0.0038 0.0113 0.0298 0.0100 0.9600 
- GER, GGD and DEP in terms of Rs. crare for the RMS error. 
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Table 9.4e refers to the five market solutions. In Original, there appears to be 
difficulty in solving pes in both SI and S2, as indicated by relatively large values of 
RMS error % of S.D. and Theil's U. Further, although there is hardly a systematic 
error with the small Urn of pes, the variation of the simulated value against the actual 
value is quite large, with 0.61 (SI) and 0.66 (S2) of Uv. This is perhaps largely due to 
the excessive volatility in share prices in the Indian stock market. This, in solving pes 
in Original, has drastically improved in SE-adjusted, in which the RMS error, U and 
Uv all have substantially fallen for pes, in particular with 0.17 (SI) and 0.21 (S2) of 
Uv. 
Regarding the other market solutions, they are reasonably good in both Original and 
SE-adjusted. In particular, solving the PGD (derived from the government securities 
yields) and PLA (derived from the lending rate) are quite satisfactory. The results of 
the RMS error as reproduced below in Table 9.5 can be compared with the ones found 
by Green (1984), who has solved interest rates of Treasury Bill rate (TB) and loan rate 
(LR) in a dynamic system-wide flow of funds model for the UK during the period 
1972:2 to 1977:12. Although, the study of Green (1984) is qualitatively different from 
the current study, it is a useful scale to assess our results in some respects, since to the 
best of our knowledge there has been no study of this kind conducted for developing 
economIes. The table suggests that the performance in our study, in general, 
outperforms that of Green, except RMS error % of S.D. for PGD (counter-part of TB). 
Table 9.5 RMS error % of mean and S.D. of PLA and PGD 
RMS error Original SE-adjusted Oreen (1984) 
PLA PLA POD PLA PLA POD LR 
S I S2 S2 SI S2 S2 
% of mean 1.77 2.38 2.46 1.91 2.28 2.72 11.30 
%ofS.D. 25.91 34.88 36.04 26.79 31.96 39.81 44.31 
PLA: Real AIDS pnce for loans and advances, POD: Real AIDS prIce for government debt 
TB: Nominal Treasury Bill rate, LR: Nominal loan rate 
TB 
6.10 
24.34 
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Evaluation of the Historical Simulation in Graphs 
The historical simulations for the market clearing endogenous variables are shown in 
graphs as follows: 
Figure 9.2 a-e 
Figure 9.3 a-e 
Figure 9.4 a-e 
Figure 9.5 a-e 
where 
Historical tracking simulations: SI Original 
Historical tracking simulations: S2 Original 
Historical tracking simulations: SI SE-adjusted 
Historical tracking simulations: S2 SE-adjusted 
a GER (excess reserves) 
b DEP (deposits) 
c GGD or PGD (total government debt or price of government debt) 
d pes (price of company securities) 
e PLA (price of loans and advances) 
The actual and simulated series are plotted on the same set of axes. For the simulated 
values, oS' is added after notation of the actual values. This is one criterion to see how 
well the model simulates turning points in the data. 
The following is common to Original and SE-adjusted and also to SI and S2. For 
GER until the end of the eighties, there is relatively good tracking performance, but in 
the early nineties the simulated values somewhat diverge and fail to capture the sharp 
decline, which occurred in 1992. In the asset of DEP and GGD, the simulated values 
trace the mild curve of the actual values quite well. With respect to PLA and PGD, the 
simulated values are almost identical to actual values in terms of turning points and 
fluctuations. 
In the case of pes, there is a significant fluctuation in the simulated values in Original 
with the relatively large scale range of around 2.5 to -0.5 for both SI (Figure 9.2d) and 
S2 (Figure 9.3di. This is substantially suppressed in SE adjusted. See Figure 9.4d for 
SI and 9.5d for S2 with the smaller scale range of around 1.8 to 0.6. 
S Due to this large fluctuation in the simulated values in Original, there is a rationale to present SE-
adjusted to supplement Original. 
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Figure 9.2a GER in the Excess Reserve Market (Rs.crores): SI Original 
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Figure 9.2b DEP in the Deposit Market (Rs.crores): SI Original 
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Figure 9.2c GGD in the Government Debt Market (Rs.crores): SI Original 
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Figure 9.2d PCS in the Company Securities Market: SI Original 
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Figure 9.2e PLA in the Loans and Advances Market: SI Original 
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Figure 9.3a GER in the Excess Reserves Market (Rs.crore): 82 Original 
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Figure 9.3c PGD in the Government Debt Market: 82 Original 
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Figure 9.3d PCS in the Company Securities Market: S2 Original 
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Figure 9.3e PLA in the Loans and Advances Market: S2 Original 
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Figure 9.4a GER in the Excess Reserve Market (Rs. crores): SI SE-adjusted 
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Figure 9.4h DEP in the Deposit Market (Rs. crores): SI SE-adjusted 
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Figure 9.4c GGD in the Government Debt Market (Rs. crores): SI SE-adjusted 
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Figure 9.4d PCS in the Company Securities Market: SI SE-adjusted 
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Figure 9.4e PLA in the Loans and Advances Market: SI SE adjusted 
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Figure 9.5a GER in the Excess Reserves Market (Rs. crores): S2 SE-adjusted 
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Figure 9.5b DEP in the Deposit Market (Rs. crores): S2 SE-adjusted 
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Figure 9.5c PGD in the Government Debt Market: S2 SE-adjusted 
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Figure 9.Sd PCS in the Company Securities Market: S2 SE-adjusted 
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Figure 9.Se PLA in the Loans and Advances Market: S2 SE-adjusted 
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Overall Assessment 
There is some trade-off in terms of tracking performance between Original and SE-
adjusted in the share of holding financial assets, in that Original outperforms SE-
adjusted in terms of bias in the simulated values, whereas SE-adjusted outperfonns 
Original in tenns of fluctuation in the simulated values. In the market solution, SE-
adjusted improves the result of Original with respect to PCS; this is also demonstrated 
in the historical simulations in graphs. 
When SI is compared with S2, the overall results are similar. Yet, the fonner slightly 
outperforms the latter in its ability to track the historical movements, not surprisingly 
since PGD is endogenous in S2. This is in particular seen in PCS: the variation of the 
simulated value ofPCS is subdued in SI as compared with that of S2 (see Figure 9.2d 
for SI and 9.3d for S2 of Original, and Figure 9.4d for SI and 9.5d for S2 of SE-
adjusted). 
On balance, these simulation results are very good considering the fact that the 
estimated models are derived from data over a relatively long time span of 43 years for 
a developing economy. Furthermore, although no dynamic model is involved in 
simulation, there is little apparent loss of information6, and that this satisfactory result 
allows us to concentrate on long-run. We are therefore reasonably confident in 
performing policy experiments given Original and SE-adjusted. The latter is to play a 
supplementary role for the former. 
9.4 Policy Analyses by Simulation Experiments 
9.4.1 Imperfect Tracking Solution versus Perfect Tracking Solution 
So far, we have been dealing with an imperfect tracking solution, as the tracking 
solution for historical simulation is imperfect. As opposed to this, a perfect tracking 
solution is to solve the endogenous variables by incorporating all the residuals of the 
share equations into the simulation. By doing so, the simulated values in the historical 
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simulation perfectly track the actual time series. In simulation experiments, the perfect 
tracking solution technique, rather than imperfect tracking solution technique, is 
employed with the same Gauss-Seidel methodology for the following reason: In the 
preliminary results, comparing the residual-out (i.e. imperfect tracking) and residual-in 
(i.e. perfect tracking) solutions, the main results in the policy changes are similar and 
intuitively plausible, for example, a fall in CRR and Bank rate reduces excess reserves, 
a fall in government securities yields reduces the holding of government securities and 
a rise in the deposit rate increases deposits. However in the case of the residual-out 
solutions, there tend to be volatile responses to policy changes, especially, in the equity 
financing in the PCB sector. This makes the inference drawn from the results in the 
imperfect tracking solution very difficult. The residuals-in simulation appears to 
circumvent this drawback, since the overall policy effects are within a plausible range. 
Furthermore, arguing that the actual time series as being equilibrium, make it possible 
to isolate the policy effects more meaningfully in terms of implementing policy actions 
(Murinde and Rarawa, 1996), it is therefore plausible to concentrate on the perfect 
tracking solution technique in analysing the policy effece. 
9.4.2 Simulation Experiments for the Period of 1969-93 
The period for the experiments is chosen to be during 1969-93 for 25 years on the 
grounds that when 20 major commercial banks were nationalized in 1969, there was a 
large impact on sectors in their portfolio choices as indicated by the significant effect 
of dummy 69. 
The policy effects on endogenous variables in the simulation experiments can be given 
by 
(9.4) 
where 
6 It is argued that, in general, static models have rather poor tracking performance as compared with that 
of dynamic models. 
7 Murinde (1992) and Murinde and Rarawa (1996) included residuals in simulated policy experiments. 
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O;D = a mean for the period 1969-93 of the policy effect that a simulated change in 
exogenous variables has on the i'th endogenous variable 
D;base = a mean of the i'th endogenous variable for the period 1969-93 with a base set 
of exogenous variables 
Dtmu = a mean of the i'th endogenous variable for the period 1969-93 with a simulated 
change in exogenous variables 
The base run (i.e. D;base) is the same as the actual time series. The mean base run for 
the period 1969-93 is found in Appendix 9.2 (the AIDS prices are converted into the 
real interest rates). The simulated run (i.e. Dtmu) is conducted by changing a single 
policy or an exogenous variable at a time with all other exogenous variables unaltered 
(i.e. single-shot simulation), so that the new equilibrium of the endogenous variables is 
derived. The simulated run is equivalent of a one period-ahead forecast. The 
difference (O;D ) between the base run and the simulated run quantifies the effect of a 
policy shock. 
The simulation policy experiments are conducted with the view to examining the 
impact of policy on the release of loanable funds for private economic activities from 
the government and banking sectors, and on the cost of debt and equity capital. The 
shock from the real variables is also examined. The numerical magnitude in the 
experiments is all within a plausible range for the Indian authorities. We specifically 
conduct the following simulations: 
1. CRR 2 % reductions (CRR) 
2. Bank Rate 2 % reduction (Bank rate) 
3. SLR 2 % reduction (SLR) 
4(SI). Government Securities Yields 2 % reduction (GSY) 
4(S2). Open market purchase of government securities by 2 % (OMO) 
5. Deposit rate 2 % increase (Deposit)8 
6. Real devaluation by 10 % (Devaluation) 
7. Nominal GDP 10 % increase with a 8 % inflation rate 
8 A rise in deposit rates is assumed to increase loanable funds in the banking sector. 
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8. Nominal GDP 10 % increase with a zero inflation rate 
9. Inflation rate 8% without any growth in GDP 
Since the rate of inflation is exogenous, the nominal interest rate changes in the Bank 
rate, GSY and deposit rates are all in real terms. 
9.4.3 Inference Based on the Perfect Tracking (Residual-in) Solution 
The results of the policy simulations are presented in Appendix 9.3a, 9.3b and 9.3c: 
Original SI and S2 in the upper table 
SE-adjusted SI and S2 in the lower table 
In these appendices, the mean percentage deviation of endogenous variables from the 
base run, and also the mean actual change in asset holdings in terms of Rs. crore are 
presented. In the market solutions, we have converted the AIDS prices into the interest 
rates. GGD applies to SI and GSY applies to S2. The first fifteen endogenous 
variables are associated with the holding of financial assets in each sector, and the last 
five endogenous variables, with the market solutions. 
When Original and SE-adjusted in the perfect solution are compared, as it was 
expected, the effects of policy changes on the RS are more suppressed in SE-adjusted. 
The magnitude of policy effects (in particular in the OFICS and PCBCS) are somewhat 
different between Original and SE-adjusted. However, in general both arrive at the 
same sign in the policy effects for almost all policy changes. Besides, the policy effect 
on PGD and PLA are satisfactory close. The salient features are, therefore, by and 
large similar between them. It may indicate the robustness of the results in Original 
and so unbiased inference may be drawn from Original. We now concentrate on 
Original. 
Refer to Tables 9.6a, 9.6b and 9.6c (reproduced from Appendix 9.3a, 9.3b and 9.3c in 
the upper table)9. Prior to inference, the simulation solution needs explaining. Since 
each sector's wealth is fixed, the policy effect in terms ofRs. crores sums zero in each 
sector; the analysis is to examine the relative movement in the portfolio. The holding 
9 These tables and any further tables are found after the last section of this chapter. 
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of a liability is indicated by the negative sign (i.e. OFICS( -), PCBCS( -), PCBLA( -) and 
HLA(-)), and a positive change implies an increase in the holding of a liability. For 
example, in the OFIs sector for SI ofa change in CRR in Table 9.6a, the policy change 
sums zero given -1,873 Rs. crores of OFIGD, 2,640 of OFICS( -) and 4,514 of OFILA. 
In the simulation of CRR and OMO, the exogenous BW and HW will change 
respectively, hence the policy effect does not sum to zero (it will be explained in detail 
in each simulation). The market solutions for GER, DEP and GGD are consistent with 
the total policy change in all sectors, for example, DEP of 544 Rs.crores in SI ofCRR 
is the total of 77.25 in PCBDEP and 467.51 in HDEP. 
The policy effect of CRR is discussed in detail to give an idea of how to interpret the 
results. For the subsequent policy change we avoid repetitive analyses, but concentrate 
on the specific effect of the policy. The comments made apply to both SI and S2, 
unless otherwise indicated. The overall results are left to the concluding remarks in the 
last section of this chapter. 
In analysing the policy effects, the underlying assumption is that the funds used in the 
government sector are mainly spent on government consumptionlO, whereas the funds 
that flow into the PCB and household sectors are used for private economic activities. 
For the PCB sector, the emphasis is on the flow of loans, rather than the flow of equity, 
since not only are new share issues costly, but they also involve uncertainty in the 
volatile equity market in India. 
No.1 Reduction of eRR by 2 % 
Since the wealth in the banking sector is the total assets minus required reserves (i.e. 
BW = BER+BGD+BCS+BLA = Deposits - Required reserves), a fall in CRR means 
an exogenous increase in the mean of bank wealth (BW) by 1,649 Rs.crores (this is 
equivalent to commercial bank deposits x 0.02) for the period 1969-93. The policy 
change therefore sums 1,649 Rs.crores in the banking sector. This policy change 
increases the proportion of earning assets to total assets, and this raises profitability in 
10 Non-development expenditure such as defence, debt service and administrative expenses are so large 
and significant in India (Datt and Sundharam, 2000). 
271 
the banking sector. The change in CRR should therefore affect the lending capacity of 
the banking sector. 
i) The effect on the interest rates: 
The policy has an expansionary effect by bringing down LR (lending rate), reflecting 
the loose monetary control by lowering CRR. The GSY (government securities yields) 
also falls by 1.73 % in S2. By contrast, there is a dramatic increase in RS, implying a 
fall in the stock market. Such a volatile effect on RS is frequently found in other 
policy simulations, making it somewhat difficult to arrive at a coherent inference (even 
in SE-adjusted in Appendix 9.3, the policy effect on RS is, though suppressed, quite 
striking). This is not unusual in the real world. A large fluctuation is observed during 
the period of 1992-1995 with the annual change ofRS being around 50 to 70 %. 
ii) SI regime vs. S2 regime: 
In comparing SI with S2, the dampening effect on the stock and credit markets by the 
controlled GSY (i.e. SI) emerges: the policy effects are 53.68% for RS and -1.69% for 
LR in S2, whereas 44.66% and -0.46% respectively in SI. In this respect, SI regime 
may be detrimental as it suppresses to a certain degree the free movement of interest 
rates, as it is hypothesized. However, the magnitude of the policy effects on the flow 
of financial funds tends to be larger in SI than in S2. Moreover, in general, the 
dampening effect is not particularly evident in other policy simulation experiments (on 
the contrary, in the simulation of Deposit rates and Devaluation, there is an inverse 
dampening effect: the policy effect in the S2 regime is somewhat suppressed). 
iii) Banking sector: 
BER is reduced, and there is a relatively significant increase in BCS and BLA, though 
LR falls. In the long-run model for this sector, the coefficient of CRR in the BER and 
BLA share equations was relatively small at 0.0083, and the lending rate and BLA 
had a positive relationship (in Table 9.3)11. The increase in BLA (and also BCS) may 
therefore be, in the main, attributes to an increase in disposable income (i.e. BW); 
banks choose to invest in riskier assets. In this respect lowering CRR exerts a 
preferable effect in releasing funds for the private sector. 
iv) OFIs sector: 
\1 Note that in the table the price of LA (PLA) is the inverse ofIending rate. 
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Given an increase in RS, the OFIs sector actively issues new securities, mutual funds 
and unit trusts, being indicated by a rise in the liability of OFICS. A relatively strong 
influence of RS in this sector is quite plausible, since for OFIs the capital market 
products are one of the major financial instruments. OFIGD falls in SI, and also a fall 
in GSY leads the OFIs to disinvest GD(government debt) in S2. In the counter-part 
there is a significant increase in OFILA, despite the fall in the lending rate. OFILA 
was, however, highly sensitive to the lending rate (positively) given the coefficient at 
2.71 in the single sector long-run model. The conflicting outcome from the single 
sector model may suggest a relatively strong influence of GSY outweighing the effect 
of the fall in LR in the system-wide model. 
v) Banking vs. OFIs sectors: 
It can be shown that there is a larger reshuffle in the flow of funds in the OFIs than in 
the Banking sectors in terms of both proportionate and actual changes (this is also true 
in SE-adjusted in the proportionate change, see the lower part of Appendix 9.3a). This 
is consistent with the finding in the less regulated OFIs in Chapter 7. This trend is 
frequently seen in other policy effects. 
vi) PCB (and Household) sector: 
The increasing lending activity by the financial institutions and the fall in lending rate 
appear to affect preferably the PCB and household sectors, as indicated by a rise in 
both PCBLA and HLA. In the PCB sector, with an ease of borrowing from the 
institutions and a fall in share prices (because a rise in RS), there is a shift in capital 
structure towards debt finance rather than equity finance. 
vii) Household sector: 
The falling share prices appear to trigger risk perception in the household sector, hence 
the sector retrieves the funds from the stock market (i.e. a fall in HCS) and transfers 
the majority of them into a risk-free asset ofGD (i.e. a rise in HGD). 
viii) Government debt (GD) market: 
In the GD market, there is quite a large increase in GGD at 4,042 Rs.crores in SI 
owing to the increase in HGD. HGD rises even in S2, where GSY falls (this also 
emerges in the simulation of Bank rate, OMO and Deposit rates); in the system-wide 
model HGD may not be so sensitive to the yields as it is in the single sector model. 
The increase in HGD may also be the result of a relatively strong substitution effect 
between the risk-free and risky assets. 
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No. 2 Reduction of the Bank Rate by 2 per cent 
The Bank rate is one of the instruments used to control credit in India. It is also 
believed to serve as a tool for influencing the interest rates of the economy. The effect 
of this policy on the flow of funds and on interest rates is, however, very small. 
The lending rate falls by only 24 basis points in S2 and none in SI, and the effect on 
RS is also very small, hence, unlike in developed economies, the role of the Bank rate 
as a signalling device for market rates is weak. This appears to reflect that the 
administrative interest rate structure prevalent in India makes the response of interest 
rates to the change in the Bank rate less sensitive. It could be also due to the risk-free 
substitution effect in the banking sector: The proportionate fall in BER is not small I2, 
yet this is absorbed by an increase in BGD, in particular, in SI in terms of actual 
change, making this policy ineffective. The insensitivity of the interest rates to the 
bank rate may be the consequence of this. 
No. 3 Reduction of SLR by 2 per cent 
The main purpose of this ratio may be to make the government security market more 
captive to support a programme of government borrowing. The reduction of SLR is, 
therefore, equivalent to a fall in involuntary investment by commercial banks in the 
government sector, and therefore it can be assumed that the banking sector increases 
investment in private sectors. 
i) There is a very large fall in RS of SI by 85 % and more in S2 by 91.45 %. The 
lending rate also falls, though it falls more in SI by -0.48 than in S2 by -0.06, hence 
the dampening effect is not particularly apparent in this policy change. 
ii) There is a relatively large decrease in BCS. This may be due to the fall in RS; 
also lowering SLR may be contributing to a fall in the banks' involuntary investment 
in the government approved company securities. Instead, an increase in investment in 
risk-free government debt (i.e. BGD) is observed, indicating that, as opposed to 
12 A fall by 14.02% in SI and 11.88% in S2 in BER is close to the finding by Sen et al. (1996) who 
found the fall by 12.84% in the simulated 2% reduction of the Bank rate. 
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government approved company securities, the investment in government securities is 
not directly associated with the level of SLR. The result is consistent with that found 
in the banking sector study. 
iii) The fall in RS also affects OFICS to contract significantly. It is surprising to 
find that the OFIs have shown such a strong sensitivity to the SLR, though SLR is not 
included in the OFIs' long-run model specification. 
iv) Contractionary portfolio behaviour in the financial institutions adversely affects 
the private sector in terms of borrowing. There is a substantial decline in PCBLA and 
HLA, (despite the fall in lending rate). Instead, PCBCS increases, but this is mainly 
taken up by the household sector as shown by the rise in HCS, not by the financial 
institutions. This finding suggests that the SLR may be, contrary to our prediction, 
contributing to delivering funds from the financial institutions to the non-financial 
private sectors. 
No. 4 (SI) Reduction in Government Securities Yields by 2% 
The simulation results are qualitatively in accord with the a priori expectation, in that a 
fall in the return of risk-free assets leads to a 'crowding-in' effect, in general terms. It 
exerts a substantial withdrawal of GD in the financial institutions, and this has 
contributed to increasing loanable funds: BLA and, especially, OFILA rise. There is 
also an expansionary effect through a fall in the cost of borrowing. Consequently, both 
PCBLA and HLA increase significantly. 
However, substitution effects between risk-free assets are observed (though not by 
much) in the banking sector; part of a fall in BGD is absorbed by a rise in BER. In the 
household sector, there is a significant increase in HGD, even though GSY falls. 
Further, the yields were market-determined in the post-reform period, hence this policy 
is perhaps fading as a policy instrument in India. 
No. 4 (S2) Open Market Purchase by 2 per cent 
In the complete general model, the consequences of government deficits for supplies of 
government securities and crowding-out will be taken into account automatically. The 
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effect of such changes in supply can be inferred from a simulation of the financial 
sector by an 'open market operation'. 
Here, we take an expansionary open market operation. This is accompanied by an 
increase in the circulation of currency by 2 % of government debt. This is reflected in 
the mean increase of HW (wealth in the household sector) by 1,444Rs.crores for the 
period 1969-93. 
i) The sign on the change in the asset holdings and interest rates is the same as for 
the simulation of a 2 % reduction ofGSY, hence the effects are expansionary. 
ii) The open market purchase leads to a relatively large decline in government 
securities' yields by 1.33 %. Given a relatively high demand for risk-free securities, 
the reduction in their supply will push up the prices, hence the yields on government 
securities fall significantly. 
iii) With the open market purchase, it is expected that not only will the banks be 
able to obtain loanable funds by selling government securities in the market, but also 
that funds will be directly obtainable by those, who sell their securities to the 
authorities. However, such an expected result does not appear to be significant: In the 
banking sector, BGD falls and BCS and BLA increases, as anticipated. Yet, part ofthe 
fall in BGD is substituted by a rise in BER. In the case of the household sector, the 
behaviour is counter-intuitive in that they purchase government securities rather than 
sell them (reflected in the increase in HGD). An increase in PCBLA and HLA in the 
main is attributed to the OFIs' expansion oflending. 
iv) There is a relatively large increase in broad money (the total of HCUR and 
HDEP) in the household sector. If the high ratio of broad money to GNP is associated 
with economic growth as McKinnon (1973 and1988) argues, this policy would exert a 
desirable effect on the Indian economy. At the same time, however, an inflationary 
effect may emerge. 
No. 5 Increase in the Deposit rate by 2 per cent 
Although the deposit rate rises by 2 %, a rise in the cost of debt capital (i.e. LR) is 
lower by 53 basis points in SI and by 13 basis points in S2, and so this does not appear 
to cause any significant contractionary effect in the flow of loanable funds. The 
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impact on the cost of equity capital (i.e. RS) is, however, quite large. As opposed to 
LR and RS, GSY falls, leading financial institutions to disinvest in the government 
sector. A flow of funds in the household sector reveals a substitution effect between 
risk-free assets; an increase in HDEP is countered by a reduction in HCUR. The 
additional inflow in the form of deposits in the financial institutions may contribute to 
releasing loanable funds. (Note that an increase in disposable income leads banks to 
increase loans in the simulation of CRR.) The major contribution to the increase in 
PCBLA and HLA is again from the OFIs sector. Overall, the impact of this policy 
change is quite desirable. 
No. 6 Real devaluation by 10 per cent 
In India, the exchange rate evolved from a basket-linked managed float to a market-
based system in 1993, yet it is still worthwhile to see the effect of devaluation on a 
flow of funds. The devaluation is in real terms since domestic and foreign prices are 
fixed. 
i) With respect to the demand for money, there is hardly any effect on currency 
(i.e. HCUR) in both SI and S2. Therefore, the effect of exchange rates on the demand 
for narrow money is weak. The interdependent behaviour among sectors is contrasted 
with that ofthe single sector study. 
ii) The devaluation leads to a large increase in RS and this has an expansionary 
effect on the banking sector's investment in BCS and on the OFIs' issuing shares; this 
could also be due to a positive perception that the economy gains price-
competitiveness by devaluation. 
iii) There appears to be easy money in the credit market; both HLA and PCBLA 
increase, though the cost of debt tends to be upwards. 
iv) By contrast, due to falling share prices the corporate sector contracts in issuing 
new shares and the risk-averse household sector disinvests in company securities. It 
may be that firms see devaluation as an indication of inflation risk, and that they are 
cautious in not expanding their long-term investment by equity finance. 
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No. 7 Rise in nominal GDP by 10% with 8% inflation rate 
With an inflation rate of 8%, all AIDS prices and the real exchange rate are adjusted 
accordingly. This is not a direct policy variable, but this kind of model is useful, in 
particular, in exploring the financial implications of a particular GDP projection. 
i) There is a relatively large fall in RS, implying rising share prices. This is quite 
plausible; as GDP increases, the stock market prospers. Yet, against GDP growth of 
10%, the impact on share prices (which is reflected in the fall in RS by 75 % in SI and 
by 83 % in S213) seems to be overheated. This demonstrates that share prices in India 
are prone to deviate from the fundamentals, and tend to be driven by speculative 
movements. 
ii) The economy is booming, but a fall in RS leads the financial institutions to 
switch from risky assets to risk-free government securities. An increase in OFIGD and 
a substantial fall in OFILA are largely responsible for a fall in PCBLA and HLA. In 
this sense, a large fall in RS seems to exert a significant contractionary behaviour in 
the financial institutions, even if there is a positive outlook for the economy. 
iii) As opposed to such a contractionary behaviour in the financial institutions, the 
growth in GDP stimulates the PCB sector to issue new shares (PCBCS substantially 
increases by nearly 70-80 % in both SI and S2, and this is also indicated in SE-
adjusted in the lower table in Appendix 9.3c). This is expected; remember that equity 
finance is elastic with respect to aggregate income in the PCB sector study. The newly 
issued company securities are mainly subscribed to by the household sector. 
iv) The dampening effect of SI regime on interest rates is observed in this 
simulation (and also in the next simulation) as the endogenous interest rates change 
more in S2 than in SI. Accordingly, the magnitude of the change in the portfolio in 
each sector is larger in S2 than in SI. This is contrasted with the change in policy 
instruments, where the dampening effect is not particularly obvious. 
13 In the SE-adjusted, RS falls by 38% in SI and 41 % in S2 (Appendix 9.3c). 
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No. 8 Rise in nominal GDP by 10% without inflation 
In order to examine the movement of interest rates, an additional simulation is 
conducted involving a rise in GDP without inflation. Without the inflation rate, the 
AIDS prices can be interpreted as being nominal prices, hence the GSY, LR and RS in 
the market solution imply nominal interest rates as well. 
i) The reshuffle of the flow of funds within and between sectors are broadly 
similar to the previous simulation ofNo.7: the banking and OFIs sectors' behaviour is 
contractionary, whereas that of the PCB sector is expansionary in the stock market. 
ii) The nominal GDP growth raises the nominal lending rate (LR). The outcome 
of both simulations No.7 and No.8 would give us an interesting insight into the 
proposition of the Fisher effectl4• The proposition appears to be supported in that the 
simulated inflation rate of 8 % in No. 7 is compensated for by an almost equal increase 
in the nominal lending rate in this simulation: 
7.34% (simulation No. 8) - 0.05% (simulation No.7) = 7.29% in SI, and 
8.46% (simulation No. 8) - 0.58% (simulation No.7) = 7.88% in S2. Hence the real 
cost of debt capital would remain the same in the context of the Indian economy. 
iii) With respect to RS, there is quite a difference between the real RS (in No.7) 
and the nominal RS (in No. 8); the nominal RS is higher by around 20 to 30 % than the 
real RS, again exhibiting a volatile behaviour. 
No. 9 Inflation rate 8% without any growth in GDP 
With an inflation rate of 8% without any accompanying growth in the economy, such a 
condition stagnates economic activities as a whole. There is rarely a flow of funds 
between and across sectors, depicting financial repression in India. An increase in real 
lending rates may somewhat suppress inflation, but at the same time accelerate the 
onset of recession, as it depresses loan demand. 
14 The Fisher effect postulates that, in order to maintain the invariance in the real economy to inflation, 
the nominal interest rate rises to the same extent as the rate of inflation, so that the real interest rate 
remains constant. 
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In the household sector study, we find that the government debt is the safest hedge 
against inflation. However, such an activity appears to be thin in the system-wide 
mode. It may be more likely that the household sector invests in unproductive 
inflation hedges such as land and property, rather than in financial investment. 
9.5 Contractionary Policy Effects 
The potential contractionary simulation experiments are conducted for the same policy 
shocks from Simulations No. 1 to No.6 by reversing the sign but with the same 
magnitude. Such that: 
1. CRR: CRR increases by 2% 
2. Bank rate: Bank rate increase by 2% 
3. SLR: SLR increases by 2% 
4(Sl). GSY: GSY increases by 2% 
4(S2). OMO: OMO 2% sales 
5. Deposit rate: Deposit rate decreases by 2% 
6. Revaluation: Revaluation by 10 % 
The results that are based on the perfect tracking solution in Original are shown in the 
upper part of Table 9.7a and 9.7b, in which the expansionary simulation results are 
reproduced (from Table 9.6) in the lower table for a comparative study. It is shown 
that the signs of the policy effects are almost in the opposite direction between the 
contractionary and expansionary simulations. However, there are some differences in 
the magnitude of the policy effects. Some features are briefly summarised as follows: 
i) CRR: The magnitude of the policy effect is less in the contractionary 
simulation (Contractionary, hereafter) in the regime SI, as compared with that of the 
expansionary simulation (Expansionary, hereafter). On the contrary, in S2 larger 
policy effects emerged in Contractionary. 
ii) Bank rate: A substitution effect is observed between BER and BGD as in the 
case of Expansionary. A similar scale of the policy effect in the opposite direction is 
found between Contractionary and Expansionary. 
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iii) SLR: There is an increase in PCBLA and HLA with a 2% rise in SLR. This 
reinforces the result obtained in Expansionary that the fall in SLR is contractionary in 
releasing loanable funds toward the non-financial private sectors. The magnitude of 
the policy effect is less in Contractionary for both SI and S2 than that in Expansionary. 
iv) GSY and OMO: Overall the quantitative size of the policy effect is again less 
in Contractionary for both SI and S2. 
v) Deposit and Revaluation: The magnitude of the policy effect is less in 
Contractionary for SI, while it is similar between Contractionary and Expansionary in 
S2. 
The quantitative policy effect (in particular, the effect on credit, i.e. PCBLA and HLA) 
is less in Contractionary than in Expansionary in the policy change of CRR, Deposit 
and Revalution for SI, and in the policy change of SLR, GSY and OMO for both SI 
and S2. This suggests that in order to achieve a similar magnitude of policy effect in 
the opposite direction, the policy change in Contractionary should be numerically 
larger than that in Expansionary. It may, in general, illustrate the difficulty of 
conducting contractionay policy. 
9.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, simulation policy experiments were undertaken in order to highlight the 
effect of policy changes on the financial sector in India. The system-wide model does 
attempt to specify the mechanics by which each policy variable works in the various 
financial markets, which are not captured in a single sector study. The following 
represents the summary and the policy implications drawn from the simulation 
experiments: 
i) The dampening effect by controlling the government securities' yields seems to 
be ambiguous in the policy simulation experiments. This suggests that whether the 
government securities yields are controlled or not may not matter in the policy 
effectiveness. 
ii) The risk-free substitution effect between BER and BGD in the banking sector 
is observed in the change in the Bank rate, government securities' yields and open 
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market purchase. These imply that increases in such as the government deficit exert a 
detrimental effect in implementing otherwise viable policy instruments. 
iii) The reduction in the SLR counter-intuitively has an adverse effect by reducing 
loans for economic activities. It could be argued that the reduction in SLR is the 
consequence of the fall in government expenditure, hence it is exerting a 
contractionary effect on the economy. However, this channel may be weak since in 
the main government spending is for their own consumption in India. We would rather 
be inclined to assume that commercial banks' involuntary subscription to government-
approved securities issued by the OFIs under this regulation may bring about a 
desirable effect in assuring loans to the PCB sector. 
iv) The expansionary effect in the open market purchases on a flow of loanable 
funds was found in the financial institutions. The behaviour of the household sector is, 
however, unexpected as it turns out to be an increase in government securities. 
Although our system-wide model simulation has not explicitly specified the thin 
securities market, this may be perhaps taken with qualification, that in countries where 
the government securities market is under-developed, open market operations rarely 
function as a viable policy, especially in the private sector (Thaker, 1985), and that 
further development of the government securities market is a priority for India. 
v) We find that the lower CRR exerts an effective expansionary effect by 
releasing funds from the banking sector to the industrial and household sectors, 
without incurring the risk-free substitution effects in the banking sector that is 
frequently found in other policy instruments. We also find that as the real deposit rate 
rises, financial saving increases in the household sector, and they are made available to 
non-financial private sectors with a relatively small increase in the cost of borrowing. 
It appears that the reduction in CRR and also the increase in the real deposit rate are 
the desirable policies in achieving the target of delivering funds to the PCB and 
household sectors for economic activities. (Note that the simulation GSY and 
Devaluation have also shown preferable impact on loans, but they are largely market-
determined in the post-reform period.) 
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vi) The effects of a policy change on the RS are quite volatile. Such a great 
uncertainty in the Indian stock market appears to distort the potency of economic 
growth. It is seen that with an increase in GDP (simulation No. 7 and No.8), but due to 
a large fall in RS, the behaviour of the financial institutions are contractionary. 
vii) It seems that the Keynesian Paradigm of an interest rate channel for boosting 
the economy is more or less supported, as the fall in the cost of borrowing by the 
policy change tends to lead to an increase in loans. However, in India, for the PCB 
and household sectors the alternatives to bank credit, issuance of shares and 
moneylenders respectively, are costly, hence, it is more likely that the credit market is 
determined by the supply-side, and that the disruption to the flow of credit in financial 
institutions has significant effects on the economy. For example, by the reduction of 
SLR, OFILA falls substantially, and this in turn reduces PCBLA and HLA 
substantially, though the loan rate falls. This rationalizes government intervention in 
credit rationing towards vulnerable sectors, to some degree, as in currently existing 
priority sector lending requirements. 
viii) In general, OFIs sector is more responsive to the policy change, rather than the 
banking sector in the system-wide model, being consistent with the single sector study. 
This restates that the OFIs sector can potentially play a crucial role in linking the 
policy effects in the economy. 
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Table 9.6a Policy effects (69-93): Original (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
1. CRR 2% reduction 2. Bank Rate 2% reduction 3. SLR 2% reduction 
SI S2 SI S2 SI S2 
% change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual 
BER -34.19 -1433.01 -16.99 -711.89 -14.02 -587.40 -11.88 -497.99 8.00 335.34 2.41 101.05 
BGD -0.27 -55.51 -0.79 -162.77 2.75 565.55 1.06 218.93 8.35 1720.36 10.71 2205.75 
BCS 19.06 1593.41 13.54 1132.01 0.19 15.67 2.51 210.27 -27.54 -2302.88 -29.68 -2481.71 
BLA 3.51 1544.24 3.16 1391.79 0.01 6.18 0.16 68.78 0.56 247.21 0.40 174.94 
OFIGD -6.90 -1873.83 -6.52 -1770.00 -0.06 -16.63 -2.15 -583.27 15.20 4127.10 17.95 4874.15 
OFICS (-) 74.86 2640.24 51.85 1828.71 0.61 21.45 11.20 395.10 -101.19 -3568.94 -111.47 -3931.60 
OFILA 20.98 4514.10 16.72 3598.73 0.18 38.08 4.55 978.37 -35.77 -7696.08 -40.92 -8805.79 
PCBCS (-) -67.41 -3143.70 -45.27 -2111.34 -0.46 -21.50 -10.68 -497.87 82.66 3854.87 92.88 4331.42 
PCBLA(-) 9.10 3220.94 6.60 2338.33 0.06 22.55 1.47 521.20 -12.18 -4313.30 -13.68 -4844.84 
PCBDEP 1.93 77.25 5.68 227.00 0.03 1.05 0.58 23.34 -11.47 -458.42 -12.85 -513.42 
HCUR -6.68 -1504.90 7.93 1788.32 -0.05 -10.16 1.96 442.42 9.77 2202.44 4.79 1080.56 
HDEP 0.69 467.51 0.51 346.74 0.00 2.80 0.05 33.25 -0.91 -618.03 -0.98 -667.17 
HGD 9.80 5971.65 3.17 1931.77 0.07 44.80 0.60 363.33 -12.00 -7308.76 -11.62 -7080.90 
HCS -14.46 -2096.87 -9.75 -1414.63 -0.11 -15.72 -2.16 -313.04 17.85 2588.82 19.87 2881.53 
HLA(-) 6.87 2837.39 6.42 2652.19 0.05 21.71 1.27 525.95 -7.59 -3135.57 -9.16 -3786.01 
GER -34.19 -1433.01 -16.99 -711.89 -14.02 -587.40 -11.88 -497.99 8.00 335.34 2.41 101.05 
DEP 0.61 544.75 0.64 573.74 0.00 3.86 0.06 56.59 -1.20 -1076.45 -1.31 -1180.58 
GGD/GSY% 5.15 4042.30 -1.73 0.76 593.71 -0.40 -1.86 -1461.31 0.63 
LR% -0.46 -1.69 0.00 -0.24 -0.48 -0.06 
RS% 44.66 53.68 0.44 8.49 -85.00 -91.45 
- % and actual change: mean values of the proportionate and actual changes respectively in holding assets by simulated policy changes for the period of 1969-93. 
- CRR 2% reduction increases the mean value ofBW by around 1649 Rs. crores during the period of 1969-93. 
- GGD for 81 and GSY for 82 
- Rs.crore=1O mi1lion rupees 
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Table 9.6b Policy effects (69-93): Original (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
4. GSY2% 4. OMO 2% purchases 5. Deposit Rate 2% increase 6. Real Devaluation 10% 
reduction 
SI S2 SI S2 SI S2 
% change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual 
BER 6.79 284.39 7.25 303.75 -7.13 -298.87 -0.40 -16.63 -8.10 -339.35 -6.62 -277.37 
BGD -10.29 -2118.91 -8.28 -1704.65 -6.16 -1269.39 -4.67 -961.33 -5.72 -1177.02 -3.51 -723.07 
BCS 16.46 1376.50 11.36 950.29 16.23 1357.11 10.71 895.75 18.76 1568.28 13.88 1160.98 
BLA 1.04 458.00 1.02 450.59 0.48 211.13 0.19 82.20 -0.12 -51.93 -0.36 -160.57 
OFIGD -13.30 -3613.18 -10.64 -2890.67 -11.52 -3128.54 -8.95 -2430.05 -10.43 -2833.23 -7.30 -1982.47 
OFICS (-) 73.78 2602.10 50.83 1792.86 74.98 2644.52 50.81 1792.09 86.31 3044.04 64.89 2288.58 
OFILA 28.88 6215.30 21.77 4683.54 26.83 5773.09 19.62 4222.16 27.31 5877.30 19.85 4271.07 
PCBCS (-) -72.92 -3400.66 -48.43 -2258.56 -73.69 -3436.33 -50.09 -2336.05 -61.44 -2865.31 -40.49 -1888.07 
PCBLA(-) 9.85 3489.32 6.68 2365.23 10.16 3596.78 7.23 2558.46 8.74 3093.14 6.02 2131.69 
PCBDEP 2.22 88.67 2.67 106.67 4.02 160.46 5.57 222.42 5.70 227.84 6.10 243.63 
HCUR 5.62 1266.59 6.23 1405.06 -15.76 -3552.87 -9.61 -2167.35 -0.08 -18.71 1.69 380.16 
HDEP 0.51 348.25 1.77 1198.09 3.08 2092.90 2.89 1962.58 -0.32 -218.25 -0.51 -345.40 
HGD 6.14 3744.20 4.97 3025.27 9.84 5996.30 5.56 3390.36 7.15 4358.72 4.44 2704.53 
HCS -15.00 -2175.06 -9.76 -1416.00 -14.82 -2148.91 -9.93 -1439.71 -9.58 -1389.54 -5.24 -760.47 
HLA (-) 7.70 3183.98 6.70 2768.91 5.78 2387.44 4.22 1745.89 6.61 2732.23 4.79 1978.81 
GER 6.79 284.39 7.25 303.75 -7.13 -298.87 -0.40 -16.63 -8.10 -339.35 -6.62 -277.37 
DEP 0.49 436.92 1.45 1304.76 2.50 2253.37 2.43 2185.00 0.01 9.60 -0.11 -101.76 
GGD/GSY% -2.53 -1987.90 -1.33 2.04 1598.37 -0.48 0.44 348.47 0.35 
LR% -1.05 -0.54 0.53 0.13 0.07 0.19 
RS% 49.76 28.58 60.57 55.60 66.13 51.25 
- % and actual change: mean values of the proportionate and actual changes respectively in holding assets by simulated policy changes for the period of 1969-93. 
- OMO 2% purchases increase the mean value ofHW by around 1444 Rs. crores during the period of 1969-93. 
- GGD for SI and GSY for S2 
- Rs.crore=10 million rupees 
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Table 9.6c Policy effects (69-93): Original (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
7. Nominal GDP 10% up with 8. Nominal GDP 10% up with no 9. Inflation rate 8% 
inflation rate 8% inflation rate 
SI S2 SI S2 SI S2 
% change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual 
BER 5.47 229.35 -1.35 -56.64 -0.73 -30.74 -14.44 -605.20 3.24 135.77 5.26 220.46 
BGD 5.19 1069.56 8.17 1682.66 3.08 634.68 9.22 1899.43 0.43 88.60 -0.98 -201.91 
BCS -19.14 -1600.13 -21.86 -1827.98 -14.19 -1186.10 -19.80 -1655.51 -3.31 -277.16 -1.37 -114.89 
BLA 0.68 301.24 0.46 201.98 1.32 582.15 0.82 361.27 0.12 52.79 0.22 96.34 
OFIGD 11.43 3103.80 14.86 4036.76 7.83 2125.44 14.73 4001.65 0.46 125.40 -1.35 -366.57 
OFICS (-) -95.07 -3353.01 -108.06 -3811.12 -60.30 -2126.74 -86.46 -3049.22 -19.69 -694.54 -10.67 -376.30 
OFILA -30.01 -6456.85 -36.47 -7847.93 -19.76 -4252.17 -32.77 -7050.87 -3.81 -819.95 -0.05 -9.74 
PCBCS (-) 76.78 3580.82 89.73 4184.47 58.78 2741.07 85.04 3965.99 1.60 74.39 -6.97 -324.94 
PCBLA(-) -10.17 -3600.09 -12.06 -4271.92 -6.95 -2462.38 -10.81 -3827.10 -0.75 -265.13 0.45 157.62 
PCBDEP -0.48 -19.27 -2.19 -87.45 6.97 278.69 3.48 138.88 -4.77 -190.73 -4.19 -167.32 
HCUR 10.29 2319.22 4.12 928.55 14.75 3325.84 2.58 580.97 -1.00 -225.75 0.93 209.10 
HDEP -1.07 -724.94 -1.15 -783.44 0.05 37.10 -0.17 -113.64 -0.41 -279.17 -0.39 -261.24 
HGD -9.81 -5977.71 -9.39 -5720.43 -10.46 -6371.01 -9.69 -5902.09 0.57 345.87 0.93 567.48 
HCS 12.60 1827.95 15.18 2201.33 12.41 1800.43 17.74 2572.27 -2.37 -343.00 -4.04 -586.36 
HLAH -6.18 -2555.51 -8.16 -3374.02 -2.92 -1207.64 -6.93 -2862.50 -1.21 -502.04 -0.17 -71.02 
GER 5.47 229.35 -1.35 -56.64 -0.73 -30.74 -14.44 -605.20 3.24 135.77 5.26 220.46 
DEP -0.83 -744.21 -0.97 -870.89 0.35 315.78 0.03 25.24 -0.52 -469.90 -0.48 -428.56 
GGD/GSY% -2.30 -1804.36 1.64 -4.60 -3610.90 10.59 0.71 559.87 0.34 
LR% 0.05 0.58 7.34 8.46 1.44 1.14 
RS% -75.36 -83.83 -47.29 -65.56 -8.57 0.58 
- % and actual change: mean values of the proportionate and actual changes respectively in holding assets by simulated policy changes for the period of 1969-93. 
- GGD for SI and GSY for S2 
- Rs.crore=10 million rupees 
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Table 9.7a Contractionary vs Expansionary Policy Effects (69-93): Original (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
Contract 1. CRR: 51 1.CRR: 52 2. Bank rate: 51 2. Bank rate: 52 3. 5LR: 51 3.5LR: 52 
% change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual 
BER 32.74 1372.36 21.46 899.25 14.00 586.74 11.89 498.47 -4.36 -182.84 -0.13 -5.50 
BGO -1.43 -293.62 4.14 853.48 -2.76 -567.36 -0.98 -201.47 -6.60 -1358.98 -5.93 -1220.91 
BCS -10.38 -868.10 -16.16 -1351.05 -0.17 -14.56 -2.75 -229.68 23.11 1932.36 19.02 1590.23 
BLA -4.23 -1859.77 -4.66 -2050.81 -0.01 -4.82 -0.15 -67.32 -0.89 -390.56 -0.83 -363.83 
OFIGO 0.63 171.14 7.26 1972.39 0.06 15.44 2.28 619.15 -12.74 -3459.94 -10.74 -2918.09 
OFICS(-) -41.13 -1450.65 -68.62 -2420.15 -0.55 -19.41 -12.16 -428.85 78.17 2756.91 60.94 2149.22 
OFILA -7.54 -1621.80 -20.41 -4392.57 -0.16 -34.85 -4.87 -1048.01 28.89 6216.88 23.55 5067.33 
PCBCS(-) 33.85 1578.45 60.94 2842.08 0.41 19.10 11.47 535.06 -63.65 -2968.18 -47.18 -2200.03 
PCBLA(-) -4.78 -1691.11 -8.67 -3069.65 -0.06 -20.14 -1.57 -557.28 9.74 3448.08 7.73 2736.66 
PCBDEP -2.82 -112.65 -5.69 -227.56 -0.03 -1.03 -0.56 -22.21 12.01 479.91 13.43 536.63 
HCUR 1.66 375.13 -8.81 -1985.45 0.04 9.37 -1.95 -438.57 -9.95 -2243.48 -5.39 -1215.31 
HOEP -0.36 -241.97 -0.49 -334.34 0.00 -2.58 -0.05 -36.65 1.08 733.37 1.01 685.21 
HGD -4.79 -2919.51 -4.64 -2826.88 -0.07 -40.56 -0.69 -418.70 9.90 6031.97 6.79 4137.99 
HCS 6.87 995.91 12.22 1772.98 0.10 14.25 2.32 335.89 -14.78 -2143.62 -11.32 -1641.04 
HLA(-) -4.33 -1790.45 -8.16 -3373.73 -0.05 -19.53 -1.35 -558.04 5.75 2378.25 4.76 1966.84 
GER 32.74 1372.36 21.46 899.25 14.00 586.74 11.89 498.47 -4.36 -182.84 -0.13 -5.50 
DEP -0.39 -354.62 -0.62 -561.91 0.00 -3.61 -0.07 -58.86 1.35 1213.28 1.36 1221.84 
GGO/G5Y% -3.88 -3042.00 1.71 -0.76 -592.48 0.40 1.55 1213.04 -0.52 
LR~. 0.80 1.91 0.00 0.24 0.73 0.26 
R5% -30.05 -51.32 -0.40 -8.64 90.16 80.46 
Expansion 1. CRR: 51 1.CRR: 52 2. Bank rate: 51 2. Bank rate: 52 3. 5LR: Si 3.5LR: 52 
% change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual 
BER -34.19 -1433.01 -16.99 -711.89 -14.02 -587.40 -11.88 -497.99 8.00 335.34 2.41 101.05 
BGO -0.27 -55.51 -0.79 -162.77 2.75 565.55 1.06 218.93 8.35 1720.36 10.71 2205.75 
BCS 19.06 1593.41 13.54 1132.01 0.19 15.67 2.51 210.27 -27.54 -2302.88 -29.68 -2481.71 
BLA 3.51 1544.24 3.16 1391.79 0.01 6.18 0.16 68.78 0.56 247.21 0.40 174.94 
OFIGO -6.90 -1873.83 -6.52 -1770.00 -0.06 -16.63 -2.15 -583.27 15.20 4127.10 17.95 4874.15 
OFICS(-) 74.86 2640.24 51.85 1828.71 0.61 21.45 11.20 395.10 -101.19 -3568.94 -111.47 -3931.60 
OFILA 20.98 4514.10 16.72 3598.73 0.18 38.08 4.55 978.37 -35.77 -7696.08 -40.92 -8805.79 
PCBCS(-) -67.41 -3143.70 -45.27 -2111.34 -0.46 -21.50 -10.68 -497.87 82.66 3854.87 92.88 4331.42 
PCBLA(-) 9.10 3220.94 6.60 2338.33 0.06 22.55 1.47 521.20 -12.18 -4313.30 -13.68 -4844.84 
PCBOEP 1.93 77.25 5.68 227.00 0.03 1.05 0.58 23.34 -11.47 -458.42 -12.85 -513.42 
HCUR -6.68 -1504.90 7.93 1788.32 -0.05 -10.16 1.96 442.42 9.77 2202.44 4.79 1080.56 
HDEP 0.69 467.51 0.51 346.74 0.00 2.80 0.05 33.25 -0.91 -618.03 -0.98 -667.17 
HGO 9.80 5971.65 3.17 1931.77 0.07 44.80 0.60 363.33 -12.00 -7308.76 -11.62 -7080.90 
HC5 -14.46 -2096.87 -9.75 -1414.63 -0.11 -15.72 -2.16 -313.04 17.85 2588.82 19.87 2881.53 
HLA(-) 6.87 2837.39 6.42 2652.19 0.05 21.71 1.27 525.95 -7.59 -3135.57 -9.16 -3786.01 
GER -34.19 -1433.01 -16.99 -711.89 -14.02 -587.40 -11.88 -497.99 8.00 335.34 2.41 101.05 
OEP 0.61 544.75 0.64 573.74 0.00 3.86 0.06 56.59 -1.20 -1076.45 -1.31 -1180.58 
GGD/GSY% 5.15 4042.30 -1.73 0.76 593.71 -0.40 -1.86 -1461.31 0.63 
LR% -0.46 -1.69 0.00 -0.24 -0.48 -0.06 
RS% 44.66 53.68 0.44 8.49 -85.00 -91.45 
- CRR 2% reductIon (Increase) Increases (reduces) the mean value ofBW by around 1649 Rs. crores In the expansIOnary (contractlOnary) policy SImulatIon dunng the pen od of \969-93. 
- Expansionary policy effects reproducd from Table 9.6. - Rs.crore= 1 0 million rupees 
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Table 9.7b Contractionary vs Expansionary Policy Effects (69-93): Original (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
Contract 4.G5Y: 51 4.0MO: 52 5. Deposit: S1 5. Deposit: 52 6. Revaluation: 51 6. Revaluation: S2 
% chanQe Actual % chanQe Actual % change Actual % change Actual % chance Actual % chance Actual 
BER -10.71 -449.00 -7.50 -314.20 4.74 198.54 1.10 46.27 5.99 251.03 7.59 318.21 
BGD 6.87 1414.40 6.12 1259.30 3.93 809.29 5.73 1179.29 3.40 699.90 2.66 548.48 
BC5 -8.64 -722.54 -7.91 -661.50 -11.33 -947.47 -13.19 -1103.10 -15.19 -1270.17 -14.43 -1206.94 
BLA -0.55 -242.85 -0.64 -283.60 -0.14 -60.35 -0.28 -122.44 0.73 319.25 0.77 340.26 
OFIGD 8.32 2259.91 7.91 2148.28 8.38 2277.19 10.48 2845.52 8.36 2270.50 7.47 2027.78 
OFICS(-) -39.43 -1390.59 -36.03 -1270.66 -54.04 -1905.79 -62.70 -2211.36 -73.85 -2604.49 -70.21 -2476.15 
OFILA -16.96 -3650.51 -15.89 -3418.94 -19.44 -4183.00 -23.50 -5056.90 -22.66 -4875.02 -20.93 -4503.95 
PCBC5(-) 38.11 1777.04 31.74 1480.01 51.73 2412.36 60.26 2810.07 44.12 2057.55 40.61 1893.74 
PCBLA(-) -5.34 -1889.42 -4.47 -1581.40 -7.30 -2584.84 -8.53 -3019.18 -6.55 -2317.95 -6.03 -2136.07 
PCBDEP -2.81 -112.38 -2.54 -101.38 -4.32 -172.47 -5.23 -209.10 -6.52 -260.39 -6.06 -242.32 
HCUR -9.90 -2232.66 -6.77 -1526.21 12.54 2826.65 9.25 2085.73 -4.46 -1004.91 -2.98 -672.16 
HDEP -0.18 -122.71 -1.58 -1069.74 -2.78 -1887.52 -2.83 -1921.86 0.87 590.41 0.88 597.28 
HGD -1.24 -757.55 -3.02 -1839.54 -6.65 -4051.65 -6.61 -4025.81 -4.18 -2546.55 -4.23 -2577.27 
HC~(_) 7.65 1108.99 6.00 870.86 10.03 1454.04 11.73 1701.81 4.99 723.23 4.31 624.54 HLA - -4.85 -2003.94 -5.13 -2121.13 -4.01 -1658.51 -5.23 -2160.15 -5.41 -2237.82 -4.91 -2027.62 
GER -10.71 -449.00 -7.50 -314.20 4.74 198.54 1.10 46.27 5.99 251.03 7.59 318.21 
DEP -0.26 -235.09 -1.30 -1171.12 -2.29 -2059.99 -2.37 -2130.97 0.37 330.02 0.39 354.96 
GGD/G5Y% 3.72 2916.75 1.27 -1.23 -965.18 0.44 0.54 423.85 -0.46 
LR% 1.23 0.59 -0.36 -0.08 0.15 
-0.15 
R5% -31.99 -23.69 -45.05 -50.58 -59.06 -53.61 
EXDanslon 4.G5Y: 51 4.0MO:52 5. Deposit: 51 5. Deposit: 52 6. Devaluation: 51 6. Devaluation: 52 
% chanQe Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % chance Actual % chanae Actual 
BER 6.79 284.39 7.25 303.75 -7.13 -298.87 -0.40 -16.63 -8.10 -339.35 -6.62 -277.37 
BGD -10.29 -2118.91 -8.28 -1704.65 -6.16 -1269.39 -4.67 -961.33 -5.72 -1177.02 -3.51 -723.07 
BCS 16.46 1376.50 11.36 950.29 16.23 1357.11 10.71 895.75 18.76 1568.28 13.88 1160.98 
BLA 1.04 458.00 1.02 450.59 0.48 211.13 0.19 82.20 -0.12 -51.93 -0.36 -160.57 
OFIGD -13.30 -3613.18 -10.64 -2890.67 -11.52 -3128.54 -8.95 -2430.05 -10.43 -2833.23 -7.30 -1982.47 
OFIC5(-) 73.78 2602.10 50.83 1792.86 74.98 2644.52 50.81 1792.09 86.31 3044.04 64.89 2288.58 
OFILA 28.88 6215.30 21.77 4683.54 26.83 5773.09 19.62 4222.16 27.31 5877.30 19.85 4271.07 
PCBC5(-) -72.92 -3400.66 -48.43 -2258.56 -73.69 -3436.33 -50.09 -2336.05 -61.44 -2865.31 -40.49 -1888.07 
PCBLA(-) 9.85 3489.32 6.68 2365.23 10.16 3596.78 7.23 2558.46 8.74 3093.14 6.02 2131.69 
PCBDEP 2.22 88.67 2.67 106.67 4.02 160.46 5.57 222.42 5.70 227.84 6.10 243.63 
HCUR 5.62 1266.59 6.23 1405.06 -15.76 -3552.87 -9.61 -2167.35 -0.08 -18.71 1.69 380.16 
HDEP 0.51 348.25 1.77 1198.09 3.08 2092.90 2.89 1962.58 -0.32 -218.25 -0.51 -345.40 
HGD 6.14 3744.20 4.97 3025.27 9.84 5996.30 5.56 3390.36 7.15 4358.72 4.44 2704.53 
HC5 -15.00 -2175.06 -9.76 -1416.00 -14.82 -2148.91 -9.93 -1439.71 -9.58 -1389.54 -5.24 -760.47 
HLAI-I 7.70 3183.98 6.70 2768.91 5.78 2387.44 4.22 1745.89 6.61 2732.23 4.79 1978.81 
GER 6.79 284.39 7.25 303.75 -7.13 -298.87 -0.40 -16.63 -8.10 -339.35 -6.62 -277.37 
DEP 0.49 436.92 1.45 1304.76 2.50 2253.37 2.43 2185.00 0.01 9.60 -0.11 -101.76 
GGD/G5Y% -2.53 -1987.90 -1.33 2.04 1598.37 -0.48 0.44 348.47 0.35 
LR "I. -1.05 -0.54 0.53 0.13 0.07 0.19 
R5 "I. 49.76 28.58 60.57 55.60 66.13 51.25 
- OMO 2% purchases (sales) Increase (reduces) the mean value ofHW by around 1444 Rs. crores In the expansIOnary (contractlonary) pohcy SImulation durIng the penod of 1969-93. 
- Expansionary policy effects reproducd from Table 9.6. 
- Rs.crore= I 0 million rupees 
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Appendix 9.1: SE-adjusted behavioural equations 
Standard error (SE) of the CS equation (from Table 9.3): 
Banking sector 0.0083 
PCB sector 0.0392 
OFIs sector 0.0399 
Household sector 0.0106 
Banking lnp~ lnp; lnp; lnp; 
sector (PER) (POD) (PCS) (PLA) 
1. ER 
2. OD 0.0083 + SE 
3. CS 0.0083+SE -0.0245 - 0.0131 +SE 
SEx2 
4. LA 0.0131 + SE 
PCB Sector lnp~ lnp; lnp; 
(PCS) (PLA) (PDEP) 
1. CS (-) - 0.1239- 1.3074+ SE -1.5956 + SE 
SEx2 
2. LA (-) 0.1239 + 
SEx2 
3.DEP 
OFI sector lnp~ lnp; lnp; 
(POD) (PCS) (PLA) 
1. OD 0.0772 -SE 
2. CS (-) 0.0772-SE 0.0862 + -0.1634 -SE 
SEx2 
3. LA -0. 1634-SE 
House-hold lnp~ lnp; lnp; lnp; lnp; 
sector (PCUR) (PDEP) (POD) (PCS) (PLA) 
1. CUR 
2.DEP 
3.00 -0.0573-SE 
4. CS -0.0573-SE 0.0203 + 0.0304-SE 
SEx2 
5.LA(-) 0.0304-SE 
- SE adjusted behavioural equations are derived by adding or deducting 2SE to the own-price coefficients in 
the CS equation and also adding or deducting SE to the surrounding cross price coefficients. Other price 
coefficients remain unchanged. But in this case, the adding-up constraint fails in other prices by the 
equivalent of SE, e.g. in the household sector the adding-up fails in POD and also in PLA by SE (i.e. 
0.0106). Restoring the adding-up by further adjusting other price coefficients leads to empirically poor 
results as it involves the changes in the significant coefficients. Hence, though the SE adjusted equations 
contribute to obtaining less volatile PCS than the original set of equations, they can be no more than the 
supplements. 
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Appendix 9.2 Mean base run (the actual mean values) for the period 1969-93 
in the holdings of financial assets and market solutions 
Rs. Crores 
Financial assets and Mean base run 
real interest rates 
BER 4192.14 
BGD 20596.22 
BCS 8357.85 
BLA 43995.12 
OFIGD 27167.18 
OFICS (-) 3519.74 
OFILA 21504.08 
PCBCS(-) 4671.13 
PCBLA(-) 35400.46 
PCBDEP 3995.73 
HCUR 22535.13 
HDEP 67860.08 
HGD 60919.46 
HCS 14507.20 
HLA (-) 41324.25 
GER 4192.14 
DEP 89981.44 
GGD 78452.05 
GSY% -1.27 
LR% 4.03 
RS% 1.03 
... (-) lIabIlItIes 
GSY: Real government securities yields, LR: Real lending rate and RS: Real return on shares 
Rs.crore=lO million rupees 
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Appendix 9.3a Policy effects (69-93): Perfect Solution (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
1. eRR 2% reduction 2. Bank Rate 2% reduction 3. 5LR 2% reduction 
51 52 51 52 51 52 
Original % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual 
BER -34.19 -1433.01 -16.99 -711.89 -14.02 -587.40 -11.88 -497.99 8.00 335.34 2.41 101.05 
BGD -0.27 -55.51 -0.79 -162.77 2.75 565.55 1.06 218.93 8.35 1720.36 10.71 2205.75 
BC5 19.06 1593.41 13.54 1132.01 0.19 15.67 2.51 210.27 -27.54 -2302.88 -29.68 -2481.71 
BLA 3.51 1544.24 3.16 1391.79 0.01 6.18 0.16 68.78 0.56 247.21 0.40 174.94 
OFIGD -6.90 -1873.83 -6.52 -1770.00 -0.06 -16.63 -2.15 -583.27 15.20 4127.10 17.95 4874.15 
OFIC5(-) 74.86 2640.24 51.85 1828.71 0.61 21.45 11.20 395.10 -101.19 -3568.94 -111.47 -3931.60 
OFlLA 20.98 4514.10 16.72 3598.73 0.18 38.08 4.55 978.37 -35.77 -7696.08 -40.92 -8805.79 
PCBCS (-) -67.41 -3143.70 -45.27 -2111.34 -0.46 -21.50 ·10.68 -497.87 82.66 3854.87 92.88 4331.42 
PCBLA(-) 9.10 3220.94 6.60 2338.33 0.06 22.55 1.47 521.20 -12.18 -4313.30 -13.68 -4844.84 
PCBDEP 1.93 77.25 5.68 227.00 0.03 1.05 0.58 23.34 -11.47 -458.42 -12.85 -513.42 
HCUR -6.68 -1504.90 7.93 1788.32 -0.05 -10.16 1.96 442.42 9.77 2202.44 4.79 1080.56 
HDEP 0.69 467.51 0.51 346.74 0.00 2.80 0.05 33.25 -0.91 -618.03 -0.98 -667.17 
HGD 9.80 5971.65 3.17 1931.77 0.07 44.80 0.60 363.33 -12.00 -7308.76 -11.62 -7080.90 
HCS -14.46 -2096.87 -9.75 -1414.63 -0.11 -15.72 -2.16 -313.04 17.85 2588.82 19.87 2881.53 
HLA(-) 6.87 2837.39 6.42 2652.19 0.05 21.71 1.27 525.95 -7.59 -3135.57 -9.16 -3786.01 
GER -34.19 -1433.01 -16.99 -711.89 -14.02 -587.40 -11.88 -497.99 8.00 335.34 2.41 101.05 
DEP 0.61 544.75 0.64 573.74 0.00 3.86 0.06 56.59 -1.20 -1076.45 -1.31 -1180.58 
GGD/GSY% 5.15 4042.30 -1.73 0.76 593.71 -0.40 -1.86 -1461.31 0.63 
LR% -0.46 -1.69 0.00 -0.24 -0.48 -0.06 
RS% 44.66 53.68 0.44 8.49 -85.00 -91.45 
5Eadj % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual 
BER -27.96 -1171.81 -17.09 -716.43 -13.96 -585.05 ·11.68 -489.56 4.12 172.53 0.66 27.87 
BGD 4.05 833.42 -8.82 -1816.02 2.78 572.16 1.62 333.23 7.65 1574.35 9.03 1859.37 
BCS 8.72 729.02 28.65 2395.46 0.10 8.17 1.35 112.64 -23.62 -1975.32 -24.76 -2070.11 
BLA 2.87 1261.58 4.11 1808.82 0.01 4.73 0.11 47.34 0.53 232.85 0.41 181.93 
OFIGD 1.75 474.90 -6.69 -1815.70 0.02 6.49 -0.83 -225.90 6.17 1676.41 7.27 1974.92 
OFICS (-) 34.43 1214.35 136.73 4822.46 0.27 9.68 6.82 240.47 -93.72 -3305.30 -99.86 -3521.82 
OFILA 3.40 731.06 30.56 6575.27 0.01 3.17 2.12 456.11 -23.21 -4994.32 -25.53 -5494.12 
PCBCS(-) -28.81 -1343.74 -134.66 -6279.79 -0.18 -8.29 -6.88 -321.01 80.95 3775.10 87.41 4076.19 
PCBLA(-) 3.82 1352.75 17.23 6101.31 0.02 8.52 0.91 320.46 -11.37 -4025.18 -12.25 -4336.29 
PCBDEP 0.39 15.61 -4.09 -163.26 0.01 0.26 0.06 2.36 -6.01 -240.05 -6.37 -254.67 
HCUR -0.28 -63.67 10.67 2404.71 0.00 0.94 2.13 480.64 5.57 1254.69 2.40 540.63 
HDEP 0.12 84.44 0.08 54.04 0.00 0.08 -0.01 -3.60 -0.44 -299.56 -0.45 -303.82 
HGD 2.41 1471.42 5.96 3630.71 0.Q1 5.12 -0.18 ·108.34 -6.80 -4145.84 -6.29 -3835.30 
HCS -5.92 -858.41 -26.57 -3852.79 -0.05 -6.77 -1.33 -193.18 16.86 2445.12 18.10 2624.48 
HLA (-) 1.55 639.89 5.52 2282.78 0.00 -0.63 0.44 182.99 -1.78 -736.30 -2.36 -975.91 
GER -27.96 -1171.81 -17.09 -716.43 -13.96 -585.05 -11.68 -489.56 4.12 172.53 0.66 27.87 
DEP 0.11 100.05 -0.12 -109.22 0.00 0.34 0.00 -1.24 -0.60 ·539.62 -0.62 -558.49 
GGD/GSY% 3.54 2779.73 -1.84 0.74 583.77 -0.35 -1.14 -895.10 0.40 
LR% -0.59 -1.43 0.00 -0.21 -0.61 -0.35 
RS% 14.65 41.31 0.10 2.83 -43.50 -45.56 
- % and actual change: mean values of the proportIonate and actual changes respecllvely m holdmg assets by SImulated polIcy changes for the penod of 1969-93. 
- CRR 2% reduction increases the mean value ofBW by around 1649 Rs. crores during the period of 1969-93. 
- GGD for SI and GSY for S2 
- Rs.crore= 10 million rupees 
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Appendix 9.3b Policy effects (69-93): Perfect Solution (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
4. G5Y 2 % reduction 4. OMO 2% purchases 5. Deposit Rate 2% Increase 6. Real Devaluation 10% 
51 52 51 52 51 52 
Orhlinal % chanqe Actual %chanqe Actual % chanqe Actual % chanqe Actual % chanqe Actual % chanQe Actual 
BER 6.79 284.39 7.25 303.75 -7.13 -298.87 -0.40 -16.63 -8.10 -339.35 -6.62 -277.37 
BGD -10.29 -2118.91 -8.28 -1704.65 -6.16 -1269.39 -4.67 -961.33 -5.72 -1177.02 -3.51 -723.07 
BCS 16.46 1376.50 11.36 950.29 16.23 1357.11 10.71 895.75 18.76 1568.28 13.88 1160.98 
BLA 1.04 458.00 1.02 450.59 0.48 211.13 0.19 82.20 -0.12 -51.93 -0.36 -160.57 
OFIGD -13.30 -3613.18 -10.64 -2890.67 -11.52 -3128.54 -8.95 -2430.05 -10.43 -2833.23 -7.30 -1982.47 
OFICS(-) 73.78 2602.10 50.83 1792.86 74.98 2644.52 50.81 1792.09 86.31 3044.04 64.89 2288.58 
OFILA 28.88 6215.30 21.77 4683.54 26.83 5773.09 19.62 4222.16 27.31 5877.30 19.85 4271.07 
PCBCS(-) -72.92 -3400.66 -48.43 -2258.56 -73.69 -3436.33 -50.09 -2336.05 -61.44 -2865.31 -40.49 -1888.07 
PCBLA(-) 9.85 3489.32 6.68 2365.23 10.16 3596.78 7.23 2558.46 8.74 3093.14 6.02 2131.69 
PCBDEP 2.22 88.67 2.67 106.67 4.02 160.46 5.57 222.42 5.70 227.84 6.10 243.63 
HCUR 5.62 1266.59 6.23 1405.06 -15.76 -3552.87 -9.61 -2167.35 -0.08 -18.71 1.69 380.16 
HDEP 0.51 348.25 1.77 1198.09 3.08 2092.90 2.89 1962.58 -0.32 -218.25 -0.51 -345.40 
HGD 6.14 3744.20 4.97 3025.27 9.84 5996.30 5.56 3390.36 7.15 4358.72 4.44 2704.53 
HCS -15.00 -2175.06 -9.76 -1416.00 -14.82 -2148.91 -9.93 -1439.71 -9.58 -1389.54 -5.24 -760.47 
HLA(-) 7.70 3183.98 6.70 2768.91 5.78 2387.44 4.22 1745.89 6.61 2732.23 4.79 1978.81 
GER 6.79 284.39 7.25 303.75 -7.13 -298.87 -0.40 -16.63 -8.10 -339.35 -6.62 -277.37 
DEP 0.49 436.92 1.45 1304.76 2.50 2253.37 2.43 2185.00 0.01 9.60 -0.11 -101.76 
GGD/GSY% -2.53 -1987.90 -1.33 2.04 1598.37 -0.48 0.44 348.47 0.35 
LR% -1.05 -0.54 0.53 0.13 0.07 0.19 
RS% 49.76 28.58 60.57 55.60 66.13 51.25 
SE ad] % chanqe Actual % chanoe Actual % chanQe Actual % chanqe Actual % chanQe Actual % change Actual 
BER 12.18 510.65 7.93 332.16 -3.72 -155.80 -0.04 -1.50 -3.95 -165.68 -5.73 -240.21 
BGD -6.78 -1396.29 -5.06 -1041.38 -4.96 -1020.94 -12.33 -2540.01 -4.00 -824.61 -2.57 -529.59 
BCS 7.80 651.79 5.46 456.18 12.65 1057.86 24.91 2082.50 14.21 1188.25 12.20 1020.26 
BLA 0.58 253.48 0.60 264.91 0.26 114.58 1.05 462.00 -0.45 -199.35 -0.58 -254.89 
OFIGD -4.92 -1335.78 -4.13 -1122.02 -4.29 -1163.93 -9.17 -2489.67 -2.09 -566.77 -1.13 -307.97 
OFICS(-) 40.81 1439.20 28.61 1009.17 67.78 2390.65 132.72 4680.82 76.55 2699.97 66.35 2340.19 
OFILA 12.64 2719.51 9.75 2097.47 16.58 3566.88 33.28 7161.80 15.20 3270.74 12.36 2660.70 
PCBCS(-) -41.82 -1950.10 -26.84 -1251.66 -68.65 -3201.63 -137.48 -6411.54 -53.83 -2510.57 -43.51 -2029.27 
PCBLA(-) 5.45 1928.78 3.53 1249.89 9.08 3214.40 17.73 6276.24 7.19 2545.40 5.87 2079.22 
PCBDEP -0.15 -6.07 0.15 5.91 -0.63 -25.22 -4.33 -172.99 0.79 31.72 1.12 44.77 
HCUR 11.58 2609.48 7.60 1713.09 -11.00 -2480.64 -7.02 -1583.05 5.83 1314.63 4.08 920.09 
HDEP -0.04 -26.11 1.36 923.21 2.50 1697.61 2.52 1708.68 -1.05 -715.18 -1.05 -711.48 
HGD -0.68 -417.07 0.97 593.35 5.13 3127.98 8.25 5028.66 1.52 928.35 1.37 836.55 
HCS -8.02 -1162.68 -4.82 -698.67 -12.89 -1868.84 -26.29 -3813.21 -6.89 -998.85 -4.89 -709.35 
HLA(-) 2.53 1044.21 2.69 1112.49 1.13 467.06 3.26 1347.56 1.27 525.99 0.79 326.59 
GER 12.18 510.65 7.93 332.16 -3.72 -155.80 -0.04 -1.50 -3.95 -165.68 -5.73 -240.21 
DEP -0.04 -32.18 1.03 929.12 1.86 1672.40 1.71 1535.69 -0.76 -683.46 -0.74 -666.71 
GGD/GSY% -4.01 -3149.15 -1.15 1.20 943.09 -0.58 -0.59 -463.03 0.46 
LR% -1.15 -0.49 0.56 0.39 0.07 0.32 
RS% 17.09 9.66 29.48 41.44 32.36 27.28 
- % and actual change: mean values of the proportIonate and actual changes respectively In holdmg assets by sImulated pohcy changes for the penod of 1969-93. 
- OMO 2% purchases increase the mean value ofHW by around 1444 Rs. crores during the period of 1969-93. 
- GGD for SI and GSY for S2 
- Rs.crore= I 0 million rupees 
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Appendix 9.3c Policy effects (69-93): Perfect Solution (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
7. Nominal GDP 10% up with innation rate 8% 8. Nominal GDP 10% up with no innation rate 9. Innatlon rate 8% 
51 52 51 52 51 52 
Original % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % chanqe 
BER 5.47 229.35 -1.35 -56.64 -0.73 -30.74 -14.44 -605.20 3.24 135.77 5.26 
BGD 5.19 1069.56 8.17 1682.66 3.08 634.68 9.22 1899.43 0.43 88.60 -0.98 
BCS -19.14 -1600.13 -21.86 -1827.98 -14.19 -1186.10 -19.80 -1655.51 -3.31 -277.16 -1.37 
BLA 0.68 301.24 0.46 201.98 1.32 582.15 0.82 361.27 0.12 52.79 0.22 
OFIGD 11.43 3103.80 14.86 4036.76 7.83 2125.44 14.73 4001.65 0.46 125.40 -1.35 
OFICS(-) -95.07 -3353.01 -108.06 -3811.12 -60.30 -2126.74 -86.46 -3049.22 -19.69 -694.54 -10.67 
OFILA -30.01 -6456.85 -36.47 -7847.93 -19.76 -4252.17 -32.77 -7050.87 -3.81 -819.95 -0.05 
PCBCS (-) 76.78 3580.82 89.73 4184.47 58.78 2741.07 85.04 3965.99 1.60 74.39 -6.97 
PCBLA(-) -10.17 -3600.09 -12.06 -4271.92 -6.95 -2462.38 -10.81 -3827.10 -0.75 -265.13 0.45 
PCBDEP -0.48 -19.27 -2.19 -87.45 6.97 278.69 3.48 138.88 -4.77 -190.73 -4.19 
HCUR 10.29 2319.22 4.12 928.55 14.75 3325.84 2.58 580.97 -1.00 -225.75 0.93 
HDEP -1.07 -724.94 -1.15 -783.44 0.05 37.10 -0.17 -113.64 -0.41 -279.17 
-0.39 
HGD -9.81 -5977.71 -9.39 -5720.43 -10.46 -6371.01 -9.69 -5902.09 0.57 345.87 0.93 
HCS 12.60 1827.95 15.18 2201.33 12.41 1800.43 17.74 2572.27 -2.37 -343.00 -4.04 
HLA (-) -6.18 -2555.51 -8.16 -3374.02 -2.92 -1207.64 -6.93 -2862.50 -1.21 -502.04 -0.17 
GER 5.47 229.35 -1.35 -56.64 -0.73 -30.74 -14.44 -605.20 3.24 135.77 5.26 
DEP -0.83 -744.21 -0.97 -870.89 0.35 315.78 0.03 25.24 -0.52 -469.90 -0.48 
GGD/GSY% -2.30 -1804.36 1.64 -4.60 -3610.90 10.59 0.71 559.87 
LR% 0.05 0.58 7.34 8.46 1.44 
RS% -75.36 -83.83 -47.29 -65.56 -8.57 
SE adj % chanqe Actual % chanqe Actual % change Actual % chanqe Actual % chanqe Actual % chanqe 
BER 1.76 73.67 -3.03 -126.82 -3.84 -160.96 -15.22 -637.76 2.35 98.57 5.25 
BGD 4.37 899.18 6.33 1303.35 1.84 378.61 6.59 1356.16 -0.06 -13.14 -1.47 
BCS -15.40 -1288.07 -17.03 -1424.11 -10.96 -916.05 -14.94 -1249.60 -1.95 -162.98 -0.47 
BLA 0.69 305.28 0.52 230.21 1.35 592.70 0.93 407.87 0.13 57.98 0.24 
OFIGD 3.33 903.85 4.87 1322.62 2.31 628.72 5.98 1624.21 -0.94 -254.21 -2.01 
OFICS(-) -87.58 -3088.89 -96.35 -3398.31 -53.43 -1884.30 -74.67 -2633.40 -14.81 -522.20 -6.96 
OFILA -18.42 -3964.49 -21.71 -4671.47 -10.29 -2213.93 -18.16 -3908.29 -0.99 -212.40 1.59 
PCBCS(-) 74.54 3476.05 83.79 3907.71 55.47 2587.00 77.93 3634.47 -2.36 -109.97 -10.38 
PCBLA(-) -9.25 -3275.87 -10.51 -3720.67 -5.46 -1931.96 -8.50 -3010.10 -0.05 -18.62 1.01 
PCBDEP 4.45 178.00 3.97 158.49 10.48 418.60 9.33 372.95 -4.31 -172.35 -4.17 
HCUR 6.49 1462.61 2.04 460.01 11.50 2592.49 1.04 235.04 -1.76 -396.14 0.95 
HDEP -0.66 -445.83 -0.66 -449.37 0.42 283.18 0.39 262.76 -0.35 -240.80 -0.36 
HGD -5.01 -3053.24 -4.31 -2626.98 -6.50 -3963.32 -4.89 -2981.38 1.66 1012.49 1.39 
HCS 11.55 1675.22 13.33 1933.51 11.16 1618.75 15.52 2250.67 -3.24 -469.19 -4.76 
HLAI-\ -0.93 -383.33 -1.74 -720.59 0.75 310.73 -1.19 -490.32 -0.33 -135.80 0.22 
GER 1.76 73.67 -3.03 -126.82 -3.84 -160.96 -15.22 -637.76 2.35 98.57 5.25 
DEP -0.30 -267.84 -0.32 -290.88 0.78 701.78 0.71 635.71 -0.46 -413.15 -0.46 
GGD/GSY% -1.59 -1250.21 1.41 -3.77 -2955.99 10.26 0.95 745.13 
LR% -0.06 0.30 7.31 8.17 1.45 
RS% -37.96 -41.00 -19.17 -26.70 -2.72 
% and actual change: mean values of the proportIOnate and actual changes respectively m holdmg assets by simulated policy changes for the penod of 1969-93. 
Rs.crore= I 0 million rupees 
Actual 
220.46 
-201.91 
-114.89 
96.34 
-366.57 
-376.30 
-9.74 
-324.94 
157.62 
-167.32 
209.10 
-261.24 
567.48 
-586.36 
-71.02 
220.46 
-428.56 
0.34 
1.14 
0.58 
Actual 
220.12 
-303.33 
-39.39 
107.65 
-545.05 
-245.46 
342.14 
-483.86 
357.14 
-166.69 
214.32 
-246.44 
847.36 
-689.92 
92.65 
220.12 
-413.13 
0.32 
1.14 
1.17 
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Chapter 10 Simulation Experiments by Endogenising the 
Deposit Rate (PDEP Endogenous Model) 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter is inspired by the 'financial repressionist' view of McKinnon (1973) and 
Shaw (1973). They assert that interest rate ceilings in developing countries have 
caused de stabilizing portfolio shifts from financial to tangible assets when inflation 
accelerates, and consequently such a reaction magnifies the initial inflationary shock. 
Therefore the real deposit rates of interest are often negative. The McKinnon-Shaw 
school considers that low real interest rates are major impediments to financial 
deepening, capital formation and economic growth. This may well be the case for 
India since the mean real deposit rate is negative being -1.45% over the period 1969-
93. See in Appendix 10.1 (in which the mean of the other real interest rates are also 
presented as they are useful later). Further the simulation of removing the deposit rate 
ceiling (i.e. an increase in the deposit rate) in Chapter 9 reveals that private saving and 
the flow of loanable funds are sensitive to changes in the real deposit rate which is 
supportive of the financial repressionist view. 
McKinnon (1988) illustrates that positive real interest rates are closely related to real 
financial growth leading to higher real economic growth in less developed countries, 
and, according to the McKinnon-Shaw school, the growth-maximizing deposit rate of 
interest is the competitive free-market equilibrium rate, since the competitive rate is 
likely to be raised, thus increasing the supply of credit. 
This chapter is designed to investigate further the idea of the McKinnon-Shaw school 
by liberalising the deposit rate. In Chapter 9, the removal of the deposit rate ceiling 
was modelled by an exogenous rise in the deposit rate. In this chapter we consider 
instead an institutional removal of the deposit rate ceiling: the deposit rate is fully 
liberated within simulations and that banks are permitted to adjust pari-passu with 
changes in the key market interest rates. This is based on the argument that any 
market-determined change in the rates on bank assets would create premiums on 
interest rates on the liability side in the banking sector, i.e. on deposit rates. As 
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lending rates rise, banks may wish to raise deposit rates above their 'ceilings' in order 
to attract funds to lend to the private sector. 
In the general equilibrium system, lending rates are determined in the loan market, and 
liberated deposit rates are hypothesized to be determined by the banking sector. We 
then analyse how our proposed simulation experiments affect the flow of funds and the 
endogenous interest rates comparing exogenous deposit rates with endogenous deposit 
rates. In the former, bank profits passively change as market-determined lending rates 
change, whereas in the latter, since banks actively manage deposit rates to encourage 
or discourage deposit flows as loan rates change, the profits can be influenced. 
The model covered in this chapter is termed as 'PDEP endogenous model' as the price 
of deposit (PDEP) enters in simulation as an endogenous variable, whereas the model 
covered in the previous chapter is termed as 'PDEP exogenous model'. 
This chapter is structured in the following manner. In Section 10.2, PDEP is estimated 
by OLS and the results are presented. In Section 10.3, historical simulations are 
presented and evaluated, incorporating the deposit rate equation. Simulation 
experiments are implemented with the perfect tracking solution technique based on the 
original share equations1, and the results are analysed comparing the PDEP exogenous 
model and PDEP endogenous model in Section 10.4. We will examine the effect of 
credit rationing and financial reforms on the endogenous interest rates in Section 10.5. 
We then conclude the impact of simulated liberalisation in deposit rates in the Indian 
financial sector, hence in the economy as a whole in Section 10.6. The notation in this 
chapter is that of Table 9.1, in Chapter 9. 
10.2 Econometric Estimation and Result ofthe PDEP Equation 
The price of deposits (PDEP) was regressed on the price of loans and advances (PLA) 
and SLR using the same data series for the period 1951-93 as for the behavioural 
1 Likewise Chapter 9, simulations with the SE-adjusted share equations are also conducted together with 
Original. The direction of the policy effects is almost the same between them, providing some 
robustness in Original. We do not, however, present the SE-adjusted results here because of space 
constraint. 
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equations. Table 10.1 shows the estimation results by OLS2. The PDEP equation 
indicates the statistically significant coefficients of PLA and SLR. Functional form, 
normality and homoscedasticity are all satisfactory as indicated in the lower part of the 
table. The chow test conducted by dividing the period into 1951-68 and 1969-93 
satisfies the parameter stability (F-test statistics = 0.851463 [Prob. 0.475] ). 
This equation, however, suffers from serial correlation, therefore the Cochrane-Orcutt 
method is employed to take account of autocorrelated errors3. The error terms are 
generated as given by (in the case of first order autoregressive process), 
Ut = PUt-I +B't 
where ct is a white noise. The estimation is often called the quasi-difference 
transformed, such that 
PDEp, - pPDEp'_1 = a(1- p) + Po (PLA, - pPLAt-l) + PI (SLRt - pSLRt-l) + ct 
(10.1) 
(10.2) 
p is estimated by iterative procedures. The results are shown in Table 10.2. p= 0.64 
has a t-ratio of 4.92 and so clearly it is significantly positive. Given the DW -statistic 
of 2.08, autocorrelation has been eradicated from the residuals with the first order error 
process. As compared with the OLS estimates, the coefficient estimate of the constant 
2 We have regressed an 1(0) variable ofPDEP on 1(1) variables ofPLA and SLR. In this case residuals 
should resemble the properties ofthe regressand, i.e. stationary (Dorado, Gonzalo and Marmol, 2001). 
Indeed, we have found the stationarity of residua1s: the Engle-Granger cointegration test statistic is 6.33. 
3 Dealing with autocorrelation might be to include lagged dependent and (or) independent variables as 
additional regressors. However, the inclusion of lagged variables did not solve the problems in the 
current study. Alternatively the model may be re-specified, yet the inclusion of potential explanatory 
variables, CRR and dummy variables did not fit the data well. Further another approach is the first-
difference method. This can be specified by the first-difference transformation of the variables in the 
equation. This is quite a popular methodology. However, this transformation rests on the strong 
assumption that the disturbances are perfectly positively correlation: if we assume that the error term 
(Ut) follows the first-order autoregressive process in equation (10.1) above, this approach implies that 
p =1. Therefore, Cochrane-Orcutt methodology is utilised to deal with autocorrelation problems. This 
method uses the estimated residuals Ut to obtain information about the unknown p. 
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tenn is now statistically significant. There is also improvement of R-bar-squared and 
the standard error of regression. 
Table 10.1 PDEP Equation by OLS 
43 observations from 1951-52 to 1993-94 
PDEPr = -0.0315 + 0.9822 PLAt + 0.0030 SLR t 
(t-ratio) (-1.17) (39.59) (12.55) 
R-Squared = 0.975, R-Bar-Squared = 0.974, 
S.E.ofRegression = 0.0107, DW-statistic = 0.832 
Diagnostic Tests 
LM Serial Correlation 
LM Heteroscedasticity 
Ramsey's RESET test 
Normality 
test statistics [Prob] 
CHSQ(l)= 15.313 [.000] 
CHSQ(I)= 0.000 [.998] 
CHSQ(I)= 0.439 [.508] 
CHSQ(2)= 0.271 [.873] 
Table 10.2 PDEP Equation by Cochrane-Orcutt Method AR(l) 
43 observations from 1951-52 to 1993-94 
PDEp, - pPDEp'_1 = -0.056(1- p) + 1.011(PLAt - pPLAt_l ) + 0.0029(SLRt - pSLRt _ l ) + Gt 
(t-ratio) (-2.20) (50.37) (5.56) 
Ut = 0.642ut-l + ct 
(t-ratio) (4.920) 
R-Squared = 0.984, R-Bar-Squared = 0.983, 
S.E. of Regression = 0.0087, DW-statistic = 2.082 
The estimates derived from the Cochrane-Orcutt method are statistically and 
economically significant. With the coefficient of PLA, 1.01, it is not significantly 
different from unitary relationship between PDEP and PLA. With respect to SLR, an 
increase in the ratio leads to an increase in PDEP or a fall in deposit rates. This can be 
shown in more sophisticated way: Given a unitary relationship in Table 10.2, we have 
(PDEP, - pPDEP'_I) - (PLA - pPLAt _ l ) = -0.056(1- p) + 0.0029(SLRt - pSLRt-\) . 
Since the AIDS prices are the inverse of the real interest rate, it can be re-fonnulated as 
gIven: (LR t - pLRt-\) -(DR - pDRt-\) = -0.056(1- p) + 0.0029(SLRt - pSLRt-I). 
This implies that a loan-deposit rates (LR-DR) margin varies directly with SLR. This 
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is rational behaviour: As SLR increases, banks have to subscribe to more government 
securities and government approved securities at a lower rate than the market rate, and 
this adversely affects their profitability. Consequently, the margin increases. 
(Note that this is an ad-hoc way of endogenising PDEP and not based on a theory of 
bank behaviour: it aims to mimic likely movements over time in loan-deposit margin 
to assure profitability of competitive banking system.) 
10.3 Historical Simulation and the Evaluation 
With the same methodology as in the previous chapter, historical simulation is 
conducted by augmenting the system-wide model with the PDEP equation4• The 
tracking performance of the share of holding of financial assets, market solutions and 
PDEP is presented in the following tables: 
Table 1O.3a SI (GGD endogenous) 
10.3b S2 (PGD endogenous) 
Table lOA Market solutions and PDEP 
In the government debt market, government debt (GGD) is endogenous in Simulation 
1 (S 1), and the price of government debt (PGD) is endogenous in Simulation 2 (S2). 
When the results of PDEP endogenous model are compared with those of PDEP 
exogenous model, Uv (variance) of S2 for OFIGD and OFILA have substantially 
fallen. Other than that generally the results of PDEP endogenous model are broadly 
similar to those ofPDEP exogenous model. 
In the market solutions, given PDEP being endogenous, DEP's RMS error has 
worsened. However, PDEP endogenous model outperforms PDEP exogenous model 
in solving PCS, in particular in S2, the Theil's U falling from 0.31 (in Table 9Ae, 
4 Given p = 0.64 in the deposit rate equation, this implies the inclusion of the dynamic element in the 
system-wide model. 
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Chapter 9) to 0.24 (in Table lOA). The tracking performance ofPGD and PLA is as 
good as that in PDEP exogenous model, and the historical simulation of PDEP also 
performs well. 
These results imply that by endogenising the PDEP, the tracking performance is no 
worse than that of the PDEP exogenous model. 
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Table 10.3a Tracking Performance for the share ofthe financial assets in static simulations: SI (PDEP endogenous) 
Variables RMS error RMS error RMS error Mean Error TheiI's U Urn Uv Uc 
% of mean %of S.D. 
BER 0.0125 39.99 43.76 -0.0002 0.1533 0.0002 0.1225 0.8744 
BGD 0.0333 12.89 82.32 -0.0009 0.0637 0.0007 0.0230 0.9763 
BCS 0.0l32 18.71 40.85 0.0015 0.0851 0.0125 0.0835 0.9040 
BLA 0.0349 5.45 59.36 -0.0004 0.0272 0.0001 0.1482 0.8517 
PCBCS 0.0677 18.79 26.65 -0.0061 0.0763 0.0081 0.0l32 0.9787 
PCBLA 0.0741 9.94 30.83 0.0067 0.0475 0.0083 0.0163 0.9754 
PCBDEP 0.0165 15.66 52.41 -0.0006 0.0754 0.0015 0.0035 0.9950 
OFIGD 0.0649 9.93 100.49 -0.0077 0.0490 0.0l39 0.23l3 0.7547 
OFICS 0.0491 86.09 71.69 -0.0057 0.3517 0.0l34 0.0060 0.9806 
OFILA 0.1023 29.65 94.61 0.0l33 0.1415 0.0170 0.l392 0.8438 
HCUR 0.0390 11.41 27.50 -0.0015 0.0526 0.0015 0.0025 0.9961 
HDEP 0.0350 8.47 32.47 0.0007 0.0369 0.0004 0.0020 0.9976 
HGD 0.0497 10.24 111.76 0.0038 0.0512 0.0058 0.0012 0.9931 
HCS 0.0166 17.39 68.82 -0.0014 0.0839 0.0067 0.0028 0.9906 
HLA 0.0195 5.09 51.37 -0.0017 0.0254 0.0072 0.0007 0.9921 
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Table 10.3b Tracking Performance for the share of the financial assets in static simulations: S2 (PDEP endogenous) 
Variables RMS error RMS error RMS error Mean Error Theil's U Urn Uv Uc 
% of mean % of S.D. 
BER 0.0097 31.03 33.95 -0.0001 0.1152 0.0001 0.0000 0.9998 
BGD 0.0394 15.25 97.41 -0.0008 0.0753 0.0004 0.0004 0.9992 
BCS 0.0131 18.64 40.69 0.0012 0.0847 0.0088 0.0720 0.9192 
BLA 0.0371 5.79 63.07 -0.0004 0.0289 0.0001 0.1355 0.8644 
PCBCS 0.0662 18.37 26.05 -0.0054 0.0746 0.0066 0.0140 0.9793 
PCBLA 0.0726 9.75 30.24 0.0059 0.0465 0.0065 0.0164 0.9771 
PCBDEP 0.0166 15.75 52.73 -0.0005 0.0758 0.0008 0.0072 0.9921 
OFIGD 0.0649 9.93 100.46 -0.0065 0.0490 0.0099 0.3144 0.6756 
OFICS 0.0484 84.85 70.66 -0.0048 0.3506 0.0099 0.0023 0.9879 
OFILA 0.1007 29.19 93.14 0.0113 0.1387 0.0125 0.1629 0.8246 
HCUR 0.0424 12.42 29.93 -0.0007 0.0573 0.0003 0.0114 0.9883 
HDEP 0.0408 8.86 33.97 0.0004 0.0429 0.0001 0.0019 0.9980 
HGD 0.0362 7.47 81.47 0.0027 0.0373 0.0056 0.0001 0.9942 
HCS 0.0165 17.27 68.37 -0.0011 0.0835 0.0046 0.0041 0.9914 
HLA 0.0205 5.36 54.08 -0.0015 0.0267 0.0053 0.0001 0.9946 
301 
Tablel0.4 Tracking Performance for the share of the market solutions and PDEP in static simulations: (PDEP endogenous) 
Variables RMS error RMS error RMS error Mean Error Theil's U Urn Uv Uc 
% of mean % of S.D. 
SI: 
GER 1623.25 66.43 40.29 -9.6972 0.1768 0.0000 0.0136 0.9863 
GOD 2794.93 5.99 3.58 96.9262 0.0156 0.0012 0.0820 0.9168 
DEP 6465.00 12.14 7.37 681.6761 0.0314 0.0111 0.1724 0.8165 
PCS 0.5669 55.90 358.01 -0.0614 0.2529 0.0117 0.5233 0.4650 
PLA 0.0195 2.00 28.01 -0.0005 0.0100 0.0007 0.0007 0.9923 
PDEP 0.0202 1.99 30.43 -0.0010 0.0099 0.0026 0.0230 0.9744 
S2: 
GER 1392.90 57.00 34.58 29.1475 0.1517 0.0004 0.0227 0.9769 
POD 0.0237 2.35 34.33 0.0002 0.0117 0.0001 0.0314 0.9668 
DEP 7416.22 13.93 8.46 688.1957 0.0359 0.0086 0.1828 0.8086 
PCS 0.5493 54.16 346.88 -0.0512 0.2469 0.0087 0.5104 0.4809 
PLA 0.0251 2.57 36.06 -0.0002 0.0128 0.0000 0.0059 0.9940 
PDEP 0.0219 2.16 32.97 -0.0007 0.0108 0.0009 0.0322 0.9669 
- OER, GGD and DEP are In terms ofRs. crore (=10mIlhon rupees). 
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10.4 Policy Analyses by Simulation 
We conduct the same simulation experiments for the period 1969-93 as in the PDEP 
exogenous model based on the perfect tracking solution (i.e. residual-in) using the 
original long-run model in Table 9.3, such that: 
1. CRR 2 % reduction 
2. Bank Rate 2 % reduction 
3. SLR 2 % reduction 
4(SI). Government Securities Yields (GSY) 2 % reduction 
4(S2). Open market purchase of government securities by 2 % 
5. Devaluation by 10 % 
6. GDP 10 % increase with a 8 % inflation rate 
7. GDP 10 % increase with a zero inflation rate 
8. Inflation rate 8% without any growth in GDP 
The first five simulations are associated with the financial reform programme, and the 
rest, with potential shocks from the real sector. Tables 1O.5a, 10.5b and 1O.5c present 
the results ofPDEP endogenous model in the upper part and those ofPDEP exogenous 
model in the lower part (the same one as in Table 9.6 in Chapter 9). (Table 10.5 is 
found after Section 10.6 Concluding remarks.) The discussion is centred around PDEP 
endogenous model-specific features, in particular endogenous interest rates, comparing 
with PDEP exogenous model. The interest rates and devaluation are all in real terms 
unless otherwise noted. 
No. 1 Reduction of eRR by 2% 
In comparison with PDEP exogenous model in the lower table, the policy effect on 
lending rates (LR) in PDEP endogenous model in the upper table is slightly larger, 
whereas it is smaller on Government securities' yields (GSY). A relatively large fall in 
deposit rates (DR) in S2 reduces the holding of deposits (HDEP), as we expect, and 
increases substantially the holding of narrow money (HCUR) as a substitute in the 
household sector. In the stock market, there is a sharp fall in the increase of the return 
303 
on shares (RS) from by 44 % in SI and 53 % in S2 in the lower table to by 16% and 
6% respectively in the upper table. 
The fall of the growth in RS leads to a lesser increase in BCS in the banking sector. 
Banks instead increase BGD, hence the substitution effect between risk-free assets of 
BER and BGD emerges in the upper table. This is adverse, because the funds tend to 
stay in the government sector. Yet, the magnitude of the policy effect in bank lending 
(i.e. BLA) remains the same as in PDEP exogenous model, such that, there is no 
marked difference between the PDEP endogenous and exogenous models in delivering 
loanable funds. 
In the OFIs sector, it is surprising that a flow of funds is considerably suppressed in the 
upper table; especially a rise of OFILA in S2 falls significantly. This could be due to 
the fact that OFILA becomes highly sensitive to the fall ofLR from by -1.69% in the 
lower table to by -1.80% in the upper table. On the other hand, OFIGD becomes 
insensitive to the fall in GSY. The contraction oflending in the OFIs sector appears to 
be responsible for the smaller increase in debt finance in the corporate sector (i.e. 
PCBLA) and also borrowing in the household sector (i.e. HLA) in PDEP endogenous 
model. This may also be indirectly caused by the fall in HDEP, reducing the available 
funds in the financial institutions. These results suggest a somewhat undesirable effect 
on the flow ofloanable funds by endogenising the deposit rate. 
No. 2 Reduction of the Bank Rate by 2 per cent 
The magnitude of the policy effect is trivial, and the substitution effect between risk-
free assets in the banking sector is persistent. Besides, the influence of the bank rate 
on endogenous interest rates is very small, even though deposit rates are now 
liberalised. These results are similar to those of the PDEP exogenous model, 
emphasizing the policy ineffectiveness. 
No. 3 Reduction of SLR by 2 per cent 
With this policy experiment, the impact on DR is not in line with that on LR: LR falls 
whereas DR rises, in other words, the loan-deposit margin falls, as SLR falls. This 
304 
may be that with the fall in the liquidity reserve requirement, banks' profitability can 
potentially improve as discussed in Section 10.2, and that it is affordable to raise DR. 
This behaviour is contrasted with the effect of lowering the cash reserve requirement in 
simulation No.l, in which the margin is maintained. 
However, with the low level of increase in DR (10 basis in S I and 53 basis in S2) there 
is hardly any difference in the flow of funds between PDEP endogenous and PDEP 
exogenous models; a substantial contraction of loanable funds is observed across 
sectors. 
No. 4 (SI) Reduction in Government Securities Yields by 2 per cent 
The endogenous interest rates are quite responsive to the change in GSY (government 
securities yields); there is a fall in LR by 1.54 % and DR by 1.56 %, and the fall in LR 
is more than the one in PDEP exogenous model. This is sharply contrasted with the 
lack of sensitivity of interest rates to a change in the bank rate. 
There is a drastic fall in the change ofRS from by 49.76 % in the lower table to by-
6.09 % in the upper table, implying a rising stock market as deposit rates are 
transferred from the administered to the liberalised regime. This, a relatively large fall 
in deposit rates as against a rise in share prices, may be explained in that, when deposit 
rates fall in line with government securities yields and lending rates, the household 
sector may be attracted to the stock market as an alternative investment opportunity, 
thereby pushing share prices upwards. This is evidenced by the positive sign on RCS 
in the upper table from the negative sign in the lower table. 
An increase in OFILA is extremely small, and this leads to an adverse effect in the 
credit market: there is a substantial decline in the change in PCBLA and RLA as 
compared with PDEP exogenous model; in particular the effect on PCBLA turns into a 
negative from by 9.85% in the lower table to by -0.96% in the upper table. These 
results are very similar to the one found in the simulation of CRR in S2, so that the 
similar reason may apply: the OFILA becomes highly sensitive to the lending rate, 
when LR falls further from by -1.05 in PDEP exogenous model to by -1.54 in PDEP 
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endogenous model. The household sector's disinvestment in deposits may also 
contribute to a reduction in loans in the credit market. 
No.4 (S2) Open Market Purchases by 2 per cent 
With respect to the open market purchases, given only a small fall in DR by 56 basis 
points, the direction and magnitude of the flow of funds are broadly the same as in 
PDEP exogenous model. It seems that the policy is not particularly affected by the 
liberalisation of deposit rates as in the case of the Bank rate. 
No.5 Real Devaluation by 10 per cent 
The policy effect on the interest rates is a broadly similar in the upper and lower tables. 
The effect of devaluation on the DR is numerically marginal. Yet, the loan market 
seems to be dampened in PDEP endogenous model: demand for and supply of loans 
both fall as compared with PDEP exogenous model. 
No.6 Rise in Nominal GDP by 10 per cent with Inflation rate 8 per cent 
Between the upper and lower tables, there is no marked difference in the flow of funds, 
yet this simulation provides some insight into the behaviour in the banking sector on 
DR and its consequences. In SI, although DR falls only marginally by 6 basis points, 
the fall in HDEP is more than twice that in PDEP exogenous model. This may be due 
to the following reasons. The actual mean inflation rate for the period 1969-93 is 
8.33%. Thus, with the assumption of the rate of inflation at 8% in this simulation, a 
0.33% rise in the real deposit rate is expected, if the banking sector maintains the 
nominal deposit rate. This is satisfied in S2 regime where DR rises by 57 basis points, 
however, in the SI regime, DR falls by 6 basis points, implying that banks reduce the 
nominal deposit rate in order to maintain the loan-deposit margin as GDP increases. 
This consequently discourages deposits in the household sector. At the same time this 
implies that the portfolio behaviour in the household sector may be sensitive not only 
to the real rates, but also to the nominal rates. 
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No.7 Rise in Nominal GDP 10 per cent with Zero Inflation rate 
In the case of the simulated shock of a 10% increase in GDP without inflation, DR 
itself may be seen as the nominal rate. Thus the actual mean inflation rate of8.33% is 
to be raised in DR if the banking sector is to maintain nominal deposit rates. This is 
satisfied in S2 with an increase of by 8.54%, but in SI regime, DR increases by 7.21 %, 
being less than the actual inflation rate, hence HDEP falls more in SI than in S2. This 
again shows that banks reduce the nominal deposit rate as GDP rises in SI. 
No.8 Inflation Rate 8 per cent without any Growth in GDP 
With an inflation rate of 8%, there is an increase in real deposit rate by 2.10% in SI 
and by 1.08% in S2. However, this does not necessarily mean that the real deposit rate 
is positive. The actual mean real deposit rate over the period 1969-93 is -1.45%; in SI 
the real deposit rate is now positive, but in S2 it is still negative. The case of S2 may 
be a classical case for a developing economy as the McKinnon-Shaw school asserts: 
the financial sector is framed with strict regulations interacting with price inflation and 
negative real deposit rates, preventing financial deepening. Yet, there are two 
conflicting features of our results from their assertion: First, their argument is based 
on administered deposit rates, whereas our simulation results are based on liberalised 
deposit rates. Second, with the inflation rate of 8 %, the financial flow is relatively 
active across sectors in PDEP endogenous model; this seems to be caused by a drastic 
increase in RS in the upper table. 
10.5 The Impact of Credit Rationing and Financial Reforms on the Endogenous 
Interest Rates in PDEP Exogenous Model and PDEP Endogenous Model 
The effects of credit rationing and financial reforms on the endogenous interest rates of 
GSY, LR, RS and DR are examined for both PDEP exogenous and PDEP endogenous 
models. This is easily conducted by undoing the dummy 69 and dummy 90 from the 
behavioural equations in simulation. By deleting dummy 69, the simulated values in 
the post-1969 period can be regarded as being the values in the case where there 
existed no credit rationing (or no priority sector lending requirements). Similarly, by 
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deleting dummy 90, the simulation values in the post-1990 period can be interpreted as 
being the values in the case where there were no financial reforms. In both cases, the 
perfect tracking solutions (i.e. residuals-in) of Original are applied. Since the real 
AIDS prices enter in the simulation, the results are converted into the real interest 
rates. 
Table 10.6 presents the mean values of the difference between the actual values and 
simulated values by undoing dummies for the period 1969-93 and 1990-93 for the 
credit rationing and financial reform respectively. The figures are quite large 
reflecting the substantial impact of the two financial shifts on the whole financial 
sector. The salient features are as follows: 
Table 10.6 Effects of the Credit Rationing (1969) and the Financial Reforms (1990) on the Real 
Interest Rates (mean values in %): Original, Perfect solution 
a) PDEP exogenous model 
SI S2 
RS LR RS LR GSY 
Credit Rationing -90.22 4.81 -68.80 6.97 2.70 
Financial Refonns -100.50 -7.78 41.90 -12.63 -8.45 
b) PDEP endogenous model 
SI S2 
RS LR OR RS LR GSY OR 
Credit Rationing 86.55 6.84 6.92 89.44 7.70 1.22 7.86 
Financial Refonns -57.45 -7.17 -7.25 -60.04 -12.89 -7.69 -13.04 
Notes: Mean value = Actual values - Simulated values, for the period 1969-93 and 1990-93. 
RS: Real return on shares, LR: Real lending rate, OR: Real deposit rate, GSY: Real government 
securities' yields 
i) Common to both models, the mean values in SI are smaller than those of S2 
for LR and DR, and the mean values of GSY are much smaller than those of LR. The 
former is perhaps due to the fact that the exogenous government securities' yields, to 
308 
some extent, suppress the results in SI, whereas the latter may be due to the fact that 
the variation of LR is larger than that of GSy5. 
ii) It is also evident in both tables that, in general, the impact of financial reform is 
larger than that of credit rationing. This can be explained in that India experienced a 
higher rate of inflation in the post-reform period (from 6% in 1989 rising to 14% in 
1991) and this may in part have contributed to the large fall in real interest rates. 
iii) Elsewhere, the impact on RS is very volatile and the direction of the effect is 
mixed between PDEP exogenous and PDEP endogenous model: The credit rationing 
lowers RS in PDEP exogenous, whereas it raises RS in PDEP endogenous. The latter 
is intuitively plausible in that credit control dampens the stock market, leading to a rise 
in RS. With respect to the effect of the financial reforms, in PDEP exogenous model, 
RS falls in SI and rises in S2, whereas in the PDEP endogenous model it falls in both 
SI and S2. The fall in RS is more plausible as it implies that the financial 
liberalisation is associated with the growth in the stock market as experienced in India. 
Overall, given a volatile movement and some evidence of the counter-intuitive results, 
this reiterates the view that the stock market is prone to be driven by the speCUlative 
movement. 
iv) For other interest rates, we have obtained similar result between the two 
models, and the outcome is quite sensible: Credit rationing increases these interest 
rates as indicated in a positive way, whereas the financial reforms lower them as 
suggested in a negative way6. This implies that credit rationing exerts a contractionary 
effect, whereas the financial reforms exert an expansionary effect in the economy. The 
higher loan rates under the regime of credit rationing may be explained by the fact that 
directed credit programs reduce the financial system's flexibility, whilst increasing its 
fragility (Fry, 1995). Firstly, in that the funds available for discretionary bank lending 
are reduced; Secondly the banks increase their risk exposure with no compensating 
retum7• This consequently pushes up loan rates, and the economic efficiency of 
resource allocation is largely distorted through credit rationing. Financial reforms may 
5 The variance of nominal lending rate is 29.20, whereas that ofnorninal GSY is 8.77 (Table 4.6a in 
Chapter 4). 
6 With respect to the government securities' yields, there is a need for clarification. In the post-reform 
period, government securities' yields were market-determined and the yields were raised. In this 
section, we are not comparing the controlled securities' yields with the market-determined yields, but 
the market-determined yields without financial reforms vs. those with financial reforms. We find here 
that the market-determined yields would have been higher without financial reforms. 
7 Directed credit programs are partly responsible for the alarming amount of non-performing assets in 
many financial institutions in developing countries (Fry, 1995). 
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have been successful on this point, since the reforms have contributed to lowering the 
loan rate, reflecting the lessening of credit control. 
v) In PDEP endogenous model in Table 10.6b there emerges some trade-off effect 
between the expansionary effect and saving-accumulation. With credit rationing DR 
rises in line with LR exerting a desirable impact in increasing deposits in the 
household sector, whereas, with the financial reform DR falls in line with LR and this 
exerts an adverse effect on saving accumulation. 
10.6 Concluding Remarks 
It is evident that the GSY as a policy instrument in SI has a significant influence on 
the endogenous interest rates in the financial markets. Such a strong impact of the 
GSY seems to impede the flow of loanable funds, as a fall in administered GSY also 
leads to a fall in DR, and this in turn reduces the loanable funds. This is contrasted 
with the desirable policy effect of GSY found in PDEP exogenous model. In this 
respect, the controlled GSY combined with the de-regulated deposit rate exerts an 
adverse effect on a flow of loanable funds. A similar detrimental effect is also 
observed by lowering CRR in S2. 
Being associated with the policy change in GSY and CRR, it is noticeable that the 
OFIs sector becomes highly sensitive, when there is a large fall in lending rates. This 
may be due to the fact that, while the banking sector is able to maintain their 
profitability in the liberalised deposit rate regime, the OFIs sector have to obtain funds 
from other sources, which may not be directly linked with the level of lending rates, 
and profitability may decline as lending rates fall. This may subsequently force the 
OFIs to take prudential measures against falling lending rates. 
Overall, in the expansionary policy simulation, the deposit rates fall in line with the 
lending rates, so that banks maintain loan-deposit margins, however, this discourages 
deposit savings in the household sector. This, coupled with the OFIs' risk-averse 
behaviour, adversely affects the credit market. In this respect, market-determined 
deposit rates may be no better (if not worse) than the administered rates. This result 
may be taken to suggest evidence of financial repression in market-detennined deposit 
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rates, though, according to the McKinnon-Shaw school, financial repression IS 
associated with regulated deposit rates. 
The simulation experiments therefore raise the question of leaving the interest rates in 
a free market environment or totally at banks' discretion, as a policy prescription to 
improve the real interest rate structure. In the case of India, it may be that nominal 
deposit rates are better off regulated and should be raised high, to the point where this 
would lead to a positive real interest rate. However, this in turn implies that, with the 
administered deposit rates, banks' profits may be squeezed and that this incurs cost in 
the banking sector. 
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Table IO.Sa PDEP Endogenous Model vs PDEP Exogenous Model Policy Effects 169-93): Perfect Solution (Original) (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
1. eRR 2% reduction 2. Bank Rate 2% reduction 3. 5LR 2% reduction 
51 52 51 52 Sl S2 
Endogenous % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change 
BER -30.45 -1276.38 -17.07 -715.50 -13.98 -585.90 -11.64 -488.03 8.17 342.23 2.27 
BGO 2.68 551.09 2.44 502.64 2.77 571.10 2.22 457.51 8.54 1758.80 10.05 
BC5 11.52 963.01 5.57 465.80 0.11 9.06 -0.03 -2.74 -27.96 -2338.12 -27.76 
BLA 3.21 1411.41 3.17 1396.21 0.01 5.73 0.08 33.25 0.54 237.11 0.36 
OFIGD -2.28 -619.29 0.30 82.20 -0.02 -4.71 -0.24 -64.21 15.60 4237.48 16.26 
OFIC5 (-) 41.71 1471.14 14.42 508.49 0.27 9.55 -0.62 -21.85 -103.37 -3645.68 -101.69 
OFILA 9.71 2090.44 1.98 426.29 0.07 14.26 0.20 42.35 -36.63 -7883.20 -37.19 
PCBCS (-) -36.12 -1684.33 -8.46 -394.52 -0.16 -7.66 0.63 29.59 85.13 3970.05 83.72 
PCBLA (-) 4.97 1758.89 1.20 424.27 0.03 9.03 -0.09 -31.10 -12.54 -4441.36 -12.34 
PCBDEP 1.87 74.57 0.74 29.76 0.03 1.38 -0.04 -1.50 -11.79 -471.30 -11.62 
HCUR -2.75 -620.58 16.33 3680.89 -0.02 -4.33 3.12 702.74 10.70 2412.02 2.65 
HDEP 0.22 150.50 -1.98 -1344.98 0.00 1.74 -0.31 -212.18 -1.13 -766.82 -<l.33 
HGO 5.56 3389.24 -<l.96 -585.85 0.03 20.73 -0.65 -394.31 -12.33 -7512.40 -10.65 
HCS -8.11 -1176.20 -2.43 -351.82 -0.05 -7.17 0.07 10.48 18.36 2662.49 18.20 
HLA(-) 4.22 1742.96 3.38 1398.23 0.03 10.96 0.26 106.71 -7.75 -3204.74 -8.41 
GER -30.45 -1276.38 -17.07 -715.50 -13.98 -585.90 -11.64 -488.03 8.17 342.23 2.27 
DEP 0.25 225.07 -1.46 -1315.22 0.00 3.12 -<l.24 -213.68 -1.38 -1238.12 -<l.77 
GGO/GSY% 4.23 3321.04 -1.34 0.75 587.12 -<l.32 -1.93 -1516.13 
lR% -0.69 -1.80 0.00 -0.25 -0.48 
RS% 16.31 6.52 0.21 -0.59 -83.63 
DR% -0.69 -1.82 0.00 -0.25 0.10 
Exogenous % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % chanQe Actual % chanQe 
BER -34.19 -1433.01 -16.99 -711.89 -14.02 -587.40 -11.88 -497.99 8.00 335.34 2.41 
BGO -0.27 -55.51 -0.79 -162.77 2.75 565.55 1.06 218.93 8.35 1720.36 10.71 
BCS 19.06 1593.41 13.54 1132.01 0.19 15.67 2.51 210.27 -27.54 -2302.88 -29.68 
BlA 3.51 1544.24 3.16 1391.79 0.01 6.18 0.16 68.78 0.56 247.21 0.40 
OFIGO -6.90 -1873.83 -6.52 -1770.00 -<l.06 -16.63 -2.15 -583.27 15.20 4127.10 17.95 
OFICS(-) 74.86 2640.24 51.85 1828.71 0.61 21.45 11.20 395.10 -101.19 -3568.94 -111.47 
OFILA 20.98 4514.10 16.72 3598.73 0.18 38.08 4.55 978.37 -35.77 -7696.08 -40.92 
PCBCS(-) -67.41 -3143.70 -45.27 -2111.34 -0.46 -21.50 -10.68 -497.87 82.66 3854.87 92.88 
PCBLA(-) 9.10 3220.94 6.60 2338.33 0.06 22.55 1.47 521.20 -12.18 -4313.30 -13.68 
PCBOEP 1.93 77.25 5.68 227.00 0.03 1.05 0.58 23.34 -11.47 -458.42 -12.85 
HCUR -6.68 -1504.90 7.93 1788.32 -0.05 -10.16 1.96 442.42 9.77 2202.44 4.79 
HDEP 0.69 467.51 0.51 346.74 0.00 2.80 0.05 33.25 -0.91 -618.03 -0.98 
HGO 9.80 5971.65 3.17 1931.77 0.07 44.80 0.60 363.33 -12.00 -7308.76 -11.62 
HCS -14.46 -2096.87 -9.75 -1414.63 -0.11 -15.72 -2.16 -313.04 17.85 2588.82 19.87 
HLA(-) 6.87 2837.39 6.42 2652.19 0.05 21.71 1.27 525.95 -7.59 -3135.57 -9.16 
GER -34.19 -1433.01 -16.99 -711.89 -14.02 -587.40 -11.88 -497.99 8.00 335.34 2.41 
OEP 0.61 544.75 0.64 573.74 0.00 3.86 0.06 56.59 -1.20 -1076.45 -1.31 
GGO/GSY% 5.15 4042.30 -1.73 0.76 593.71 -0.40 -1.86 -1461.31 
lR% -0.46 -1.69 0.00 -<l.24 -0.48 
RS% 44.66 53.68 0.44 8.49 -85.00 
% and actual change: mean values of the proportionate and actual changes respectIvely In holding assets by simulated pohcy changes for the pen od of 1969-93. 
Exogenous: PDEP Exogenous Model, reproduced from Table 9.6 in Chapter 9. Rs. crore = 10 million rupees. 
CRR 2% reduction increases the mean value ofBW by around 1649 Rs. crores during the period of 1969-93. 
Actual 
95.01 
2069.58 
-2321.09 
156.52 
4416.50 
-3586.35 
-8002.89 
3904.13 
-4368.59 
-464.45 
597.61 
-227.13 
-6487.09 
2638.87 
-3477.78 
95.01 
-691.59 
0.57 
-<l.05 
-82.51 
0.53 
Actual 
101.05 
2205.75 
-2481.71 
174.94 
4874.15 
-3931.60 
-8805.79 
4331.42 
-4844.84 
-513.42 
1080.56 
-667.17 
-7080.90 
2881.53 
-3786.01 
101.05 
-1180.58 
0.63 
-0.06 
-91.45 
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Table lO.5b PDEP Endo2enous Model vs PDEP Exo2enous Model Policy Effects (69-93): Perfect Solution (Original) (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
4. G5Y 2 % reduction (51) I OMO 2% purchases (52) 5. Devaluation 10% 6. Nominal GDP 10% up with Inflation rate 80/. 
51 52 51 52 51 52 
Endogenous % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % chanQe Actual 
BER 14.98 627.73 7.32 306.96 -4.55 -190.71 -6.40 -268.22 6.87 287.89 -1.31 -54.98 
BGD -3.34 -687.78 -8.07 -1662.00 -2.72 -560.45 -2.36 -486.25 6.40 1317.59 8.50 1750.01 
BCS -1.36 -113.83 10.17 850.66 11.88 993.19 12.13 1014.50 -22.96 -1919.58 -22.69 -1896.97 
BLA 0.40 173.88 1.15 504.38 -<l.55 -242.05 -<l.59 -260.05 0.71 314.12 0.46 201.95 
OFIGD -1.12 -303.91 -9.57 -2599.67 -6.26 -1699.69 -6.19 -1681.66 14.74 4003.84 15.67 4255.46 
OFICS(-) -7.69 -271.35 44.77 1578.98 56.37 1988.00 57.57 2030.61 -114.70 -4045.54 -112.41 -3964.63 
OFILA 0.15 32.55 19.42 4178.66 17.14 3687.71 17.25 3712.29 -37.41 -8049.43 -38.20 -8220.13 
PCBCS (-) 6.90 321.95 -43.32 -2020.31 -31.52 -1469.77 -32.77 -1528.21 96.00 4476.95 94.09 4387.70 
PCBLA(-) -<l.96 -339.80 5.84 2067.31 4.91 1737.99 5.08 1798.79 -12.99 -4600.77 -12.71 -4502.06 
PCBDEP -0.45 -17.84 1.18 47.00 6.71 268.23 6.77 270.59 -3.10 -123.81 -2.86 -114.36 
HCUR 20.18 4549.43 8.50 1916.80 3.41 768.61 0.77 174.23 16.40 3697.57 5.21 1174.24 
HOEP -2.03 -1374.41 1.09 742.82 -<l.55 -376.10 -<l.26 -175.56 -2.58 -1753.04 -1.48 -1003.89 
HGD -4.58 -2793.19 4.42 2691.63 2.94 1790.13 3.56 2166.90 -12.19 -7430.03 -9.86 -6006.49 
HCS 1.13 164.43 -8.91 -1291.99 -3.27 -474.96 -3.53 -512.11 16.21 2351.00 16.00 2320.04 
HLA(-l 1.32 546.23 6.33 2615.73 4.13 1707.67 4.00 1653.45 -7.58 -3134.54 -8.51 -3516.12 
GER 14.98 627.73 7.32 306.96 -4.55 -190.71 -6.40 -268.22 6.87 287.89 -1.31 -54.98 
DEP -1.55 -1392.25 0.88 789.82 -<l.12 -107.88 0.11 95.02 -2.09 -1876.85 -1.24 -1118.24 
GGD/GSY% -4.82 -3784.89 -1.23 -<l.60 -470.01 0.35 -2.69 -2108.62 1.67 
LR% -1.54 -<l.55 -0.07 0.21 -<l.06 0.57 
RS% -6.09 15.57 51.90 53.17 -90.01 -88.38 
DR% -1.56 -<l.56 -0.07 0.21 -0.06 0.57 
Exogenous % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % chanQe Actual 
BER 6.79 284.39 7.25 303.75 -8.10 -339.35 -6.62 -277.37 5.47 229.35 -1.35 -56.64 
BGD -10.29 -2118.91 -8.28 -1704.65 -5.72 -1177.02 -3.51 -723.07 5.19 1069.56 8.17 1682.66 
BCS 16.46 1376.50 11.36 950.29 18.76 1568.28 13.88 1160.98 -19.14 -1600.13 -21.86 -1827.98 
BLA 1.04 458.00 1.02 450.59 -<l.12 -51.93 -<l.36 -160.57 0.68 301.24 0.46 201.98 
OFIGD -13.30 -3613.18 -10.64 -2890.67 -10.43 -2833.23 -7.30 -1982.47 11.43 3103.80 14.86 4036.76 
OFICS (-) 73.78 2602.10 50.83 1792.86 86.31 3044.04 64.89 2288.58 -95.07 -3353.01 -108.06 -3811.12 
OFILA 28.88 6215.30 21.77 4683.54 27.31 5877.30 19.85 4271.07 -30.01 -6456.85 -36.47 -7847.93 
PCBCS(-) -72.92 -3400.66 -48.43 -2258.56 -61.44 -2865.31 -40.49 -1888.07 76.78 3580.82 89.73 4184.47 
PCBLA(-) 9.85 3489.32 6.68 2365.23 8.74 3093.14 6.02 2131.69 -10.17 -3600.09 -12.06 -4271.92 
PCBDEP 2.22 88.67 2.67 106.67 5.70 227.84 6.10 243.63 -<l.48 -19.27 -2.19 -87.45 
HCUR 5.62 1266.59 6.23 1405.06 -0.08 -18.71 1.69 380.16 10.29 2319.22 4.12 928.55 
HDEP 0.51 348.25 1.77 1198.09 -0.32 -218.25 -<l.51 -345.40 -1.07 -724.94 -1.15 -783.44 
HGO 6.14 3744.20 4.97 3025.27 7.15 4358.72 4.44 2704.53 -9.81 -5977.71 -9.39 -5720.43 
HCS -15.00 -2175.06 -9.76 -1416.00 -9.58 -1389.54 -5.24 -760.47 12.60 1827.95 15.18 2201.33 
HLA(-) 7.70 3183.98 6.70 2768.91 6.61 2732.23 4.79 1978.81 -6.18 -2555.51 -8.16 -3374.02 
GER 6.79 284.39 7.25 303.75 -8.10 -339.35 -6.62 -277.37 5.47 229.35 -1.35 -56.64 
DE? 0.49 436.92 1.45 1304.76 0.01 9.60 -<l.11 -101.76 -<l.83 -744.21 -0.97 -870.89 
GGD/GSY% -2.53 -1987.90 -1.33 0.44 348.47 0.35 -2.30 -1804.36 1.64 
LR% -1.05 -<l.54 0.07 0.19 0.05 0.58 
RS% 49.76 28.58 66.13 51.25 -75.36 -83.83 
% and actual change: mean values of the proportIOnate and actual changes respectively m holdmg assets by sImulated polIcy changes for the penod of 1969-93. 
Exogenous: PDEP Exogenous Model, reproduced from Table 9.6 in Chapter 9. 
OMO 2% purchases increase the HW by around 1444 Rs. crores. Rs. crore = ID million rupees. 
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Table IO.Sc PDEP Endo~enous Model vs PDEP Exo~enous Model Policy Effects (69-93): Perfect Solution (Original) (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
7. Nominal GDP 10% up with no innation rate 8. Innation rate 8% 
51 52 51 52 
Endo!lenOU5 % chanQe Actual % chanQe Actual % chanQe Actual % chanQe Actual 
BER 1.89 79.19 -14.37 -602.23 -5.65 -236.87 3.12 130.84 
BGD 5.33 1097.88 9.57 1970.71 -6.63 -1364.78 -9.29 -1912.12 
BC5 -21.01 -1756.85 -20.64 -1726.02 15.69 1311.96 16.35 1366.74 
BLA 1.32 579.78 0.81 357.54 0.66 289.67 0.94 414.52 
OFIGD 13.57 3684.44 15.53 4218.32 -12.00 -3259.73 -13.68 -3715.01 
OFIC5(-) -94.68 -3339.35 -90.90 -3206.10 66.92 2360.27 68.95 2431.69 
OFILA -32.64 -7023.79 -34.50 -7424.42 26.12 5620.03 28.57 6146.72 
PCBCS(-) 92.49 4313.20 89.49 4173.49 -79.98 -3730.03 -81.99 -3823.59 
PCBLA(-) -11.92 -4219.48 -11.47 4062.78 10.25 3630.37 10.49 3713.00 
PCBDEP 2.35 93.72 2.77 110.70 -2.49 -99.66 -2.77 -110.58 
HCUR 25.82 5820.92 3.72 838.88 -13.05 -2941.77 -0.90 -202.68 
HDEP -2.68 -1820.59 -0.51 -346.34 1.49 1013.75 0.27 183.42 
HGD -14.70 -8955.55 -10.16 -6190.04 11.31 6889.04 9.23 5626.12 
HC~ (-) 18.83 2730.70 18.57 2693.41 -18.49 -2681.71 -19.02 -2758.65 HLA - -5.38 -2224.53 -7.27 -3004.10 5.51 2279.33 6.89 2848.23 
GER 1.89 79.19 -14.37 -602.23 -5.65 -236.87 3.12 130.84 
DEP -1.92 -1726.87 -0.26 -235.64 1.02 914.09 0.08 72.83 
GGD/GSY% -5.32 -4173.25 10.63 2.89 2264.52 -0.51 
LR% 7.13 8.44 2.07 1.07 
RS% -74.09 -70.74 88.44 89.96 
DR% 7.21 8.54 2.10 1.08 
Exo!lenous % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual % change Actual 
BER -0.73 -30.74 -14.44 -605.20 3.24 135.77 5.26 220.46 
BGD 3.08 634.68 9.22 1899.43 0.43 88.60 -0.98 -201.91 
BCS -14.19 -1186.10 -19.80 -1655.51 -3.31 -277.16 -1.37 -114.89 
BLA 1.32 582.15 0.82 361.27 0.12 52.79 0.22 96.34 
OFiGD 7.83 2125.44 14.73 4001.65 0.46 125.40 -1.35 -366.57 
OFiCS(-) -60.30 -2126.74 -86.46 -3049.22 -19.69 -694.54 -10.67 -376.30 
OFILA -19.76 -4252.17 -32.77 -7050.87 -3.81 -819.95 -0.05 -9.74 
PCBCS (-) 58.78 2741.07 85.04 3965.99 1.60 74.39 -6.97 -324.94 
PCBLA(-) -6.95 -2462.38 -10.81 -3827.10 -0.75 -265.13 0.45 157.62 
PCBDEP 6.97 278.69 3.48 138.88 -4.77 -190.73 -4.19 -167.32 
HCUR 14.75 3325.84 2.58 580.97 -LOO -225.75 0.93 209.10 
HDEP 0.05 37.10 -0.17 -113.64 -0.41 -279.17 -0.39 -261.24 
HGD -10.46 -6371.01 -9.69 -5902.09 0.57 345.87 0.93 567.48 
HC~ (-) 12.41 1800.43 17.74 2572.27 -2.37 -343.00 -4.04 -586.36 HLA - -2.92 -1207.64 -6.93 -2862.50 -1.21 -502.04 -0.17 -71.02 
GER -0.73 -30.74 -14.44 -605.20 3.24 135.77 5.26 220.46 
DEP 0.35 315.78 0.03 25.24 -0.52 -469.90 -0.48 -428.56 
GGD/GSY% -4.60 -3610.90 10.59 0.71 559.87 0.34 
LR% 7.34 8.46 1.44 1.14 
RS% 47.29 -65.56 -8.57 0.58 
% and actual change: mean values of the proportIOnate and actual changes respectIvely m holdmg assets by sImulated polIcy changes for the period of 1969-93. 
Exogenous: PDEP Exogenous Model, reproduced from Table 9.6 in Chapter 9. Rs. crore = 10 million rupees. 
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Appendix 10.1 Mean values of the real interest rates (%) over the respective periods 
Period 51-93 69-93 90-93 
GSY -0.98 -1.27 1.40 
LR 2.44 4.03 5.27 
RS -1.41 1.03 10.67 
DR -1.39 -1.45 -0.75 
.. GSY: Real government secuntles YIelds, LR: Reallendmg rate, RS: Real return on shares and DR: Real deposIt rates 
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Chapter 11 Stochastic Simulation on a System-wide Flow of 
Funds Model: Policy Implications 
11.1. Introduction 
This chapter is inspired by Brainard (1967), who argues that optimal policy in the 
presence of uncertainty is found to differ significantly from optimal policy in a world of 
certainty. This implies that the actual response of endogenous variables (or target 
variables) to policy action may differ from the expected value of the response coefficient 
that is estimated. This is because in deterministic simulations, the error process of the 
model is ignored, and that the uncertainty element is assumed away (Murinde and 
Rarawa, 1996). The deterministic policy impact therefore remains a crude criterion. 
In this chapter, a stochastic simulation technique is implemented to uncover the properties 
of the error term of the model or the stochastic nature of policy effects (Hall 1986). The 
uncertainty that is attached to policy effects can be reckoned by comparing the results 
with those in the deterministic simulation obtained in Chapter 9 (PDEP Exogenous 
Model). The policy experiments are therefore as before expansionary in terms of a flow 
of loanable funds. We specifically consider the uncertainty, which is embedded in the 
financial institutions, as their portfolio behaviour has a major influence on the financial 
sector. 
The study in this chapter has important implications for the robustness of policies and at 
the same time for the estimated model itself, in the sense, that if policy effects are 
insensitive to the true structure of the model (i.e. there is no large deviation in results 
between deterministic and stochastic simulations), then the policy undertaken is robust 
and also the model is robust. But if policy effects are sensitive (i.e. there is a large 
deviation), then either the policy or the model, or both may not be robust. 
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, the simulation experiments go beyond 
the single-shot policy experiments, as we apply the simulation techniques to multiple 
policy experiments. These experiments can be interpreted as the impact of a 'policy 
package'. The idea is that we want to measure the interdependent policy effects in 
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deterministic and stochastic experiments. Second is associated with the scale of the 
stochastic simulation. The application of stochastic simulation for developing economies 
is found in Murinde (1992) and Murinde and Rarawa (1996) in a dynamic 
macroeconomic model. Our approach to stochastic simulation is static as the model is 
based on a long-run equilibrium model. However, the scale of the stochastic model far 
exceeds that of Murinde and Murinde and Rarawa: they use only three equations for 
simulation, whereas we employ fifteen behavioural equations and five market clearing 
conditions. To the best of our knowledge, stochastic simulation has never previously 
been applied to such a large scale system model for developing economies. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured into 4 sections. Section 11.2 deals with the 
methodology of stochastic simulation. In Section 11.3, the results of stochastic 
simulations together with those of deterministic simulations are reported. In this section, 
we have taken a unique selective presentation by segregating the policy effects into 
mainly the credit market, the equity market, the government securities' market and the 
currency market. In this way, a comparative analysis of the different policies is 
specifically conducted for each market. This means that individual policy effects are not 
discussed1• Section 11.4 summarises the results with concluding remarks. 
For notation in this chapter, refer to Table 9.1 in Chapter 9. 
11.2 Methodology 
11.2.1 Error Term in the Model 
The error term in the model is specified in the work of Hall (1986, p.I82), who sets up a 
formal framework for analysing the forecasting error. 
We define 
Y=Y(X,A,U) (11.1 ) 
1 We believe that this is suffice as we have already discussed the policy effects in depth for each policy 
instrument in Chapter 9 and 10. 
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as a general economic model in usual notation, where U = error term. 
Y = Y(.X,A,c) (11.2) 
as the deterministic model forecasts, where Y = functional form estimated, X = the 
estimated exogenous variables, A = the estimated set of coefficients and c = residuals. 
By definition the model's error is given by Y - Y . 
We may now define 
(11.3) 
as the forecast of Y given by the true parameters but with the estimated functional form 
and the estimated exogenous variables, 
Y =Y(X,A,c) (11.4) 
as the forecast of Y given by the true parameters and the true functional form, but the 
exogenous variables are estimated, 
y* = Y(X,A,c) (11.5) 
as the forecast of Y given by the true model structure and the parameters with the true 
exogenous variables. 
Then we can decompose the error of the model into four parts as given by 
Y - Y = (Y - Y) + (Y - Y) + (Y - Y*) + (Y * - Y) 
where 
(Y - Y) = the error caused by incorrect parameter estimates 
(Y - Y) = the error caused by mis-specified functional form 
(11.6) 
(Y - Y*)= the error caused by incorrectly forecast estimated exogenous variables 
(Y * -Y) = the error caused by implicit additive error term 
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Hall (1986) comments that there is no uniquely recognised approach to stochastic 
simulation experiments. What we consider about uncertainty is associated with the 
incorrect parameter estimates2 i.e. the component of (:r -Y) in equation (11.6). In 
particular, we focus on random effects on the interest rate parameters in the portfolio 
behaviour of financial institutions in India, assuming away other error processes. This 
will enable us to isolate the uncertainty in portfolio behaviour of the financial institutions 
in India from other types of uncertainty. The reason for concentrating on financial 
institutions is that there are the intermediaries in the economy, and the impact of interest 
rate is particularly important in understanding their portfolio behaviour and hence the 
overall movement in interest rates. 
11.2.2 Specification ofthe Random Variables 
We specify a probability distribution for the price coefficients. The coefficients are 
assumed to follow a joint normal distribution where the mean of each coefficient is given 
by the estimated value and the standard deviation of each coefficient is given by its 
estimated standard error. To simulate the distributions, one-half the estimated standard 
errors are used as standard deviations3• 
The random shocks are applied additively to the price coefficients of the banking and 
OFIs sectors. Hence the slope coefficients are no longer deterministic. We maintain 
homogeneity and symmetry (and therefore adding-up constraints) in random elements, 
rather than taking into account the covariances between coefficients4. This means that we 
conduct stochastic simulations, while maintaining the theoretical restrictions on the 
model. Table 11.1 presents how the restrictions are respected. 
2 Murinde (1992) and Murinde and Rarawa (1996) consider incorrect parameter estimates and additive error 
terms as uncertain elements in their models. 
3 The usage of the whole standard errors produced very volatile results, and that in order to keep the results 
reasonable we scale down the standard error by half. 
4 Ignoring the covariances between coefficients tends to over-emphasize the size of the model's forecast 
error, as there is significant possibility that all the shocks in an equation may be applied in the same 
direction (Hall, 1986 and Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991). Given covariance, if one parameter falls then 
another will move in a compensating fashion so that the level of the dependent variable is maintained within 
'sensible' bounds. Homogeneity and symmetry impositions on random elements will to some degree take 
the place of the role of covariance. 
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Table 11.1 Random variables of the price coefficients in the banking and OFIs sectors 
a 8anking sector (symmetry and homogeneity imposed) 
lnp; lnp; lnp; lnp; 
(PER) (POD) (PCS) (PLA) 
1. 8ER -0.38 * 0.3670± B12 0.0031 ± B13 0.0099± B14 
2. 8GD 0.3670± B12 -1.0866 ± B22 0.0083 ± 823 0.7113 ±B24 
3. 8CS 0.0031 + B13 0.0083 ± B23 -0.0245 ± 833 0.0131 ± B34 
4. 8LA 0.0099 ± BI4 0.7113 ± B24 0.0131 ± 834 -0.7343 ± 844 
.. 
-0.38 IS Imposed. 
b OFI sector (symmetry and homogeneity imposed) 
lnp; lnp; lnp; 
(PGD) (PCS) (PLA) 
1. OFIGD 
-2.9578 ± OFll 0.0772 ± OF12 2.8806 ± OF13 
2. OFICS (- ) 0.0772 ± OF12 0.0862 ± OF22 -0.1634± OF23 
3.0FILA 2.8806 ± OF13 -0.1634 ± OF23 -2.717 ± OF33 
- Entry in each cell is the random variable consisting of the mean (=the estimated price coefficients) and the 
standard deviation (=half of the standard error of the price coefficients). The standard deviation is given 
by: 
812=0.0896,813=0.0091,822=0.1322,823=0.0128,833=0.004 
814=-(812+813) 
824=-(812+822+823) 
834=-(813+823+833) 
844=-(814+824+834) 
OFll=0.1566, OF12=0.0286, OF22=0.0215 
OF13=-(OFl1+0FI2) 
OF23=-(OFI2+0F22) 
OF33=-(OF13+0F23) 
In Table 11.1, homogeneity and symmetry are reconciled with the random draws by 
treating BLA and OFILA share equations as the residuals in the modelS: The row sums 
zero, hence satisfying homogeneity, while symmetry is self-explanatory. 
5 Random variables are generated by TSP 4.5. 
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11.2.3 Stochastic Simulation 
We, first, obtain a mean of the stochastic one-period-ahead forecast of the endogenous 
variables for the period of 1969-93 (25 years) using the Gauss-Seidel method. 500 of the 
simulations are performed; in each simulation, the error terms are chosen at random from 
the corresponding probability distributions6. 
Then, the mean value as well as the standard error of the forecast of the 500 mean values 
are calculated. In order to qualify the uncertainty effects, we compare the deterministic 
and stochastic solutions. The policy effects (£5) are derived as given by ((11.7) is 
reproduced from (9.6) in Chapter 9): 
where 
(11.7) 
(11.8) 
£5 ~ = a deterministic mean estimate for the period 1969-93 of the policy effect that a 
I 
simulated change in exogenous variables has on the i'th endogenous variable 
D:ase = a deterministic mean for the period 1969-93 with a base set of exogenous 
variables (deterministic base run) 
Dtmu =a deterministic mean for the period 1969-93 with a simulated change III 
exogenous variables (deterministic simulated run) 
£5 S = a stochastic mean estimate for the period 1969-93 of the policy effect that a 
i 
simulated change in exogenous variables has on the i'th endogenous variable 
s:ase = a stochastic mean of the 500 means for the period 1969-93 with a base set of 
exogenous variables (stochastic base run) 
6 Throughout this study, each set of stochastic simulations has involved 500 replications. It is expected that 
as the number of repetitions becomes large, the resulting estimate of the mean and standard error of each 
endogenous variable will approach the 'true' value if the model is linear (Hall, 1986, Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1991 and Murinde and Rarawa, 1996). Hall further comments that less than 300 replications 
give highly unreliable results in the sense that a change in the number of replications gives different 
outcomes. 
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stmu = a stochastic mean of the 500 means for the period 1969-93 with a simulated 
change in exogenous variables (stochastic simulated run) 
Both deterministic and stochastic simulations are run including the residuals of the 
behavioural equations, such that D;base generates a perfect tracking solution, i.e. a mean of 
the actual time series. As before, we conduct the simulation in the two regimes of: 
SI = the government debt endogenous in the government debt market 
S2 = the government securities yields endogenous in the government debt market 
In the deterministic simulation, In(WT / pOT) in the AIDS model was treated as being 
endogenous7• In the stochastic simulation it is however assumed to be exogenous, 
because in the simulation, pOT sometimes fails to be positive given a random shock to the 
AIDS price coefficients, then the AIDS wealth in the form of log becomes unobtainable. 
This is perhaps permissible that W itself, as the major element of In(W r / pOT), is an 
exogenous variable8• 
11.3 Simulation Results 
11.3.1 Base Run 
Table 11.2 presents the base run in deterministic (D;base) and stochastic (s;ase) 
simulations and standard error (SE) of the stochastic solution. (The share of holding 
assets is converted into actual values in Rs. crore.) Further, standard error (SE) is scaled 
by the mean, as the relative SE is more meaningful than the absolute SE. Since D;ase is 
the actual mean of the time series, SI and S2 are the same. The first fifteen endogenous 
. ~ . 
variables are the holding of financial assets and liabilities and the last six endogenous 
variables are the market clearing solutions. The AIDS prices are converted into real 
interest rates (throughout this chapter, interest rates are all in real terms). 
7 Recall that the sector wealth (= W T) is exogenous, but the price (= por) is endogenous, and that we 
treated In(W T / por) as an endogenous variables in deterministic simulation. 
8 With this assumption, PCBDEP is unchanged in stochastic simulation, except a change in deposit rate, 
since PCBDEP is independent of any endogenous AIDS prices and other policy variables. 
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It is shown that stochastic simulations almost replicates their deterministic simulations' 
counterpart. In general the relative SE is very small, except for that of the return on 
shares (RS). The bias due to stochastic simulation appears to be small in the base run. 
However, so long as there is a difference between Dtase and s;base, it should be borne in 
mind the stochastic nature of the model (Murinde and Rarawa, 1996). 
Table 11.2 Base Run: Deterministic and Stochastic means for the period (69-93) (Rs. Crores) 
Detenninistic Stochastic 
(500) 
SI 
BER 4192.14 
BGD 20596.22 
BCS 8357.85 
BLA 43995.12 
OFIGD 27167.18 
OFICS (-) 3519.74 
OFILA 21504.08 
PCBCS(-) 4671.13 
PCBLA(-) 35400.46 
PCBDEP 3995.73 
HCUR 22535.13 
HDEP 67860.08 
HGD 60919.46 
HCS 14507.20 
HLA (-) 41324.25 
GER 4192.14 
DEP 89981.44 
GGD 78452.05 
GSY% -1.27 
LR% 4.03 
RS% 1.03 
Rs. crore = 10 miIlion rupees 
(-) liabilities 
4263.37 
20755.93 
8238.83 
43898.85 
27346.61 
3282.69 
21087.33 
4933.53 
35138.05 
3995.73 
22506.29 
67908.05 
60505.44 
14651.57 
41073.64 
4263.37 
90029.41 
78377.18 
4.10 
-7.26 
SE Relative SE Stochastic SE 
(500) 
S2 
10.97 0.003 4224.22 
57.60 0.003 21002.88 
105.07 0.013 7936.01 
57.53 0.001 43993.85 
262.13 0.010 28176.43 
173.94 0.053 2703.00 
435.56 0.021 19677.81 
215.66 0.044 5648.02 
215.66 0.006 34423.57 
0.00 0.000 3995.73 
45.16 0.002 22332.60 
46.68 0.001 68046.02 
403.59 0.007 59503.54 
146.29 0.010 15089.19 
166.68 0.004 40473.62 
10.97 0.003 4224.22 
46.68 0.001 90167.39 
84.64 0.001 
-1.12 
0.05 0.012 4.13 
3.30 0.455 -17.70 
GSY=Real government securities yields, LR=Reallending rate, RS=Real return on shares. 
- Detenninistic mean is the actual time series for the period 69-93. 
- Stochastic mean is a mean of 50Q runs for the period 69-93. 
- SE: Standard Error, SE = SD / J500 and SD = Standard Deviation of the stochastic mean 
- Relative Standard Error = SE / Stochastic mean 
Relative SE 
16.13 0.004 
63.68 0.003 
89.39 0.011 
43.89 0.001 
229.11 0.008 
162.67 0.060 
390.38 0.020 
194.89 0.035 
194.89 0.006 
0.00 0.000 
31.59 0.001 
38.40 0.001 
291.84 0.005 
121.37 0.008 
161.48 0.004 
16.13 0.004 
38.40 0.000 
0.04 0.032 
0.03 0.007 
4.43 0.250 
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11.3.2 Simulated Run 
The potentially expansionary single-shot policy simulations that are conducted in 
Chapter 9 for the deterministic simulations are replicated here. Such that, 
1. CRR CRR 2% reduction 
2. Bank rate Bank rate 2% reduction 
3. SLR SLR 2% reduction 
4. GSY(SI) Government Securities Yields (GSY) 2% reduction 
OMO(S2) Open Market Purchases 2 % 
5. Deposit Deposit rate 2 % increase 
6. Devaluation Devaluation 10 % 
Multiple-policy simulations are introduced as follows, in which two or three policy 
instruments are undertaken concurrently to examine the policy effects. 
1. CRRlBank rate eRR 2% reduction + Bank rate 2% reduction 
2. CRRlSLR CRR 2% reduction + SLR 2% reduction 
3. CRRlDeposit CRR 2% reduction + Deposit rate 2% increase 
4. CRRlGSY(SI) CRR 2% reduction + GSY 2% reduction 
CRRlOMO(S2) CRR 2% reduction + Open Market Purchases 2% 
5. Deposit/Bank rate Deposit rate 2% reduction + Bank Rate 2% reduction 
6. Deposit/SLR Deposit rate 2% reduction + SLR 2% reduction 
7. Deposit/GSY(S 1) Deposit rate 2% reduction + GSY 2% reduction 
Deposit/OMO(S2) Deposit rate 2% reduction + Open Market Purchases 2% 
8. CRRlDeposit/SLR CRR2% reduction + Deposit rate 2% reduction + SLR 2% 
reduction 
The multiple policy simulations revolve around CRR and Deposit rates for the 
following reasons. First, in Chapter 9 preferable expansionary effects are found in 
particular in CRR and Deposit rates. Second, CRR is the one commonly used as a 
monetary policy in India. Furthermore, the removal of the ceiling on the deposit rates 
would change the structure of financial markets and that it is interesting to see the 
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policy effects in different circumstances. CRRlDepositlSLR is the combination of 
policies which the financial reformers in India attempted; the reduction in the reserve 
ratio and SLR with the removal of the interest rate ceiling were intended to create a 
more competitive and efficient environment in the banking sector (see Chapter 3). 
The policy effects (OJ) for deterministic and stochastic simulations are presented in 
Appendicies 11.la-ll.lc and 11.2a-l1.2d. Absolute SE (SE itself) and relative SE are 
attached to the stochastic simulation. The report on the deterministic simulation in the 
single-policy shock is the reproduction of Table 9.6 in Chapter 9. Based on the results 
in the appendices, a number of tables are created to specify the policy effects in the 
area of: 
-the stability in stochastic simulation 
-the sign consistency in policy effects between deterministic simulation (D hereafter) 
and stochastic simulation (S hereafter) 
-the credit market 
-the equity market 
-the government securities market 
-the inflation effect. 
The overall discussions are left to the conclusion. 
Stability in Stochastic Simulations 
Table 11.3 indicates the number of relative SE that is above one out of 20 endogenous 
variables in each policy shock. There is no obvious difference between single and 
multiple policy changes. But this is not the case between SI and S2. Comparing SI, 
more endogenous variables display relatively large SE in S29. This indicates the 
instability of the endogenous variables in policy changes in the uncertainty, and that 
policies tend to be risky in S2. 
9 Bank rate in SI indicates 15. This is largely due to the very small policy effects: in a majority of cases 
the change is less than 1 %. 
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Table 11.3 Stability in stochastic simulation 
Single policy Number of relative SE above one 
SI S2 
1. CRR 1 9 
2. Bank rate 15 10 
3. SLR 3 12 
4. GSY(SI)/OMO(S2) 3 10 
5. Deposit 3 11 
6. Devaluation 7 8 
Multiple policy Number of relative SE above one 
SI S2 
I.CRRlBank Rate 1 9 
2. CRRlSLR 4 18 
3. CRRlDeposit 4 8 
4. CRRlGSY(SI) /OMO(S2) 1 7 
5. DepositlBank Rate 4 11 
6. DepositlSLR 2 10 
7. DepositlGSY(SI)/OMO(S2) 5 12 
8. CRRlDepositlSLR 1 11 
Number of relative SE above one out of20 endogenous variables. 
Sign Consistency in Policy Effects Between Deterministic and Stochastic 
Simulations 
Table 11.4 shows the number of endogenous variables with different signs between D 
and S on the policy effects out of twenty endogenous variables. In SI as a whole, the 
number of inconsistent signs is relatively small, whereas in S2 in some policies there 
are quite a large number of endogenous variables, which have inconsistent signs, in 
particular SLR and Deposits/OMO(S2). The results in Table 11.3 and Table 11.4 are 
the overall indication that the uncertainty due to the coefficient estimates is more likely 
to alter the effectiveness of policies in the regime S2 of market-determined 
government securities' yields. Now we see more specifically this tendency in each 
market. 
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Table 11.4 Different simulated policy effects between Deterministic (D) and Stochastic (S) for 
the period 69-93 
Single policy Number ofD * S on sign 
SI S2 
1. CRR 2 4 
2. Bank rate 2 10 
3. SLR 5 15 
4. GSY(SI)/OMO(S2) 0 9 
5. Deposit 2 14 
6. Devaluation 4 13 
Multiple policy Number ofD * S on sign 
SI S2 
I.CRRlBank Rate 0 2 
2. CRRlSLR 5 2 
3. CRRlDeposit 4 5 
4. CRRlGSY(SI) /OMO(S2) 1 5 
5. DepositlBank Rate 2 13 
6. DepositlSLR 2 13 
7. DepositlGSY(SI)/OMO(S2) 5 16 
8. CRRlDepositlSLR 0 2 
D=Deterministic simulation, S=Stochastic simulation 
Number of D * S on the sign of the % (or actual) change out of twenty endogenous variables. 
% change less than 1 % for both D and S is set at zero, except interest rates. 
Credit Market 
For the credit market, we present three types of tables, first for the policy effect on 
lending rates, second the impact on the flow of loans, and third the relevant relative 
SE. 
Table 11.5 shows the simulated policy effect on lending rates (LR). Given an 
expansionary policy, the effect on LR in the main is negative. When SI and S2 are 
compared, there is some dampening effect on LR observed in the controlled GSY (S 1 
regime) in D of multiple policies: LR falls more in S2 rather than in SI. In S, this is 
vigorously observed both in single and multiple policies, in particular, in CRRlDeposit 
the fall in LR increases by from 1.47% in S 1 to 6.13% in S2. The implication is that 
policy uncertainty coupled with mUltiple policies has exerted a stronger expansionary 
effect with respect to loan rates in S2. 
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Table 11.5 Simulated policy effects on Lending rate (LR) for the period 69-93 
Single policy (%) SI S2 
D S D S 
1. CRR - 0.46 -1.02 -1.69 - 3.80 
2. Bank rate 0.00 
- 0.01 -0.24 - 0.43 
3. SLR - 0.48 1.35 -0.06 3.98 
4. GSY(SI)/OMO(S2) 
-1.05 - 1.90 - 0.54 - 1.10 
5. Deposit 0.53 -0.60 0.13 - 1.91 
6. Devaluation 0.07 
-1.12 0.19 -1.59 
Multiple policy (%) SI S2 
D S D S 
I.CRRlBank Rate 
- 0.47 - 1.03 - 1.91 -4.29 
2. CRRlSLR 
- 1.21 -0.03 - 1.81 - 4.19 
3. CRRlDeposit -0.12 -1.47 - 1.51 - 6.13 
4. CRRlGSY(SI) /OMO(S2) 
-1.74 - 1.03 -2.20 - 0.40 
5. DepositlBank Rate 0.53 - 0.61 -0.10 -2.34 
6. DepositlSLR -0.22 0.75 0.01 2.07 
7. DepositlGSY(SI)/OMO(S2) 
-0.72 - 2.50 - 0.39 - 3.01 
8. CRRlDepositlSLR -0.91 - 0.48 - 1.74 -2.21 
D=Detenninistic simulation, S=Stochastic simulation 
Table 11.6a (single policy) and I1.6b (multiple policy) show the effects on the flow of 
loanable funds from both aspects of supply and demand. With BLA and OFILA, 
positive sign implies that they increase the supply of loans. With PCBLA and OFILA, 
positive sign implies an increase in their demand or in loan availability. The sign * 
indicates the magnitude. 
In SI, both in single and multiple policies, S (stochastic simulation) almost replicates 
D (deterministic simulation). Therefore, the preferable instruments are the same for D 
and S, and they are those, which are not associated with SLR: the effect of lowering 
SLR is contractionary as indicated by the negative sign in both supply of and demand 
for loans. 
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However, in S2 a different outcome is observed in some policy instruments between D 
and S. In the single policy, the direction of the effect by SLR, Deposit and 
Devaluation is opposite between D and S. This is also observed in Bank rate and 
OMO but in a lesser degree. Likewise, multiple policies that are combined with 
Deposit, namely DepositlBank rate, DepositlSLR and DepositfOMO(S2) exhibit the 
opposite sign. Random shock in the model has reversed these policy effects, which 
have arrived at D, implying that these policies are sensitive to the true parameters of 
the model. Yet, there are desirable expansionary policy instruments in S2 that are 
robust in the uncertainty; these are the ones which involve CRR, but without SLR, 
namely CRR in a single policy and CRR/Bank Rate, CRRlDeposit and CRRlOMO(S2) 
in a multiple policy. In particular, CRRlOMO(S2) in S exhibits quite a large impact 
on loans as compared with D: the uncertainty has brought a larger expansionary effect. 
There are some other general features, which are common to SI and S2. First, the 
effect of Bank rate in single policy is weak even in S as shown with zeros. Second, in 
deterministic simulation, the OFIs played a leading role in releasing (or tightening) 
loans, rather than banks in India, as indicated with more * marks on OFILA. The 
evidence is also true in the uncertain world as Table 11.6a and 11.6b uncover the 
larger reshuffle in OFILA as compared with BLA. Third, evidence of the 
contractionary effect by lowering SLR in single policy is also found in multiple policy: 
the effect of CRRlSLR, DepositfSLR and CRRlDepositfSLR is largely dominated by 
SLR and therefore contractionary. In this respect, the policy impact of SLR is quite 
strong suppressing other policy effects in the loan market. Fourth, the gain from using 
more than one instrument is observed in CRRlDeposit and CRRlOMO(S2), in 
particular in S, rather than in CRR as a sole policy instrument. This is displayed with 
the increased number of * marks. 
329 
Table 11.6a Simulated policy effects on the flow of Loans for the period 69-93 
Single policy SI 
D 
1. CRR BLA + 
OFILA + ** 
PCBLA + 
HLA + 
2. Bank Rate BLA 0 
OFILA 0 
PCBLA 0 
HLA 0 
3. SLR BLA 0 
OFILA 
- *** 
PCBLA -* 
HLA 
-
4. GSY(SI)/OMO(S2) BLA + 
OFILA + ** 
PCBLA + 
HLA + 
5. Deposit BLA 0 
OFILA + ** 
PCBLA +* 
HLA + 
6. Devaluation BLA 0 
OFILA + ** 
PCBLA + 
HLA + 
.. D=DetemllnIstIc simulatIOn, S=StochastIc simulatIOn 
*, **, ***: more than 10%,20% and 30% change respectively 
0: less than 1 % change 
S 
+ 
+ ** 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
- *** 
- ** 
-* 
+ 
+ ** 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ *** 
+* 
+ 
+ 
+ *** 
+* 
+ 
S2 
D S 
+ + 
+* +* 
+ + 
+ + 
0 0 
+ 
-
+ 0 
+ 0 
0 -* 
- *** + *** 
-* +* 
-
+* 
+ + 
+* 
-
+ 
-
+ 0 
0 + 
+* 
- *** 
+ 
-
+ 
-
0 + 
+* 
- *** 
+ 
-
+ 
-
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Table 11.6b. Simulated policy effects on the flow of Loans for the period 69-93 
Multiple policy SI S2 
D S D S 
1. CRRlBank Rate BLA + + + + 
OFILA + ** + ** +* +* 
PCBLA + + + + 
HLA + + + + 
2. CRRlSLR BLA + + + + 
OFILA 
- *** - *** - ** - *** 
PCBLA 
- - *** - -* 
HLA 
- -* - -
3. CRRlDeposit BLA + + + +* 
OFILA + ** + *** +* + *** 
PCBLA + + ** + +* 
HLA + +* + +* 
4. CRRlGSY(SI) BLA + + + - ** 
CRRlOMO(S2) OFILA + ** + ** + ** + *** 
PCBLA + + + + *** 
HLA + + + + *** 
5. DepositlBank Rate BLA 0 + 0 + 
OFILA + ** + *** + ** 
- *** 
PCBLA +* +* + 
-
HLA + + + 
-
6. DepositlSLR BLA 0 
-
0 
-
OFILA 
- ** - *** - ** + *** 
PCBLA 
- -* - + 
HLA 
- - -
+ 
7. DepositlGSY(SI) BLA 0 + 0 + 
DepositlOMO(S2) OFILA + ** + *** + ** 
- *** 
PCBLA +* + ** + 
-
HLA + +* + 
-
8. CRRlDepositlSLR BLA + + + + 
OFILA -* - *** - -
PCBLA 
- -* 0 0 
HLA 
- -
+ 0 
.. D=DetenmmstIc sImulatIOn, S=Stochastlc sImulatIOn 
*, **, ***: more than 10%,20% and 30% change respectively 
0: less than 1 % change 
Table 11.7 shows the relative SE of the stochastic simulation policy effects on the flow 
of loans in the financial institutions. In general, the relative SE is above one in S2, as 
we expect from the overall result in Table 11.3\0. 
The relative SE of OFILA tends to be larger than that of BLA, especially in S2 in the 
main the relative SE is above one, implying the instability of OFILA. In other words, 
although we have found the leading role of OFIs in tenns of supplying loans, the 
10 Bank rate in SI shows relatively high SEs for BLA and OFILA in Table 11.7. This is due to virtually 
no policy effect as indicated '0' (less than 1% change) in Table 11.6a. 
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policie 
financ} 
s are risky in OFILA. This may not be unreasonable for the less regulated other 
'al institutions. 
associated with OFILA in S2, when policies are compared to each other, the Being 
relative ly 'risky policies are CRRlSLR with the SE at 2.77, DepositlOMO(S2) at 2.2 
and CRRID epositlSLR at 3.1 in the multiple policy, whereas the most risky policy is 
S2) at 5.3 in the single policy. The latter is not surprising; this could be due to OMO( 
the und erdeveloped capital market in the conduct of open market operations. 
By con 
the SE 
the rob 
trast, less risky policies are associated with BLA in S2 and they are CRR (with 
at 0.1), CRRlBank rate (at 0.1) and CRR/Deposit (0.12). This again indicates 
ustness of CRR in the uncertainty with respect to the relative SE. 
Table 1 1.7 Relative SE of the simulated policy effects on the flow of Loans 
Single p olicy 
1. CRR 
2. Bank Rate 
3. SLR 
4. GSY( S I)/OMO(S2) 
5. Depo sit 
6. Deval uation 
Multiple policy 
1. CRR! Bank Rate 
2. CRR! SLR 
3. CRR! Deposit 
4. CRR! GSY(SI) 
CRR! OMO(S2) 
5. Depos itlBank Rate 
6. Depos itlSLR 
itlGSY(SI) 7. Depos 
De os itlOMO(S2) 
8. CRRID epositlSLR 
BLA 
OFILA 
BLA 
OFILA 
BLA 
OFILA 
BLA 
OFILA 
BLA 
OFILA 
BLA 
OFILA 
BLA 
OFILA 
BLA 
OFILA 
BLA 
OFILA 
BLA 
OFILA 
BLA 
OFILA 
BLA 
OFILA 
BLA 
OFILA 
BLA 
OFILA 
SI S2 
0.307 0.101 
0.839 1.861 
6.044 0.334 
15.948 1.355 
0.335 0.238 
0.591 Ll58 
0.556 0.558 
0.571 5.378 
0.844 0.246 
0.610 1.244 
1.296 0.307 
0.642 Ll02 
SI S2 
0.313 0.104 
0.858 1.847 
10408 1.048 
0.609 2.772 
0.746 0.126 
0.699 1.644 
0.313 1.311 
0.858 0.967 
0.843 0.241 
0.619 1.228 
0.987 0.245 
0.602 LlOl 
0.685 00475 
0.577 2.230 
0.391 0.242 
0.549 3.180 
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Stock market 
Table 11.8 presents the policy effects on RS. The sign between D and S is almost 
identical in SI. This is not true in S2. There is a tendency that RS is more volatile in 
the multiple policies, in particular, in S of S2, RS exhibits a extremely volatile 
movement in CRR/SLR and CRR/OMO(S2). Such a volatility in RS (or share prices) 
may not be implausible in India; in the post-refonn era there is an unprecedented 
upsurge of activity experienced in the stock market and the BSE (Bombay Stock 
Exchange) Sensex recorded the increase by 266.9% (in 1992-93). It seems that the 
multiple policies, when given a stochastic shock, will bring a magnifying volatility to 
the already volatile share prices in India. 
Table 11.8 Simulated policy effects on Return on Shares (RS) for the period 69-93 
Single policy (%) SI S2 
D S D S 
1. CRR 44.66 59.26 53.68 -26.12 
2. Bank rate 0.44 -0.50 8.49 -8.32 
3. SLR -85.00 -118.15 -91.45 118.75 
4. GSY(SI)/OMO(S2) 49.76 28.57 28.58 -45.58 
5. Deposit 60.57 53.95 55.60 -54.18 
6. Devaluation 66.13 68.23 51.25 -43.52 
Multiple policy (%) SI S2 
D S D S 
I.CRRlBank Rate 45.04 58.75 56.69 -30.67 
2. CRRlSLR -68.23 -212.65 -57.90 -829.03 
3. CRRlDeposit 83.57 189.46 73.86 -59.62 
4. CRRlGSY(SI) /OMO(S2) 68.44 58.75 67.21 616.05 
5. Deposit/Bank Rate 60.79 53.45 59.01 -62.75 
6. Deposit/SLR -50.72 -64.20 -55.16 64.57 
7. Deposit/GSY(S 1 )/OMO(S2) 84.44 82.51 71.15 -247.39 
8. CRRlDeposit/SLR -29.61 -82.44 -7.24 -117.84 
D=Detenninistic simulation, S=Stochastic simulation 
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Government Securities Market 
Table 11.9 is associated with the government securities' market. SI presents the 
policy effects on the total government debt (GGD), whereas S2 presents the effects on 
government securities yields (GSY). 
For both D and S, the proportionate change on GGD is less than 10% with a mixed 
sign of positive and negative impact, though more positive signs than negative signs 
are observed. This suggests the popularity of government securities in that investors 
are reluctant to disinvest government debt, even though, in general, policy action is 
intended to release funds from the government sector. 
With respect to the change in GSY, on average, the yields tend to fall. There is some 
marked difference between D and S in CRRlOMO(S2) and CRRlSLR. 
CRRlOMO(S2) shows a large fall in GSY by 7.02% in S in comparison with 2.86% in 
D. CRRlSLR exhibits an increase of 5.43% in S as against a fall of 0.90% in D. The 
results indicate that GSY is vulnerable to these policy instruments. It is noteworthy 
that the two multiple policies also led to a volatile movement in RS as discussed 
above, indicating the sensitiveness to the uncertainty with respect to these interest 
rates. 
Tables 11.1 Oa (single policy) and 11.10b (multiple policy) present the simulated policy 
effects on excess reserves (ER) and government debt (GD) sector-wise. This is to 
examine how the funds in the government sector are released in each sector by the 
policy changes. The presentation of BER and BGD will uncover the substitution 
effects between the risk-free assets in the banking sector. As is consistent with GGD 
in Table 11.9, overall more positive signs are found in GD, in particular HGD in a 
single policy. In D, the substitution effects (given by the opposite sign between BER 
and BGD) are observed in 13 out of 28 cases. In the case of S, especially in regime 
S2, the substitution effects are found in almost all policy changes. 
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Table 11.9 Simulated policy effects on the total Government Debt (GGD) and Government 
Securities' Yields (GSY) for the period 69-93 
Single policy SI (GGD) 
D S 
1. CRR + 
2. Bank rate 0 
3. SLR -
4. GSY(SI)/OMO(S2) 
-
5. Deposit + 
6. Devaluation 0 
Multiple policy SI (GGD) 
D S 
I.CRRlBank Rate + 
2. CRRlSLR + 
3. CRRlDeposit + 
4. CRRlGSY(S 1) /OMO(S2) 0 
5. DepositlBank Rate + 
6. DepositlSLR 
-
7. DepositlGSY(SI)/OMO(S2) 
-
8. CRRlDepositlSLR + 
D=Deterministic simulation, S=Stochastic simulation 
GGD: They are all less than 10 %. 
0: less than 1 % change 
S2 (GSY: %) 
D S 
+ -1.73 
0 
-0.40 
- 0.63 
-
-1.33 
+ -0.48 
0 0.35 
S2 (GSY: %) 
D S 
+ -2.09 
-
-0.90 
+ -1.85 
+ -2.86 
+ -0.83 
-
0.35 
-
-1.65 
+ -1.34 
-1.l3 
-0.27 
-0.81 
-0.61 
0.33 
1.08 
-1.43 
5.43 
-0.93 
-7.02 
0.07 
-0.48 
1.19 
-0.39 
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Table It.lOa. Simulated policy effects on Excess Reserves (ER) and Government Debt (GD) for 
the period 69-93 
Single policy SI 
D 
I. eRR BER 
- *** 
BGD 0 
OFIGD 
-
HGD + 
2. Bank Rate BER 
-* 
BGD + 
OFIGD 0 
HGD 0 
3. SLR BER + 
BGD + 
OFIGD +* 
HGD 
-* 
4. GSY(SI)/OMO(S2) BER + 
BGD 
-* 
OFIGD 
-* 
HGD + 
5. Deposit BER 
-
BGD 
-
OFIGD 
-* 
HGD + 
6. Devaluation BER 
-
BGD 
-
OFIGD 
-* 
HGD + 
.. D=Deternllmsttc simulatIOn, S=Stochastlc simulatIOn 
*, **, ***: more than 10%,20% and 30% change respectively 
0: less than 1 % change 
S2 
S D S 
- *** -* - *** 
+ 0 + 
- -
0 
+ + 0 
-* -* - * 
+ + + 
0 
- + 
0 0 
-
+ *** + + *** 
+* +* -* 
+ ** +* - *** 
- ** -* + ** 
+ + + 
- - -
- -* + 
+ + + 
-* 0 - ** 
- - + 
-* - +* 
+* + -* 
- ** - - ** 
- - + 
-* - +* 
+ + 
-* 
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Table 11.IOb Simulated policy effects on Excess Reserves and Government Securities Market 
for the period 69-93 
Multiple policy SI 
D 
1. CRRlBank Rate BER 
- *** 
BGD + 
OFIGD 
-
HGD + 
2. CRRlSLR BER 
-* 
BGD +* 
OFIGD +* 
HGD -
3. CRRlDeposit BER 
- *** 
BGD + 
OFIGD -
HGD + 
4. CRRlGSY(SI) BER 
-* 
CRRlOMO(S2) BGD 
-* 
OFIGD 
-* 
HGD + 
5. DepositlBank Rate BER 
- ** 
BGD 
-
OFIGD 
-* 
HGD + 
6. DepositlSLR BER + 
BGD + 
OFIGD + 
HGD 
-
7. DepositlGSY(SI) BER + 
DepositlOMO(S2) BGD -
OFIGD 
-* 
HGD + 
8. CRRlDepositlSLR BER 
- ** 
BGD +* 
OFIGD + 
HGD -
.. D=Detenmmstlc sImulatIOn, S=StochastIc sImulatIOn 
*, **, ***: more than lO%, 20% and 30% change respectively 
0: less than 1 % change 
S2 
S D 
- *** - ** 
+ + 
- -
+ + 
+ 
-* 
+ ** +* 
+ *** +* 
- ** -
- *** -* 
-
0 
- ** -
+ ** + 
- *** -* 
- -
- -
+ + 
- *** -* 
- -
-* -
+ + 
+ ** + 
+ + 
+* +* 
-* -
-* + 
-* -
- ** -* 
+* + 
-* -* 
+* + 
+* + 
-* -
S 
- *** 
+ 
0 
0 
-
+* 
+* 
-* 
- *** 
-
-
+ 
+ *** 
- *** 
- *** 
+ *** 
- *** 
+ 
+ ** 
-* 
+ ** 
-
- ** 
+* 
-* 
+ 
+* 
-* 
-* 
+ 
+ 
-
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Inflationary Effects 
The policy simulation has been focused on an expansionary policy. India, like many 
other developing economies, has however been implementing stabilization policy-
packages aimed at restoring macroeconomic balance. It is therefore important to see 
how these policies affect the rate of inflation. The inflationary effect can be measured 
by observing the flow of currency in the household sector caused by the policy shock, 
though this is a crude manner. This is associated with Monetarist view that when an 
increase in the rate of growth in the quantity of money exceeds that in output, the rate 
of inflation would be higher than otherwise. See Table 11.11. 
Table 11.11 Simulated policy effects on holding Narrow Money (HCUR) for the period 69-93 
Single policy SI 
D S 
1. CRR 
-
+ 
2. Bank rate 0 0 
3. SLR + 
-
4. GSY(SI)/OMO(S2) + +* 
5. Deposit -* -
6. Devaluation 
-
+* 
Multiple policy SI 
D S 
I.CRRlBank Rate - + 
2. CRRlSLR + + 
3. CRRlDeposit -* -
4. CRRlGSY(S 1) /OMO(S2) + + 
5. DepositlBank Rate -* -
6. DepositlSLR - -
7. DepositlGSY(SI)/OMO(S2) 
-
+ 
8. CRRlDepositlSLR - -
D=Detenninistic simulation, S=Stochastic simulation 
*, **, ***: more than 10%,20% and 30% change respectively 
0: less than 1 % change 
S2 
D S 
+ +* 
+ + 
+ 
-
+ + 
- -
+ + 
S2 
D S 
+ +* 
+* + 
-
+* 
+* + *** 
- -
- -
-
+ 
-
+ 
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The inflationary effect by these policy changes is generally modest, given by less * 
marks on the positive sign. The policies, which involve Deposit rates tend to contain 
the inflationary effect as, in many cases, indicated by the negative sign 11. In this 
respect, policies incorporating the removal of a ceiling on deposit rates may exert an 
expansionary effect with potentially the least cost of inflation, even in a world of 
uncertainty. An increase in deposit rates in order to contain the rate of inflation, this 
policy action was actually taken in Korea (during 1964-70) and Taiwan (in the 1960's) 
with some fruitful results (McKinnon, 1973). By contrast, there is a warning against 
the policy choice CRRlOMO(S2) given by a more than 30% increase in S. This 
multiple policy may induce higher rates of inflation faced with the uncertainty. 
11.4 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
Stochastic simulation is conducted by incorporating random shocks to the estimated 
price coefficients of the financial institutions, and the results are compared with those 
of deterministic simulation. The results obtained with the stochastic simulations help 
distinguish between unfavourable and favourable policy instruments in a more 
vigorous manner than do deterministic simulations only. The stochastic simulations 
have uncovered evidence, which deterministic simulations have not brought out, as 
some of the policy effects have been reversed in S2. This procedure models an 
important aspect of the uncertainty in policy-making, and the results support the 
argument that policy must be more cautious if there is policy uncertainty. 
We summarise the main results in policy instrument in terms of the effectiveness to a 
flow ofloanable funds in Table 11.12. 
11 This outcome is consistent with that in the single sector study for the household sector. Given a 
substitution effect between deposits and currency, as deposit rates increase, the holdings of currency fall 
in the household sector. 
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Table 11.12 Effectiveness to a flow of loan able funds by policy shock 
Policy Effectiveness to a flow of loanable funds 
CRR -Desirable effects are found in a single and multiple policies (except CRRlSLR). 
- Policy is robust in the uncertainty. 
-CRRlSLR and CRRlOMO(S2) in S2 led to volatile change in RS and also a 
lesser degree in government securities' yields in stochastic simulation. 
-CRRlOMO(S2) and CRRlDeposit have a potency to exert a large preferable 
impact in stochastic simulation, but the former is with the cost of a potential 
higher rate of inflation. 
Bank rate - The policy effect is persistently weak even in stochastic simulations. 
SLR - In SI, the effects of a decrease in SLR are contractionary in both deterministic 
and stochastic simulations. 
- In multiple policy, it suppresses other expansionary policy effects. 
- In S2 the policy is sensitive in a sense that uncertainty reverses the results 
arrived at deterministic simulation, but this in turn brings an expansionary effect. 
OSY(Sl) -Desirable effects are found, and the policy is insensitive to the uncertainty. 
-However, the substitution effects between BER and BOD may dilute the 
preferable effect. 
OMO(S2) -Desirable effects are found in deterministic simulations, but sensitive to the true 
structure of the model. 
-This policy turns out to be the most risky policy instrument among others with 
respect to the relative SE. 
Deposit -In SI, desirable effects are found for the single and multiple policies (except 
with SLR) with an additional preferable effect by potentially suppressing a rate 
of inflation. 
-But in S2, uncertainty reverse results obtained in the deterministic simulations. 
Devaluation -The impact is desirable, but in S2 uncertainty reverse results arrived at 
deterministic simulations. 
Empirical evidence provides a number of policy implications. 
i) With respect to delivering funds in the private sector, we have found that CRR 
and Deposit policy instrument were the most desirable policies in Chapter 9. The 
stochastic simulation experiments reveal that CRR is robust to the true parameters, 
whereas Deposit is sensitive to the true parameters in S2, hence the true structure of 
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the Indian economy. But when CRR and Deposit are combined, the policy becomes 
more robust, in that, not only is it insensitive to the uncertainty in S2, but also the 
magnitude of the effect increases. Further, in terms of the instability (measured by the 
relative SE) in the uncertainty, CRRlDeposit proved to be less risky policy (Table 
11.7)12. In this respect, in order to achieve the target of increasing a flow of loanable 
funds to private sectors, CRR/Deposit of multiple policy may be the most desirable 
policy instrument in the spectrum of our study. 
ii) The study also reveals that in the uncertainty, multiple-policies such as 
CRRlDeposit and CRR/OMO(S2) have generated better results than a single-policy by 
augmenting the expansionary effect in the credit market. On the other hand, a 
multiple-policy of CRR/SLR and CRRlOMO(S2) has disturbed the financial markets 
with the extremely volatile movement of the return on shares. The latter may be taken 
as a warning in implementing mUltiple instruments, as Brainard (1967) hinted that a 
multiple-policy stance could lead to an unexpected volatility in the world of 
uncertainty. 
iii) In the deterministic simulation in Chapter 9, there is not a marked difference in 
policy change between SI and S2. However, in stochastic simulation, there is a 
considerable difference between the two regimes. Evidence suggests that the 
contribution of the uncertainty of the coefficient estimates to the effectiveness of 
policies is relatively small in SI. By contrast, in S2 this is large; further the relative 
SE tends to indicate the instability of the endogenous variables in S2. This 
demonstrates that the estimated system-wide model may be robust in SI, but exposes 
some weakness in S2. Alternatively, it can be argued that the policies are robust in SI, 
whereas they are unstable in S2. If the latter argument is true rather than the former, 
there is some awareness in the liberalisation of interest rates in terms of the 
effectiveness of policies. In particular, new evidence suggests that in an environment, 
where GSY are completely liberalised (i.e. S2 regime) with the removal of the deposit 
rate ceiling, policy instruments become sensitive to the uncertainty, which exists in the 
financial institutions in India. 
12 Specifically, while the average relative SE ofBLA, OFILA, PCBLA and HLA for CRR is 0.8925 and 
that for Deposit 1.2115, it is 0.877 when both policies are simultaneously conducted (Appendices ILIa, 
11.1 c and 11.2b). 
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iv) The stochastic policy experiments emphasise the popularity of government 
securities and a substitution effect between risk-free assets in the banking sector. The 
latter is founds to be stronger in the uncertainty. 
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Appendix 11.1a Simulated Expansionary Policy Effects: Deterministic and Stochastic (500) means for the period 69-93 (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
eRR 51: Deterministic 51: Stochastlc Standard Error 52: Deterministic 52: Stochastic Standard Error 
% change Actual % change Actual Absolute Relative % change Actual % change Actual Absolute Relative 
BER -34.19 -1433.01 -35.56 -1516.05 41.57 0.027 -16.99 -711.89 -38.40 -1622.18 110.77 0.068 
BGO -0.27 -55.51 3.10 643.79 479.72 0.745 -0.79 -162.77 1.13 236.74 787.43 3.326 
BCS 19.06 1593.41 14.36 1183.04 876.29 0.741 13.54 1132.01 0.91 72.36 1023.71 14.147 
BLA 3.51 1544.24 3.05 1338.69 410.44 0.307 3.16 1391.79 6.73 2962.67 300.68 0.101 
OFIGO -6.90 -1873.83 -5.47 -1495.36 2070.99 1.385 -6.52 -1770.00 -0.23 -64.46 2595.15 40.263 
OFICS(-) 74.86 2640.24 83.59 2743.93 1486.87 0.542 51.85 1828.71 89.59 2421.57 2042.65 0.844 
OFILA 20.98 4514.10 20.10 4239.32 3556.40 0.839 16.72 3598.73 12.63 2486.03 4627.01 1.861 
PCBCS(-) -67.41 -3143.70 -60.26 -2972.90 1778.13 0.598 -45.27 -2111.34 -50.32 -2842.15 2422.62 0.852 
PCBLA(-) 9.10 3220.94 8.46 2972.90 1778.13 0.598 6.60 2338.33 8.26 2842.15 2422.62 0.852 
PCBOEP 1.93 77.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 5.68 227.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 
HCUR -6.68 -1504.90 1.83 411.25 302.21 0.735 7.93 1788.32 15.40 3439.73 445.21 0.129 
HDEP 0.69 467.51 -0.69 -471.57 372.05 0.789 0.51 346.74 -0.25 -167.97 445.67 2.653 
HGO 9.80 5971.65 6.74 4077.36 3216.93 0.789 3.17 1931.77 -0.29 -172.28 3381.25 19.626 
HCS -14.46 -2096.87 -9.64 -1412.00 1161.97 0.823 -9.75 -1414.63 -3.27 -492.94 1401.83 2.844 
HLA(-J 6.87 2837.39 6.34 2605.11 1384.17 0.531 6.42 2652.19 6.44 2606.56 1969.34 0.756 
GER -34.19 -1433.01 -35.56 -1516.05 41.57 0.027 -16.99 -711.89 -38.40 -1622.18 110.77 0.068 
OEP 0.61 544.75 -0.52 -471.57 372.05 0.789 0.64 573.74 -0.19 -167.97 445.67 2.653 
GGOIGSY% 5.15 4042.30 4.12 3225.79 667.15 0.207 -1.73 -1.13 0.52 0.463 
LR% -0.46 -1.02 0.52 0.511 -1.69 -3.80 0.30 0.079 
RS% 44.66 59.26 47.25 0.797 53.68 -26.12 65.13 2.494 
Bank rate S1: Deterministic S1: Stochastic Standard Error S2: Deterministic 52: Stochastic Standard Error 
% change Actual % change Actual Absolute Relative % change Actual % change Actual Absolute Relative 
BER -14.02 -587.40 -13.74 -585.95 11.76 0.020 -11.88 -497.99 -13.67 -577.35 27.55 0.048 
BGO 2.75 565.55 2.80 581.46 61.80 0.106 1.06 218.93 2.79 586.99 179.91 0.306 
BCS 0.19 15.67 -0.07 -5.70 113.07 19.838 2.51 210.27 -3.39 -268.76 239.17 0.890 
BLA 0.01 6.18 0.02 10.34 62.53 6.044 0.16 68.78 0.59 259.29 86.58 0.334 
OFIGO -0.06 -16.63 0.08 22.58 281.19 12.454 -2.15 -583.27 1.81 510.43 636.69 1.247 
OFICS(-) 0.61 21.45 -0.20 -6.70 186.38 27.801 11.20 395.10 -11.29 -305.28 470.04 1.540 
OFILA 0.18 38.08 -0.14 -29.28 466.99 15.948 4.55 978.37 -4.15 -815.71 1105.04 1.355 
PCBCS(-) -0.46 -21.50 0.22 10.74 230.67 21.469 -10.68 -497.87 6.00 338.63 571.85 1.689 
PCBLA(-) 0.06 22.55 -0.03 -10.74 230.67 21.469 1.47 521.20 -0.98 -338.63 571.85 1.689 
PCBOEP 0.03 1.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.58 23.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 
HCUR -0.05 -10.16 0.02 5.37 48.57 9.050 1.96 442.42 2.14 478.91 96.31 0.201 
HOEP 0.00 2.80 0.00 3.05 50.03 16.421 0.05 33.25 0.14 98.62 107.69 1.092 
HGO 0.07 44.80 -0.04 -26.35 432.62 16.421 0.60 363.33 -1.84 -1097.42 815.96 0.744 
HCS -0.11 -15.72 0.07 9.74 156.82 16.101 -2.16 -313.04 2.00 302.11 339.72 1.124 
HLA(-) 0.05 21.71 -0.02 -8.19 178.55 21.794 1.27 525.95 -0.54 -217.79 462.61 2.124 
GER -14.02 -587.40 -13.74 -585.95 11.76 0.020 -11.88 -497.99 -13.67 -577.35 27.55 0.048 
OEP 0.00 3.86 0.00 3.05 50.03 16.420 0.06 56.59 0.11 98.62 107.69 1.092 
GGDIGSY% 0.76 593.71 0.74 577.69 90.63 0.157 -0.40 -0.27 0.08 0.306 
LR% 0.00 -0.01 0.06 6.890 -0.24 -0.43 0.05 0.114 
RS% 0.44 -0.50 4.07 8.109 8.49 -6.32 10.24 1.231 
.. % and actual change: mean values of the proportIOnate and actual changes respechvely by Simulated policy changes over the penod of 1969-93. Smce the determmlshc simulatIOn consists of a smgle run, the 
deterministic mean is a straight mean, whereas the stochastic mean is a mean of 500 runs. Standard Error: SE = SD I ,f5OO and SD = Standard Deviation of the stochastic change, Relative Standard Error = SE I 
Stochastic change. CRR 2% reduction increases the mean value ofBW by around 1649 Rs. crores during the period of 1969-93. 
Deterministic simulation is the reproduction of Table 9.6 in Chapter 9. Rs. crores = 10 million rupees. 
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Appendix 1l.lb Simulated Expansionary Policy Effects: Deterministic and Stocbastic (500) means for the period 69-93 (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
sLR 51: Deterministic 51: stochastic Standard Error 52: Deterministic 52: stochastic Standard Error 
% change Actual % chanqe Actual Absolute Relative % chanqe Actual % chanqe Actual Absolute Relative 
BER 8.00 335.34 39.98 1704.32 150.27 0.088 2.41 101.05 46.68 1972.07 364.13 0.185 
BGD 8.35 1720.36 12.40 2573.52 1234.33 0.480 10.71 2205.75 -10.40 -2183.26 3120.08 1.429 
BCS -27.54 -2302.88 -35.39 -2915.39 2359.05 0.809 -29.68 -2481.71 58.35 4630.56 3999.57 0.864 
BlA 0.56 247.21 -3.10 -1362.41 1205.36 0.885 0.40 174.94 -10.05 -4419.29 1053.67 0.238 
OFIGD 15.20 4127.10 27.14 7421.73 5548.09 0.748 17.95 4874.15 -40.46 -11399.61 10653.95 0.935 
OFICs(-) -101.19 -3568.94 -264.00 -8666.27 3972.11 0.458 -111.47 -3931.60 186.04 5028.64 8410.78 1.673 
OFILA -35.77 -7696.08 -76.29 -16088.07 9511.24 0.591 -40.92 -8805.79 83.49 16428.36 19031.32 1.158 
PCBCs(-) 82.66 3854.87 208.31 10277.24 4694.03 0.457 92.88 4331.42 -108.29 -6116.16 10126.11 1.656 
PCBLA (-) -12.18 -4313.30 -29.25 -10277.24 4694.03 0.457 -13.68 -4844.84 17.77 6116.16 10126.11 1.656 
PCBDEP -11.47 -458.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 -12.85 -513.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 
HCUR 9.77 2202.44 -1.47 -330.16 816.46 2.473 4.79 1080.56 -0.88 -195.90 1838.77 9.386 
HDEP -0.91 -618.03 2.19 1486.87 984.19 0.662 -0.98 -667.17 -2.61 -1776.23 1816.63 1.023 
HGD -12.00 -7308.76 -21.25 -12856.13 8509.70 0.662 -11.62 -7080.90 22.83 13582.88 13768.51 1.014 
HCS 17.85 2588.82 30.89 4526.36 3074.46 0.679 19.87 2881.53 -37.90 -5718.08 5712.88 0.999 
HLA(-) -7.59 -3135.57 -17.46 -7173.24 3653.58 0.509 -9.16 -3786.01 14.56 5892.90 8053.29 1.367 
GER 8.00 335.34 39.98 1704.32 150.27 0.088 2.41 101.05 46.68 1972.07 364.13 0.185 
DEP -1.20 -1076.45 1.65 1486.87 984.19 0.662 -1.31 -1180.58 -1.97 -1776.23 1816.63 1.023 
GGD/GSY% -1.86 -1461.31 -3.65 -2860.88 1730.45 0.605 0.63 -0.81 2.08 2.568 
LR% -0.48 1.35 2.06 1.524 -0.06 3.98 1.23 0.308 
RS% -85.00 -118.15 156.71 1.326 -91.45 118.75 254.88 2.146 
GSY(Sl) 51: Deterministic 51: 5tochastic Standard Error 52: Deterministic 52: stochastic Standard Error 
OMO(52 % chanqe Actual % chanqe Actual Absolute Relative % change Actual % change Actual Absolute Relative 
BER 6.79 284.39 2.90 123.78 48.71 0.394 7.25 303.75 2.77 116.88 107.84 0.923 
BGD -10.29 -2118.91 -6.87 -1426.57 372.52 0.261 -8.28 -1704.65 -1.34 -281.09 814.16 2.897 
BCS 16.46 1376.50 7.83 645.33 709.30 1.099 11.36 950.29 -5.15 -408.66 1016.08 2.486 
BLA 1.04 458.00 1.50 657.61 365.85 0.556 1.02 450.59 1.30 572.94 319.52 0.558 
OFIGD -13.30 -3613.18 -9.84 -2690.06 1687.40 0.627 -10.64 -2890.67 2.00 564.77 2835.60 5.021 
OFICS (-) 73.78 2602.10 71.41 2344.02 1190.91 0.508 50.83 1792.86 -12.64 -341.60 2043.06 5.981 
OFILA 28.88 6215.30 23.87 5034.09 2875.30 0.571 21.77 4683.54 -4.61 -906.39 4874.87 5.378 
PCBCS (-) -72.92 -3400.66 -60.57 -2988.11 1419.13 0.475 -48.43 -2258.56 11.42 644.72 2562.51 3.975 
PCBLA(-) 9.85 3489.32 8.50 2988.11 1419.13 0.475 6.68 2365.23 -1.87 -644.72 2562.51 3.975 
PCBDEP 2.22 88.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 2.67 106.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 
HCUR 5.62 1266.59 13.70 3083.93 257.01 0.083 6.23 1405.06 8.62 1925.27 437.80 0.227 
HDEP 0.51 348.25 -0.58 -395.32 299.36 0.757 1.77 1198.09 1.43 970.50 484.01 0.499 
HGD 6.14 3744.20 2.16 1304.36 2588.40 1.984 4.97 3025.27 -3.11 -1852.72 3648.79 1.969 
HCS -15.00 -2175.06 -8.80 -1289.42 935.80 0.726 -9.76 -1416.00 4.72 711.77 1529.03 2.148 
HLA (-) 7.70 3183.98 6.58 2703.59 1102.45 0.408 6.70 2768.91 0.77 311.28 2065.50 6.636 
GER 6.79 284.39 2.90 123.78 48.71 0.394 7.25 303.75 2.77 116.88 107.84 0.923 
DEP 0.49 436.92 -0.44 -395.32 299.36 0.757 1.45 1304.76 1.08 970.50 484.01 0.499 
GGD/GSY% -2.53 -1987.90 -3.59 -2812.27 529.49 0.188 -1.33 -0.61 0.39 0.633 
LR% -1.05 -1.90 0.60 0.317 -0.54 -1.10 0.14 0.131 
RS% 49.76 28.57 45.31 1.586 28.58 -45.58 43.42 0.953 
.. % and actual change: mean values of the proportIOnate and actual changes respectIvely by SImulated polIcy changes over the penod of 1969-93. Smce the deterrmmstIc sImulatIOn consIsts of a smgle run, the 
detenninistic mean is a straight mean, whereas the stochastic mean is a mean of 500 runs. Standard Error: SE = SD / J500 and SD = Standard Deviation of the stochastic change, Relative Standard Error = SE / 
Stochastic change. OMO 2% purchases increase the mean value ofHW by around 1444 Rs. crores during the period of 1969-93. 
Detenninistic simulation is the reproduction of Table 9.6 in Chapter 9. Rs. crores = 10 million rupees. 
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Appendix It.lc Simulated Expansionary Policy Effects: Deterministic and Stochastic (500) means for the period 69-93 (Rs. Crores for Actual change~ 
Deposit 51: Deterministic 51: 5tochastic Standard Error 52: Deterministic 52: 5tochastic Standard Error 
% chanqe Actual % chanqe Actual Absolute Relative % chanQe Actual % chanqe Actual Absolute Relative 
BER -7.13 -298.87 -19.21 -818.79 81.04 0.099 -0.40 -16.63 -22.46 -948.85 184.71 0.195 
BGD -6.16 -1269.39 -5.34 -1107.44 640.97 0.579 -4.67 -961.33 5.72 1200.67 1588.29 1.323 
BC5 16.23 1357.11 14.40 1186.05 1218.96 1.028 10.71 895.75 -31.65 -2511.94 2034.99 0.810 
BLA 0.48 211.13 1.69 740.16 624.89 0.844 0.19 82.20 5.14 2260.08 555.05 0.246 
OFIGD -11.52 -3128.54 -14.01 -3832.39 2898.20 0.756 -8.95 -2430.05 19.12 5388.33 5468.71 1.015 
OFIC5(-) 74.98 2644.52 130.22 4274.58 2052.14 0.480 50.81 1792.09 -89.37 -2415.79 4255.85 1.762 
OFILA 26.83 5773.09 38.44 8107.01 4945.41 0.610 19.62 4222.16 -39.66 -7804.16 9708.66 1.244 
PCBC5 (-) -73.69 ·3436.33 -108.92 -5373.69 2443.85 0.455 -50.09 -2336.05 46.79 2642.52 5154.16 1.950 
PCBLA (-) 10.16 3596.78 15.18 5334.00 2443.85 0.458 7.23 2558.46 -7.79 -2682.21 5154.16 1.922 
PCBDEP 4.02 160.46 -0.99 -39.69 0.00 0.000 5.57 222.42 .0.99 -39.69 0.00 0.000 
HCUR -15.76 -3552.87 -5.95 -1338.69 437.85 0.327 -9.61 -2167.35 -5.91 -1320.23 923.54 0.700 
HDEP 3.08 2092.90 1.04 708.29 514.32 0.726 2.89 1962.58 3.39 2308.81 931.35 0.403 
HGD 9.84 5996.30 10.62 6428.63 4447.04 0.692 5.56 3390.36 -11.07 -6589.00 7054.30 1.071 
HCS -14.82 -2148.91 -15.60 -2285.16 1607.51 0.703 -9.93 -1439.71 18.15 2738.68 2931.00 1.070 
HLA(-) 5.78 2387.44 8.55 3513.18 1897.57 0.540 4.22 1745.89 -7.07 -2861.87 4102.88 1.434 
GER -7.13 -298.87 -19.21 -818.79 81.04 0.099 -0.40 -16.63 -22.46 -948.85 184.71 0.195 
DEP 2.50 2253.37 0.74 668.60 514.32 0.769 2.43 2185.00 2.52 2269.11 931.35 0.410 
GGD/G5Y% 2.04 1598.37 1.90 1488.80 909.50 0.611 -0.48 0.33 1.01 3.064 
LR% 0.53 -0.60 1.04 1.729 0.13 -1.91 0.60 0.314 
RS% 60.57 53.95 78.71 1.459 55.60 -54.18 123.57 2.281 
Devaluation 51: Deterministic 51: Stochastic Standard Error S2: Deterministic 52: Stochastic Standard Error 
% change Actual % change Actual Absolute Relative % change Actual % change Actual Absolute Relative 
BER -8.10 -339.35 -21.63 -922.28 91.32 0.099 -6.62 -277.37 -26.09 -1101.95 161.34 0.146 
BGD -5.72 -1177.02 -4.52 -938.90 699.24 0.745 -3.51 -723.07 7.80 1638.09 1352.11 0.825 
BCS 18.76 1568.28 16.13 1328.76 1333.13 1.003 13.88 1160.98 -27.28 -2164.72 1741.86 0.805 
BLA -0.12 -51.93 1.21 532.40 690.24 1.296 -0.36 -160.57 3.70 1628.48 499.18 0.307 
OFIGD -10.43 -2833.23 -13.00 -3555.27 3159.15 0.889 -7.30 -1982.47 19.80 5578.94 4673.92 0.838 
OFIC5 (-) 86.31 3044.04 147.02 4826.29 2227.19 0.461 64.89 2288.58 -70.92 -1916.97 3601.53 1.879 
OFILA 27.31 5877.30 39.75 8381.60 5380.92 0.642 19.85 4271.07 -38.09 -7495.95 8262.36 1.102 
PCBC5(-) -61.44 -2865.31 -100.86 -4975.80 2650.11 0.533 -40.49 -1888.07 56.27 3177.94 4367.37 1.374 
PCBLA(-) 8.74 3093.14 14.16 4975.80 2650.11 0.533 6.02 2131.69 -9.23 -3177.94 4367.37 1.374 
PCBDEP 5.70 227.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 6.10 243.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 
HCUR -0.08 -18.71 10.78 2426.53 481.53 0.198 1.69 380.16 5.52 1232.06 774.27 0.628 
HDEP -0.32 -218.25 -2.48 -1685.88 560.59 0.333 -0.51 -345.40 -0.19 -130.13 795.32 6.112 
HGD 7.15 4358.72 7.73 4675.71 4847.08 1.037 4.44 2704.53 -12.13 -7217.03 6023.79 0.835 
HCS -9.58 -1389.54 -10.09 -1478.27 1752.45 1.185 -5.24 -760.47 22.70 3425.68 2504.09 0.731 
HLAH 6.61 2732.23 9.59 3938.19 2063.67 0.524 4.79 1978.81 -6.65 -2689.53 3487.28 1.297 
GER -8.10 -339.35 -21.63 -922.28 91.32 0.099 -6.62 -277.37 -26.09 -1101.95 161.34 0.146 
DEP 0.01 9.60 -1.87 -1685.88 560.59 0.333 -0.11 -101.76 .0.14 -130.13 795.32 6.112 
GGD/GSY% 0.44 348.47 0.23 181.55 990.47 5.456 0.35 1.08 0.81 0.755 
LR% 0.07 -1.12 1.15 1.027 0.19 -1.59 0.48 0.299 
RS% 66.13 68.23 86.02 1.261 51.25 -43.52 99.28 2.281 
.. % and actual change: mean values of the proportIOnate and actual changes respectively by Simulated policy changes over the penod of 1969-93. Smce the deterrmmstlc Simulation conSISts of a smgle run, the 
deterministic mean is a straight mean, whereas the stochastic mean is a mean of 500 runs. 
Standard Error: SE = SD / .J5OO and SD = Standard Deviation of the stochastic change, Relative Standard Error = SE / Stochastic change. 
Deterministic simulation is the reproduction of Table 9.6 in Chapter 9. Rs. crores = 10 million rupees. 
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Appendix 1l.2a Simulated Multiple Expansionary Policy Effects: Deterministic and Stochastlc (500) means for the period 69-93 (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
eRR/Bank 51: Deterministic 51: Stochastlc Standard Error 52: Deterministic 52: Stochastic Standard Error 
% chanQe Actual % chanQe Actual Absolute Relative % chanQe Actual % change Actual Absolute Relative 
BER -48.47 -2031.52 -49.60 -2114.45 42.54 0.020 -28.73 -1204.21 -52.79 -2229.82 123.19 0.055 
BGD 2.57 528.87 5.94 1233.49 491.20 0.398 1.39 286.96 3.07 645.74 877.21 1.358 
BCS 19.15 1601.52 14.41 1187.39 897.05 0.755 13.70 1145.91 0.41 32.52 1140.47 35.072 
BlA 3.52 1550.26 3.06 1343.19 420.09 0.313 3.23 1420.47 7.28 3201.34 333.85 0.104 
OFIGD -6.90 -1873.57 -5.45 -1490.07 2120.46 1.423 -7.05 -1915.70 -0.54 -151.92 2888.60 19.014 
OFICS(-) 75.05 2646.98 83.83 2751.79 1522.27 0.553 52.26 1843.15 97.60 2638.14 2277.47 0.863 
OFILA 21.01 4520.57 20.12 4241.89 3641.24 0.858 17.47 3758.86 14.18 2790.06 5154.01 1.847 
PCBCS (-) -67.46 -3146.21 -60.32 -2975.95 1820.68 0.612 -45.92 -2141.58 -55.23 -3119.15 2699.37 0.865 
PCBLA (-) 9.11 3225.25 8.47 2975.95 1820.68 0.612 6.76 2394.31 9.06 3119.15 2699.37 0.865 
PCBDEP 1.98 79.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 6.32 252.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 
HCUR -6.68 -1506.08 1.84 415.19 309.50 0.745 9.83 2216.90 18.14 4052.04 496.83 0.123 
HDEP 0.69 469.10 -0.69 -471.52 380.95 0.808 0.57 384.74 -0.25 -172.46 496.12 2.877 
HGD 9.82 5983.30 6.74 4076.94 3293.84 0.808 2.67 1627.73 -0.83 -493.82 3764.29 7.623 
HCS -14.48 -2100.75 -9.63 -1411.55 1189.75 0.843 -9.96 -1444.34 -3.40 -513.53 1560.39 3.039 
HLAI-l 6.88 2845.58 6.35 2609.13 1417.21 0.543 6.74 2785.02 7.10 2872.25 2193.96 0.764 
GER -48.47 -2031.52 -49.60 -2114.45 42.54 0.020 -28.73 -1204.21 -52.79 -2229.82 123.19 0.055 
DEP 0.61 548.15 -0.52 -471.52 380.95 0.808 0.71 637.48 -0.19 -172.46 496.12 2.877 
GGD/GSY% 5.91 4638.60 4.87 3820.36 683.15 0.179 -2.09 -1.43 0.58 0.409 
LR% -0.47 -1.03 0.53 0.518 -1.91 -4.29 0.34 0.078 
RS% 45.04 58.75 48.03 0.818 56.69 -30.67 72.87 2.376 
CRRlSLR 51: Deterministic 51: 5tochastic Standard Error 52: Deterministic 52: Stochastlc Standard Error 
% change Actual % change Actual Absolute Relative % chanae Actual % chanae Actual Absolute Relative 
BER -19.42 -813.86 9.81 418.38 118.76 0.284 -14.83 -621.49 -6.70 -283.21 524.03 1.850 
BGD 13.76 2834.35 21.39 4439.98 1672.33 0.377 11.66 2401.93 14.04 2949.14 4951.41 1.679 
BCS -21.76 -1819.36 -50.31 -4144.65 2982.47 0.720 -19.65 -1642.92 -39.24 -3114.29 6583.69 2.114 
BLA 3.29 1448.03 2.13 935.82 1318.08 1.408 3.44 1511.64 4.77 2097.89 2198.07 1.048 
OFIGD 15.75 4278.24 38.34 10484.63 7249.11 0.691 13.34 3622.25 18.46 5200.87 16639.35 3.199 
OFICS (-) -80.36 -2834.20 -304.92 -10009.55 5238.31 0.523 -70.52 -2487.26 -201.21 -5438.73 12861.73 2.365 
OFllA -33.05 -7112.47 -97.19 -20494.29 12484.83 0.609 -28.39 -6109.54 -54.07 -10639.66 29492.76 2.772 
PCBCS (-) 67.46 3145.83 233.46 11517.75 6345.95 0.551 57.99 2704.13 87.04 4915.93 15283.98 3.109 
PCBLA(-) -9.90 -3506.85 -32.78 -11517.75 6345.95 0.551 -8.52 -3017.48 -14.28 -4915.93 15283.98 3.109 
PCBDEP -9.03 -361.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 -7.84 -313.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 
HCUR 9.36 2110.19 1.59 357.66 1038.66 2.904 13.37 3014.25 4.82 1076.73 2708.63 2.516 
HDEP -0.68 -464.45 2.71 1837.59 1304.68 0.710 -0.63 -429.24 1.26 856.07 2840.09 3.318 
HGD -9.74 -5934.30 -26.26 -15888.57 11280.85 0.710 -9.89 -6025.19 -13.70 -8150.01 21588.32 2.649 
HCS 14.69 2131.00 38.58 5652.84 4073.40 0.721 12.82 1859.78 17.17 2591.49 8933.76 3.447 
HLA(-) -5.22 -2157.60 -19.58 -8040.72 4870.60 0.606 -3.82 -1580.42 -8.96 -3625.83 12482.84 3.443 
GER -19.42 -813.86 9.81 418.38 118.76 0.284 -14.83 -621.49 -6.70 -283.21 524.03 1.850 
DEP -0.92 -825.46 2.04 1837.59 1304.68 0.710 -0.83 -742.58 0.95 856.07 2840.09 3.318 
GGD/GSY% 1.50 1178.28 -1.23 -963.95 2361.70 2.450 -0.90 5.43 8.90 1.639 
lR% -1.21 -0.03 1.67 63.632 -1.81 -4.19 2.71 0.646 
RS% -68.23 -212.65 159.06 0.748 -57.90 -829.03 1066.48 1.286 
.. % and actual change: mean values of the proportIOnate and actual changes respectively by Simulated polIcy changes over the penod of 1969-93. Smce the determlD1stlc simulatIOn consists of a smgle run, the 
deterministic mean is a straight mean, whereas the stochastic mean is a mean of 500 runs. Standard Error: SE = SD / ,J5OO and SD = Standard Deviation of the stochastic change, Relative Standard Error = SE / 
Stochastic change. CRR 2% reduction increases the mean value ofBW by around 1649 Rs. crores during the period of 1969-93. Rs. crores = 10 million rupees. 
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Appendix tl.2b Simulated Multiple Expansionary Policy Effects: Deterministic and Stochastic (500) means for the period 69-93 (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
CRRlDeposit 51: Deterministic 51: Stochastic Standard Error 52: Deterministic 52: Stochastic Standard Error 
% change Actual % change Actual Absolute Relative % change Actual % change Actual Absolute Relative 
BER -32.14 -1347.20 -57.37 -2445.89 117.26 0.048 -16.00 -670.63 -65.34 -2759.98 232.90 0.084 
BGD 1.01 207.03 -4.88 -1013.03 1522.00 1.502 0.23 48.01 -2.32 -487.13 1707.11 3.504 
BC5 18.13 1515.67 41.92 3453.96 2736.07 0.792 13.49 1128.26 -1.06 -84.09 2206.39 26.238 
BLA 2.89 1273.62 3.77 1654.39 1234.87 0.746 2.60 1143.49 11.32 4980.82 628.31 0.126 
OFIGD -7.92 -2151.50 -26.93 -7363.08 6591.65 0.895 -8.45 -2295.92 -2.89 -813.62 5626.42 6.915 
OFIC5 (-) 74.06 2612.14 270.15 8868.15 4750.04 0.536 56.79 2002.97 195.90 5295.08 4439.97 0.839 
OFILA 22.14 4763.67 76.97 16231.32 11338.47 0.699 19.98 4298.91 31.04 6108.71 10044.06 1.644 
PCBCS (-) -66.50 -3101.01 -207.64 -10243.93 5732.42 0.560 -51.06 -2381.35 -114.39 -6460.92 5277.54 0.817 
PCBLA(-) 9.60 3398.30 29.04 10204.24 5732.42 0.562 7.95 2814.61 18.65 6421.23 5277.54 0.822 
PCBDEP 7.44 297.29 -0.99 -39.69 0.00 0.000 10.84 433.27 -0.99 -39.69 0.00 0.000 
HCUR -14.29 -3220.47 -4.62 -1039.21 951.89 0.916 -1.29 -290.67 15.10 3371.57 973.28 0.289 
HDEP 3.22 2185.29 -0.19 -130.44 1185.60 9.090 3.21 2178.20 1.58 1077.68 966.55 0.897 
HGD 9.32 5678.70 22.61 13680.64 10251.20 0.749 3.69 2246.90 2.19 1300.75 7330.94 5.636 
HC5 -13.82 -2004.54 -32.96 -4829.73 3702.11 0.767 -10.39 -1506.64 -7.17 -1081.75 3039.86 2.810 
HLA(-) 6.38 2638.99 18.70 7681.47 4419.46 0.575 6.36 2627.79 11.53 4668.30 4278.31 0.916 
GER -32.14 -1347.20 -57.37 -2445.89 117.26 0.048 -16.00 -670.63 -65.34 -2759.98 232.90 0.084 
DEP 2.76 2482.58 -0.19 -170.13 1185.60 6.969 2.90 2611.46 1.15 1037.99 966.55 0.931 
GGD/GSY% 4.76 3734.23 6.77 5304.53 2139.89 0.403 -1.85 -0.93 1.14 1.236 
LR% -0.12 -1.47 1.58 1.076 -1.51 -6.13 0.69 0.113 
R5% 83.57 189.46 148.64 0.785 73.86 -59.62 142.08 2.383 
CRRlGSY(SI) 51: Deterministic 51: Stochastlc Standard Error 52: Deterministic 52: 5tochastic Standard Error 
CRRlOMO(S2) % change Actual % change Actuai Absolute Relative % chanQe Actual % change Actual Absolute Relative 
BER -18.01 -754.88 -49.64 -2116.28 42.54 0.020 -8.76 -367.34 41.95 1771.86 3053.30 1.723 
BGD -3.36 -692.73 5.95 1235.22 491.20 0.398 -3.64 -749.04 -80.21 -16846.56 16419.33 0.975 
BCS 19.02 1590.41 14.41 1187.53 897.09 0.755 14.54 1215.60 324.27 25733.90 25173.71 0.978 
BLA 3.42 1506.33 3.06 1343.15 420.13 0.313 3.52 1549.92 -20.48 -9009.05 11813.99 1.311 
OFIGD -10.15 -2756.71 -5.45 -1490.31 2120.47 1.423 -9.80 -2661.22 -206.17 -58090.11 57447.66 0.989 
OFICS(-) 75.59 2665.88 83.83 2752.01 1522.27 0.553 56.82 2003.95 1613.50 43612.81 40882.52 0.937 
OFILA 25.20 5422.61 20.12 4242.34 3641.25 0.858 21.68 4665.19 516.84 101703.46 98329.78 0.967 
PCBCS (-) -68.39 -3189.39 -60.33 -2976.17 1820.64 0.612 -48.15 -2245.24 -861.86 -48677.94 46136.32 0.948 
PCBLA(-) 9.63 3410.13 8.47 2976.17 1820.64 0.612 7.25 2567.52 141.41 48677.94 46136.31 0.948 
PCBDEP 5.52 220.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 8.07 322.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 
HCUR 6.63 1494.93 1.84 415.18 309.49 0.745 15.01 3382.96 53.36 11915.88 6603.76 0.554 
HDEP 0.70 477.56 -0.69 -471.56 380.95 0.808 1.95 1324.80 -13.26 -9025.80 9639.30 1.068 
HGD 6.01 3660.24 6.74 4077.34 3293.84 0.808 3.02 1840.22 123.30 73367.64 73866.90 1.007 
HCS -14.58 -2113.92 -9.64 -1411.69 1189.75 0.843 -10.05 -1456.88 -204.11 -30799.03 30419.32 0.988 
HLA(-) 8.51 3518.82 6.35 2609.32 1417.21 0.543 8.83 3647.59 108.75 44016.46 40407.99 0.918 
GER -18.01 -754.88 -49.64 -2116.28 42.54 0.020 -8.76 -367.34 41.95 1771.86 3053.30 1.723 
DEP 0.78 698.31 -0.52 -471.56 380.95 0.808 1.83 1647.10 -10.01 -9025.80 9639.30 1.068 
GGD/GSY% 0.27 210.79 4.88 3822.25 683.14 0.179 -2.86 -7.02 4.57 0.651 
LR% -1.74 -1.03 0.53 0.518 -2.20 -0.40 3.64 9.011 
R5% 68.44 58.75 48.04 0.818 67.21 616.05 594.95 0.966 
.. % and actual change: mean values of the proportIOnate and actual changes respectIvely by SImulated polIcy changes over the penod of 1969-93. Smce the determlDlstIC sImulatIOn consIsts of a smgle run, the 
deterministic mean is a straight mean, whereas the stochastic mean is a mean of 500 runs. Standard Error: SE = SO I J500 and SO = Standard Deviation of the stochastic change, Relative Standard Error = SE I 
Stochastic change. CRR 2% reduction increases the mean value ofBW by around 1649 Rs. crores during the period of 1969-93. OMO 2% purchases increase the mean value ofHW by around 1444 Rs. crores during 
the period of 1969-93. Rs. crores = 10 million rupees. 
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Appendix 1l.2c Simulated Multiple Expansionary Policy _Effects: Deterministic and Stochastic (500) means for the period 69-93 (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
DepositiBank 51: Deterministic 51: Stochastic Standard Error 52: Deterministic 52: Stochastlc Standard Error 
% change Actual % change Actual Absolute Relative % change Actual % change Actual Absolute Absolute 
BER -21.11 -884.71 -32.99 -1406.53 82.03 0.058 -11.86 -497.02 -36.19 -1528.60 202.81 0.133 
BGD -3.35 -689.69 -2.53 -524.30 648.13 1.236 -2.46 -506.82 8.54 1792.61 1735.48 0.968 
BCS 16.29 1361.93 14.33 1180.51 1232.98 1.044 10.89 910.57 -35.10 -2785.59 2225.53 0.799 
BLA 0.48 212.45 1.71 750.45 632.49 0.843 0.21 93.26 5.73 2521.72 606.80 0.241 
OFIGD -11.51 -3126.18 -13.93 -3810.14 2931.15 0.769 -9.54 -2592.41 20.97 5909.80 5969.63 1.010 
OFICS(-) 75.04 2646.45 130.02 4268.15 2075.01 0.486 51.35 1811.03 -100.97 -2729.35 4654.08 1.705 
OFILA 26.83 5772.66 38.31 8078.33 5001.18 0.619 20.46 4403.46 -43.90 -8639.19 10606.04 1.228 
PCBCS (-) -73.61 -3432.71 -108.71 -5363.25 2470.96 0.461 -50.90 -2373.48 52.95 2990.53 5630.37 1.883 
PCBLA(-) 10.15 3594.81 15.15 5323.56 2470.96 0.464 7.40 2619.60 -8.80 -3030.22 5630.37 1.858 
PCBDEP 4.06 162.11 -0.99 -39.69 0.00 0.000 6.16 246.12 -0.99 -39.69 0.00 0.000 
HCUR -15.73 -3546.54 -5.92 -1333.36 442.99 0.332 -7.79 -1755.88 -3.77 -840.84 1010.38 1.202 
HDEP 3.08 2090.27 1.05 711.28 520.14 0.731 2.96 2007.79 3.54 2409.34 1016.75 0.422 
HGD 9.84 5994.74 10.58 6402.81 4497.40 0.702 5.08 3098.22 -12.94 -7702.40 7702.12 1.000 
HCS -14.81 -2148.19 -15.53 -2275.61 1625.73 0.714 -10.16 -1473.02 20.19 3046.77 3199.46 1.050 
HLA(-) 5.78 2390.29 8.53 3505.22 1918.84 0.547 4.54 1877.12 -7.63 -3087.26 4482.39 1.452 
GER -21.11 -884.71 -32.99 -1406.53 82.03 0.058 -11.86 -497.02 -36.19 -1528.60 202.81 0.133 
DEP 2.50 2252.38 0.75 671.59 520.14 0.775 2.51 2253.92 2.63 2369.65 1016.75 0.429 
GGD/GSY% 2.78 2178.86 2.64 2068.38 919.79 0.445 -0.83 0.07 1.11 16.812 
LR% 0.53 -0.61 1.05 1.726 -0.10 -2.34 0.65 0.280 
RS% 60.79 53.45 79.58 1.489 59.01 -62.75 135.28 2.156 
DeposiUSLR 51: Deterministic 51: Stochastic Standard Error 52: Deterministic 52: Stochastic Standard Error 
% change Actual % change Actual Absolute Relative % chanqe Actual % chanqe Actual Absolute Relative 
BER 5.15 216.04 20.77 885.53 76.13 0.086 1.92 80.47 24.22 1023.22 185.32 0.181 
BGD 5.94 1222.98 7.06 1466.08 623.52 0.425 7.51 1545.49 -4.68 -982.59 1559.27 1.587 
BCS -19.75 -1651.64 -20.99 -1729.34 1197.15 0.692 -21.38 -1788.05 26.70 2118.63 2005.03 0.946 
BLA 0.48 212.63 -1.42 -622.25 613.97 0.987 0.37 162.10 -4.91 -2159.21 528.12 0.245 
OFIGD 8.72 2369.32 13.13 3589.34 2795.84 0.779 10.58 2872.36 -21.33 -6011.29 5302.40 0.882 
OFICS(-) -61.97 -2185.67 -133.78 -4391.68 2009.94 0.458 -69.61 -2455.10 96.67 2612.86 4214.29 1.613 
OFILA -21.17 -4555.01 -37.85 -7981.06 4801.28 0.602 -24.76 -5327.49 43.83 8624.20 9499.34 1.101 
PCBCS (-) 44.85 2091.68 99.39 4903.55 2364.29 0.482 52.38 2442.55 -61.50 -3473.64 5053.52 1.455 
PCBLA(-) -6.68 -2365.01 -14.07 -4943.24 2364.29 0.478 -7.76 -2747.19 9.98 3433.95 5053.52 1.472 
PCBDEP -6.84 -273.33 -0.99 -39.69 0.00 0.000 -7.62 -304.63 -0.99 -39.69 0.00 0.000 
HCUR -1.49 -336.55 -7.42 -1668.85 407.29 0.244 -4.37 -984.49 -6.79 -1516.13 922.72 0.609 
HDEP 1.83 1243.49 3.23 2195.16 495.70 0.226 1.78 1209.68 0.78 532.57 904.50 1.698 
HGD -7.29 -4441.93 -10.62 -6427.49 4286.07 0.667 -7.25 -4418.87 11.75 6993.88 6858.81 0.981 
HCS 10.74 1557.65 15.30 2241.21 1548.20 0.691 12.24 1775.50 -19.75 -2979.41 2843.43 0.954 
HLA(-) -4.78 -1977.36 -8.91 -3660.07 1844.51 0.504 -5.85 -2418.19 7.49 3031.03 4020.99 1.327 
GER 5.15 216.04 20.77 885.53 76.13 0.086 1.92 80.47 24.22 1023.22 185.32 0.181 
DEP 1.08 970.17 2.39 2155.47 495.70 0.230 1.01 905.05 0.55 492.88 904.50 1.835 
GGD/GSY% -1.08 -849.64 -1.75 -1372.08 868.37 0.633 0.35 -0.48 1.05 2.186 
LR% -0.22 0.75 1.05 1.410 0.01 2.07 0.61 0.295 
RS% -50.72 -64.20 80.26 1.250 -55.16 64.57 129.00 1.998 
.. % and actual change: mean values of the proportIOnate and actual changes respectively by simulated policy changes over the penod of 1969-93. Smce the determlD1stlc simulatIOn consIsts of a smgle run, the 
deterministic mean is a straight mean, whereas the stochastic mean is a mean of 500 runs. Standard Error: SE = SD / ,f5OO and SD = Standard Deviation of the stochastic change, Relative Standard Error = SE / 
Stochastic change. CRR 2% reduction increases the mean value ofBW by around 1649 Rs. crores during the period of 1969-93. Rs. crores = 10 million rupees. 
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Appendix H.2d Simulated Multiple Expansionary Policy Effects: Deterministic and Stochastic (500) means for the period 69-93 (Rs. Crores for Actual changes) 
DepositlGSY(SI) 51: Deterministic 51: Stochastic Standard Error 52: Deterministic 52: Stochastic Standard Error 
" 
IOMO(S2) % chanqe Actual % chanqe Actual Absolute Relative % chanqe Actual % chanqe Actual Absolute Relative 
BER 9.06 379.90 -16.30 -695.01 122.66 0.176 8.10 339.58 -12.90 -545.10 293.21 0.538 
BGD -8.89 -1831.59 -12.21 -2534.01 983.15 0.388 -7.49 -1543.15 3.15 660.64 2479.24 3.753 
BCS 15.28 1277.40 22.23 1831.38 1871.17 1.022 11.78 985.35 -25.25 -2004.16 3059.70 1.527 
BLA 0.40 174.27 3.18 1397.77 957.25 0.685 0.50 218.21 4.29 1888.68 897.83 0.475 
OFIGD -14.28 -3877.35 -23.85 -6522.45 4439.47 0.681 -12.37 -3358.50 16.54 4660.68 8577.19 1.840 
OFICS (-) 71.98 2538.60 201.62 6618.60 3153.01 0.476 55.85 1969.68 -73.26 -1980.19 6241.61 3.152 
OFILA 29.82 6415.97 62.32 13141.11 7585.01 0.577 24.76 5328.21 -33.75 -6640.91 14809.16 2.230 
PCBCS (-) -71.45 -3332.14 -169.49 -6361.80 3748.59 0.448 -53.34 -2487.49 50.14 2831.93 7831.73 2.766 
PCBLA(-) 10.28 3638.47 23.68 8322.11 3748.59 0.450 7.92 2804.63 -6.34 -2871.62 7831.73 2.727 
PCBDEP 7.67 306.33 -0.99 -39.69 0.00 0.000 7.94 317.14 -0.99 -39.69 0.00 0.000 
HCUR -2.23 -502.25 7.75 1745.24 666.07 0.382 -2.82 -636.50 2.19 489.36 1356.51 2.772 
HDEP 3.10 2106.61 0.46 312.97 787.78 2.517 4.41 2993.35 4.57 3108.11 1466.75 0.472 
HGD 5.61 3418.35 12.78 7732.99 6811.52 0.881 5.47 3331.61 -11.58 -6890.35 11053.86 1.604 
HCS -14.28 -2070.94 -24.40 -3574.58 2461.87 0.689 -10.36 -1503.16 18.93 2855.90 4631.42 1.622 
HLA (-) 7.14 2951.78 15.14 6216.76 2911.32 0.468 6.63 2741.79 -4.65 -1880.61 6291.55 3.345 
GER 9.06 379.90 -16.30 -695.01 122.66 0.176 8.10 339.58 -12.90 -545.10 293.21 0.538 
DEP 2.68 2412.94 0.30 273.28 787.78 2.883 3.68 3310.49 3.40 3068.42 1466.75 0.478 
GGD/GSY% -2.92 -2290.59 -1.69 -1323.47 1391.37 1.051 -1.65 1.19 2.03 1.702 
LR% -0.72 -2.50 1.61 0.642 -0.39 -3.01 0.58 0.192 
RS% 84.44 82.51 121.76 1.476 71.15 -247.39 225.98 0.913 
CRRlDepositl 51: Deterministic 51: Stochastic Standard Error 52: Deterministic 52: Stochastlc Standard Error 
SLR % chanqe Actual % change Actual Absolute Relative % change Actual % change Actual Absolute Relative 
BER -22.93 -961.09 -12.00 -511.46 42.52 0.083 -15.72 -658.69 -13.64 -576.18 93.35 0.162 
BGD 10.80 2223.67 13.41 2783.17 624.73 0.224 6.16 1269.26 6.52 1368.44 846.71 0.619 
BCS -12.55 -1049.43 -22.74 -1873.72 1113.04 0.594 -6.60 -551.63 -9.20 -729.87 1128.20 1.546 
BLA 3.26 1436.00 2.85 1251.51 489.69 0.391 3.61 1590.20 3.61 1587.19 384.30 0.242 
OFIGD 8.60 2335.94 16.88 4616.91 2706.72 0.586 2.99 812.24 3.07 864.51 2844.85 3.291 
OFICS (-) -35.95 -1268.09 -118.36 -3885.33 1959.41 0.504 -9.14 -322.51 -26.64 -720.13 2195.12 3.048 
OFILA -16.75 -3604.05 -40.32 -6502.29 4665.35 0.549 -5.27 -1134.76 -6.05 -1584.65 5038.40 3.180 
PCBCS (-) 25.04 1167.74 86.08 4246.72 2373.64 0.559 -0.69 -32.13 4.20 237.08 2607.48 10.998 
PCBLA(-) -3.80 -1343.99 -12.20 -4286.41 2373.64 0.554 -0.19 -67.57 -0.80 -276.77 2607.48 9.421 
PCBDEP -4.41 -176.25 -0.99 -39.69 0.00 0.000 -2.49 -99.70 -0.99 -39.69 0.00 0.000 
HCUR -2.44 -549.13 -4.86 -1092.80 385.78 0.353 3.96 892.94 3.20 714.42 461.54 0.646 
HDEP 2.09 1420.38 3.21 2178.72 487.21 0.224 2.23 1515.61 2.28 1551.04 485.53 0.313 
HGD -4.34 -2644.36 -10.39 -6285.29 4212.60 0.670 -3.42 -2082.51 -3.75 -2232.94 3691.03 1.653 
HCS 6.54 949.07 15.26 2235.11 1520.99 0.681 1.36 196.99 1.64 246.81 1527.38 6.188 
HLA(-) -1.99 -624.06 -7.22 -2964.36 1820.63 0.614 1.27 523.01 0.69 279.31 2132.23 7.634 
GER -22.93 -961.09 -12.00 -511.46 42.52 0.083 -15.72 -658.69 -13.64 -576.18 93.35 0.162 
DEP 1.38 1244.13 2.38 2139.02 487.21 0.228 1.57 1415.91 1.68 1511.34 485.53 0.321 
GGD/GSY% 2.44 1915.23 1.42 1114.79 882.05 0.791 -1.34 -0.39 1.40 3.571 
LR% -0.91 -0.48 0.61 1.274 -1.74 -2.21 0.57 0.258 
RS% -29.61 -62.44 57.32 0.695 -7.24 -117.84 168.15 1.427 
.. % and actual change: mean values of the proportIOnate and actual changes respectIvely by SImulated pohcy changes over the penod of 1969-93. Smce the determmlstJc sImulatIOn consIsts of a smgle run, the 
deterministic mean is a straight mean, whereas the stochastic mean is a mean of 500 runs. Standard Error: SE = SD / .J5OO and SD = Standard Deviation of the stochastic change, Relative Standard Error = SE / 
Stochastic change. eRR 2% reduction increases the mean value ofBW by around 1649 Rs. crores during the period of 1969-93. OMO 2% purchases increase the mean value ofHW by around 1444 Rs. crores during 
the period of 1969-93. Rs. crores = 10 million rupees. 
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Chapter 12 Conclusion 
The current study sheds important light on a range of issues in the financial sector in 
India: the way in which different sectors of the economy choose their portfolios; how 
credit rationing and financial liberalization in the financial sector affect the country's 
financial performance; how interest rates are determined and affect different sectors 
of the economy and how credit is distributed to the most in need of the economic 
development. 
The content in this thesis is a first step towards a fuller analysis directed at the ways in 
which policy instruments affect an economy as a whole, as well as for future 
development of this kind of study for developing economies. 
In Section 12.1 a summary and the key findings and in Section 12.2 the key policy 
implications drawn from the empirical analysis are spelled out. The limitations in 
conducting this project are explained by outlining further promising research ideas in 
section 12.3. 
12.1 Summary and the Key Findings 
In the general equilibrium system in the financial sector for India, Banks, OFIs, PCB 
and Household sectors are modelled with the financial instruments of currency, 
deposits, government debt (including provident funds), company securities, loans and 
excess reserves. 
The survey in Chapter 2 shows the difficulty in obtaining statistically significant and 
correctly-signed interest rate coefficients (or price coefficients in the case of the AIDS 
model). Table 12.1 shows the overall econometric performance for each single 
sector. 
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Table 12.1 The Performance of the demands for financial assets and liabilities with the AIDS 
model in India 
Sector Proportion of Proportion of Static S & H Proportion of cointegration 
(Number of the significant the correctIy- joint test existing in share equations 
share own price signed (SSLR test) ** at the 5% level 
equations) coefficients at a own-price 
5% level coefficients * Engle-Granger Johansen 
Banking: 213 (3/3 at 10%) 4/4 Rejected 2/4 4/4 
Model 2 (4) ( -D.38 imposed (S given H, not 
on PER in ER) rejected) 
peB: 213 2/3 Not applicable 3/3 3/3 
Model 1 (3) 
OF!: 3/3 2/3 Accepted 0/3 3/3 
Net (3) 
Household: 5/5 4/5 Accepted 5/5 5/5 
Model 2 (5) 
PER=Pnce of excess reserves, ER=Excess reserves equation 
S = Symmetry, H = Homogeneity, SSLR = Small sample-adjusted likelihood ratio test, 
* 'on a priori ground' 
** Specific model taken as a null of restricted model 
With respect to price coefficients, the result is comparable with that of BaIT and 
Cuthbertson in Table 2.2 (in Chapter 2), and outperforms the pitfalls type model in 
Table 2.1 (in Chapter 2). Further, though not shown in the table, 73 out of the 110 
parameters in the demand equations used for simulation have t-ratio being greater 
than 2.0, and all but 12 parameters have t-ratio being greater than unity. This is itself 
a considerable achievement, but also, cointegration analysis reveals that a long-run 
equilibrium relationship appears to exist in the share equations. 
In general the estimated long-run model provided coherent price parameters, and also 
economically plausible parameters of policy variables. It shows that the AIDS model 
is capable of explaining portfolio behaviour in the context of the financial sector in 
India. 
Having achieved sensible results in estimation, we then conducted the policy analysis 
by simulation, in a system-wide model incorporating all the behavioural equations and 
the market clearing identities. Simulation analysis is implemented with a view to the 
removal of rigidities in the flow of funds in the government sector and the delivery of 
adequate funds to the private sectors. The simulation policy experiments provided us 
with plausible unbiased policy effects in the financial sector. The general impression 
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produced by the experiments is that the policy effects in a single-shot experiment 
reconcile the developing economy-specific features: a weak effect is found in the 
indirect monetary policies of the Bank rate and OMO, whereas a relatively strong 
effect is found in the direct policies of eRR, SLR, deposit rate and government 
securities' yields. 
As a whole in this project, the key finding is the significant role of interest rates in the 
financial sector. Interest rates play an important role in portfolio selection in the 
disaggregated economic sectors. This is also clear from system-wide simulation 
experiments: there is a relatively strong impact from exogenous and endogenous 
interest rates on the flow of funds for India (though the impact of the bank rate turns 
out to be relatively limited). These results demonstrate that interest rates matter in the 
operation of financial markets. The other key finding is that the nationalization of the 
banking sector in 1969 and the financial liberalisation in the early 1990s have exerted 
an enormous effect on the whole financial sector in India. It is evidenced from the 
significant dummy variable effects, in particular on loans by dummy 69 and on 
company securities by dummy 90, in estimation, and the influences on the level of 
endogenous interest rates in simulation. 
12.2 Policy Implications 
Over the past two or three decades, financial liberalization has been set in train in 
many developing economies. However, it was not always the case that financial 
liberalisation improved the mobilization and allocation of scarce domestic resources 
in the financial sector. Our simulation experiments reveal that this is also the case for 
India. The following are the key policy implications drawn from this research. 
i) Market-determined government securities' yields versus controlled government 
securities' yields: 
It is not clear as to whether controlled or market-determined yields contribute most in 
delivering extra funds to private economic activities. Government securities' yields 
were suppressed before the financial reforms, so that government could borrow 
cheaply from the market. On the other hand, it had an advantageous effect in that 
investors invested in other financial assets, which generated a better rate of return. If 
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these funds were made available to non-financial private sectors, they would bring 
benefits in generating extra funds for private economic activities. After the financial 
reforms were begun, government securities yields became market-determined, and 
this increased the yields. However, this had a detrimental effect. Investors (in 
particular in the banking sector) are attracted to risk-free government securities, and 
therefore funds tend to stagnate in the government sector. Yet, controlled government 
securities yields are intuitively disadvantageous to the economy from the point of 
view of the banking sector. Commercial banks were obliged to invest the government 
securities under SLR, though the yields were pushed lower than market-determined 
yields. This reduced their profitability, so that banks had to either increase their 
lending rate or lower the deposit rate, or both, in order to improve their profitability. 
Further, banks may have been forced to curtail credit rationing towards priority 
sectors, since credit rationing was delivered at subsidised rates. These situations 
represent financial repression. In this respect, the introduction of market-determined 
government securities yields in the post-reform era may well be better than the 
controlled yields in the long run. 
ii) The effect of SLR: 
Empirical experiments reveal a relatively clear picture of the policy effect for the 
main policy instruments. However, the effect of the SLR on the economy is 
ambiguous, as to whether it is detrimental or advantageous in terms of delivering the 
funds to the non-financial private sectors. Further the allocation of SLR, between 
government securities issued by the government sector and government approved 
securities issued by the OFIs sector, is not clear. With respect to the government 
securities, it is widely believed that lowering SLR will increase the flow of loans to 
the private sector and that it may cause a problem for government finances, since the 
captive market diminishes. However, the empirical experiments demonstrated an 
unexpected outcome: Government securities are attractive risk-free assets, therefore, 
where there is a fall in the rate of return in other financial assets, the banking sector 
voluntarily invests in government securities, irrespective of the level of the SLR. This 
is particularly so in the post-refonn period because; first, government securities' 
yields were de-controlled, raising the nominal yields (as mentioned above); second, 
liberalization may reduce lending rates, if firms can more easily raise funds on the 
stock market, the demand for loans, hence lending rates may fall (Green, Murinde and 
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Moore, 2002); and third, there is the increasing perception of risk. Our empirical 
study suggests that commercial banks' subscription to government approved 
securities under this regulation contributes to delivering funds into the private sector. 
It seems that the allocation of SLR between the government securities and 
government approved company securities is a key to whether this is detrimental or 
favourable. When the share of the government approved company securities is high 
enough to ensure credit to the industrial sector, then an increase in SLR may be a 
desirable policy strategy. 
iii) Fiscal disciplinary efforts: 
The econometric estimation results and the simulation experiments repeatedly 
directed us to the issue of fiscal stance. The attractiveness of government securities 
are frequently found especially in the banking and household sectors. This is the 
implication of 'crowding-out' effect. Literally, the effect emerges through the interest 
rate channel as a result of an increase in government expenditure. In the system-wide 
model, the real sector is treated as exogenous, hence 'crowding-out' effect is observed 
through the flow of funds from other financial assets to the government securities 
This suggests the need for fiscal disciplinary efforts by reducing government deficit, 
hence, government debt in the government sector in order to increase the funds for the 
private sectors. 
iv) Deposit rates: 
Our experiments demonstrate that as the ceiling on the deposit rate is removed, 
financial saving increases in the household sector and these funds are made available 
for private economic activities with a relatively small increase in the lending rate. 
This not only supports the view of the McKinnon and Shaw school, but also is 
consistent with the aim of financial liberalization in India, and may well be one of the 
main channels through which the flow of funds into investment projects can increase 
(Green et al., 2002). Yet, abolishing entirely the control of interest rates is unlikely to 
achieve the optimum results. Our study suggests that, faced with expansionary 
policies, market-determined deposit rates fall in line with the lending rates, and this 
may discourage deposit savings in the household sector resulting in a detrimental 
effect on the flow of loanable funds. Continued government intervention in the 
determination of the institutional interest rates may be the best interim policy until 
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competition within the financial sector is adequate and interest rates achieve the 
efficient allocation of resources. In particular this is the case where there is a 
tendency towards a cartelised banking industry as seen in many developing 
economies (Fry, 1995). 
v) Robustness of complete interest rate liberalisation: 
Possible perverse outcomes from a completely liberalised interest rate regime are also 
highlighted in the stochastic simulations, with respect to government securities' 
yields. There is evidence that the policies are sensitive to the uncertainty in the 
regime of S2 ,where the government securities' yields are liberalised, whereas this is 
less so in SI, where the government securities' yields are controlled and the supply of 
securities is endogenous. This highlights the exposure to vulnerability in policy 
effects on the financial markets in the face of liberalised interest rates. We have seen 
that the financial sector in developing economies tends to suffer from government 
intervention in allocating resources. However, if the detrimental effects of the 
complete liberalisation of interest rate structure proves to be a general characteristic of 
liberalized financial markets in a developing country, it emphasises the need for 
gradualism in implementing policies with the view to giving a greater role to the 
market in determining interest rates (Green et al., 2002). It may be worth noting that 
'indiscriminate attempts at financial decontrol have sometimes come to grief 
(McKinnon, 1988)1. 
vi) Optimal policy: 
Deterministic and stochastic simulation experiments conclude that lowering eRR and 
removing the deposit rate ceiling are the most robust policy instruments in achieving 
the target of increasing loanable funds to non-financial private sectors. This finding is 
in line with the argument of McKinnon (1988). Indeed, he comments on the 
applicability of a policy package for developing economies; lowering the cash reserve 
ratio potentially improves profitability in the banking sector, and this would allow 
1 For example, in the last decade, the financial liberalisation in Thailand led to a massive inflow of 
foreign capital and these funds fuelled exuberant and speculative spending and lending. This in turn 
aggravated the current account deficits and inflation to such an extent that the IMF-led rescue packages 
became inevitables. The crisis can be largely attributed to the undertaking of the financial decontrol 
when the financial system and institutions were not yet ready (Vajragupta and Vichyanond, 2000). 
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them to raise deposit rates, whilst containing loan rates. In this respect, the policy 
may be widely considered not only in India, but also in other developing economies. 
12.3 Limitations and PRIs 
A number ofIimitations in this study and a future research area are as follows. 
i) The AIDS prices: 
With respect to prices in the ADIS model, there are two points to be noted. The first 
point is inflation illusion. The estimation of the AIDS model was based on real 
prices, hence real interest rates. This implies that nominal expected returns and 
expected goods price inflation have an equal impact on long run asset shares (Barr 
and Cuthbertson, 1991 b). Then, the comparative study by using nominal interest rates 
may reveal whether agents suffer from inflation illusion2, as it is possible that the 
effect will be reflected in the magnitude of parameter estimates. The second point is 
the price of company securities. The major limitation in modelling the flow of funds 
is that, in order to derive the price of company securities in the AIDS model, we relied 
on the rate of growth in share prices (since dividend yields were not available over 
the sample period). Moreover, since share prices exhibited relatively volatile 
behaviour, it proved difficult to solve the complete model without creating 'excess 
volatility' for the price of company securities. 
ii) Dynamic model and real sector: 
Given an annual data, concentration is on the LR model in this thesis. Some of the 
estimated models suffer from serial correlation. If we assume that agents use an 
adjustment mechanism to attain an optimal portfolio, a logical extension would be to 
estimate a dynamic version of the models. Moreover, we have confined the 
estimation to the financial sector for India. It can be extended to endogenise variables 
in the real sector, then the main channels through which the financial sector affects 
the real economy can be identified. Further, this depicts the full cycle of the economy 
since this is equivalent to endogenising the Net Acquisition of Financial Assets 
(NAFAs): changes in real variables directly affect the NAFAs which then feed back 
2 It is hinted in the simulation of the rise in GDP in Chapter 10 (PDEP Endogenous Model) that the 
houshold secotr is responsive to the nominal deposit rates. 
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into the financial sector. There are however caveats in a dynamic and extended 
model: first, as indicated here, its estimation is dependent upon data constraints, and 
second, everything becomes dependent on everything and the system-wide model has 
a tendency to become too large. 
iii) Co-operative banks and credit societies: 
In this study the co-operative banks and credit societies are treated as exogenous due 
to the fact that their financial transactions are negligible as compared with other 
sectors. Yet, it is still essential to examine the portfolio behaviour of these financial 
institutions, as the main objective of these institutions is to ensure loans to the rural 
areas where commercial banks do not reach. A study of their portfolio behaviour by 
itself may be appropriate rather than including it in a system-wide simulation model, 
and this would be a potentially important contribution to the study of micro finance in 
India. 
iv) Non-linear AIDS: 
The AIDS share equation is transformed from non-linear to linear form, by assuming 
the quadratic price index to a Stone index of a form. It can be compared to the results 
derived from the true non-linear model. This is worthwhile, in particular, if there is a 
gain in using a more accurate AIDS model in terms of not only econometrics 
estimation but also of solving endogenous variables in simulation. 
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